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ABSTRACT
The thesis explores the role of internationalization in the socioeconomic development of 
three regions in the Czech Republic. For this purpose a theoretical framework for the 
analysis of regional change is developed which combines network theory as presented 
by New Economic Sociology, actor-network theory and the concepts of social capital, 
symbolic capital and symbolic power of Pierre Bourdieu. It is argued that a 
conceptualization o f economic action requires a simultaneous analysis of networked 
activities of individuals and their relations to the sources of recognition and symbolic 
poweç.
On this basis the thesis strives to elaborate on the ways in which these aspects of 
analysis may be incorporated into a culturally-informed regional research and research 
into the uneven abilities of regions to 'hold down' the process of internationalization. 
With this conceptual framework in mind, the thesis analyses the functioning of the 
centrally-planned economic system in Czechoslovakia, as well as explaining the 
outcomes of Czech privatization.
The empirical chapters subsequently present three case studies of Czech regions 
- namely Lanskroun, Mlada Boleslav, and Roznov - and seek to explain how and why, 
in each of them, the process of internationalization was 'held down' with different 
degrees of success.
In the summary of empirical findings the thesis argues that a 'successful' process 
of internationalization requires local actors to control and mediate the meaning of this 
process and to become empowered by i t . .
Pro Barusku
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INTRODUCTION
The focus and aims of the thesis
The year 1989 marked the end of what many people in Communist countries ironically 
called 'the greatest experiment of the twentieth century' After years of mutual isolation 
between the East and the West, formerly Communist countries began to open to and re­
integrate with the Western capitalist world. As a consequence, these countries 
experienced a radical transformation of their socioeconomies as they began to adapt and 
adjust to the economic rationality of Western capitalism. An important part of this 
transformation was the process of internationalization, which heightened uneven 
regional development within countries of the former Communist block. Both 
internationalization and high regional differentiation are well established processes 
across the countries of the capitalist West. Yet in Eastern Europe it was only the 
collapse of Communism at the end of 1980s that brought increasing levels of 
internationalization, as well as an exacerbation of regional unevenness to levels that had 
previously been unknown. The dynamics of internationalization and its uneven impact 
in the post-Communist societies have stimulated a large body of research which has 
sought to document and explain their outcome (see e.g. Hampl et a i, 1996; Grabber and 
Stark, 1997a; Smith, 1997; Pickles and Smith, 1998; Swain and Hardy, 1998). The 
thesis builds on this existing body of research and attempts to provide answers to some 
crucial questions associated with the processes of internationalization and regional 
change in the post-Communist context.
The issue addressed in this thesis is the role that internationalization has played 
in reinvigorating regional economies under post-Communist conditions. The specific 
focus is that of the Czech Republic which offers a good example of relatively quick re­
integration into the networks and flows of international capitalist economy. More 
significantly, the aim of the present research is to establish what kind of institutional and 
cultural forms can 'hold down' (Amin and Thrift, 1994b) the process of 
internationalization in ways that increase the adaptability and long term competitiveness 
of regions. In other words, the thesis attempts to .explain why the impact of
internationalization on the institutional forms of some regions is predominantly positive 
and strengthens locally-based development potential, while in others it leads to an 
increasing dependence on foreign firms and to a lack of autonomous innovative and 
adaptive capacity. In sum, the aim is to find out what kind of "institutional set-up" 
(Amin and Hausner, 1997, p. 14) allows some post-Communist regions to adapt to and 
to accommodate the process of internationalization in a way which enhances their 
ability to compete internationally, as well as maintaining their ability to adapt in the 
longer term.
The ability to accommodate successfully the process of internationalization is an 
issue of great importance, both for the regions of formerly Communist countries as well 
as for 'traditional' capitalist ones. There is, however, a fundamental reason why social 
scientists should be interested in the specific character of internationalization and its 
impact on the adaptability and competitiveness of the post-Communist regions. The 
regional economies of these countries have recently experienced a transition from the 
particular rationality of central planning to the radically different profit-making 
rationality of capitalism. The contrasting speed and the sharpness of the socioeconomic 
'rupture' that the post-Communist regions have experienced make an understanding and 
explanation of socioeconomic transformation that much easier to see and to grasp. As a 
consequence, the creation of locally-specific forms of market rationalities, the 
suppression of old regional institutional forms and their transformation into new ones, 
as well as the rapid increase in regional disparities, can almost be directly sensed and 
experienced in these societies.
The post-Communist regions of the 1990s thus represent some kind of 
socioeconomic 'laboratory' which provides a series of insights into processes that 
constitute markets or are responsible for regional growth and decline. These are 
processes which, in the countries of the West, usually operate over longer periods of 
time and tend to be less distinct and of a lesser contrast. The specific character of the 
post-Communist transformations thus makes these societies well placed to contribute in 
an important way to our understanding of the functioning o f market-based economies in 
the West. This research attempts to demonstrate the useful role that the post-Communist
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'laboratory' can play in offering new insights into the processes responsible for uneven 
regional development and for the diverse abilities of regions to adapt to 
internationalization.
The central claim of this thesis is that the capacity of regions to 'hold down' 
internationalization in ways that contribute to their adaptability and competitiveness 
depends on the ability of local actors to become empowered through the process of 
internationalization, to be in control of its meaning and to enrol others in the specific 
interpretation of such a process. It is argued here that such a differentiated capacity of 
regions can be explained by analyzing the different aspects of locally-specific forms of 
embeddedness. Following the work of Granovetter (1985/1992) and the New Economic 
Sociology (Swedberg and Granovatter, 1992), embeddedness is understood as a set of 
networked personal relationships among actors. However, this research claims that in 
order to get a full understanding of the diverse capacity of regions to accommodate 
internationalization, the concept of embeddedness needs to be expanded beyond such a 
networked understanding. It should also include the analysis of symbolic power 
relations (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990, 1991) which allow actors to transform collective 
practices and meanings. In order to explain the existing system of practices and power 
relations, the analysis of embeddedness needs to focus on the cultural processes of 
translation and enrolment through which actors rework the forms of embeddedness, 
stabilize meanings of practices and transform the understandings of others (Bourdieu, 
1977; Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991).
The rapid crystallisation of new sources of power and the dramatic redefinition 
of recognized practices and meanings over a fairly limited period of time are features 
unique to the post-Communist economies. As such the post-Communist societies 
provide a stimulating empirical opportunity for exploring the character of processes that 
produce the institutional set-ups capable of 'holding down' internationalization: This
I
thesis intends to exploit this opportunity in its effort to specify the circumstances under 
which internationalization transforms existing forms of embeddedness in ways which 
make regional economies capable of sustaining adaptability and competitiveness. In 
doing so, the thesis also attempts to enrich the existing concept of embeddedness as
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commonly used in the geographical and sociological literature by combining the 
analysis of networks (Granovetter, 1985/1992; Swedberg and Granovetter, 1992) with 
an analysis of cultural practices and power based on the theory of Pierre Bourdieu 
(1977, 1990,1993a, b) and actor-network theory (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991).
The issues of post-Communist transformation: ’legacies’, internationalization and 
uneven development
The exact contours of the new socioeconomic forms appearing in Eastern Europe are far 
from clear and are not yet stabilized. Nevertheless what seems to be clear is that the 
opening of the post-Communist societies to a Western capitalist world and a greater 
interconnectedness between the two formerly separated 'worlds' of the East and the West 
has led to their convergence. Despite this, however, there is also plentiful evidence that 
the development paths of the post-Communist economies and their gradual adaptation 
to Western capitalist rationality are very likely to result in specific forms of capitalism 
with unique institutional and cultural features (Stark, 1992, 1995; Hausner et a i, 1995; 
Stark and Bruszt, 1995, 1998; Grabber and Stark, 1997a; Pickles and Smith, 1998;
Swain and Hardy, 1998). The specific institutional and cultural forms of Eastern 
European capitalism reflect what has been called elsewhere the 'legacies' of 
Communism (Stark, 1992, 1995; Grabber and Stark, 1997a, b).
The argument of the thesis builds on the proposition put forward by Stark and 
others (1995, 1996; Stark and Grabber, 1997b; Stark and Bruszt, 1998) that these 
'legacies' interact with elements of Western capitalist economies in locally-specific ways 
to create new socioeconomic forms based on a 'recombination' of parts of Communist 
and capitalist economic systems. The results of such locally-specific transformations 
and recombinations are responsible for the diverse responses of regions to the new 
economic environment, as well as for the increasing spatial unevenness observed in all 
the post-Communist countries (Hampl et al., 1996; Smith, 1996, 1997; Grabber and 
Stark, 1997a; Smith and Pickles, 1998).
The character of the new socioeconomic forms created by this process of 
'recombination!, however, raises further questions. These are related to the compatibility
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of institutional and cultural forms of post-Communist economies with those of Western 
capitalism and to their ability to adapt to its criteria of profit-making rationality.
What, then, are the possible scenarios for the transformation of regions in post- 
Communist countries? Will these regions prove to be compatible with the globalized 
economy of the West, but only as a part of the 'new periphery' of Europe used as a 
location for low-cost and low-technology production? Or will they be able to learn from 
the examples of successful regions .in Western Europe and transform their institutional 
legacies in ways that will make them internationally competitive over the longer term on 
the basis of their ability to become innovative and 'learning regions' (Morgan, 1997)?
If the post-Communist countries and their regions indeed prove to be adaptable, 
what role will the legacy of the Communist economic system play in the process of 
adjusting to Western capitalism? Will such institutional legacies become a fundamental 
source of the innovativeness and international competitiveness of regions (Stark, 1992,
1996)? Or, more bleakly, will this specific heritage based on the rationality of central 
planning become an obstacle to capitalist rationality, to innovation and adaptability 
(Smith, 1995; Smith and Swain, 1998; Van Zon, 1998)? In that case, will the 
compatibility with the West require a replacement of such a heritage by the import and 
'cloning' of Western institutional forms with their likely negative long term 
consequences (Grabber, 1994, 1997; Gowan, 1995; Sadler and Swain, 1994)?
This thesis engages with these debates and intends to provide answers to such 
questions about the future adaptability and competitiveness of post-Communist regions. 
It argues that the answers to these questions are closely connected with the character of 
the specific institutional legacies of regions, that is, with their inherited forms of 
embeddedness. At the same time, however, such answers also depend on the character 
of the processes which transform the institutional and cultural heritages of regions. In 
the post-Communist societies, the transformation of locally-specific institutional 
legacies and the increase of regional unevenness has been triggered by three related 
processes that accompanied the collapse of Communism. The first of these is the 
process of marketization responsible for the liberalization of state-controlled prices 
which used to favour some enterprises and industrial sectors while disadvantaging
others. Second, the process of privatization was aimed at unleashing the forces of supply 
and demand by loosening the enterprises from their subordination to central planning. 
And third, the process of internationalization opened up the markets of post Communist 
countries to foreign competition and exposed local companies to a selection based on 
the rationality of Western capitalism.
Compared to the complexity of all these aspects of post-Communist 
transformations, the overall aim of this research is relatively modest. The thesis focuses 
on three regions in the Czech Republic and seeks to explain the uneven outcomes of 
their internationalization by analyzing the processes that transformed and reworked their 
inherited forms of embeddedness. It further explores and attempts to assess the impact 
of internationalization on the adaptability and competitiveness of the 'institutional set­
ups' (Amin and Hausner, 1997) of these regions. In this way, the research contributes to 
the discussion about the compatibility of the legacies of Communism with capitalist 
economies, as well as to the discussion about the wider issue of what kind of 
institutional arrangement can increase the positive effects of internationalization and 
enhance the competitiveness and adaptability of regions.
The key concepts and analytical framework of the thesis 
In order to fulfil the task set above and to explore the role of internationalization in 
transforming the legacies of Communism in the three Czech regions, the research 
develops concepts capable of analyzing such processes. These need to be able to specify 
and assess the impact of a fairly abstract process of internationalization in relation to the 
equally abstract concepts of locally-specific 'legacies' or 'institutional set-ups'. The three 
key concepts developed and explored in this thesis are internationalization, 
embeddedness and adaptability. These, together, lay the basis of the explanatory 
framework used for the analysis and assessment of the diverse consequences of 
internationalization for individual regions.
The concept of internationalization is used throughout the thesis to describe the 
process which brings 'the market' - that is, the competitive environment of Western 
capitalism - to post-Communist countries. It is a process that integrates parts of the
previously isolated Communist socioeconomy into the socioeconomic system of 
international or global capitalism. Although internationalization is a fairly common 
process in most parts of the world, it has a particular importance in the post-Communist 
countries. In these countries, internationalization represents a very powerful force of 
great symbolic value which sets an important example and is assumed to play a 
considerable role in shaping the future character of their market environment (Swain, 
1998; Swain and Hardy, 1998).
Internationalization exerts a systematic pressure on actors in post-Communist 
countries to adjust to an economic logic and rationality which dominates in capitalist 
societies. It pushes actors to accommodate new values, practices and meanings 
associated with Western ways of doing business, with the behaviour of Western 
companies, investors or trading partners. Compared to the rationality of centrally 
planned economies, the rationality of international - or more specifically Western 
capitalist - economies is based on greater accountability, financial discipline and a much 
greater stress on lower production costs and higher quality of products.
However, these common features cannot obscure the fact that the actual impact 
of internationalization varies from region to region. In fact, the central issue that runs 
throughout the thesis stresses precisely the great variety of regional outcomes produced 
by the process of internationalization. The concept used in this research to explain this 
diversity is that of embeddedness.
The concept of embeddedness is used to describe the dynamic, locally-specific 
cultural and institutional arrangements of individual regions. Moreover, embeddedness 
represents a dynamic arrangement or context of action which both shapes and is shaped 
by actions of actors in individual regions. This concept encompasses the locally-specific 
arrangements of networks (Granovetter, 1985/1992), as well as the practices, meanings 
and relations of symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1977; Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991) which 
allow actors to coordinate collective action.
It is argued in this thesis that the different ways in which actors accommodate 
international networks and practices are influenced by their existing forms of 
embeddedness. The role of internationalization in the uneven regional development is
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then analyzed by studying aspects of the embeddedness of actors which are transformed 
by this process. It is further argued that an understanding of cultural processes which 
transform embeddedness in this 'wider' understanding can, in turn, explain the diverse 
ways of accommodating internationalization in individual local contexts. Subsequently, 
the locally-specific forms of embeddedness and their transformations play a major role 
in explaining the capacity of regions to 'hold down' the process of internationalization. 
That is, they largely determine the ability of regional economies to use 
internationalization as a source of ability to adapt, learn and innovate, which are now 
understood to be the key aspects of the competitiveness in an increasingly globalized 
world.
The transformation of existing forms of embeddedness, however, is not 
presented in this research as a 'product' of a uniform and unidirectional force of 
internationalization. Instead, regional transformation is described as a process in which 
locally-specific forms of embeddedness interact with internationalization. Neither the 
concept of embeddedness, nor that of internationalization are pre-given. They are both 
an outcome of their dynamic mutual interaction which is interpreted by actors and 
mediated through their actions (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991). The mediated interaction 
and mutual shaping gives both internationalization and embeddedness their particular 
content and meaning which are specific to local contexts.
The variety of interactions between embeddedness and internationalization 
translate locally into a variety of institutional arrangements which can have both 
negative and positive consequences for the future of regions. In some cases, the actors 
are able to use the locally-specific forms of embeddedness in ways which turn the 
international networks and practices to the benefit of the region or locality. They turn 
internationalization into an element enriching an existing form of embeddedness which 
might increase the chances of the region to sustain competitiveness over a long term 
(see e.g. Pavlinek and Smith, 1998). In other regions, however, internationalization 
might transform the local institutional set-up and forms of embeddedness in a way that 
limits scope for innovative forms of action. In such cases internationalization often 
results in some sort of branch plant economy whose competitiveness is based almost
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entirely on cheap labour costs and whose longer term future is quite uncertain (see e.g. 
Grabber, 1994; Smith and Ferenôikovâ, 1998).
In order to grasp and assess such a variety of regional transformations, a third 
key concept of adaptability is introduced. Adaptability is a concept which is used to 
assess the character of the new, regional institutional set-ups arising from the interaction 
between internationalization and embeddedness. The concept of adaptability is used in 
this thesis to discern between the short term and long term effects of 
internationalization. It allows one to determine the following issue: whether the process 
of internationalization makes regions competitive in the short term but at the cost of 
their long term ability to adapt and compete, or whether such process increases the 
chances of long term regional competitiveness by improving regions' ability to sustain 
the process of adaptation and to  learn to adapt' (Grabber, 1993b, c, 1994, 1997; Sabel, 
1994; Amin and Hausner, 1997; Grabber and Stark, 1997a, b; Morgan, 1997; Amin, 
1998).
The research seeks to build up an analytical framework based on these three 
concepts of internationalization, embeddedness and adaptability. By means of these 
concepts it attempts to explain the success or failure of three Czech regions in gaining 
international competitiveness and in developing long term adaptability through the 
process of internationalization. In assessing the adaptability of the three regions the 
research shows how the local forms of embeddedness and the actions of local actors 
were able to 'hold down' and accommodate internationalization in a way that was or was 
not beneficial to the regional economy.
Furthermore, the examples of the three regions aim to substantiate the claim that 
the differentiated ability of regions to 'hold down' internationalization and develop it 
into a creative force can be explained and assessed by analyzing the interaction of 
internationalization with the various aspects of actors' embeddedness. The empirical 
research demonstrates how the analysis of such interactions can and should involve all 
the aspects of embeddedness. It should include both what I call the 'network heritage' of 
actors' personal relationships (Granovetter. 1985/1992), as well as the transformation of 
power relations which give legitimation and recognition to actors (Bourdieu, 1977,
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1990,1993a, b) in the new capitalist environment and which allow them to transform 
the collective practices and understandings of other actors (Latour, 1987). The empirical 
findings of the three regional case studies then serve as a grounding for more general 
claims. On this basis the thesis attempts to explain why internationalization in some 
regions transforms local institutional set-ups in ways which increase the reflexivity of 
actors and the long term adaptability of regions, while in others it reduces actors' scope 
for action and the ability of regions to adapt independently.
Structure of the thesis
The thesis consists of eight chapters. The first four chapters develop the theoretical 
framework of the argument through which the empirical material is to be examined. 
This is followed by a methodological chapter which introduces the empirical element 
developed in the subsequent three chapters.
The task of Chapter One is to develop the concept of embeddedness in relation 
to economic action. It makes a case for why this concept should be understood in a 
'wider' sense than just a 'networked' one (Granovetter, 1985/1992; Swedberg and 
Granovetter, 1992) and why it should also involve the conceptualization of power in 
social relations Such a 'wider' concept of embeddedness is subsequently developed by 
engaging with the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1990) and also with elements of 
actor-network theory (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991).
In Chapter Two the thesis moves on to the level of regions and the analysis of 
regionally-specific forms of embeddedness. Through a discussion of the geographical, 
economic and sociological literature, this chapter develops the analytical concepts of 
action framework (Storper, 1997; Storper and Salais, 1997) and institutional set-up 
(Amin and Hausner, 1997) enriched by the insights of Bourdieu's work and of actor- 
network theory. These concepts are further used in an attempt to create an institutional 
and culturally informed framework for assessing the differences in the adaptability of 
regions and for predicting their long term competitiveness.
Chapter Three shifts the focus to an historical introduction to the operation of 
Communist economies, with special attention paid to the former Czechoslovakia. It
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analyzes the functioning of centrally planned economies and the regionally-specific 
institutional legacies produced by this specific socioeconomic system. Following that. 
Chapter Four turns attention to the processes that followed the collapse of the 
Communist regime in former Czechoslovakia and which re-worked the regionally- 
specific legacies of Communism. It pays attention especially to the processes of 
privatization and internationalization which began to redefine the notions of 
competitiveness and adaptability in the post-Communist economic environment.
Chapter Five elaborates the methodological position of the research and 
specifies the relation between the theory and empirical work, which is then considered 
in the following three chapters. These chapters examine three regions in the Czech 
Republic which, since the collapse of Communism, have experienced a substantial 
degree of internationalization.
The regional case studies attempt to explain the different abilities of the 
institutional set-ups in each of the regions to adapt to the new, internationalized 
economic regime characterized by increasing competitiveness and a logic of profit 
making. Chapter Six analyzes the region of Lanskroun, which is dominated by the 
electronics industry and the Japanese-American-British multinational AVX. Chapter 
Seven examines the region of Mladâ Boleslav and the situation of the subcontractors of 
the car manufacturer Skoda after its takeover by the German company Volkswagen. 
Finally, Chapter Eight explores the consequences of internationalization in the Roznov 
pod Radhostem region which again is dominated by the electronics industry and more 
recently witnessed a major investment by American electronics giant Motorola. All the 
three regions were relatively successful in meeting the demands of internationalization 
which almost immediately increased their competitiveness. However, despite the 
success in adjusting their institutional legacies to Western capitalism, not all of the 
regions were equally successful in 'holding down' internationalization in ways that
i '
increased their adaptability and long term competitiveness. Nevertheless, the findings of 
Chapter Eight and particularly of Chapter Six show that at least in some cases 
internationalization can combine with local institutional legacies in ways that produce
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new, independent sources of competitiveness and enable the post-Communist regions to 
sustain their adaptability over the long term.
The conclusion pulls together the insights of the empirical findings and specifies 
the characteristics of the regionally-specific institutional set-ups that are capable of 
'holding down' internationalization. Drawing on the empirical findings, the conclusion 
specifies under what circumstances post-Communist regional economies can achieve 
competitiveness and adaptability in the globalized world economy. However, the 
lessons drawn from the empirical case studies do not represent an attempt to prescribe a 
universal strategy for other post-Communist regional economies. This research tries to 
pinpoint and explain why and how specific circumstances occurred in the three case 
study regions and with what consequences for their future without offering any 
universalist claims for 'solutions' or for a transferability of development strategies to 
other regions with different institutional legacies. At the same time, the thesis attempts 
to provide a new way of thinking about regional change that could be applied more 
generally and offer some lessons also for analyzing the economic success or failure of 
other regional settings.
CHAPTER ONE: CONCEPTUALIZING 
ECONOMIC ACTION: NETWORKS, 
EMBEDDEDNESS AND SYMBOLIC POWER
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades or so investigation into the theories on the border between 
economics and sociology experienced a revival of interest. Some economic theorists 
started to realize that economic action is not simply or exclusively directed by the 
motives of profit maximization and that people only rarely behave in the ways that 
neoclassical economics expects them to behave. Many traditional assumptions of 
'standard' economic theory have been seriously challenged and undermined by those 
working within a framework of heterodox, non-mainstream economic theory (see e.g. 
Hodgson, 1988, 1993; Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990; Samuels, 1995). Sociology, on the 
other hand, began to loose much of its respect for the monopoly that economics exerted 
on research into economic topics and started to 'trespass' more frequently into the 
domain of economists. Thanks to this trend there has been a substantial inflow of 
literature which is mûre aware of the fact that the separation of categories of social, 
economic, political and cultural and the subsequent compartmentalization of social 
science is far from automatic and useful (for good reviews see e.g. Swedberg, 1990; 
Smelser and Swedberg, 1994). As a result of these developments economic action is 
today again - as it was at the time of Max Weber - regarded by many social scientists as 
a particular type of social action and the 'social' is seen as an integral part of the 
'economic' (Swedberg and Granovetter, 1992; Ingham, 1996a).
These arguments have had a substantial influence on theorizing in the field of 
economic geography where also it has been appreciated that the "economy is not a 
universal entity, governed by an always-the-same formal logic, but a set of activities 
differently instituted in different times and spaces" (Crang, 1997, p. 10). One of the 
prominent arguments developing this position has been the debate over the notion of 
embeddedness of economic action in the wider structures of the society. This debate
originated in what has become known as the New Economic Sociology (NES) and it had 
(and still has) important implications for research in economic geography (see e.g. Amin 
and Thrift, 1997).
The main aim of this chapter is to build on the recent debates in economic 
sociology and to construct a theoretical base suitable for the analysis of regional 
economies and regional change which takes into account this socially embedded nature 
of economic activity. However, before we turn our attention in the next chapter to the 
issue of regional change and adaptability of regional economies, it is important to 
specify the exact meaning of the notion of embeddedness as it is employed throughout 
this research. This chapter therefore explores the concept of embeddedness and explains 
its role in explaining the character of economic action.
This chapter comes in two substantial parts, each with four separate sections.
The first section of the chapter traces back the origins of the concepts of embeddedness 
and network in social sciences. The following two sections describe two distinct 
traditions of understanding embeddedness, here referred to as 'the governance approach' 
(Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994) and 'the analytical approach' advocated by Mark 
Granovetter (1985/1992, 1993) and the New Economic Sociology (Swedberg and 
Granovetter, 1992). These two sections try to unpack' and clarify the meanings of the 
key concepts of the debate about embeddedness which have often been a source of 
much confusion and they attempt to specify the weaknesses in each of these approaches. 
This is followed by a section which gives an overall assessment and criticism 
concerning the limitations of the networked concept of embeddedness.
In the second part, a 'wider1, alternative notion of embeddedness is developed 
that goes beyond its networked understanding by NES. It begins with a section which 
argues that the concept of embeddedness can be fruitfully expanded by integrating parts 
of the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1990,1993b) into a theoretical framework that 
involves a more appropriate conceptualization of power. The next two sections discuss 
Bourdieu's concept of social capital and its power aspects, as well as explain Bourdieu's 
concept of symbolic capital and symbolic power. The final section pulls together an 
alternative analytical framework of 'wider' embeddedness suitable for the analysis of
economic action. This framework consists of the NES, Bourdieu's theory and also 
elements of actor-network theory. The conclusion then discusses the relationship 
between the 'wider* understanding of embeddedness and the issue of adaptability of 
actors in the socioeconomy. In this way,, the conclusion sets the scene for a discussion of 
the issue of the adaptability and competitiveness of regions and localities which is 
presented in the following chapter.
EMBEDDEDNESS, NETWORKS AND ECONOMIC ACTION: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT
The origin and meanings of embeddedness
The history of NES, as well as the resurgence of the notion of embeddedness, is closely 
connected with the discontent among sociologists about the way economic phenomena 
have been treated by economists and by some sociologists. The seminal article of Mark 
Granovetter (1985/1992) set the scene by arguing that there is a need for a 'middle 
ground' between the undersocialized conception of complete methodological 
individualism and the oversocialized conception of structuralism. The former, according 
to Granovetter, is exemplified by neoclassical economics which sees "actors as atoms 
outside a social context" (1985/1992, p. 58). While the latter is represented by 
substantivist anthropology, but also by some contemporary sociologists and economists, 
who see actors as if they adhered "slavishly to a script written for them by the particular 
intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy" (1985/1992, p. 58). 
Granovetter concludes that both these approaches share what he calls "atomized 
conceptions" of individuals. He argues that actors' "attempts at purposive action are 
instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations." (p. 58), or, in other 
words, that their actions and characteristics are derived from relational ties with other 
actors. Embeddedness thus returns to the vocabulary of social science.
Granovetter borrowed the term embeddedness from Karl Polanyi's substantivist 
anthropology (1944/1957) which is perhaps surprising as he is critical of its
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oversocialized understanding (Granovetter, 1993). This subsequently caused some 
confusion among Granovetter's followers about the precise meaning of embeddedness. 
Unlike Polanyi, who stressed that profit making and its economic rationality are not 
necessary attributes of human societies and were only imposed on humans with the 
advent of capitalism and its disembedding effects (1944/1957, Chapter 4), Granovetter 
docs not reject the existence of rationality in economic actions altogether (1985/1992, p. 
75). He argues that rationality is conditional on the way the action is embedded or 
socially situated in wider social relations and that "economic actions are embedded in 
different ways" (Swedberg and Granovetter, 1992, p. 10). What is common to all 
economic actions, however, is the fact that they are "embedded in ongoing networks of 
personal relationships rather than being carried out by atomized actors" (Swedberg and 
Granovetter, 1992, p. 9; emphasis added).
The use of a networked concept o f embeddedness allows Granovetter to avoid 
the trap of structuralist atomization because the actual form of embeddedness is then 
specific to individual actors. It also has other advantages. Networks which provide the 
concrete interactions of individuals and groups are sufficiently concrete to be observed 
empirically (Swedberg and Granovetter, 1992, p. 9-10). By looking at how networks 
were established and developed over time Granovetter's approach can prevent the 
abstraction of social analysis from history and can also provide the grounds for 
analyzing the position of actors in the wider structure of networks (1985/1992, p. 57). 
All of this allows for a far less rigid interpretation of economic action than either the 
under- or over-socialized approaches.
By transforming the notion of embeddedness into sets of networks and by 
making them central to his analysis of economic action, Granovetter obtained the 
"middle road" (1993, p. 38) between determinism of social structures and determinism 
of stable individual preferences. Networks became the explanatory apparatus that 
provided the grounds for nonfunctional and non atomized explanation of 
socioeconomic action. This project subsequently attracted substantial attention among 
other social scientists and produced a number of reactions. Some of them, which are 
relevant to this argument, are briefly summarized in the next two sections under the
broad headings o f  Networks as a form o f  governance' and Networks as an analytical 
tool'.1
Networks as a form of governance
The study of networks has a long history in social sciences, especially in organization 
studies. However, with the interest in the concept of embeddedness this stream of 
research gained a new impetus and a large number of publications, by sociologists, 
economists and geographers alike, have appeared in this area since the mid-1980s (for a 
summary and review see Thompson et al., 1991 or Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994).
Their common feature is - similar to Granovetter's concepts of embeddedness and 
networks - the rejection of neoclassical assumptions and a focus on networks as the 
means by which resources are mobilized and action is carried out. Networks are seen as 
"a social glue that binds individuals together into a coherent system" (Powell and Smith- 
Doerr, 1994, p. 369). They represent "a kind of organizing logic, a way of governing
relations among economic actors" (p. 368).
This stream of research has a strong empiricist inclination and has been very 
productive in illustrating the important changes in the economy of the 1980s with its - 
sometimes overgeneralized - shift from hierarchical organization of firms to the more 
flexible organizational structures in which networks are central. Much of the research 
within this line of research has focused on the issues of new flexible and networked 
arrangem ents of relations between firms (Powell, 1991; Thompson et al., 1991), in 
particular, on subcontracting and collaborative ventures (Lorenz, 1988), often with links 
to the concept of industrial districts in the flexible specialization debate (see e.g. Powell
and Smith-Doerr, 1994; Sayer, 1997).
Following the line set by Granovetter (1985), this approach argues that much of 
the dichotomy between 'market' and 'hierarchy' can be overcome by the use of the 
concept of network. Networks not only break this dichotomy but, according to the 
governance approach, also represent the source of embeddedness. Similar to
lThis classification o f two broad types o f research is adopted from Powell and Smith-Doerr (1994). 
Although in their case these terms are used more narrowly for classification o f the research o f the 
'networks literature', I think it can be easily extended to include the literature on embeddedness too.
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Granovetter, interactions among economic actors are seen to take on a networked form, 
but unlike in the case of Granovetter and Polanyi, networks and embeddedness are 
regarded by a governance approach as positive features in their own right (Powell, 1991; 
Thompson et al., 1991; Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994; Uzzi, 1996).
The main difference between the governance approach and Granovetter's theory 
is that the former associates networks and embeddedness with trust and reciprocity.
Trust is taken for a feature that distinguishes networks from other types of social 
interactions (see esp. Powell, 1991) and it is common among authors who represent the 
governance approach to see trust-based networks as a crucial element that actually 
makes the relationships 'embedded'. Networks, unlike either markets or hierarchies, are 
then supposed to 'embed' individuals' behaviour in a way that "shifts actors' motivations 
away from the narrow pursuit of immediate economic gains towards the enrichment of 
relationships through trust and reciprocity" (Uzzi, 1996, p. 677).
In this type of literature it is often presumed that 'embedded' relations enable and 
smooth action, enhance exchange of 'thicker information', know-how and tacit 
knowledge; that 'embeddedness' can increase the capacity to learn, creates 
interdependencies which involve sunk costs, allows for joint problem-solving and also 
increases innovativeness (see e.g. Uzzi, 1996; Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994), In other 
words, in this strongly normative understanding, 'embeddedness' is defined by the 
existence of trust-based networks which are associated with superior economic 
performance of firms and economic actors.
'J Understandably, much attention is devoted to the empirical analysis and 
subsequent categorization and classification of the qualities of networked social 
relations among actors or firms. Authors who have been developing arguments along 
these lines often use typologies developed and try to assess the degree of'embeddedness' 
and 'disembeddedness', or the degree of trust involved in transactions and interactions. 
Examples of this are Ray (1995) using Qkun's distinction between auction and customer 
markets (Okun, 1981), Helper (1993) using concepts of'voice' and 'exit' developed by 
Hirschman (1970) for analysis of the differentiated quality of subcontracting relations,
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or Sako (1992) distinguishing between arm's-length contractual relations and 
obligational contractual relations in subcontracting.
However, putting emphasis on selected characteristics leads to several 
shortcomings in the governance approach. The major one is its dichotomic perspective 
which is probably best reflected in the distinction between 'embedded' and 
'disembedded' relations. It might well be true that the modem capitalist economy and the 
associated "divisions of labour, markets, money and capital are [...] disembedding 
forces" (Sayer, 1997, p. 19). However, as both Polanyi (1944/1957) and Granovetter 
(1985/1992) were aware, this does not mean that economic action could be completely 
disembedded from social relations since the disembedding from one set of relations 
implies embeddedness in another one (Polanyi, 1944/1957). This dichotomy then does 
not seem to represent an accurate understanding of embeddedness in its original sense, 
nor does it account for the complex reality that cannot be reduced to a set of dualisms.
Another shortcoming is the underlying assumption that networks are in principle 
'good', 'democratic' or more 'efficient' as some of this literature would lead us to believe. 
Clearly, there are also some networks which are not based on trust, yet they still 
represent a form of embeddedness of economic action (see Granovetter, 1985/1992, p. 
61-2 or 1993). Embeddedness and networks in which actors are embedded thus do not 
always have to be 'good', 'efficient' or economically advantageous (Sayer, 1995).
Despite a strong tendency towards the construction of ideal types and often 
somewhat prescriptive nature of the 'networks as governance' approach (Powell and 
Smith-Doerr, 1994), the typologies provided by these studies are probably also their 
greatest strength. The récognition that trust in social relations can enhance overall 
productivity and efficiency (Helper, 1993; Sako, 1992; Uzzi, 1996), which is a point of 
convergence of most studies in this approach, has made trust a central issue of much of 
network analysis.
Nonetheless, this literature moves very little beyond the elementary recognition 
of the importance of trust for economic performance. It is certainly true that "different 
types of exchange can be defined according to the level of trust present" (Misztal, 1996, 
p. 16), but trust is not a characteristic specific to individual interactions and networked
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relations among actors only. Trust exists also in a more general form, independently of 
networks, as a part of a collective organization of social life (Misztal, 1996; Sayer,
1997). The failure to recognize this fact leads to a more general shortcoming of the 
governance approach: despite some statements to the contrary (Powell and Smith-Doerr, 
1994), it simply does not deal with either the issue of wider social structures, nor that of 
power, in any systematic way (Ingham, 1996a).2 Instead, it reduces the notion of 
embeddedness to a mere presence or absence of trust in the networks which are 
presented as isolated binary relations between pairs or small numbers of actors. In other 
words, the attention paid to the qualities of networks is often not supported by an 
equally rigorous analysis of the relation between the networks themselves and the wider 
system of social relations and power in society.
Moreover, this approach usually focuses just on a particular type of network, 
especially the networks of production and exchange, or more narrowly just on the inter- 
firm networks. Such an understanding, then, is a misinterpretation of the concept of 
embeddedness as presented by Polanyi (1944/1957) and later adapted by Granovetter 
(1985/1992), who were both aware of the need for a "detailed analysis of social 
structure and of the complex way social and economic motives and actions are 
intertwined" (Granovetter, 1993, p. 38; 1991). Moreover, this approach also misses the 
opportunity for intermixing and blurring the boundaries between the 'cultural' and 
'economic' (Crang, 1997) which is provided by the concept of embeddedness.
The following section returns to the work of Mark Granovetter. It explains how 
the literature described here as 'the analytical approach' associated especially with the 
New Economic Sociology developed the concepts of networks and embeddedness in a 
way that treats successfully some of the problems of the governance approach.
Networks as an analytical tool: contribution of New Economic Sociology
The difference between the 'analytical approach' and the one that sees networks a s  a  
form of governance is not so much in the ways they conceive of networks themselves.
2Compare this also to the peculiar absence o f the analysis o f power relations in most o f the related stream 
of literature on industrial districts.
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Their differences are in the roles which they ascribe to networks and in the ways they 
understand the relation between networks and embeddedness. Unlike the 'governance 
approach' which sees trust-based networks as the characteristic which 'embeds' actors 
and enables them to use networks as the media for mobilizing resources, the analytical 
approach sees networks also as (micro) structures of the social world. Networks, 
according to the analytical approach, do not only enable action, but they also restrict the 
scope for potential actions and predispose the behaviour of actors. In other words, 
economic action is still regarded as embedded in networks of social relations, yet it is 
also understood as "structurally embedded in a wider network of [...] relations 
(Granovetter, 1993, p. 20). ThusThis conception of embeddedness is much wider in so 
far as it takes into account the impact of the wider social context of the operation of 
networks and does not restrict this context solely to the position of actors in their
personal relations with others (Granovetter, 1990).
The analytical approach is much more closely associated with the work of Mark
Granovetter (1985/1992, 1990, 1991; Swedberg and Granovetter 1992) and some other 
members of NES such as Burt (1993) or Portes (1995); Also some authors who are not 
directly associated with NES would, in my opinion, fit into this group because of their 
similar methodological approach (e.g. Grabber, 1993a, 1993b, and some of the 
contributors in Grabber's collection, namely HÉkansson and Johanson, 1993).
While the 'governance approach' contents itself with a focus on networks as 
relationships among actors and on the quality and characteristics of these networks, the 
analytical approach goes beyond this position. It neglects neither the qualities and 
content of networks, nor the important role of trust in mobilizing networks (Granovetter, 
1985/1992). Yet, in addition, it also appreciates that even the trust-based networks 
create micro-structures which can restrict action in both positive and negative ways
(Lyon, 1997).
3Here I am slightly adapting the original classification developed by Powell and Smith-Doerr (1994) 
provide a substantial review o f this literature, but fail to appreciate the major methodological differences 
between the two approaches. Instead, they argue for the "points o f convergence and common, themes (p. 
370) between the analytical and governance approaches.
Subsequently, the analytical approach acknowledges that trust-based networks 
can lead to a 'lock-in' of the present structure of networks which can become obsolete in 
time (Grabber, 1993b, 1993c), or they can reproduce the present network structure 
despite its obvious inefficiencies (David, 1985,1993; Arthur, 19894). All these studies 
are good examples of the ways that networks enable, but also restrict potential economic 
action. At the same time, they also represent examples of how the analytical approach 
accounts for the importance of history in network analysis, and for the fact that the 
existing network structure created in the past is predisposing actors to certain actions 
and behaviours. Seen from this perspective, networks represent not just the relations and 
interactions but also the dynamic and changing structures of society created by previous 
network activities (Granovetter, 1991; Swedberg and Granovetter, 1992; Portes, 1995; 
Ingham, 1996a).
Equally important is the attention paid by the analytical approach to the process 
of network construction through interactions among individuals. This allows the 
analytical approach to preserve the concern with the ways the structure of networks 
changes as well as to include dynamism in its explanation. The process of change of the 
network structure, the role of contingency in historical development of individual 
networks and the path-dependent nature of change are thus all well incorporated into the 
explanatory framework (Swedberg and Granovetter, 1992). The understanding of 
networks and embeddedness presented by the analytical approach thus seems quite 
successful in creating a framework which is able to grasp the structural constraints 
influencing economic action (i.e. the concept of networks as social micro-structures) 
while avoiding the dangers of oversocialized concepts of social structure feared by 
Granovetter (1985/1992) (e.g. big implies powerful, small implies powerless etc.). 
Furthermore, it also gives the notion of embeddedness both a dynamic and a historical . 
dimension.
To give a couple of examples of how the micro-structures created by networks 
allow for both a dynamic and an historical, non-structural explanation, we can think
4These authors are not themselves members o f the NES but they are often used as an important point o f 
reference by many 'new economic sociologists', including Swedberg and Granovetter (1992).
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about the way network structure affects the power positions of two firms subcontracting 
to each other. Take a small firm, for example, that has been supplying a big firm for 
years. As a consequence of its position this firm has temporarily, at least until the big 
firm finds a suitable substitute, the power to put pressure on the big firm which is 
locked into a particular network. Or, in another case, because one firm is a monopoly 
producer and a major customer of another firm the former has, thanks to its structural 
position in the networks, the potential to exercise much more pressure through the threat 
of withdrawal than its less dominant supplier.
Although the concern with power in the analytical approach to networks and 
embeddedness is rarely made explicit, the two examples show quite clearly that it still 
tells us quite a lot about the capacity for power and influence among actors.5 This is 
because embeddedness (or 'social capital' in the case of Burt, 1993) described by the 
analytical approach takes into account not only the qualitative characteristics of 
networks, but also the position of an actor in their structure. Some authors within this 
group also acknowledge the power aspects of actors' reputation and status acquired 
through their previous activities (Granovetter, 1990, 1993; Burt, 1993; Portes, 1995). In 
such a way the analytical approach recognizes that concrete forms of embeddedness 
create different opportunities for actors (Burt, 1993; Portes, 1995), that the inclusion or 
exclusion from particular networks creates a form of power relationship which either 
empowers or disempowers actors and that networks can be used as a "tool for analysing 
power and autonomy" (Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994, p. 369). The attention which the 
line of argument represented by Mark Granovetter and the NES pays to the role of social 
structures and constraints created by network activity brings at least an implicit 
recognition of the importance of power in the analysis of economic action.
Assessment of networked concept of embeddedness
5 Although most authors only touch on this issue, the implicit importance o f power is present in much of 
this line o f argument. Uranovetter (1985/1992) stresses that "power relations cannot be neglected" (p. 71) 
and several times mentions the importance o f status in economic relations (1993); Burt (1993) who talks 
about social capital rather than embeddedness in networks, acknowledges the relation between social 
capital, prestige and power; or Grabber (1993b, p. 11-12) who also mentions the important role o f power 
in network interactions.
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The networked concept of embeddedness as developed mostly by NES arid labelled here 
the analytical approach seems to provide very useful tools for the analysis of social and 
economic action. Its stress: first, on the empirical analysis of networks; second, on the 
centrality of networks based on trust which are seen as means of mobilizing resources as 
well as the source of reputation; and third, on power included in the structure of the 
network, together represent a feasible analytical framework. This approach, however, 
has its limitations and shortcomings.
Firstly, although power is included in this framework, its discussion is quite 
limited. It largely fails to appreciate that the concept of power and its role in shaping 
actions of actors cannot be reduced to the micro-structures of networks. This has been 
rightly criticized by Ingham as stretching "the core of N.E.S. approach too far [which] 
exposes the shortcomings of confining the idea of social structure to ’social relations'” 
(1996a, p. 557). The network analysis of the NES can therefore be criticized for 
neglecting the power aspects of the 'macro' level social processes (Ingham, 1996b). A 
similar point is made by Beckert (1996, p. 829) who argues that when talking about the 
social embeddedness of economic actors sociologists should also appreciate the 
embedding roles of habits, institutions, structures and power. The 'analytical approach' 
clearly does this only partly, if at all. There is some tentative treatment of social 
institutions by Swedberg and Granovetter (1992, p. 17) which are described as "the 
result of slow, social creation [through which] a way of doing something 'hardens' and 
'thickens' and finally becomes the way things are done." Despite this important insight 
the members of the NES neither specify the processes by which institutions are 
institutionalized, nor do they tell us anything about how institutions reproduce 
themselves.
Secondly and relatedly, the analytical approach fails to address some important 
aspects of social action: the "emergent properties" of the society (Ingham, 1996a, p. 
557). Notions of trust and power (the latter is dealt with unsystematically anyway) are 
discussed only at the level of interacting individuals, in relation to their networking 
activities. This understanding of power derived from trust-based networks and the 
position of actors in the structure of such networks is certainly a valid one and
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represents what has been called a networked concept of power of association or alliance 
(Allen, 1997, p. 62). What is missing here, however, is the recognition that trust and 
power exist also at a more general level of the society which is not directly influenced 
by interactions of isolated individuals (Misztal, 1996; Allen, 1997). There is no or very 
little appreciation of other types of power than the 'networked power', such as the power 
of generalized trust and morality embodied in the social norms, routines and practices 
that guide much of economic behaviour (Hodgson, 1988; Misztal, 1996). The analysis 
of the kind of power which "'fixes' a collective orientation through a complex process of 
constructed meanings" (Allen, 1997, p. 67) is largely absent from the research of NES. 
By missing these important aspects of social 'macro-structure', this interpretation of 
embeddedness fails to appreciate how "embeddedness [is] bound with cultural 
practices" (Crang, 1997, p. 12) and how economic action is related to and conditioned by 
the power of controlled routinization of practice (Bourdieu, 1977, 1993; Ingham, 1996a; 
Allen, 1997; Crang, 1997).
In order to clarify the critical points related to the concepts of networks and 
embeddedness as developed by the NES, and also to specify the role of power in 
routinizing and reproducing economic action, I will now elaborate on the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu. It will be shown that pulling together the insights of Bourdieu's approach and 
that of the NES, it might be possible to remedy some of the shortcomings of the concept 
of embeddedness outlined above. In doing so a 'wider' concept of embeddedness is 
argued for which can arguably bridge the persisting dualisms between 'the economic' 
and 'the social' (Ingham, 1996a) and integrate 'the economic' with 'the cultural' (Crang, 
1997) in the socioeconomic analysis.
ACTION AND POWER IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF PIERRE BOURDIEU
I
Practice, power and action
At first sight it might se e m  that Pierre Bourdieu has little in common with the NES of 
Mark Granovetter, chiefly because their terminology differs quite substantially. I want to
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argue, however, that despite their different understanding of power and action there are 
some partial but important overlaps in both of these theoretical approaches. Bourdieu, 
similarly to Granovetter, tries to find a middle ground between the 'oversocialized' and 
'undersocialized' conceptions of human behaviour. Although Bourdieu is little 
concerned with economic action (he would probably not even recognize it as any 
different from social action), he finds equally disturbing the gap between the analysis of 
formalism and hermeneutics (i.e. an equivalent of undersocialized methodology) and the 
explanation of structuralism and interactionism (i.e. oversocialized methodology) 
(Bourdieu, 1977; Robbins, 1991; Johnson, 1993). Both Bourdieu and Granovetter agree 
with Polanyi (1944/1957) that economic action is embedded in wider social relations 
(e.g. Bourdieu, 1977, p. 185), but they diverge in the ways that they analyze this fact.
First of all, Bourdieu uses other words to talk about the social embeddedness of 
economic action. This is partly because his theory has a far wider ambition to analyze 
'social formations' rather than analyzing the relatively narrow notion of economic action. 
Partly this can also be attributed to the language difference when all of Bourdieu’s major 
works were written in French which lacks the tradition of meaning associated with the 
English term embeddedness. This, however, does not make Bourdieu's theory any less 
relevant to the analysis of specific 'kinds' of actions and the analysis of their 
embeddedness in the wider social relations of the society.
Secondly, Bourdieu's theory is probably not very useful for analyzing the 
appearance of new phenomena within society (innovations, changes of practices etc.) 
(Pels, 1997) in which the network theory has achieved some success. This is not 
Bourdieu's aim, as he is mainly concerned about how the ways of doing things persist 
within the society and how they reproduce themselves. The major advantage of his 
approach is its ability to integrate the analysis of individual actors' actions with concerns 
about the wider and more general, collective aspects of the society (or 'social formations' 
to stick with Bourdieu's terminology). This is precisely the feature missing in much of
the research on networks and embeddedness.
For Bourdieu the key concepts are 'fields' each of which is associated with its
specific 'capital' (cultural, social, political, educational etc.):
/E ach  o f  the fields is relatively autonomous [but] its structure, at any given moment, is determined by the 
relations between the positions agents occupy in the field. A field is a dynamic concept in that a change in 
agents' positions necessarily entails a change in the field's structure." (Johnson, T993, p. 6).
The actors compete for control and resources which are specific to each of the 
fields in question. Such competition or struggle over positions in fields, however, does 
not happen in an entirely arbitrary way because the activity of individuals is immersed 
in the continually reproduced system of practices (Johnson, 1993; Crang, 1997).
Practice is a form of représentation of social structures projected into a mode of 
behaviour which individuals reproduce through their actions (Bourdieu, 1977; 
Thompson, 1991; Johnson, 1993). Practices "tend to reproduce the regularities 
immanent in the objective conditions" (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78) of the society but they 
cannot be deduced directly from the social structures. They are not deterministic to the 
extent that they can be 'read off from social structures, yet they reflect the social 
structures to some extent (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78). According to Bourdieu, different 
practices characterize different fields and the system of practices produces a form of 
rationality specific to each field which largely predisposes the behaviour and actions of 
individuals (Bourdieu, 1977; Johnson, 1993; Crang, 1997)/
Practices in Bourdieu's theory thus share a common feature with networks of the 
NES. They are both ways of doing things, ways of enabling action and they 
simultaneously represent a major restriction of actors' behaviour. The notion of practice, 
however, unlike that of networks, has a stronger and more restrictive meaning. It implies 
unreflective action (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78-9; Johnson, 1993) on the part of individual 
actors who are already predisposed "to act in certain ways, pursue certain goals, avow 
certain tastes" (Thompson, 1991, p. 17). Practice implies doing things in an automatic 
way without reflecting on how things are done and without considering alternatives.
This allows Bourdieu to make the discussion of power and domination in social 
relations an integral part of his theory. The notion of practice and the process of
6Here my brief description of'practice* is necessarily oversimplified . Practice can not be properly 
understood and explained without reference to the notion of'habitus' used by Bourdieu to describe the 
relation between and translation o f social structures into practices in specific social contexts. For the sake 
o f simplicity and clarity o f my argument, however, I have decided to omit the discussion of the concept of 
habitus. Not just because I find it difficult to relate to the analysis o f economic action and largely 
redundant to my argument, but partly also because I personally find it often somewhat confusing and 
' inconsistent (see esp. Bourdieu, 1977, chapter 2).
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routinization and reproduction associated with it, allow Bourdieu to go beyond the 
simple notion of a networked conception of power (see esp. Bourdieu, 1977, Chapter 4). 
They allow him to extend his analysis to more durable forms of power, to symbolic 
aspects of organization of society, to forms of domination and authority (Allen, 1997) 
that both mould and are moulded by human action.
Social capital of connections and networks
Bourdieu, in accord with the authors associated with the NES, acknowledges a 
networked form of power: the power associated with a particular position within the 
structure of networks given by previous experience and history of social relations 
(Granovetter, 1985/1992). For Bourdieu this type of power is derived from the social 
capital which is described as "what ordinary language calls ’connections'" (1993b, p.
32). For Bourdieu, again similar to the work of the NES, social capital represents also 
the position of an actor in the web of connections or social relations determined by the 
extent of connections. Social capital and the power derived from it thus depends on the 
size of'clientele', that is, a network of individuals tied by obligations to the particular 
actor. These individuals, their skills and capabilities represent the social capital which 
can be mobilized for support of one's claims and actions. The social capital of actors is 
thus closely related to the reputation, prestige, honour and trustworthiness which they 
have accumulated over the past since all these features tend to increase with the size of a 
clientele (Bourdieu, 1977, Chapter 4). In order to be of use, the networks which 
represent social capital need to be maintained by regular interaction, that is, these 
"social relations [...] must be kept up through nothing less than a process of continuous 
creation" (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 189). The social capital is therefore not readily 
transferable from one individual to another.
Social capital has a specific position in Bourdieu's theory. Unlike other capitals 
this one does not have its own 'field' in which it could be used and accumulated. It acts 
instead as a medium linking together different fields and capitals and enables a
transmutation of one type of capital into another (e.g. cultural capital into economic, 
educational into economic and vice versa etc.) (Bourdieu, 1993b, p. 32-3).7
Bourdieu in contrast to the NES does not elaborate on how the networks of 
social capital are constructed by individual actors and simply accepts their existence and 
reproduction in time (Bourdieu, 1977). Instead, he pays attention to the ways in which 
the connections or networks of social capital empower individuals. The social capital of 
connections, reputation and prestige is an important asset in its own right as it represents 
an important means of empowering actors and a means of appropriating different types 
of capital (economic, cultural or any other). It represents nevertheless only one aspect of 
the process by which individuals can be empowered. Moreover, according to Bourdieu, 
reducing the power relations in the society to relations of communication (i.e. network 
activity) would be a form of an "interactionist error" (1991, p. 167).
For Bourdieu networked interactions cannot be divorced from the symbolic 
aspects of social life (Johnson, 1993) because social capital may transform itself into 
symbolic capital; that is, the form of power which is associated with "cognition 
[connaissance] and recognition [reconnaisance]" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 22; original 
emphasis) at the wider societal level. In contrast to Granovetter and the NES, Bourdieu 
is very explicit in his argument that socioeconomic action is influenced by a form of 
power which is not directly associated with networks or with the positions of actors in 
them. Power, he says, can only be exercised if it is recognized (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 170). 
The potential for power that is present in the networked social capital of actors can only 
be effective when it transforms into recognition by other actors. In this way, social 
capital is inseparably connected with what Bourdieu describes by the concepts of 
symbolic capital and symbolic power.
Symbolic capital and symbolic power
7lt should be mentioned here that I am not entirely convinced by Bourdieu's understanding of fields as 
separate areas o f social action. It is certainly correct that there are separate fields or spheres of social life 
where action is guided by different forms o f rationality and system o f practices, but I believe that these 
often miic and intermingle with each other in everyday life thus malting the notion of field somewhat 
artificial.
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symbolic power according to Bourdieu is an "aspect of most forms of power as they art 
routinely deployed in social life" (Thompson, 1991, p. 23). It is a form of power which 
is part of everyday life and action of all actors, but individuals differ in the degree to 
which their everyday actions are perceived and accepted by the rest of the society. In 
other words, their symbolic capital is different.
The symbolic capital represents a source of recognition, legitimation and 
authority of actors which is derived from their accumulated prestige and honour, that is, 
from aspects of their networked social capital (Bourdieu, 1990; Thompson, 1991). The 
possession of symbolic capital gives actors the recognition and acknowledgement of 
legitimation which is granted by the collectivity of other individuals. Those who control 
symbolic capital have, in turn, the power to present their actions as correct and 
appropriate. Bourdieu calls this form of power symbolic power and although he is not 
very explicit about how actors achieve it, he elaborates on its effects and on its role in 
the reproduction and routinization of action.
Symbolic capital, according to Bourdieu, empowers actors to a position from 
which they can impose on other minds a vision and provides them with a power of 
constituting the reality by "making people see and believe" in particular ways (Bourdieu, 
1991, p. 170). It represents the power to constitute a group and to speak on its behalf, as 
well as the power of conserving or transforming present classification (Bourdieu, 1990). 
Symbolic power is thus also a "power mediated by the words that are used to designate 
or to describe individuals, groups or institutions" (1990, p. 137) and represents a force 
that makes the world seem self-evident, undisputed and taken for granted (Bourdieu, 
1977, 1990). More to the point, symbolic power is a power that makes others reproduce 
actions and practices in a routine or habitual way, yet often keeping this fact "invisible" 
and "misrecognized" as such (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 270). Bourdieu asserts on several 
occasions, that symbolic power can only be exercised to this effect as long as it is 
recognized as legitimate and taken for granted (Bourdieu, 1977, 1991)8.
8In this point I do not entirely agree with Bourdieu's argument about taken-for-grantedness and 
unreflective reproduction o f  symbolic power by actors, there seem to be many cases where actors may be 
critical o f  a particular form o f  symbolic power and system o f  practices associated with it but still take part 
in their reproduction. A good example o f  this is the operation o f  Communist regime which will be 
analyzed in Chapter Three. . *
The exercise of symbolic power often results in an unreflective reproduction of 
practices by individuals exercised even by those who are subject to the symbolic order 
connected with this particular form of symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 138). The 
symbolic power is thus also "a major dimension of political power" (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 
165). This power, by virtue of its recognition and legitimation, predisposes behaviour of 
individuals in ways they are unaware of, by the production and reproduction of certain 
beliefs and ways of doing things. Moreover, the imposition of a particular symbolic 
order usually serves the dominant social group, the already powerful, the ones who 
already control and posses the symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 165). In relation to 
economic activity, the function of symbolic capital is, according to Bourdieu (1977* p. 
164), to secure the reproduction of the power relations. Its role is to help to "sustain 
economic power by enabling it to present itself as something economically neutral" 
(Robbins, 1991, p. 116), that is, as a 'natural' part of the economy and an essential part 
of a 'correct' form of action (Bourdieu, 1977).
Symbolic power represents a form of generalized morality, a system of 
recognized and appropriate actions and practices, norms and habits, which determine the 
ways in which different kinds of capital (social, economic etc.) are used (Johnson, 1990, 
p. 17). This is precisely the aspect of power which Granovetter and his followers fail to 
appreciate as an important part of the embeddedness of economic action. Although 
Granovetter occasionally acknowledges the existence of what he refers to as 
"generalized morality" (1985/1992, p. 62 when talking about "standards of behaviour" 
among diamond dealers; or p. 60 in reference to Kenneth Arrow) or sometimes habitual 
behaviour (in his discussion of differences in economic transactions among different 
tribal societies, Granovetter, 1993, p. 11-17), he nonetheless regards the empirical 
experience of network interactions and their history as something more important that 
overrules the habituàl behaviour based on social norms and practices (1985/1992, p. 61 
and 62-3). At most, the NES recognizes that networks are conditioned by the existing 
framework of norms and power which they help to sustain.9 This is correct and,
9Mark Granovetter has qualified this by saying that his recent work (1995) and his work in progress 
attempt to remedy.this weakness and will be more explicit about power relations.
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especially in the explanation of novel forms of action which go beyond the existing 
system of practices, the NES approach may be highly useful. It does not, however, 
obscure the fact that the NES, unlike Bourdieu, does not present any systematic 
conceptual framework that could account for the persistence, routinization and 
reproduction of particular forms of behaviour, of particular practices.
To summarize Bourdieu's argument we can say that the activity exercised by 
individuals is not only enabled and restricted by the social capital of their networks and 
the potential for power they derive from them. Actors' actions are also influenced by 
their relation to symbolic power. That is, by the way their networks are inserted into a 
system of practices that are recognized as legitimate and are reproduced by actions of 
other individuals as a matter of routine. The routine character and the reproduction of 
practices in time then represent an aspect of power which also predisposes actions of 
actors in both an enabling and a restricting sense. However, the relation of individual 
actors to recognized and legitimate practices and their symbolic values, is not an equal 
one. The inequality of this relation thus works as a mechanism of their empowerment or 
discmpowerment. Only the individuals who arc endowed with symbolic capital and who 
are recognized by others have the power to produce and manipulate symbols, practices 
and their symbolic values (Bourdieu, 1991, 1977, Chapter 4).
Although Bourdieu's theory elaborates on the processes of reproduction and 
routinization of practices that reinforce and maintain the symbolic power of some 
actors, his theory is not very explicit about the processes through which actors gain 
recognition and symbolic power. In this point, as we shall see in the next section, 
integrating Bourdieu's theory with the NES and elements of actor-network theory 
(Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991) might be a useful way of extending the concept of 
embeddedness and turning it into a framework for an analysis and explanation of 
economic action.
Symbolic power, networks of social capital and economic action
It has been argued that the restricting and enabling qualities of networked social capital 
cannot be seen as the only force shaping the economic action of individuals and that the
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role of symbolic capital and symbolic power is equally important. Yet, in contrast to the 
networked power of social capital which needs to be maintained by interaction, the 
symbolic capital and power are supported by the collective recognition and legitimation 
by other actors who reproduce the symbolic order in their practices. Symbolic power is 
thus partly internalized by other actors and to some extent independent of individuals' 
actions. It contains "within itself the principle of its own continuation [which] frees 
agents from the endless work of creating or restoring social relations" (Bourdieu, 1977, 
p. 189), but also predisposes the ways in which networks are constructed and for what
purposes they are constructed.
From this perspective each particular form of embeddedness involves webs of 
networks specific to individual actors, as well as differences in actors' relations to the 
disciplining force of the symbolic power. The actions of individuals, according to 
Bourdieu (1977, 1990), can then be interpreted more appropriately as an outcome of a 
complex interaction (or 'struggles', to use Bourdieu's terminology) and mutual 
transformations between social and symbolic capitals. The actors use their networks in 
this 'struggle' in their effort to increase their symbolic power of recognition and to 
accumulate different forms of capital. The struggle, however, takes place according to a 
logic or rationality specific to an existing symbolic order which restricts the actions by a 
system of practices recognized as legitimate forms of action.
The interaction and relationship between the symbolic power of recognition and 
networked social capital can be demonstrated by an example of monetized capitalist 
societies. Here the fact that financial or economic capital is recognized as a standard of a 
value is effectively nothing more than a specific form of rationality. It represents a 
recognized form of symbolic power which, by the virtue of its recognition and 
legitimation, directs the motivations of actors' actions in particular ways. In the case of a 
capitalist society, the practice is recognized as legitimate when it leads to profit making 
(Bourdieu, 1990).
However, the important role of symbolic power in guiding and setting the 
accepted standard and underlying rationality of networking activity does not imply that 
the means of recognition could not change over time. Although Bourdieu s theory does
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not specify adequately the mechanisms by which the practices and forms of recognition 
change, his specification that such change is an outcome of the process of interaction 
and transmutations among different forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1990) provides a clue. 
What Bourdieu means is that economic action which takes a form of network 
interaction affects simultaneously the networked power of actors and their symbolic 
power of recognition. The network activities can change the position of actors in the 
structure o f networks and thus transform their social capital and their potential for the 
exercise of networked power of association. This is the case when the network activity 
of individuals either increases or decreases the number of other actors, skills and 
capacities that they can mobilize in the future. At the same time, however, every action 
is in some way related to and interacts with the existing form of symbolic power. Every 
actor can therefore either conform to or, on the contrary, challenge and change the 
practice recognized as legitimate.
In concrete terms, such challenges can take, for example, the form of new 
organizational practices that suddenly appear and start to challenge the existing ones. 
Under such circumstances those actors who have access to a network through which the 
newly recognized and more 'efficient' practice is being distributed can use their network 
position and their 'power to' (Allen, 1997) in a way which transforms their networked 
social capital into a greater symbolic recognition and power. In this way, the action of 
actors can also transform their own recognition by the collectivity of other actors and 
increase, or decrease, their symbolic power. The actions of individual actors can thus 
transform their own networked social capital as well as their symbolic capital and 
degree of recognition.
The 'size' and the structure of both social and symbolic capital that individual 
actors accumulate are thus reflected in their actual actions (Bourdieu, 1990). They shape 
the actors' actions, but can also be shaped and transformed by them. The study and 
explanation of economic action should therefore take into account the embeddedness of 
actors in, first, the networks of interpersonal relations which may transform the 
recognized practices and, second, in the relations of symbolic power which give actors 
different degrees of recognition and may stabilize their actions into a collective practice.
In order to understand how exactly the actions of individuals are carried out and 
how they transform recognized practice, we need to study the concrete context of actor’s 
action, that is, the actual process of construction of networks (Granovetter, 1985/1992; 
Latour, 1987; Swedberg and Granovetter, 1992; Murdoch, 1995). Yet, in order to 
understand how these networks are stabilized, reproduced over time, and turned into 
means of symbolic power and domination, we also need to study the process by which 
actors and their actions achieve legitimation and approval of others. We thus need to 
study and explain how actors make others accept a particular representation of facts
(Bourdieu, 1977, 1993b; Latour, 1987).
Although Bourdieu does acknowledge this important fact, his own theory 
nevertheless lacks theoretical concepts that would explicitly tackle the issue of change 
in the relations of symbolic power, control and domination. Bourdieu s approach and his 
understanding of power thus remains essentially 'structuralist' (Pels, 1997) and is 
primarily concerned with the reproduction of existing structures of power and not their 
transformation. This is in contrast to another important stream of sociological theory 
inspired by the work of Michel Foucault which makes the change and subsequent 
stabilization of power relations a central issue of analysis (Pels, 1997).
Prominent among the 'Foueauldian' approaches to the study of power relations 
conditioning socioeconomic action is actor-network theory (ANT) which aims to 
analyze power as a process of ascribing meanings to things, giving them differentiated 
symbolic values and stabilizing power relations through intermediaries (Murdoch, 1995, 
1997). In contrast to Bourdieu's concern with the reproduction and stability of power 
relations, the major contribution of ANT as developed by Latour (1983, 1987) and 
Gallon (1986) lies in the detailed empirical investigation of the cultural processes 
through which individual actors gain authority and transform power relations to their 
advantage. ANT thus deals explicitly with the processes that stabilize individual 
networks into means of transforming symbolic power and recognized practice. Both 
Latour (1983, 1987) and Gallon (1986, 1991) analyze in detail the ways in which actors 
become representatives of others and their recognition allows them to exercise control 
over the actions of others. In their analysis focused on actors who transformed existing
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ways of behaviour these two authors demonstrate how individuals can utilize their 
networks to create a particular representation of reality which is referred to as 
translation. This is a process involving the enrolment of other actors, human and non­
human entities (Latour, 1987; Murdoch, 1997), by which actors use their existing 
networked social capital and symbolic recognition to give particular meanings to things. 
Through the processes of translation and enrolment actors can make others interested, 
make them accept particular goals and align their interests with those of their own 
(Gallon, 1991; Murdoch, 1995,1997). If successful, these processes will result in the 
stability of meaning which, in turn, will empower the actors who translate and enrol 
others (Murdoch, 1997). Put in other words, the concepts of translation and enrolment 
provide an essential link between, on the one hand, networks as understood by NES and 
the concept of social capital and, on the other hand, Bourdieu's concept of symbolic 
power and recognition. Successful accomplishment of translation and enrolment 
effectively increases the recognition and legitimization of actors or, in other words, 
transforms their social capital and networked power into a symbolic power of 
recognition, domination and authority.
The theoretical insight of ANT, however, should not be understood as an 
alternative to the present analytical framework of embeddedness based on the NES and 
Bourdieu's work. Instead, I want to argue, the framework based on the concepts of 
networked social capital and symbolic power can be supplemented in a productive way 
by concepts of translation and enrolment originating in ANT. These two concepts open 
the way for analyzing the dynamics of cultural processes through which networks are 
stabilized over time and become a source of symbolic power. As such, they can make 
the present analytical framework much more directly applicable to the empirical 
analysis of changing power relations and the transformation of existing system of 
practice. Furthermore, the concepts borrowed from ANT help to avoid the potential 
problem associated with Bourdieu's approach, namely the dichotomy between the micro 
and macro forms of power which persists in his work and is not fully resolved.
The rationale for supplementing the present analytical framework of 
embeddedness with the two ANT concepts is mainly to do with their ability to provide
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|  more concrete and empirically grounded means of analyzing the transformations
between social and symbolic capital of individual actors. The analytical framework 
advocated here therefore allows the research to pay attention simultaneously to the 
empirical detail, which is characteristic of both NES and ANT, and to the issues of 
symbolic power and recognition.
The concepts of translation and enrolment originating in ANT, then, contribute 
in an important way to the understanding of embeddedness as a dynamic concept for 
explaining economic action. Within this 'wider1 framework of embeddedness we can 
interpret and analyze the economic, or more generally, socioeconomic action as an 
outcome of mutual interactions between the social capital of networked relations and the 
relations of symbolic power, whereas the preoccupation with the cultural processes of 
translation and enrolment makes it much easier to move from the empirical detail of 
networking to more general concepts of symbolic power, control and domination.
Such a conceptual framework allows us to explain the dynamics and change in the 
socioeconomy characteristic of the NES approach (Granovetter, 1985/1992; Swedberg 
and Granovetter, 1992), to explain the reproduction and routinization of action in the 
form of practice (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990), as well as to explain the transformation of 
practice through actions of individual actors (Latour, 1983, 1987; Gallon, 1991). As 
such, this framework provides a more appropriate conceptual framework for analyzing 
economic action than the NES or Bourdieu's theory alone. This framework strives to 
understand the underlying rationality of action. At the same time, however, it also 
acknowledges that the forms of embeddedness specific to individual actors modify this 
rationality and translate it into specific systems of practices and logics.
The systems of practices, their rationalities and meanings are bound to vary 
among actors and also among individual socioeconomic contexts over space. Depending 
on the past processes of translation and enrolment, each society or community will 
regard certain practices and properties as legitimate, as a desired, material or non­
material 'objectification' of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1991, note 7, p. 277). These, in 
turn, will create diverse preconditions for particular, locally-specific forms of action.
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However, the stabilization of locally-specific practices and the contestation over their 
meaning will be issues addressed in the next chapter.
CONCLUSION: ECONOMIC ACTION, EMBEDDEDNESS AND 
ADAPTABILITY
From the foregoing it follows that economic action is partly determined by space and 
time specific forms of embeddedness. The first half of the chapter, following the work 
of the NES, explained that the actions of individuals are embedded in networks and 
their positions in the web of networks. These, it was argued, give actors the networked 
form of power of association. The second half of the chapter, using the theory and 
vocabulary of Pierre Bourdieu, described the networked aspect of embeddedness as 
social capital and argued that actors are also embedded in relations of symbolic power 
which play an equally important role in shaping their action. Not all actors, however, are 
equally endowed either with networked or symbolic power and their attempts to 
increase their relative powers can be seen as the main reason for the constant change in 
the forms of embeddedness (Bourdieu, 1990). The existing forms of embeddedness are 
thus constantly challenged by actors who construct new networks and who posses or 
strive for alternative forms of legitimation and recognition.
It has been argued that the combination of the networked concept of 
embeddedness and power of association advocated by the NES, with Bourdieu's concept 
of symbolic power of recognition can provide an appropriate framework for explaining 
economic action. Within this framework, economic action can be analyzed and 
explained as the outcome of interactions between the networked social capital and the 
symbolic capital in which actors are embedded. The final section of the chapter argued 
that in order to explain concrete forms of interaction between actors' networked social 
capital and their symbolic power, it is useful to employ the concepts of translation and 
enrolment developed within ANT (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1986,1991). The analysis of 
the process of translation can explain how actors mobilize and use their networks in 
order to achieve collective recognition which, in turn, enables them to transform and
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redefine the character of symbolic power and the criteria of recognition in specific
socioeconomic contexts.
An underlying logic of this analytical framework is a presumption, derived from 
Bourdieu's work, that the effort of actors to gain recognition or to remain recognized is 
central to their activities. In this sense Bourdieu's theory has somewhat rationalist 
assumptions about human behaviour. It presents human action as a maximization of 
recognition and prestige which follows the logic of accumulation of symbolic, cultural, 
economic and other capital. This underlying rationality of action is, however, often 
obscured and made hard to discern by the simultaneous operation of different 
rationalities associated with diverse and often conflicting means of recogmtion 
(Bourdieu, 1977, p. 177-8; Johnson, 1993, p. 8).
Although I am sympathetic to Phil Crang's critique of Bourdieu who leaves little 
space in his schema "for those girls (and boys) who just want to have fun [and] do not 
want to win in anyone's terms" (Crang, 1997, p. 10), I still agree with Bourdieu that the 
main driving force of human action is some form of recognition. Although this 
presumption might sound rather crude, I nevertheless think that Bourdieu s rationalism 
in the analysis of economic action is tolerable to some extent, in the specific case of 
economic action in capitalist economies, which represent the empirical focus of the 
following chapters, the underlying rationality is largely one of profit making. The 
recognition based on the ability to make profit and to adapt to changes in order to 
remain profitable and competitive is the prevailing form of symbolic recognition in the 
capitalist socioeconomies. We should therefore not forget that actors who fail to adapt 
to this form of symbolic power of recognition will be forced out of business (Ingham, 
1996a, b).
The ability to adapt in order to remain recognized, or competitive in economic 
terms, should thus be a central issue in the analysis of economic action. Different forms 
of embeddedness will strongly influence the adaptability of actors and their ability to 
maintain recognition and competitiveness in dynamically changing capitalist economy. 
Moreover, concrete forms of embeddedness vary among actors in different 
socioeconomic contexts across space and they modify the underlying capitalist
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rationality of profit making. The concrete actions of actors, their ability to translate and 
enrol others then turn this rationality into locally-specific systems of practices, meanings 
and understandings which shape the economic action of actors in individual
socioeconomic contexts.
This 'wider* understanding of embeddedness, then, represents an analytical 
concept which can be used to explain the economic action of individual actors and their 
adaptability in relation to diverse forms of symbolic capital. In the following chapter, it 
will be argued that this framework can also be extended to the analysis of regionally- 
specific forms of embeddedness. The next chapter thus represents an attempt to set up a 
framework for analyzing regions through the analytical lens of 'wider embeddedness 
which, arguably, can provide a way for explaining the differences in the economic 
performance and adaptability of regions.
CHAPTER TWO: FROM ACTORS TO REGIONS: 
CONCEPTUALIZING REGIONAL 
EMBEDDEDNESS AND ADAPTABILITY
INTRODUCTION
Having outlined in the previous chapter a general framework for the analysis of 
embeddedness and action of individual actors, the focus in this chapter turns towards the 
analysis of a more specifically geographical, regional forms of embeddedness. More to 
the point, such collective forms of embeddedness, it is argued, play a crucial role in the 
process of uneven regional development, as well as in explaining the ability of regions 
to adapt and to hold down' the process of internationalization (Amin and Thrift, 1994b). 
These regionally-specific, collective forms of embeddedness are referred to 
interchangeably as local/regional culture or, following Amin and Hausner, as 
regional/local "institutional set-ups" (1997, p. 14).
The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, to establish a dynamic and non­
functional framework for the analysis of regionally-specific institutional and cultural 
forms. Using the theory of Bourdieu (1977, 1990) and actor-network theory (Latour, 
1987; Gallon, 1991), this chapter seeks to develop a framework capable of analyzing 
regional/local forms of embeddedness as an outcome of diverse, contested cultural 
processes. This chapter pays special attention to the conceptualization of locally-specific 
practices and meanings which represent an important but often neglected and under- 
theorized aspect of uneven regional development. It is argued here that a better 
understanding of these concepts can also bring new insights to the explanation of the 
diverse ability of regions to adapt jand to 'hold down' the process of internationalization 
in a productive way.
Secondly, this chapter also aims to specify the relationship between the concepts 
of embeddedness and regional adaptability. It attempts to specify the character of 
cultural processes which transform the existing forms of embeddedness in a way which 
may increase the ability of regional, institutional set-ups to 'hold down1 diverse new
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practices and increase the adaptability and competitiveness of whole regional 
economies.
The chapter begins with a brief summary of an approach towards the issue of 
uneven development advanced by certain geographers inspired by the network 
approaches of economic sociology and organizational theory (Asheim, 1992; Harrison, 
1992; Cooke and Morgan, 1993; Yeung, 1994). This stream of thinking, although it 
employs the concept of embeddedness, is criticized here because it provides neither an 
adequate 'unpacking' of the notion of local culture, nor the necessary clues to differences 
in the competitiveness of regions. Following that, the chapter develops an alternative 
framework which, arguably, offers a more plausible conceptualization of cultural 
differences responsible for the regional unevenness. This framework draws on the 
arguments developed within the emerging 'socio-economic' stream in geography (Amin 
and Thrift, 1995,1997; Storper, 1997; Storper and Salais, 1997).
The subsequent sections briefly summarize the main points of institutional 
evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hodgson, 1988), which served as an 
important inspiration for the socio-economic approach, and they assess its possible 
contribution to the analysis of uneven regional development. Significantly, the concept 
of'action framework' (Storper, 1997, p. 253) is specified and identified as a possible 
link between institutional evolutionary theory and the socio-economic analysis of 
regions. However, two problems related to the application of this concept are identified 
and are then addressed in two separate sections. These represent the core of an effort to 
develop a culturally informed understanding of Storpefs original concept and its 
extension to the analysis of regions/localities. Firstly, the issue of the dynamics and the 
stabilization of action frameworks in time is addressed using the concepts of social 
capital and symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1977,1990,1993b), as well as translation and 
enrolment (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991). Secondly, an attempt is made to specify the 
relationship between the concept of action framework and tlic contested and plural 
character of local cultures. Subsequently, the concept of'institutional set-up' (Amin and 
Hausner, 1997) is developed which permits a dynamic and non-functional explanation 
of diverse, locally-specific forms of embeddedness.
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The final sections of the chapter deal with the issue of adaptability and the 
competitiveness of regions. Their aim is to specify the character of regional institutional 
set-ups that create suitable preconditions for a sustained process of locally-based 
reflection and adaptation. As such, these sections open the way for an analysis and 
assessment of regions from the point of their long term adaptability and 
competitiveness.
LOCAL CULTURE AND UNEVEN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Networks and regional 'embeddedness': an 'oversocialized' view of culture?
Influenced by the New Economic Sociologists' (Granovetter, 1985/1992) and some 
organizational theorists (Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994), some economic geographers 
increasingly have incorporated the concepts of networks and embeddedness into their 
thinking about regional competitiveness. In their work, however, networks were 
invariably interpreted in a rather narrow sense.10 They were interpreted specifically as an 
intermediary form of organization between market and hierarchy which allows for the 
building of trust (Yeung, 1994; Sayer, 1995; Asheim, 1997) and which represents an 
essential part of the 'embeddedness' of economic actors.
Much of this writing about networks follows from the literature on post-Fordism 
(e.g. Asheim, 1992; Cooke and Morgan, 1993; Sayer, 1997) and industrial districts (e.g. 
Lorenz, 1988; Harrison, 1992; Grotz and Braun, 1993) which supposes that the 
emerging new organizational forms rely more on network organization than the 
previous era of Fordism. This mode of thinking implies the existence of a shift or a 
break in the organization of the socioeconomy (Murdoch, 1995) (such as a shift from 
Fordist mass production to a networked economy (Cooke and Morgan, 1993) or to a 
learning economy (Lundvall, 1992; Morgan, 1997)) which will increase the need for the 
'embeddedness' of relations of production (Sayer, 1997). Particular socioeconomic or
10In a sense similar to the concept of'network as a form o f governance' (Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994) 
described in the previous chapter.
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cultural characteristics are then expected to become prominent because of such a shift. 
Networks and 'embeddedness' in particular are supposed to be necessary attributes that 
actors, firms and regional institutional arrangements need to possess in order to remain 
competitive in the new, emerging environment. These accounts chart firms embedded in 
trust-based and reciprocal networks as an alternative to Fordist mass production, which 
itself is described as 'disembedded'.
What these writers share is the need to specify the cultural and institutional 
forms that are conducive to the competitiveness of regions and can explain their varied 
ability to adapt to the changing economic environment. Such cultural and institutional 
forms, in the understanding of these authors, are equated with the existence of networks 
and what they call 'embeddedness'. However, networks and embeddedness, unlike 
Granovettefs (1985/1992) original understanding, arc regarded as a positive quality in 
their own right and the 'network paradigm' (Cooke and Morgan, 1993) is suggested as 
the new organizational principle as well as a strategy for regional development.
While this approach has its strengths, its weakness lies in that little is said about 
why embeddedness is the key to competitiveness. The approach focuses instead on 
listing individual qualities of networks, local institutions, practices, organizational 
forms and arrangements that are supposed to be aspects of the desired state of regional 
'embeddedness' and which are also required for the economic success of regions in the 
future. The lists are often constructed as a series of characteristics typical of two 
opposed states of'embeddedness' and 'disembeddedness'. The characteristics that 
distinguish 'embeddedness' from 'disembeddedness' include qualities such as the high 
level of interaction among local firms and institutions, a trust-based collaborative 
atmosphere in the locality (Harrison, 1992; Cooke and Morgan, 1993; Yeung, 1994; 
Morgan, 1997), the presence of untraded interdependencies and locally-codified 
knowledge (Asheim and Dunford, 1997), cultural, organizational and spatial proximity 
(Lundvall, 1993; Malmberg, 1996, 1997) or simply the 'localness' of networks (Dicken 
et a i, 1994).
Subsequently, the construction of and search for the two opposed ideal types - 
the 'embedded' and 'disembedded' relations, firms, or regional economies - commonly
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replace an explanation of the processes that lead to the success or the failure of regions. 
Unfortunately, such analytical simplicity does not make the reasons for the uneven 
ability of regions to compete and adapt that much clearer. Overall, it seems that these 
accounts provide insufficient insight into the processes responsible for the differences in 
the performance of regions and that they suffer from a contrastive 'explanation' through 
a series of dualisms (Murdoch, 1995).
Despite such shortcomings these authors still provide some interesting insights 
to the understanding of uneven regional development. They bring to our attention the 
complex interactions between 'economic' and 'non-economic' relationships in the 
process of constructing adaptable and competitive regional economies capable of 
'holding down' the process of internationalization. Indeed, it seems to be the 'soft' 
cultural characteristics identified by these authors which cause the regional differences 
in the ability to respond and adapt to new challenges (Grabber, 1993c; Sabel, 1993; 
Locke, 1996).
My reservations towards this approach, however, concern the rather static nature 
of explanation, whereby little attention is paid to the processes through which such 
characteristics are achieved. 'Embeddedness' is presented as the desired aim by this 
stream of geographical research. This 'paradigmatic example', however, is regarded 
simply as an institutional arrangement consisting of a particular 'correct' blend of 
cultural 'ingredients' (Amin and Graham, 1997, p. 416-7). Such an understanding and 
explanation of successful regional development then fails to explain how the particular 
important 'ingredients' of the arrangement were produced or reproduced by actors. 
Furthermore, the understanding of embeddedness as a desired institutional arrangement 
also causes terminological confusion: it disregards the fact that all regional economies 
are embedded in some ways (at least in the sense of the concept of embeddedness as 
proposed by Polanyi (1944/1957) and later Granovetter (1985/1992) - see previous 
chapter), be it to their benefit or their disadvantage.
Equally, the approach described above often suffers from a functional 
understanding of locally-specific cultural contexts. It fails to appreciate that cultural or 
social characteristics (such as trust or cultural proximity) are subject to contestation
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which may give them very different meanings in different regional contexts. As such, 
the same cultural characteristics can also have very different consequences for regional 
development. This approach thus resembles the functionalism of the oversocialized 
view of economic action criticized by Granovetter (1985/1992). The characteristics of 
local institutional settings are somehow present while the fact of their presence is then 
supposed to guide the actions of individual actors in the locality in ways which lead 
either to a success or a failure of the regional economy.
I will argue that this 'oversocialized' approach does not provide a satisfactory 
framework for explaining the diverse adaptability and competitiveness of regions, 
largely due to an inadequate conceptualization of culture and the cultural processes 
which transform regional forms of embeddedness. The following section will argue for 
an alternative approach which shares one feature with the 'oversocialized' approach. It 
too regards locally-specific cultural forms and forms of embeddedness as central to an 
explanation of the uneven ability of regions to adapt, to 'hold down' internationalization 
and to compete. However, the approach advocated here recognizes the dynamism and 
contested nature of cultural processes and their role in constituting as well as 
transforming the locally-specific forms of embeddedness.
Socio-economic approach: an alternative explanation of regional unevenness
The alternative approach to an explanation of diverse regional adaptability and 
competitiveness suggested here is more akin to the arguments of another grouping of 
authors (Amin and Thrift, 1992, 1994, 1997; Grabber, 1993a, b, c; Sabel, 1993, 1994; 
Grabber and Stark, 1997a, b; Storper, 1997; Storper and Salais, 1997) who conceive of 
embeddedness and networks in a regional context more closely along the lines outlined 
by Granovetter (1985/1992, 1993; Swedberg and Granovatter, 1992). Following Amin 
and Thrift (1997), I will call this loose grouping of authors and the emerging alternative 
approach 'socio-economics' (p. 152) or socio-economic approach. The authors 
mentioned above do not represent any coherent and organized school' or project and in 
fact this approach does not yet seem fully developed. Moreover, these authors often
differ in the terminology they use, although they share certain methodological features 
and sources of inspiration.11
Apart from the network theory and embeddedness of Mark Granovetter, another 
common point of reference for the socio-economic approach is evolutionary 
institutional economics (Amin and Thrift, 1997; Grabber and Stark, 1997a; Storper and 
Salais, 1997). The approach of socio-economics in geography draws on these two 
sources and attempts to add a spatial dimension to them. It also draws upon some 
inspiration from earlier geographical investigations into the reasons for uneven regional 
development (Massey, 1995) that recognize the need to explain spatial unevenness as a 
combined outcome of the interactions of economic and social relations in space and the 
need to interpret them against a background of the localized social relations and spatial 
structures inherited from the past.
The main difference between the socio-economic stream of literature in 
geography and the oversocialized accounts of regional embeddedness is that the socio­
economic approach attempts to analyze how the desirable cultural characteristics come 
into being in particular local settings. Unlike the oversocialized view of culture, the 
socio-economic stance develops a framework capable of analyzing the processes which 
produced existing forms of embeddedness. Its study of embeddedness is much more 
explicit in analyzing socioeconomic change as a combination of the historical inertia of 
the past relations and institutional forms with newly created networked relations.
The socio-economic approach also brings forward the fact recognized by 
Granovetter (1985/1992) that embeddedness and networks are not only 'good' things, 
based on cooperative, democratic and trust-based arrangements but, that networks also 
include power relations (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Murdoch, 1995). Some regions, for 
example, can be embedded in a set of relations that bring them to a powerless and 
subordinate position (Massey, 1995), or the relations can be unstable, ridden with 
suspicion and inner conflicts which might prevent regions from being competitive and 
responsive to change (Sabel, 1993). The success and competitiveness of regions
1 •Although they do not all use the term 'embeddedness' they all share the view o f networks both as a set o f 
relations and as positions o f actors in the wider structure o f networks. This is an understanding very
similar to networks and embeddedness o f Mark Granovetter - see Chapter One.
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subsequently does not depend on whether firms or actors are 'embedded* in networks or 
not, but on how actors are embedded in their networks. It depends on how the networks 
are structured and what properties they include (Grabber and Stark, 1997b) as well as on 
the character of locally-specific processes of institutionalization through which the 
forms of embeddedness were created (Amin and Thrift, 1994a). All of this means that in 
order to explain the differences in local/regional cultures, their adaptability and 
competitiveness, the analysis has to involve a time dimension. And in this the socio­
economic approach does indeed overcome the static understanding of culture presented 
by the oversocialized approach. In a sense it has the same virtues as the notion of 
embeddedness presented by Mark Granovetter (1985/1992, 1993): it also avoids 
functionalism as well as brings dynamism and a historical dimension to the explanation 
of diverse adaptability and competitiveness of regions.
The following sections of this chapter aim to build on the positive features of the 
emerging socio-economic approach in geography. They attempt to develop this 
approach further and to some extent synthesize the work and concepts of its individual 
authors into a framework for explaining the differential ability of regions to adapt.
*
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC APPROACH: TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANALYZING REGIONAL ADAPTABILITY 
Inspiration from evolutionary institutional economics
The attention to the dynamism and to the historical developmenTof existing forms of 
embeddedness are strong features of the socio-economic approach in geography. This is 
perhaps not that surprising given the fact that one of the main sources of inspiration for 
socio-economics is evolutionary institutional economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Hodgson, 1988, 1993). One of the main achievements of this stream in economics was 
to bring a temporal dimension to economic analysis.
Evolutionary institutional economics (i.e. evolutionary economics following the 
tradition of old institutionalism, Hodgson, 1994) represents a critical reaction to the
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’static', neoclassical description of economic 'reality'. Instead, it lays stress on the 
evolution of institutional forms and advocates an approach that recognizes the 
importance of culture, power and their co-evolution with economic processes and 
phenomena (Samuels, 1995). A particular stress is put on the concept of routines 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hodgson, 1988) which represent a form of "durable 
repositories of knowledge" (Hodgson, 1998, p. 44) or an "organizational memory of 
firms" (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 99). Routines are mutable and perform a function 
in a way similar to genes in the biological realm: they preserve knowledge in relation to 
skills, competencies and capabilities and "act through time as their transmission belt" 
(Hodgson, 1997, p. 4). Routines are then strongly influenced by existing institutions and 
embody past institutional forms (Hodgson, 1988, 1993; Nelson, 1994). They are created 
and stabilized in time in the process of change and the historical unfolding of social 
relations.12
The key concepts through which the evolutionary institutional arguments 
develop a temporal economic analysis are mutation and selection (Simonetti, 1998). In 
the same way as genes in biology, so too the routines in the process of evolution are 
winnowed by selection. Selection is responsible for their constant change, mutation and 
evolution. The change "occurs through a somewhat blind mutation, and somewhat 
systematic selection" (Nelson, 1994, p. 133) each of which can be both random or 
purposive (Hodgson, 1998, p. 45).
Routines of individuals and firms develop in specific ways over time and have 
more or less positive consequences for the economic performance of actors. But the 
mutation of routines, as in the case of regional economies (Massey, 1995), is already 
restricted by an existing system of routines (or economic environment) and by its 
evolutionary trajectory (Dosi and Orsenigo, 1988; Hodgson, 1997).13 The
12Ih e  mechanism by which routines are transmitted and spread, however, differs radically in several 
respects from the one o f  genes. Routines are much more mutable, can be acquired through socialization in 
a much shorter time span than genes and they can be both learned and unlearned (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Hodgson, 1988, 1997, 1998; Barnes, 1997).
l3The restriction by existing system o f routines, however, does not mean that the previous routines 
determine the development o f  the 'next' routine or exactly specify the behaviour o f  individuals. The action 
o f  individuals is not guided by their own system o f  routines in some deterministic way. There is always an 
element o f  uncertainty in human behaviour because routines can, to some extent at least, be purposively
institutionalization of routines over time eventually results in the creation of an 
institutional setting or framework which safeguards a certain degree of continuity and 
stability of behaviour.
The idea of a stabilized set of routines has been picked up and applied to 
geographical analysis by Storper (1997), who refers to this stabilized institutional 
framework specific to individual actors as an 'action framework' (p. 253). An action 
framework represents an ensemble of relational assets such as routines, conventions and 
competencies "by which actors come to coordinate with each other [according to] the 
specific evolutionary trajectory of the actors involved" (Storper, 1997, p. 253). Action 
frameworks are specific to individual actors, but because they consist of collective, 
relational assets which may be reproduced independently of individual actors, they are 
also specific to localities and regions (Storper, 1997; Storper and Salais, 1997).
In a similar way to routines, the institutionalization of an action framework is 
shaped and gradually transformed by selection and mutation. The temporary 
stabilization or institutionalization of an action framework moulds the actions of 
individuals. It sets the standard for what type of action is viable in the present conditions 
and, as such, it creates preconditions for actions which have either virtuous or negative 
consequences for the adaptability of regions.
From the perspective of an analysis of diverse regional adaptability, the most 
important contribution of evolutionary institutional economics is the recognition of a 
temporary stabilization of institutional forms and the semi-permanence of these forms in 
particular time-space contexts (Nelson, 1994). The concept of action framework, then, is 
an expression of the effort by certain geographers to turn this insight into a basis for a 
new way of thinking about locally-specific forms of embeddedness and about the 
reasons for the diverse ability of regions to adapt and compete. In many ways this 
concept is quite successful as it shares the two major advantages of evolutionary 
institutional economics. First, it allows for the dynamism associated with mutation and ' 
selection, while it also acknowledges the temporal stabilization of institutional forms in
shaped by actors' actions. This fact makes any system o f  routines only probabilistic and subject to the 
processes o f  mutation and selection (Hodgson, 1988;.Nelson, 1994; Storper and Salais, 1997).
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space. Second, the concept of action framework also acknowledges the collective 
character of regional institutional arrangements (Storper, 1997). These are regarded as 
expressions of locally-specific processes of institutionalization that embody the history 
of a particular locality and local actors (Amin and Thrift, 1997; Bames, 1997; Storper, 
1997).
The concept of action framework thus remedies to some extent the major 
problems of the oversocialized approach in geography. It provides an opportunity to 
study locally-specific forms of embeddedness in a dynamic way; that is, from the point 
of view of their institutionalization. In this sense the concept of action framework 
provides a useful tool for the analysis of'regional cultures' and could provide a basis for 
a processual and non-functional socio-economic approach towards an explanation of the 
uneven ability of regions to adapt and adjust to change.
However, an explanatory framework based on the concept of action framework 
alone does not provide sufficient means for an analysis of regionally-specific forms of 
embeddedness. There seem to be at least two problems related to its application as the 
basis and key tool for the socio-economic approach.
The first problem is more general and is related to the dynamics and stabilization 
of cultural and institutional forms over time. Institutional and evolutionary economics 
tell us that stability is only temporary due to the processes of selection and mutation 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson, 1994). It is, however, precisely the specification of 
'how selection selects', and the ability of economic research to explain "what made a 
mutation fit, and what doomed it to extinction" (Nelson, 1994, p. 133) that puzzles most 
evolutionary economists (Bames, 1997). A conceptualization of the processes that 
actually select and stabilize particular routines and conventions and make them partly 
durable in time still seems inadequately developed in the theory of evolutionary 
institutional economics (Nelson, 1994). The same is also true for the concept of action 
framework.
The second problem is related more specifically to the analysis of institutional 
and cultural formations in individual regions. It has to do with the fact that regions arc 
spaces of multiple and competing sets of routines, conventions and institutional forms
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that co-exist and operate simultaneously (Amin and Thrift, 1992, 1994a; Grabber and 
Stark, 1997a, b; Storper, 1997; Storper and Salais, 1995; Amin, 1998). The challenge 
for the socio-economic approach, then, is to develop a framework for explaining the 
diverse adaptability of regions as entities that represent collective assets consisting of a 
multiplicity of routines, conventions and institutions. In other words, localities often 
consist of multiple action frameworks of routines, conventions and practices 
characterized by different forms of co-existence. If this should be the case, how can we 
employ the concept of action framework in the analysis of locally-specific cultural and 
institutional forms in individual regions?
These issues are addressed in the next two sections. In this way, the two 
problems associated with the application of the concept of action framework to regional 
analysis will help us to develop and specify an explanatory framework for the socio­
economic approach.
The dynamics and stabilization of action frameworks: contestation of meanings, 
translation and symbolic power
It has been explained that the evolutionary institutional approach, as well as Storper's 
concept of action framework, stress the dynamism and temporal stabilization of 
institutional forms. The present section seeks to remedy their common weakness, that is, 
their failure to specify and explore fully the character of the processes that select, 
stabilize and institutionalize particular routines, competencies and practices over time. 
However, in order to understand the process by which routines or action frameworks are 
stabilized, we first need to understand what actually transforms them. According to 
evolutionary institutional theory, the process that makes the mutation of routines 
possible is the "interaction between firms" (Simonetti, 1998, p. 334). In more general 
terms, it is the contact with the surrounding environment mediated by personal networks 
among actors that secures an influx of new impulses which might lead to a mutation of 
routines. The transformation of action frameworks, then, is a product of a process in 
which the knowledge embodied in routines and practices of individuals is continuously 
challenged by the experience o f such a network interaction. Put simply, networks bring
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new impulses for a reflection and for a reinterpretation of routines (Salais and Storper,
1997). Through the networked interaction between individuals, different routines and 
cultural practices can be spread, mixed up with others, and thus altered.
The process by which networked interactions transform the existing action 
framework of routines, however, is not a straightforward one since the influx of new 
impulses does not lead to an automatic change of existing routines. This is because the 
transformation of routines and cultural practices depends on the réévaluation of the 
existing routines by actors themselves which, in turn, is open to different and often 
conflicting interpretations (Hall, 1995). So instead of a straightforward change of 
routines, the networking activity results in a process of contestation over the meaning 
and interpretation of aspects of reality which may or may not transform the existing 
action framework of an actor. The process of contestation over meaning ultimately 
represents the cause as well as the process that reshapes the routines and practices of 
actors.
The central role of contestation and interpretation of meanings in the mutation of 
routines has been partly recognized by some evolutionary economists too (Allen, 1988; 
Dosi and Orsenigo, 1988; David, 1993). What they leave largely unanswered, however, 
is the question why particular routines or conventions stabilize over time without being 
challenged and replaced by more recent network interaction?
Following Bourdieu (1977, 1990), whose theory was developed in the previous 
chapter, I want to ague that the cultural processes of approbation, approval and 
recognition by the collectivity of other actors are crucial to the stabilization of action 
frameworks.14 The temporal stabilization of action frameworks and the reproduction of 
their practices and routines in time is only possible because of a shared, collective 
recognition of an action by other actors. This, in turn, is connected with the exercise of
l4Some evolutionary economists (e g David, 1985, 1993, or Dosi and Orsenigo, 1988) do acknowledge 
that the selection and stabilization of particular institutional arrangements depends on the collective 
processes o f approbation and acceptance o f routines by others. They stress that such acceptance can be 
either purposive (such as an attempt to be compatible with others in the case o f adjusting to technological 
development) or unreflective (as with the unrettective acceptance o f a dominant routine) (David, 1985, 
1993). However, neither David, nor any other evolutionary economist, seem to provide a more general 
framework for explaining the stabilization of institutional and cultural forms over time (Nelson, 1994; 
Bames, 1997). Instead, many evolutionary economists resort to a somewhat mechanistic concept o f path- 
dependency and increasing returns (Arthur, 1989; David, 1993).
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symbolic power and results in the production of shared meanings. As in the previous 
chapter in relation to the concept of practice, so equally here, the concepts of social and 
symbolic capital, symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1977,1990) as well as translation and 
enrolment (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991) appear to provide a fruitful way for specifying 
the relationship between the production of meanings, collective recognition and the 
temporal stabilization of action frameworks.
The fact of collective recognition gives individual actors the symbolic power to 
make their actions an accepted and legitimate standard of behaviour. Such action may 
be later reproduced by others and turned into a collective practice or a shared routine 
which further confirms the symbolic power of those who are recognized (Bourdieu, 
1977, 1990, 1993b). The exercise of symbolic power thus allows for both the 
reproduction and the stabilization of practices and routines. However, in order to 
achieve such a symbolic power of recognition and to stabilize routines over time, actors 
need to make others accept and recognize a particular meaning or interpretation of 
specific routines. This happens through the processes of translation and enrolment 
(Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991).
To give an example of the processes through which actors stabilize actions into 
routines and practices, we can think of, say, a practice of order sharing among several 
small firms in one area. If one owner of a small firm decides to make a move towards 
establishing such a practice, there are in principle two possible responses from other 
firms: either their owners accept such a behaviour and reciprocate in a similar way next 
time, or they take advantage of such a behaviour but do not behave in such a way 
themselves and do not reproduce the action.
In the first case, this action becomes accepted and recognized by others as 
legitimate and subsequently stabilized as a form of practice by the actions of those who 
reproduce it. For this to happen, however, other firm owners have to accept a particular 
meaning of the original action. They need to be enrolled into and persuaded about its 
particular positive meaning and regard such action as beneficial to themselves. That is, 
they need to interpret the original action as a well intentioncd one and understand it in a 
way which makes it logical for them to reproduce it (Latour, 1987; Murdoch, 1995).
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The collective reproduction of the new practice of order sharing thus leads to its 
stabilization over time. The actor who initiates such a practice has a wide range of 
options of how to translate the meaning of his/her action and enrol others in its 
interpretation - through personal recommendations, persuasion, friendly gestures, 
pointing out mutual advantage and so on.
Alternatively, actors might accept the offer for order sharing but without 
reproducing it. They can, of course, even refuse to get involved. In either case this 
means that they do not accept or recognize this action as legitimate, that they are not 
enrolled in its positive interpretation. For some reason they give this action a different 
meaning and, as a consequence, they prevent it from becoming a practice that is 
collectively reproduced and stabilized over time.
The stabilization of practices and routines in the form of an action framework 
thus depends on the collective recognition of actors and on the processes of translation 
and enrolment. Actors can take an active part in producing the meaning of an action, use 
their networks to enrol others in its particular interpretation and effectively transform, as 
well as stabilize, routines within the action framework of others. A successful process of 
cultural translation and enrolment thus effectively allows actors to transform their 
networked social capital into the symbolic power of collective recognition (Bourdieu, 
1977, 1993b; Latour, 1987; Pels, 1997). It allows them to become recognized mediators 
who orchestrate recognition (Gallon, 1991, 1998) and control the meaning of actions 
and practices. A successful translation of meanings by mediators and the enrolment of 
others in the reproduction of such meanings thus represent the actual process through 
which individual action frameworks are stabilized over time.
The concept of action framework in this culturally informed understanding has a 
further feature which is of crucial importance for an explanation of the diverse 
adaptability of regions. The history of successful past translations and enrolment which 
helped to stabilize the present action framework of actors also created a specific form of 
logic (Amin and Hausner, 1997) or rationality with a degree of irreversibility (Latour, 
1987; Gallon, 1991). Depending on the process of their institutionalization (Amin and 
Thrift, 1994a, 1997; Bames, 1997; Amin, 1998), such locally-specific forms of
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rationality give particular significance and recognition to certain practices within 
individual action frameworks as well as in specific spatio-temporal contexts.
Thus an explanation of the diverse ability of regions to adapt cannot be reduced 
to an action framework understood as a set of'untraded interdependencies', relations, 
conventions and routines (Storper, 1997; Storper and Salais, 1997) simply added 
together. The concept of action framework needs also to take into account the cultural 
processes of translation, enrolment, and symbolic recognition that give such routines 
their particular meaning and create unique and partly irreversible forms of rationality.
Hence, the understanding of the concept of action framework as it is presented 
here is more complicated and fluid than the one suggested by Storper (1997), but it does 
form a viable basis for the socio-economic approach in geography. The concept of 
action framework as developed here includes the insights of the dynamic and temporal 
analysis advocated by evolutionary economics combined with the analysis of power 
based on Bourdieu's work and on actor-network theory. Such a 'wider1, culturally 
informed, understanding of action framework enables the research to explore the 
specific character of cultural processes of enrolment, translation and recognition which 
creates an existing action framework and thus explains its unique form of logic or 
rationality. Such forms of rationality can, in turn, form the basis for explaining the 
diverse preconditions for the competitiveness and adaptability of actors as well as 
regions.
This approach towards explaining the diverse adaptability of regions based on 
the concept of action framework, as developed so far, remedies the major shortcoming 
of evolutionary economics. By introducing the concepts of social and symbolic capital, 
recognition, translation and enrolment it provides a framework for explaining the 
processes that stabilize routines and practices into locally-specific action frameworks. It 
builds in the cultural contestation of meaning and thus avoids any oversocialized, 
functional explanation of the diverse economic performance of actors or regions. 
However, in order to make the concept of action framework suited to the analysis of a 
region's adaptability there is one more problem that needs to be tackled. This problem is
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related to the fact that regions commonly consist o f multiple action frameworks of 
practices, meanings and understandings and is addressed in the following section.
From action frameworks to regional institutional set-ups
In every region, at any one time, a large number of actors are involved simultaneously in
the processes of translation, enrolment and production of meaning which often
contradict one another. Every region, as a consequence, represents a site with multiple
action frameworks, a plural entity characterized by numerous systems of practices and
meanings with different forms of rationality and with varied degrees of stability. The
problem which this section tackles is the conceptualization of regions in a way which is
able to grasp their plural character and the contested nature of processes that constitute
them. Such a concept, arguably, has to be an essential part of the socio-economic
approach and its framework for explaining the differentiated adaptability and varied
success of regions in 'holding down' the process of internationalization.
Most geographers close to the socio-economic approach have recognized that
regions/localities represent a specific conjuncture of multiple cultural and institutional
forms (Amin and Thrift, 1997; Storper and Salais, 1997). It has been argued that places
"do not have pre-given identities, but are 'constructed out o f the juxtaposition, the intersection, the 
articulation, o f multiple social relations', and should be seen as shared spaces', 'riven with internal 
tensions and conflicts'" (Massey, 1991, p. 18-19; quoted in Amin and Thrift, 1994b, p. 9).
Localities are thus rarely identified with one single action framework. Instead, they are 
more commonly spaces inhabited by numerous individuals or groups of individuals 
whose action frameworks are perhaps not even based on very similar systems of 
meaning.
The regional culture or 'regional embeddedness' ean be described more 
appropriately as an outcome of the simultaneous operation of numerous processes of 
translation, enrolment, signification and recognition that produce a number of diverse 
action frameworks. Local actors - through the series of interactions between their 
networked social capital and the symbolic power of recognition (Bourdieu, 1977) -
/
simultaneously produce and reproduce a large number of diverse practices and 
meanings. These are stabilized through the processes of enrolment and translation
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(Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991) into action frameworks but with different degrees of 
success and local 'reach'15. This means that certain local action frameworks may involve 
practices and meanings which are recognized and shared by a greater number of actors 
than others. Some actors thus might recognize as legitimate only those practices which 
are recognized and accepted by some non-local authority (such as a multinational 
company or national government) to which they are connected through their networks.
At the same time, however, such practices may be regarded by the majority of local 
actors as unacceptable and contradicting the practice which the majority of actors 
recognize as legitimate. This may be the case because some practices have a limited 
'reach' within the locality; either because the processes of translation and enrolment 
were unsuccessful or has involved only a limited number of local actors.
In other words, the fact of the spatial proximity of actors within one locality in 
no way guarantees that they share and recognize the same system of meaning, or indeed 
that they share the same culture. Moreover, regions are not closed and autonomous 
units; they can only be understood by taking into consideration the sets of relations and 
networks that connect local actors with other actors in others places (Massey, 1995; 
Meegan 1995; Allen et a i, 1998). Regions and localities therefore seem to be mostly 
sites of co-presence of heterogeneous cultural and institutional forms (Amin and Thrift,
1994a; Massey, 1995; Allen et al., 1998).
Different systems of meaning and practices, however, are not simply co-present 
within regions. They also 'come together' and co-exist in space in specific ways while 
the "simultaneous presence of multiple logics [...] yields complex ecologies of meaning 
(Grabber and Stark, 1997b, p. 535). An understanding of regions as 'ecologies' implies 
that there is always an important degree of mutual dependence, interaction and overlap 
between actors in space even if their action frameworks are quite different (Amin and 
Thrift, 1994a; Amin and Hausner, 1997; Storper and Salais, 1997). Regions are thus 
characterized not simply by juxtapositions of diverse action frameworks, but also by
15By local 'reach' o f individual meanings or practices I mean how many actors are successfully enrolled 
and translated, how strongly they adhere to the one, specific interpretation of reality, and, as a 
consequence o f this, how stable are their action frameworks. Such reach reflects the structure and quality 
o f the social and symbolic capital that different mediators mobilize and use during the processes o f 
translation and enrolment.
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unique sets of relations between them, by different forms of interdependence, co­
existence and degrees of coordination that have developed between local action 
frameworks over time.
The interactions and interdependence among different action frameworks in 
space produce what Amin and Hausner term 'institutional set-ups' (1997, p. 14). The 
concept of institutional set-up, I believe, is sufficiently broad as well as concrete to 
describe and analyze the adaptability of the ecologies of meanings that regions 
represent. The concept of regional institutional set-up is more specific than the rather 
vague and general notion of'regional culture', while it also represents more than a sum 
of the action frameworks present in a locality. An institutional set-up also involves the 
relations and networks by which the action frameworks of different local actors are 
connected, 'held together1 and integrated between themselves, and which produce unique 
rationalities, logics of governance and coherence. The locally-specific forms of 
rationality produced by the coordination of.local institutional set-ups are important 
because they can have a crucial - positive or negative - impact on the adaptability of a 
whole region.
The adaptability of regions and their ability to 'hold down' the process of 
internationalization is therefore dependent on the character of two important aspects that 
characterize any institutional set-up. First, on the variety of action frameworks present 
in the locality and their individual rationalities. And second, on the character of 
networked relations between diverse local action frameworks; that is, by the form of 
their coordination within a unique collective logic and rationality. Both the varieties of 
action framework and the form of their coordination together constitute locally-specific 
cultural and institutional forms that need to be analyzed in order to explain and assess ' 
the diverse adaptive capacities of regions. So how should such an analysis and 
assessment be accomplished?
It has been suggested in the previous sections that the adaptive capacity of 
individual actors can be explained by analyzing their action frameworks with specific 
forms of rationality since these to a large extent shape the.actions of actors. This 
analysis should be done in a processual and non-functional way, that is, by analyzing the
interactions between the networked social capital of actors and their symbolic power 
(Bourdieu, 1977, 1990) which, in turn, may lead to successful processes of enrolment 
and translation (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991), stabilize the meanings of actions and turn 
them into collectively reproduced practices. The analysis of cultural processes of 
translation and enrolment should therefore play a crucial role in an explanation of the 
stabilization and transformation of individual local action frameworks and serve as a 
basis for an assessment of the differentiated adaptability of actors.
The adaptability of individual actors and their action frameworks, however, 
represents only one important aspect of regional adaptability. The adaptability of 
regional economies also depends on the cultural processes through which local 
mediators can 'hold together' different action frameworks and constitute specific forms 
of coordination between them. Moreover, these processes of translation, enrolment and 
production of meaning need to be analyzed in order to explain and assess the character 
of regional institutional set-ups and their differentiated adaptability.
These claims, however, raise further questions related to the character of 
adaptable institutional set-ups. What kind of cultural processes make action frameworks 
adaptable? And what form of their integration increases the ability of whole regions to 
accommodate and adapt to novelties? What can we say about the character of processes 
that increase the capacity of regional institutional set-ups "to evolve in order to compete" 
(Amin and Hausner, 1997, p. 28; original emphasis)? In the rest of this chapter an 
attempt is made to answer these questions and to specify under what circumstances the 
diversity of meanings, practices and networks articulates into a successful and adaptable 
institutional set-up.
ADAPTABILITY AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF REGIONS 
Two dimensions of regional adaptability
The ability of regions to constantly accommodate and adapt to alternative meanings and 
practices and to learn from this process has been identified by several researchers as
critical to the economic success of regions (Grabber, 1993b, c; Amin and Thrift, 1994a, 
1995, 1997; Gertler, 1997; Grabber and Stark, 1997b; Morgan, 1997; Storper and 
Salais, 1997; Amin, 1998). Most localities are constantly confronted with new meanings 
and new practices which challenge and might transform the existing action frameworks 
of local actors as well as the whole local institutional set-ups. Only some regions, 
however, are able to 'hold down' such challenges in a productive way. Such adaptable 
regions are capable of using alternative interpretations as a basis for collective reflection 
and reinterpretation of an existing system of conventions, practices and meanings 
(Storper, 1995,1997). They can turn them into a source of a sustained reinterpretation 
and a continuous process of adaptation (Grabber, 1993b, c).
More to the point, regions which have 'learnt' to use alternative practices as a 
basis for reflection and for a collective reinterpretation of actors' action frameworks also 
seem to be more likely to create innovative forms of action and independent, locally- 
based sources of competitiveness (Sabel, 1993; Storper and Salais, 1997; Grabber and 
Stark, 1997b; Amin, 1998). These abilities are also at the centre of the region's success 
in 'holding down' the process of internationalization and in gaining maximum benefits 
from an integration into the global economic processes (Amin and Thrift, 1994b). The 
critical question then is how can regions achieve an institutional set-up which is 
conducive to a continuous reinterpretation and adaptation that could also increase their 
competitiveness?
The first half of this chapter argued that an explanation of the varied regional 
adaptability requires one to analyze simultaneously the cultural processes of mediation, 
translation, enrolment and production of meaning along two dimensions. The first 
involves analyzing the action frameworks of individual local actors mid their capacity 
to accommodate alternative meanings and practices. The second involves analyzing the 
coordination of regional institutional set-up and the character of processes through 
which a collectivity of diverse local actors is enrolled in the accommodation of new 
impulses. Both these dimensions of regional adaptability are important and both need to 
be understood in order to provide an appropriate explanation as well as an assessment of 
the differentiated ability of regions to adapt and to 'hold down' novel practices. The two
subsequent sections address, in turn, these two dimensions of regional adaptability and 
try to specify the character of cultural processes that are likely to increase the 
adaptability of regional institutional set-ups.
The adaptability of action frameworks: the character of a 'perfect translation'
The successful accommodation of a new, alternative practice into an actor's action 
framework depends on the character of the processes of translation and enrolment. If a 
new impulse (alternative practice or meaning) is to be successfully accommodated by an 
individual, it needs to be translated and reinterpreted in a way that is compatible with 
the actor's action framework. It needs to be made intelligible to the actor and it needs to 
reconcile and align his/her views, interests and attitudes with views and interests of 
other actors associated with the alternative interpretation (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991; 
Murdoch, 1995). The success or failure in accommodating a new impulse into an action 
framework of actors reflects the ability of mediators to enrol others (Gallon, 1991,
1998), that is, to make them accept a particular vision of the world, align their interests 
and agree on the appropriateness of certain practices and meanings.
A 'perfect translation', as defined by Gallon (1991, p. 145), leads to just such an 
alignment of interests and it m akes actors agree on the interpretation of different 
meanings and practices. This process, as a by-product, mutually adjusts the roles and 
understandings of all actors who are enrolled in the translation (Gallon, 1991; Murdoch,
1995). In other words, a perfect translation is a process which allows actors to 
accommodate and internalize alternative interpretations as well as adjust their action 
frameworks to incorporate them. The activity of mediators adjusts the interpretation of a 
new practice in a way which enables actors to internalize it and to integrate it within a 
system of meaning which they recognize (Gallon, 1991, 1998).
However, the 'perfection' of the processes of enrolment and translation does not 
imply that "everyone does the same thing [but rather that] the activities of actors [who 
were enrolled] fit together despite their heterogeneity" (Gallon, 1991, p. 148). The 
enrolment of actors in a particular translation does not necessarily mean that the diverse 
meanings and practices which they recognize as legitimate have to merge or become the
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same. Instead, a perfect translation implies that the actors enrolled are willing to 
communicate with each other, that they can negotiate their differences with one another, 
and thus achieve a mutual adjustment of their original action frameworks (Gallon, 1991; 
Amin and Thrift, 1995; Murdoch, 1995; Amin and Hausner, 1997). This process enables 
actors to perceive their own system of meanings and practices as compatible with those 
of others and thus opens the way for innovative forms of action (Sabel, 1993).
The precondition for a perfect translation is a degree of collective recognition 
enjoyed by the mediators who are translating and enrolling others. It is the symbolic 
power of recognition (Bourdieu, 1977,1990) exercised by mediators which makes their 
translations able to create a "consensus on the meaning of the social world" (Bourdieu, 
1991, p. 166). The collective recognition of mediated and translated meanings generates 
a shared space, an equivalence among diverse actors who are enrolled (Gallon, 1991, p. 
145) which is demonstrated by a degree of mutual trust among actors. It is trust in a 
generalized form16 (Sabel, 1993; Misztal, 1996; Shapin, 1998); a form of trust which is 
an expression of "shared expectations [...] and confidence that the expectations are and 
will continue to be shared" (Sabel, 1993, p. 110). The enrolment in a perfect translation 
thus allows actors to trust in the stability of a particular shared interpretation and in the 
ability of others to communicate, decode and interpret meanings in particular ways. 
Moreover, the trust characteristic of a perfect translation smoothes the interaction 
among heterogeneous actors and facilitates the mobilization of networks between them 
(Gallon, 1991).
Importantly, the degrees of trust and the 'perfection' of a translation provided by 
mediators directly influences the ability of individuals to accommodate and internalize 
new meanings and practices. The fact that a perfect translation ensures that actors with
16lt is stressed that we talk here about the notion o f trust as a generalized social construct to contrast it 
with the understanding o f trust in the oversocialized understanding o f embeddedness or with the approach 
o f  NES criticized in the previous chapter. Both these approaches have a tendency to regard trust only as a 
characteristic o f mutual relations between interacting individuals. Here, in contrast, trust is regarded as a 
collective aspect o f an exercise o f symbolic power, i.e. a trust in what is recognized by a collectivity of 
actors. This form of trust can only be understood by studying the interactions o f social and symbolic 
capital and the processes of translation and enrolment which create such a collective recognition. This 
notion o f trust, I believe, is also different from the functional understanding o f trust which acts as the 
means o f reducing uncertainty (Luhmann, 1979), or from a purely self-interested construction o f 
cooperative, trust-based relations suggested by game theory and rational choice models (Gambetta, 1988; 
for a critique see Misztal, 1996).
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diverse action frameworks are compatible and that it facilitates communication between 
them represents the key towards an understanding of actors' adaptability. This kind of 
translation results in the commensinability and alignment of different action 
frameworks (but not in their merging of homogenization) (Gallon, 1991) and thus 
represents the actual process which enables actors to respond and adapt to new 
impulses. Moreover, the trust and mutual adjustment involved in the process of perfect 
translation increase the chances that actors will be able to draw on each other's 
interpretation and thus reinterpret the meaning of their existing practices. Such a process 
of reinterpretation may, in turn, create new interpretative possibilities for actors, create 
scope for innovative forms of action and therefore increase their potential for 
competitiveness (Sabel, 1993, 1994; Storper and Salais, 1997).
The adaptability of regions thus depends on the ability of louai actors to adjust 
their action frameworks to alternative interpretations through the continued process of a 
perfect translation. However, the adaptability of regions as plural and collective entities 
also involves the coordination and integration of diverse action frameworks that co-exist 
in space. It is to this that we now turn and look at the specific character of cultural 
processes which can align and 'hold together' the diversity of action frameworks in a 
way that increases the adaptability of whole regions.
The adaptability of regions: the coordination of institutional set-ups
Although the adaptability of individual actors is very important for the overall adaptive 
capacity of regions, it cannot be reduced to a sum of individual adaptabilities. The 
major difference between the adaptability of regions and that of individual actors is that 
regions may accommodate a new, alternative impulse into its ecology of meanings, and 
yet, this fact does not necessarily turn the new impulse into a source of collective, 
locally-based reinterpretation, innovation and learning. The institutional set-ups of 
regions represent a multiplicity of action frameworks that co-exist in space and the 
overall adaptability of regions is therefore influenced also by the effects that the 
processes of accommodation and adaptation have on the action frameworks of other 
actors and on the constitution of the local institutional set-up.
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The adaptability of one local actor thus may or may not lead to the adaptability 
of the whole region. Whether it does or does not depends on the concrete character of 
the processes of translation and enrolment involved in accommodating a new practice 
and on their 'reach' within the locality. In some cases the accommodation of a new 
impulse by one local actor may result in a collective reinterpretation of practices and 
learning among other, heterogeneous local actors. In other cases, however, such 
accommodation and adaptation may also be restricted to the action framework of one 
local actor alone. In both of these cases the result will be a successful adaptation of 
actors which may perhaps make the whole region look adaptable too. Each of the cases, 
however, will have different consequences for the ability of the region to 'hold down' 
alternative meanings in a way that secures a sustained process of reinterpretation and 
long term adaptability. In other words, the character of adaptability in the two regions 
may be quite different.
On the one hand, some regions might appear adaptable because a small number 
of local actors are (through their personal networks) well connected to sources of 
alternative meanings and practices outside their locality (e.g. a multinational company). 
These actors might be enrolled in a perfect translation of alternative practices and thus 
show signs of adaptation despite the fact that the majority of local actors are not 
included in the adaptation process at all. The limited 'reach' of such a perfect translation 
would thus lead to a fragmented institutional set-up whereby local actors exist in mutual 
exclusion and are unable or unwilling to communicate with each other.
Some actors within the region might still prove to be responsive to new impulses 
and their adaptation may even produce innovative practices. Their adaptability, 
however, would be dependent on the external ties, while the creative and innovative 
potential of local actors would not be utilized. The limited collective reinterpretation 
and adjustment of actors within the locality would be unlikely to trigger a sustained 
process of adaptation nurtured from the resources of local institutional variety. The 
disadvantage of such an institutional arrangement is that the isolation between the action 
frameworks of local actors would prevent the process of accommodation from 
stimulating a collective reflection and reinterpretation among local actors, as well as
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restrict the potential for locally-based innovation (Sabel, 1993). Rather than adaptable, 
the institutional set-up of such a region can be more appropriately described as 'adaptive' 
(Grabber, 1993c, 1997), that is, capable of adjustment but not characterized by an 
autonomous reflexivity or an independent capacity to 'learn to adapt' (Grabber, 1993b, c; 
Amin and Hausner, 1997; Amin, 1998).
In other regions, on the other hand, the accommodation of the same new practice 
or meaning by one local actor might lead to a reassessment and reinterpretation of the 
action frameworks of other local actors too. The process of perfect translation would 
then have a substantial local 'reach'. The process of adaptation, as a consequence, can 
'bring together1 diverse action frameworks of local actors and smooth the interaction 
among them. Eventually, this process may result in an integrated institutional set-up 
which allows local actors to align their diverse interests and form a basis for a shared 
system of meaning and for collective trust.
The coordination of an integrated institutional set-up is based on a common 
interest and a system of shared meanings which enable local actors with diverse action 
frameworks to draw on a collective 'pool' of networks, routines, practices and skills. The 
greater the number of heterogeneous local actors enrolled and translated, the greater is 
this common 'pool' and.the greater are the chances that the local institutional variety will 
stimulate an innovative form of response from one or several local actors. Moreover, 
due to the close integration of a local set-up, any innovative local response can be 
accommodated also by other local actors and lead to a further reinterpretation within the 
locality. The process of perfect translation which enrols a large number of diverse local 
actors is thus more likely to create new interpretative possibilities that are independent 
of external networks and to secure a continuous process of autonomous reflection and 
localized learning. The integrated institutional set-up thus seems crucial for the long 
term adaptability of regions, for the capacity of regions to sustain the process of 
collective reinterpretation and to "become, or remain, self-regenerating growth poles in 
the global economy" (Amin and Thrift, 1997, p. 147; original emphasis).
The fragmented and integrated institutional set-ups are, of course, just simple 
model' examples. The reality is bound to be more complex and neither a complete
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fragmentation, nor a complete integration of all actors within any locality is likely to be 
the case. However, these 'model' examples demonstrate that an explanation of region's 
long term adaptability and its ability to 'hold down' the process of internationalization 
cannot be achieved simply by exploring the ability of individual local actors to 
accommodate novelties. It also needs to consist of an analysis focused on the process 
through which local actors - with different degrees of success - become what Gallon 
(1991,1998) calls 'mediators'. In this process local actors transform their networked 
social capital into a symbolic power of recognition (Bourdieu, 1977) by enrolling others 
and translating the meanings for them (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991). Depending on the 
character of translation and enrolment produced by local mediators, the process of 
accommodating a novel practice can have a diverse local 'reach' and thus increase either 
the integration or the fragmentation of an institutional set-up.
The regional adaptability thus has two aspects: the adaptability of the action 
frameworks of local actors and the form of integration associated with the local 
institutional set-up. The cultural processes which transform each of these aspects need 
to be analyzed simultaneously in order to explain the different ability of regions to 'hold 
down' new impulses.17 Furthermore, the argument developed thus far suggests that the 
ability o f  local m ediators to sustain perfect translations and give them considerable local 
'reach' will increase regional adaptability as well as stimulate the potential for locally- 
based innovation and competitiveness. The following, final section of this chapter will 
examine the validity of such normative claims and will also outline the limitations of 
the socio-economic approach in predicting the long term adaptability of regional 
economies.
Regional adaptability and competitiveness: the limitations of the socio-economic 
approach
,7The empirical chapters (see Chapter Six, Seven and Eight) will further explore and substantiate this 
argument in relation to the process o f internationalization in the Czech Republic. These chapters will also 
demonstrate that the distinction between adaptability and ’adaptiveness’ would not be possible without 
analyzing simultaneously the adaptability o f individual actors' action frameworks as well as the form o f 
coordination o f  local institutional set-up.
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The foregoing discussion suggested that the sustained process of perfect translation 
combined with an integrated regional institutional set-up creates conditions conducive 
to a continuous, locally-based process of collective reinterpretation, learning and 
competitiveness. This normative argument, however, requires a further elaboration and 
qualification in order to prevent any oversimplified conclusion. This elaboration 
requires an important distinction between the adaptability and competitiveness of 
regions.
The adaptability of regions, their capacity to accommodate new impulses and 
turn them into a basis for collective reflection and learning can only be established in 
relation to the impulses that confront the region. In other words, the adaptability of a 
region is relative to the diverse networks, practices and meanings which enter the region 
and thus may be potentially accommodated within the action frameworks of local 
actors.
The competitiveness of regions, on the other hand, is related to the practices and 
meanings produced by the large number of actors who operate in different parts of the 
globalized socioeconomic system. Their activities continuously create new meanings 
and novel interpretations of practices which might potentially become a new source of 
competitiveness. Inevitably, many of these activities only take place in some regions 
while other regions might never confront them. As a consequence, some localities may 
be simply bypassed by alternative interpretations; they may miss entirely particular new 
practices or meanings that could become crucial for their competitiveness in the future.
In concrete terms, some regions might be able to accommodate novelties and use 
them as a basis for collective reinterpretation and learning. Such regions might be 
adaptable and create preconditions for a locally-based, autonomous competitiveness and 
yet, this positive institutional set-up might not be sufficient to create a competitive 
regional economy. The reason is that the regional competitiveness depends also 
Crucially on what enters the locality in the form of networked relations (Grabber and 
Stark. 1997b) and what forms the basis for reflection and learning among local actors.
The competitiveness of regions is, unlike their adaptability, related also to the 
ability of local actors to create networks capable of sustaining an influx of new impulses
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that represent potential sources of future competitiveness. The ability to maintain an 
inflow of such alternative interpretations is crucially important even for regions that are 
competitive at present. These regions also could be bypassed by novel interpretations in 
the future and thus lose their competitive advantage.
Moreover, every region which undergoes a successful process of adaptation and 
increases the integration of its institutional set-up also creates a potential threat to its 
future adaptability and competitiveness. This is because a perfect translation, an 
alignment of interests and creation of shared interpretations can become entrenched to 
the point of determining future translations (Gallon, 1991, p. 143). Due to a 'perfection' 
of a particular process of translation, actors might come to reproduce a limited number 
of existing practices and meanings in an unreflective way and close themselves to 
alternatives.
At the regional level, a similar process can take place within an integrated and 
competitive institutional set-up. Local actors might find it easy to interact with each 
other and might even reassure each other of the correctness of their interpretation. 
However, the 'perfection' of a translation and the local 'reach' of enrolment may 
eventually make actors 'blind' to alternative interpretations and experience what Grabber 
calls a 'cognitive lock-in' (1993c, p. 262). The whole region, as a consequence, might 
become unable to adjust and respond to novel practices to the point when it suffers from 
an 'institutional lock-in1 (Grabber, 1993c). In this way the institutional set-up of a region 
that once successfully accommodated a new impulse and aligned action frameworks of 
heterogeneous local actors can easily become an obstacle to its future adaptability and 
competitiveness (Grabber, 1993b, c; Amin and Thrift, 1994a; Glasmeier, 1994; Grabber 
and Stark, 1997b; Malmberg, 1997; Amin, 1998). Moreover, some empirical studies 
suggest that a transformation of a successful set-up into one which is 'locked in' can take 
place within a relatively short period of time (Grabber, 1993b; Sabel, 1993; Locke,
1996).
To avoid or minimize the risk of regional institutional lock-in, as. well as the risk 
of being bypassed, a region needs to remain open to alternative interpretations of 
existing practices (Grabber, 1993b, c; Amin and Thrift, 1995, 1997; Grabber and Stark,
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1997a, b). Such an openness to alternatives could temporarily undermine the 
cohesiveness of the locality and increase the fragmentation of a local institutional set­
up, yet the same openness could also avert the negative consequences of a potential 
institutional lock-in and decrease the risk of missing out on the novel interpretative 
possibilities.
The long term competitiveness of regions thus depends on the ability of their 
institutional set-ups to sustain the process of adaptation and locally-based reflection and 
learning. At the same time, however, it also depends on the ability of local actors to 
identify and accommodate alternatives which might, at some future date, become a 
source of competitiveness (Amin, 1998). It is impossible, of course, to know in advance 
future sources of competitiveness, so we can only conclude that the long term regional 
competitiveness requires a degree of disruption to the integrated institutional set-ups.
Several authors have tried to explore this issue by arguing that long term 
competitiveness and adaptability require a degree of 'friction' (Hodgson, 1988), 
'redundancy' and 'loose coupling' (Grabber 1993b, c), 'discrepancy' (Grabber and Stark, 
1997b), or 'network of loose alliances' (Amin and Hausner, 1997, p. 12). These 
characteristics are likely to keep local actors alert, to increase the chance that no crucial 
alternative interpretation is missed and that no single interpretation becomes excessively 
dominant. However, the precise degree of friction or redundancy required seems 
impossible to specify beforehand. Even for the most successful regions, their long term 
competitiveness cannot be guaranteed and at some point their institutional set-up may 
become obsolete.
This conclusion, however, should not be understood as the inability of research 
to suggest ways that may increase the competitiveness of regions and which can prevent 
their institutional lock-in. The research, I want to argue, can contribute substantially to 
such a task, but it should not attempt to specify a 'model' institutional set-up with some 
specific cultural features as a way to greater competitiveness. The success of regional 
economies and the sustenance of their competitiveness should be regarded instead as a 
process of a continuous search for a compromise between the openness and the 
integration of their institutional set-ups. To maintain their competitiveness regions and
their actors need to strike a delicate balance between, on the one hand, the enrolment, 
alignment and integration of local institutional variety and, on the other hand, the 
preservation of openness to new impulses. Some regions might require a closer 
integration of diverse local practices and meanings that would allow local actors to 
exploit the potential of the existing institutional variety. Other regions, on the contrary, 
might require a greater openness that would disrupt their integrated institutional set-up, 
but would increase their limited cultural and institutional variety. Rather than a 
universal model, the aim of the research should then be an assessment of the character 
o f local institutional set-ups, their integration or fragmentation, and the search for a 
compromise between integration and openness.
A culturally informed socio-economic approach, as advocated and developed in 
this chapter, I believe, provides a useful framework within which to analyze the 
character of local institutional set-ups and assess the adaptability and competitiveness of 
regions. The acknowledgement of the contested and evolutionary nature of the 
socioeconomy, however, prevents this approach from making any general or universal 
statements about the character of an adaptable and competitive institutional set-up. This 
is probably the limit of what a culturally informed socio-economic perspective can say 
about the long term competitiveness and adaptability of regions.
CONCLUSION: SUMMARY OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter has sought to develop a framework which provides a conceptual lens for 
analyzing the forms of embeddedness in individual regions and for assessing their long 
term adaptability. This framework does not underestimate the importance of 
traditionally 'economic' factors, but it aims to collapse the artificial distinction between 
the 'economic' and 'social/cultural' characteristics.
The present approach is based on the work of geographers close to the socio­
economic approach (Amin and Thrift, 1995, 1997; Amin and Hausner, 1997; Grabber 
and Stark, 1997a, b; Storper, 1995, 1997; Storper and Salais, 1997) which it combines 
with the theoretical work of Bourdieu (1977, 1990, 1991) and with the actor-network
71
theory (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991). Its aim is to explain the differentiated economic 
success of regions by analyzing meanings and practices that are recognized by actors in 
individual regional contexts (i.e. instead of attempting to extract 'ingredients' of social 
and cultural characteristics 'responsible' for diverse economic performance). This is 
done by exploring the ways in which contested meanings and practices have stabilized 
over time into action frameworks and institutional set-ups that, in turn, create specific 
forms of rationality with diverse preconditions for the adaptability and competitiveness 
of regions. This analysis of locally-specific forms of embeddedness and the explanation 
of their diverse adaptability can be described as dynamic, processual and non-functional.
It has been argued that the research, in order to explain the diverse ability of 
regions to adapt and 'hold down' novel practices, has to analyze the character of 
individual action frameworks as well as regional institutional set-ups. The claim has 
also been made that such an explanation and assessment needs to focus on the cultural 
processes through which actors become mediators (Gallon, 1991, 1998) capable of 
stabilizing and reproducing systems of meanings, practices and networked relations in 
individual regions.
In the part analyzing the issue of adaptability this chapter has suggested that the 
combination of a sustained process of perfect translation with an integrated institutional 
set-up will lead to an inclusiveness and a greater local 'reach' of translations. This will 
also increase the chances for the collective adaptation of actors which is, in turn, more 
likely to stimulate a reflection and learning within the locality and thus produce 
innovative interpretative possibilities and locally-based sources of competitiveness 
(Sabel, 1993, 1994; Storper, 1995, 1997).
The sustained economic success of regions, however, cannot be reduced to any 
form of institutional arrangement. It represents a process of searching for a compromise 
between the sustained process of perfect translation and an integration of heterogeneous 
action frameworks on the one hand, and a preservation of a degree of openness, which 
disrupts the process of perfect translation but sustains the inflow of alternative practices 
and interpretations. Ultimately, it is the ability to find the 'right' balance between the two 
that allows for 'holding down' of new impulses in a productive way, that is, in a way
which creates new interpretative possibilities and which may increase the 
competitiveness of regions.
There is no direct, chain-like causality in the evolutionary explanation of 
regional adaptability and competitiveness as it has been conceptualized here. This, 
however, does not mean that anything can happen, or that the culturally informed socio­
economic approach cannot present any normative claims in respect of the prospective 
adaptability of regions. The evolutionary character of regional institutional set-ups 
produces a degree of irreversibility (Gallon, 1991) which means that by analyzing the 
process of its evolution and stabilization in time we can deduce something about the 
possible future development of regions (Nelson, 1994; Storper and Salais, 1997). The 
socio-economic approach "can make no claims to predictability or determinacy" 
(Storper and Salais, 1997, p. 197), but it can nevertheless, contribute in an important 
way to the assessment of institutional set-ups and their adaptability. Moreover, it also 
represents a basis for evaluating which regional "pathways of development are more 
likely than others, and [which] are quite unlikely" (Storper and Salais, 1997, p. 197).
The empirical chapters of this thesis employ the theoretical framework 
developed in this and the previous chapter in the analysis and assessment of three 
regional institutional set-ups in the Czech Republic. However, before we turn to the 
issue of the adaptability of Czech regions and their ability to 'hold down' the process of 
internationalization in the post-1989 period, the analysis will focus on the 
socioeconomic system of Communist countries. The next chapter will explore the 
processes that produced uneven regional development in the Communist Czech 
Republic through the conceptual lens of a culturally sensitive socio-economic 
framework. It will also examine what diverse preconditions these processes produced 
for the adaptability and competitiveness of regions in the post-Communist period.
CHAPTER THREE: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
LEGACIES OF A CENTRALLY PLANNED 
ECONOMY
INTRODUCTION
The post-Communist economy of the Czech Republic, which is the empirical focus of 
this thesis, has gone through dramatic changes over the past ten years since the collapse 
of Communism in 1989. The transformation and marketization of thé economic system 
previously based on central planning resulted in a complex reworking and 
reconfiguration of the practices, networks, and associated meanings inherited from the 
previous regime (Stark, 1992,1995; Swaan and Lissowska, 1996; Rôna-Tas, 1998;
Smith and Pickles, 1998). The 'rupture' in the socioeconomic evolution of the formerly 
Communist countries led to a substantial réévaluation of the inherited practices through 
new, and often radically different, means of recognition and legitimation. This process 
can be regarded as a 'test of adaptability' of the inherited institutional legacies in which 
the performance of individual Eastern European countries as well as regions do and 
certainly will continue to vary. This variety of regional socioeconomic transformation 
and the differential success of regions in achieving competitiveness in the market- 
oriented environment are an outcome of a combined effect of two factors which are both 
bound to vary over space. First, regional differences will reflect the different 
institutional legacies of locally-specific practices, networks and understandings, which, 
despite the 'rupture' in the socioeconomic evolution, will be partly irreversible. And 
second, they will also reflect the different ways in which local actors use, rework and 
transform these legacies (Stark, 1995; Grabber and Stark, 1997a, b; Smith and Swain,
1998).
The crucial role of the legacies of the past, therefore, requires that before we 
embark on an analysis of the post-Communist transformation we need to have some 
understanding of the processes which guided the operation of the centrally planned 
economies. The aim of the present chapter is to provide precisely such an insight into
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the processes which created the legacies of post-Communist countries and regions of the 
1990s. This is done by employing the theoretical framework developed in the previous 
two chapters to an analysis of the operation of the centrally planned Communist 
economies or, more specifically, of the centrally planned economy of Czechoslovakia.
The chapter starts by specifying some of the basic differences between the logic 
of socialist, centrally planned economies and capitalist economies, and for this purpose 
it explores the notion of'soft-budget constraints' (Komai, 1981). The next section 
employs the theoretical concepts of social and symbolic capital in an attempt to explain 
the actual, shadow coordination mechanisms characteristic of the Communist 
economies. This section describes the relationship between the recognized, official 
economy of Communism and the officially unrecognized, illegitimate informal 
networks which nevertheless played a critical role in the running of the economy and in 
the process of translating the formal rules of central planning into everyday informal 
practices. The following two sections turn towards the regional inequality produced by 
the functioning of the centrally planned economies. Here the stress is placed on the role 
of the locally-specific translations, that held together - with different degrees of success 
- elements of the official and informal economies in a form of local coalitions. It is 
argued that the locally-specific translations were responsible for unique forms of 
coordination of diverse action frameworks and resulted in a specific Communist form of 
uneven regional development. The conclusion explains how the operation of informal 
networks and local coalitions contributed to the final collapse of the centrally planned 
economic system and also sets the scene for the following chapter by stressing the 
importance of institutional legacies for the outcome of the post-Communist regional 
transformation.
THE CHARACTER AND FUNCTIONING OF CENTRAL PLANNING 
The ideal and reality of socialist economies: planning and soft-budget constraints
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The fact that socialist economies were different from the capitalist ones is generally 
accepted and recognized. What made them so different, however, is a much more 
difficult question. According to Szelényi et al. (1994) who provide a detailed review of 
the literature on this topic, there are three main criteria which may be used to distinguish 
between them: first, the two systems are characterized by different forms of ownership; 
second, their integrative mechanisms are different; and third, the socialist economies 
have a unique form of economic rationality which is radically different from the 
capitalist one. The first criterion means that the socialist economic systems tried to 
suppress individual ownership and substitute it by a collective one. The difference in 
integrative mechanisms means that one of the priorities of socialism was to substitute 
the supposed 'anarchy' of the market by rational planning characterized by a longer term 
consideration of economic activities. The change from the mechanism of market 
coordination to one of planning is closely related to the third kind of difference, namely 
to the type of rationality that governed centrally planned economies. While the market 
economies are based on 'formal rationality', the socialist thinkers criticized it for its 
instrumental reason which allowed "the despotism of means over ends" (Szelényi et al., 
1994, p. 234) and the sacrifice of all other considerations to that of immediate profit 
maximization. The socialist planners on the other hand were supposed to possess the 
'substantive rationality' (Szelényi et a i,  1994, p. 234) which would allow them to 
determine the most efficient or optimal use of the surplus value of production in a way 
that would benefit the economy as a whole. The extracted surplus was supposed to be 
used for subsequent massive redistribution and an eventual eradication of all social 
inequalities.
It is a well known fact today that the reality of socialist economies looked very 
different from its original theoretical model and that they suffered from numerous 
chronic problems. In everyday practice the rationality of planning turned into a fairly 
irrational system which favoured the mass production of goods for which there was no 
demand, while at the same time leading to the persistent shortages of other goods 
(Szelényi et a i, 1994; Pickles, 1998). Also, the collective character of the ownership of 
economic means proved to be difficult to maintain in practice and it soon became clear
that the bureaucracy of state planners and directors of enterprises exercised de facto 
control of the property (Szelényi et a i,  1994; Mlêoch, 1997). The role of these people as 
privileged bureaucrats or 'nomenklatura"» in the socialist society was only justified and 
legitimized as long as they kept fulfilling the economic and political directives of the 
Communist Party which was the only officially recognized and legitimate authority in 
the society. This built-in condition, as we shall see later, paradoxically reduced the 
overall economic efficiency of the whole socialist economic system and proved the 
'substantive rationality' of socialism to be counterproductive in the long run.
Probably the best and most penetrating analysis to date of the microeconomic 
weaknesses of the socialist economy is provided by the Hungarian economist Janos 
Komai in his book Economics o f Shortage (1981). According to Komai, the crucial 
problem facing the centrally planned socialist economy is control over resources. The 
resources in the planned economy are subject to what Komai calls soft-budget 
constraints. This means that the budgets of socialist enterprises are not restricted by 
their accumulated profits because, in the socialist economy, the allocation of resources 
to enterprises is subject to negotiation and bargaining. Unlike capitalist firms, which can 
only produce as long as their production creates profits and their budget, inputs and 
resources are restricted by the criteria of their own profitability, their socialist 
counterparts can operate almost indefinitely despite apparent wastefulness of the use of 
inputs. Or more accurately, they can operate as long as the inputs and resources are 
available, as long as the planners provide them or the enterprise directors can mobilize
them and can justify their use.
Bargaining over resources and inputs was thus a crucial aspect of managing an
enterprise under Communism and took place largely between the directors and 
managers of state-owned enterprises and the state bureaucracy. However, each of the
demonstrations of loyalty to it.
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groups had rather different aims and interests. The aim of the state bureaucracy and its 
planners was to maximize their own pbwer by attempting to maximize the amount of 
goods and services (i.e. the surplus) at their disposal (Komai, 1959, quoted by Szelényi 
et a i, 1994), to withhold the inputs from the enterprises in order to accumulate more 
resources for further redistribution and planning purposes* The directors of state 
enterprises, on the other hand, had a direct interest in minimizing the production targets 
for their enterprises and in maximizing the resources and inputs allocated to them by the 
state bureaucracy. The motivation of directors was quite simple, in order to justify their 
position, to gain recognition in the eyes of the 'substantive rationality of central 
planning as well as the Communist Party (of which they all were members), they had to 
fulfil the plan and its targets by at least 100 per cent. Thus in order to perform 'well' and 
legitimize their posts, the directors had to make sure that the targets were realistically 
low and that their company was allocated sufficient resources to meet them.
The success of their legitimation then depended mostly on their networking and 
bargaining ability at all levels of the bureaucracy, including bargaining with the 
planning boards, sectoral ministries. The State Bank and other governmental bodies.
The existence of soft-budget constraints allowed directors of enterprises to negotiate and 
to bargain over anything from (usually quantitative) production targets and quotas, all 
kinds of subsidies allocated to enterprises, bank credits, to changes in administratively 
set prices of their products, infrastructure provision and housing development that could 
secure supply of extra labour force. Successful negotiators could obtain import 
permissions and supplies of hard currency for purchases of Western technology, funding 
for lucrative production activities or an allowance of export contracts, which further 
increased their prestige and recognition (Komai, 1981, Szelényi et al., 1994, Mlcoch,
1997, Pickles, 1998).
The combined effect of economic coordination based on soft-budget constraints
and bargaining was a hoarding of resources by all enterprise directors. This was 
effectively the safest way to guarantee the fulfilment of the plan (Komai, 1981) and the 
continued recognition of the directors by the political establishment. The enterprises 
kept hoarding all kinds of production inputs such as raw materials, spare parts for
machinery, fuel, labour force or even stationary for their administrative employees in 
order to satisfy the planned increase in output, energy consumption, or employment The 
ultimate result was an acute shortage of most goods, both of inputs into the corporate 
sector industrial production and especially of consumer goods intended for individual
consum ption.
As a response to the persistent and repeated shortages, the directors of state 
enterprises developed an informal, 'shadow' system of bargaining between enterprises 
based on barter and mutual reciprocity among directors (Kysilka, 1989; MKSoch, 1997).
Its aim was to fix the holes in the plan, to secure a reliable flow of supplies which could 
make sure that production ran smoothly and that the plan was fulfilled. Such bargaining 
and shadow coordination mechanisms were especially pronounced within the so called 
VHJs, the industrial conglomerates of enterprises with a similar or related production 
programme and a common administration of resources (for details about the importance
of the VHJ networks see Kysilka, 1989 or McDermott, 1997).
Bargaining and informal networks played an equally important role within the 
enterprises. They were crucial for negotiating the coordination of tasks and the supply of 
inputs between an enterprise headquarters and its divisions, between divisions, branches 
and departments, but also between the directors and the collectives of workers over 
issues such as the quality of work, speeding up of the production before the planned 
production deadlines, over provision of holidays or subsidised food for workers 
(McDermott, 1997; Pickles, 1998). All these activities, however, were not directed so 
much at fulfilling the plan but rather at its 'circumvention' (Smith and Swain, 1998, p. 
36). The informal shadow system of coordination helped enterprises to cope and obtain 
the inputs they needed to fulfil the plan, but at the same time it was gradually making 
the whole system of central planning dysfunctional and was undermining its efficiency 
and legitimation in the eyes of the majority of people (Szelényi et a i, 1994; Mlêoch, 
1997; Smith and Swain, 1998).
Mechanisms of coordination under Communism: the role o f  social and symbolic 
capital
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The consequence of bargaining and the permanent shortages of goods made the role of 
networks in the socialist economies prominent (Moznÿ, 1991; Szelényi et a l ,  1994).
This was equally true for the managers and directors in the economic sector of socialist 
societies, as well as for the rest of the population, the 'common people'. An immensely 
com plex network of relationships was thus constructed at all levels of the society and 
with a small degree of exaggeration one could say that people eventually ended up 
accumulating networks instead of money or capital. The reason was that in the centrally 
planned economies it was not necessarily the most efficient or profitable workers or 
managers who were rewarded, as would have been the case under the hard-budget 
constraints, but the ones who possessed the best networking abilities. Only the people 
who were successful in building up their networks could tap into the resources which 
were distributed under soft-budget constraints and could increase their personal well­
being, social or economic benefits above the average (Motnÿ, 1991). Merit was only a 
minor criteria in the distribution of financial resources. Given the peculiar nature of the 
socialist economy the financial benefits were not necessarily the most important ones 
anyway, as the possession of money in the socialist economies did not provide a 
sufficient guarantee entitling people to the purchase of goods. So in fact the most 
important form of reward for the successful (or efficient in the sense of Communist 
rationality) individuals was access to the networks which they themselves created, and 
their position within these networks in which they were legitimized by their previous 
networking activities (Moznÿ, 1991; Mlcoch, 1997; Rôna-Tas, 1998).
People soon realized that the best way to use their abilities and skills was to 
invest in building networks of reciprocity and placing their relatives and friends into the 
key posts in the vital networks. In this way, they could obtain all they needed and when 
they needed it, despite the conditions of repeated acute shortages of goods and services. 
The whole of the state economy, including the retail and services provided by the state, 
as well as the corporate sector was therefore, step by step, colonized and put to an 
autonomous use by individuals, families, friends, and friends of friends (Moznÿ, 1991). 
Families, in Moznÿ's terminology, should be. of course, understood in a much wider 
sense than just that of biological relatedness, as a kind of clientele of family, friends and
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cronies. The whole society in fact consisted of extensive 'families' or clienteles, some 
associated with others, some standing in an opposition to yet others, and most of them 
consisting of a mixture of both the nomenklatura families and 'the common people'.
Since the Communist society was not monetized in the same way as capitalist 
societies are, almost every economic transaction involved not only financial transfers 
but also a substantial essence of what Moznÿ (1991), using Bourdieu's (1977) 
terminology, refers to as social capital. The source of social capital according to Moznÿ 
(1991, p. 31, my translation) is
"the ability to create a complex tissue o f  social networks, the ability to understand how they are knit and 
using this knowledge to one's benefit [...] [Tjhis is done mainly by shuffling oneself and one's next o f kin 
to the strategically most beneficial positions."
These networks of social capital were based on reciprocity and their primary 
rationale was the immediate shared interest of both sides in an exchange of material or 
non-material benefits. In this sense the networks of social capital followed a logic and 
rationality not very different from the capitalist logic of maximization of individual 
benefits. Their rationality represented an alternative, although officially unrecognized, 
system of recognition which substantially departed from the rationality of central 
planning and the symbolic power of the Communist regime. Nevertheless this 
rationality was commonly present in the shadow mechanisms which coordinated the 
functioning of enterprises and most directors and managers were dependent on such 
informal mechanisms for the fulfilment of planned targets and delivery of inputs. Even 
more pronounced was this alternative rationality in the operation of informal, reciprocal 
networks used by 'common people' for the accessing of resources and for the exchange 
of goods and services. The existence of an alternative system of recognition 
subsequently resulted in a system of practices or action frameworks that markedly 
differed from the practices prescribed by central planning.
However, the symbolic power and recognition that actors could achieve through 
the reciprocal and informal networks did not represent the most powerful mechanism 
shaping practices and action frameworks of actors in the Communist society. These 
networks represented only an alternative, unofficial source of symbolic recognition as 
opposed to the system of symbolic domination based on the enforced, officially
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recognized and legitimate power of the Communist Party. The power of the Communist 
Party remained unchallenged and was guaranteed by the Constitution, as well as the 
secret police and armed forces. The legitimation of the individuals' actions was 
dependent and conditional on the opinion of the Party apparatus which guaranteed that 
certain practices were regarded as the only appropriate ones. So, although in theory 
everyone was equal, everyone knew that the reality was accurately expressed in the 
popular saying that "some people were more equal than others".
It was the nomenklatura, the people privileged by the Communist regime, who 
possessed and controlled the official symbolic capital1* and who were able to decide on 
the appropriateness of certain practices. The power of symbolic recognition which the 
nomenklatura was granted by the regime, gave them an advantage which strengthened 
their positions in bargaining and networking in relation to people who did not posses 
such official symbolic recognition. In this way an effective mechanism was created that 
allowed the nomenklatura to mediate the interactions between networked social capital 
and the official symbolic capital, as well as to create specific kinds of translations which
could be used to their own benefit.
The membership and position in the Communist political hierarchy was 
officially the ultimate form of symbolic capital and means of legitimation which 
effectively could not be challenged and which gave actors the symbolic power to over­
rule any alternative means of recognition. This official symbolic capital could always 
have always been used to punish any defiance or to resolve conflicts and disputes over 
resources (Moznÿ, 1991) in relation to the alternative, unofficial system of recognition. 
It always enjoyed a privileged position in relation to the power derived from informal 
networks based on reciprocity, profit making or any kind of self-interested, capitalist- 
minded rationality.20
l9See Moiny (1991) who is using terminology o f Bourdieu (1977) for a more detailed analysis ot 
interactions between social and symbolic capital in Communist society and also for some interesting 
parallels between the symbolic domination and social organization o f Communist societies and the Kabyle 
tribe o f Algeria analyzed by Bourdieu (1977). Although M oiny prefers the term 'cultural capital to that o f 
symbolic capital, he nevertheless accurately describes the mechanism of domination through a system ul 
recognized and legitimate symbols and practices imposed by the Communist regime.
20Under Communism the political rationality thus over-ruled the economic rationality which was the 
crucial difference between the capitalist and the socialist economic system. In capitalist societies politics 
also plays an important role in the economic sphere but the hard-budget constraints mean that in the long
In order to secure the reproduction of the whole political system and to control 
the symbolic power of recognition, the nomenklatura developed a complex system of 
ritualized practices, the purpose of which was to confirm regularly their positions by 
organizing demonstrations of popular support. These consisted of the regular 
participation by all people in manifestations and celebrations of Communist 
anniversaries, Party or trade union meetings, but also of more restrictive practices such 
as the recognition and acceptance by the public of the limited freedom of speech in 
relation to certain topics and so on.
However, the major difference between Bourdieu's (1977,1990, 1991) notion of 
symbolic power and the symbolic power exercised by the Communist nomenklatura was 
that the symbolic capital of Communism was not universally recognized, accepted or 
taken for granted. On the contrary, the attitude of many people to the ritualized 
demonstrations of loyalty and support and often to the whole political regime itself, was 
highly sceptical and hypocritical. Moreover, this cynicism was constantly increasing as 
the shortages and inequalities intensified. Nevertheless the majority of people did take 
the factor of officially recognized symbolic capital and its system of practices into 
consideration and adjusted their activities accordingly, even if they did not believe in the 
legitimation of such practices and were aware of the possibility of doing things 
otherwise. They were forced to accept and reproduce the logic of the centrally planned 
economy to some extent, but in order to achieve desired goals they developed a 
technique of combining the official symbolic capital based on the political loyalty to the 
Communist Party with the symbolic capital derived from the informal networks of 
social capital.
The symbolic capital of socialism was thus an inherently undemocratic one and 
the only equality it produced was that everyone, including the nomenklatura themselves, 
was to some degree dependent on it as well as threatened by it. The official symbolic 
capital also caused an obvious tension in situations where the symbolic recognition of
run it cannot rise beyond a certain threshold. In the capitalist system, unlike in the pre-modem societies 
such as the Kabyle tribe analyzed by Bourdieu or the Communist regime in former Czechoslovakia 
(M oiny, 1991), both social and symbolic capital are thus given a common denominator o f money and 
profit on which both the economic.and political rationalities agree.
the dominant Communist ideology clashed with the logic of an alternative system of 
symbolic recognition based on the self-interested rationale which put one's personal 
material interests and benefits above those of the Communist society.
The problem was that in comparison with personal material benefits the value of 
the official symbolic recognition and political support was quite dubious From the 
point of view of the nomenklatura, however, the continued symbolic value and political 
domination of the Communist Party was a precondition for their own existence, as well 
as a precondition for the reproduction of the whole Communist system on which they 
were dependent. However, the interest of the 'common people' in the political support 
provided by the nomenklatura in exchange for other services and goods was entirely 
dependent on the trust of actors in the continuing existence ot the official symbolic 
power and the future need for being legitimated by it. In other words, for most actors the 
need for official symbolic recognition and backing by the political regime was limited to 
a cynical instrumental rationality which could operate only as long as the majority of 
people believed that the regime would continue to exist.
Translation and economic practice in centrally planned economies
The nomenklatura were largely aware of the risk of increased public suspicion and they 
knew that it could threaten their legitimation and the reproduction ot the whole system. 
However, the control over the recognized symbolic capital of Communism enabled 
members of the nomenklatura to make a viable compromise with the public. Many 
members of the nomenklatura soon realized that in order to maintain their legitimation it 
was very useful to be equally cynical and to use their symbolic power of recognition and 
capacity to bend and shape the officially recognized practices. The compromise 
involved the translation (Latour, 1.987; Gallon, 1991) of the meanings associated with 
the practices officially required by the Communist Party and central planning into 
systems of practices and meanings which were based on reciprocity and were 
understood to be mutually beneficial to both the nomenklatura and the 'common people'.
The nomenklatura therefore began to exchange some of their advantages, 
privileges, and benefits with some of the 'common people' for the kinds of goods and
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services which the official economy was not able to supply. Through a particular 
interaction of their social and symbolic capital they allowed the action frameworks 
based on the official practices and meanings recognized by the Communist regime to be 
transformed into action frameworks which reconciled the differences between the 
official and the informal practices. The translated meanings and practices were much 
more acceptable to the public as they recognized the rationality of one's personal 
interests as equally legitimate.
The processes of translation and enrolment thus aligned and reconciled the 
differences between the two means of recognition: the political one connected with the 
Communist party which represented the unpredictable and ever changing political 
criteria of central planning, and the merit-based one which preferred reciprocal 
exchange and personal interests of actors. The translations created a fairly innovative 
action framework which represented a symbiotic relationship between the nomenklatura 
and the common people' embodied in different forms of clienteles. Virtually every 
actor, both members of the nomenklatura or the 'common people', had to rely on the 
support of their extended family, on their clientele. This network of people bound to 
each other by different mutual obligations could have been mobilized and called upon in 
time of need for support o f one's own needs and demands (Bourdieu, 1977; Moiny,
1991). The clienteles included both members of the nomenklatura and the 'common 
people' and each of them was characterized by a slightly different mixture of 
rationalities, according to the specific character of the processes of translation and 
enrolment which created them.
Each actor in the clientele was able to provide different resources and benefits to 
others. The nomenklatura could provide official recognition and backing or even a 
legalization of certain economic practices and actions. They could also provide certain 
types of services and goods available in the official economy, or through the networks 
of the shadow coordination mechanism of inter-enterprise barter. The informal networks 
among common people', on the other hand, could provide in exchange an illusion of 
recognition in ritualized demonstrations of support for the nomenklatura (Moznÿ, 1991), 
as well as the resources that were impossible to acquire or difficult to control through
the official nomenklatura networks. These included 'commodities' such as academic 
distinctions and degrees, privileged quality of specialist health care, or Western goods 
and currency that were only available through the networks of the black market 
(Benâôek, 1997). All these resources could be exchanged with other actors, members of 
one's clientele, to the mutual satisfaction of both sides. In this way the political cadres 
who, for example, wanted to get their own children to a university could use their 
privileges and influence to make sure that the university professor whose support they 
needed, could get on allowance for a holiday abroad or could buy a car without having
to wait for several years.
To conclude this section, we can say that the role of clienteles was essential for 
survival in the Communist economy. This was the case for the members of the 
economic nomenklatura (especially the lower ranks), the directors of enterprises who 
relied on their clienteles in order to fulfil the plan, and also to get the kinds of goods and 
services which the official economy could not provide. Finally, the nomenklatura 
needed their clienteles also as a pool of reliable individuals who could be used as 
'witnesses' ready to prove their truthfulness and loyalty to the Party (Moznÿ, 1991). The 
clienteles were equally essential for the 'common people' who relied on them simply to 
obtain the goods and services in short supply, a group of goods and services that was 
getting bigger every year as the increasingly frequent shortages spread. The need for 
clienteles was also strong among the 'operators'21 (Benâôek, 1997) recruited from certain 
social strata of the 'common people' whose actual job was the administration of the 
black market. These people usually did not possess the officially recognized symbolic 
capital and without official backing by the nomenklatura could have been easily
prosecuted and criminalized.
The clientele thus represented a feasible compromise coordination mechanism 
between the official economy and the informal one (Moznÿ, 1991; Mlcoch, 1997). It 
was backed by the official means of recognition and political support but, in reality,
21,Operators' is a term borrowed from BenâCek (1997) and describes the people who specialized in 
'operating' or running the black economy under Communism, pooplc who could for a fco or a share of the 
price arrange any deal, supply o f goods, official permission or a licence. For details see BenâCek, 1997, p. 
22U2.
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through a particular kind of translation, the members of nomenklatura were able to turn 
it into an action framework which was very different from the official norm of 
prescribed practices. The translations in many cases created action frameworks which 
tolerated and recognized as legitimate a system of practices and meanings based on a 
capitalist-like rationality of personal gain and benefit. As the shortages were getting ever 
more severe, the need for clienteles and informal networks spread. Even the members of 
the nomenklatura, especially the lower ranks, but increasingly also the ones in the 
highest positions started to use them as a survival strategy and thus undermined the 
regime itself (Moiny, 1991). As time went on, it was becoming clear that the interest in 
the symbolic capital offered by the Communist regime was fading and the symbolic 
power derived from activities leading to a personal financial and material benefit was 
gaining the edge. With cynicism, one could say that the kind of coordination and 
redistribution through reciprocal clan-like networks of clienteles was all that was left of 
the collective ownership and collective control over the resources.
CENTRAL PLANNING AND THE ORGANIZATION OF SPACE
From clienteles to local coalitions
The existence of clienteles also had an important consequence for the organization of 
space in the centrally planned economies since individual regions became largely 
dependent on the character of localized coalitions of actors. The way the centrally 
planned economies were organized in space led to the enormous significance of 
industrial enterprises in the organization of life at the local level. The economic 
nomenklatura of enterprise directors then enjoyed particularly important positions in 
shaping the local clienteles and the institutional set-ups of whole regions. The system of 
central planning implied a mutual dependence between enterprises and localities 
(Premusovâ, 1989; Illner, 1992a, b; McDermott, 1997; Clark and Soulsby, 1998; Smith 
and Swain, 1998) and, as Illner writes, the "socialist industrial enterprises [had]
assumed a wide range of functions in the social reproduction of their workers and of 
other inhabitants of their respective communities" (Illner, 1992a, p. 40).
Unlike the local councils, the enterprises, thanks to their direct links with the 
planning bodies and sectoral ministries, enjoyed much better positions in mobilizing 
resources which were in the short supply. These enterprises, as a consequence, often 
substituted the official role of local councils in managing the city and many of them also 
provided an alternative system of social services. These included the operation of 
company shops which were usually better supplied than the official retail network, the 
operation of company public transport, and the operation of kindergartens and creches, 
hospitals, maternity and medical clinics, hotels and holiday resorts for enterprise 
employees, stadiums and even cemeteries (Premusovâ, 1989; Illner, 1992a; Pickles,
1998).
Apart from having the official function of securing the 'social reproduction' of 
employees, this system which allowed the enterprise to dominate the localities also 
provided a very fertile soil for cultivating the clienteles based around the networks of 
local enterprise directors. The local coalitions thus came to play a central role in the 
organization of social and economic life at the local level (Premusovâ, 1989; Illner,
1992a; Clark and Soulsby, 1998). Through the networks of such coalitions the directors . 
of enterprises could maintain their local recognition, they could use the other members 
of their clientele and their networks for fulfilling the planned targets and securing 
recognition by the Party, as well as for increasing their personal benefits. The directors 
could use the strength of their official networks with ministries and other central bodies, 
as well as the informal inter-enterprise networks of the shadow economy, for the 
mobilization of resources that could be offered for exchange with and redistributed to 
their clientele directly in the region where 'their* enterprise was located. In the localities 
the directors had the most immediate possibility of securing the loyalty of and gaining
i
prestige and recognition by local clientele through redistribution. Here they could 
relatively easily gain control and leverage over people and their resources, abilities and 
skills that could then be called upon in case of need, or, as was often the case, in the 
time of retirement. '
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The mutual support and backing within the networked coalitions of directors and 
local people were usually based on reciprocity. The strength of backing and support for 
local economic nomenklatura was thus dependent on the quantity and quality of 
resources that the directors were able to mobilize and on the extent to which they were 
willing to redistribute these resources. If the directors were wise and supportive of their 
local clientele and also had suitable networks for mobilizing sufficient resources, then 
they could usually also rely on the support of local informal networks. In other words, 
these coalitions were based on a reciprocal rationality of exchanging goods and services 
for mutual benefit. Under ideal circumstances a system of local redistribution was 
created which could bring mutual benefit to all members of a local clientele.
In many cases such reciprocal networks actually did serve the interests of the 
locality as a form of protection of local interests against the demands of the centre and 
from other, non-local clienteles. The system of reciprocal networks acted as a 
mechanism o f "self-protective localism" (Illner, 1992b, p. 483) which served the 
purpose of satisfying the needs of local actors and in some cases even represented 
"embryonic vehicles for local governance" (Smith and Swain, 1998, p. 37).
The prevailing practices and forms of rationality characterizing such local 
coalitions varied substantially between localities since they largely reflected the 
character of the processes of translation and enrolment through which the local actors, 
and the local nomenklatura in particular, mediated the meanings of the official practices 
and means of recognition (Premusovâ, 1989; Illner, 1992b: Clark and Soulsby, 1998). 
Sometimes elements of some sort of market-based rationality prevailed in the action 
frameworks of local actors, but due to the dubious value of money under Communism 
(Moznÿ, 1991) the dominant practices were more commonly based on mutually 
advantageous forms of reciprocity. In any case, these locally-specific translations 
represented a departure from the officially recognized rationality of the Communist 
regime which prioritized the criteria set by the central plan. However, in order to be 
functional every local coalition had to recognize, take into account and incorporate the 
power monopoly and the official symbolic recognition enjoyed by the Communist Party. 
Failure to do so would be to expose the coalition to the risk of being dismantled as
illegitimate or even criminalized as an anti-socialist element by any officially 
recognized body of the Communist state.
Seeking to avoid the risk of disruption caused by the intervention of the 
Communist Party, the coalitions often chose to incorporate members of the Party who 
would lobby on behalf of the community and secure political backing. Most commonly, 
these were members of local political nomenklatura, the bosses of local or district units 
of the Communist Party (Illner, 1992b, p. 483). The reasons for which the local political 
nomenklatura became involved in the informal networks and lobbying on behalf of 
'their* regions were perhaps in some measure based on altruism and local patriotism. 
Sometimes one could even talk about a sense of duty to and responsibility for 'their* 
locality on the part of local Party bosses. However, an equally, and perhaps even more 
important factor was their need to overcome another serious problem of the Communist 
system: their inability to accumulate, inherit, or to transfer the privileges, powers, and 
control rights over the means of production to someone else (Moiny, 1991; Szelényi et 
a l,  1994; Rôna-Tas, 1998). By the means of localized and spatially concentrated 
clienteles and coalitions of reciprocal networks, the nomenklatura were able to secure 
local recognition which was relatively easy to control and sustain through regular 
interaction. They enabled the local political nomenklatura to turn their temporal and 
uncertain advantages dependent on the changeable will of the Party into more durable 
locally or regionally-based networks of support, respect, prestige and appreciation that 
could, in turn, support their future claims, or the claims of their family, for any 
resources or action.
No matter what the motivation of the local nomenklatura was, certainly in some 
cases these coalitions and the lobbying in favour of regions proved to be an efficient 
mechanism of a peculiar form of Communist type of local and regional development. 
The peculiar character stemmed from the fact that the mechanism of development was 
based on the lobbying for and sucking of resources from the central bodies rather than 
on an active mobilization and utilization of local resources. Hence "the dependence on 
the centre was therefore paradoxically exploited as a strategic element in the efforts of 
localities to obtain extra resources" (Illner, 1992b, p. 483; my translation). Spatially,
such activities resulted in the creation of regional strongholds, bases, or regional 
'kingdoms' where individual members of nomenklatura could be sure of the support of 
their clientele.
Local coalitions and uneven regional development under Communism
The development of local coalitions in many respects undermined or circumvented the 
effort of the Communist state to decrease regional inequalities. These coalitions were 
responsible for an increasing spatial unevenness since not all members of the 
nomenklatura had the same opportunity or degree of interest to turn their personal 
clienteles into local coalitions. Some members of local nomenklatura preferred to rely 
on their networks and bargaining with the central bodies and other industrial enterprises 
as the means of maintaining recognition and increasing their personal benefits. In other 
cases the enterprise directors did not even have suitable networks for the mobilization of 
additional resources that could be redistributed locally. This varied according to the 
networking abilities of directors but also according to the industrial sectors and the 
position of the company in the corporate hierarchy (Illner, 1992a; Premusovâ, 1989; 
McDermott, 1997). Generally coal mining and heavy industry such as steel, engineering 
or chemicals were the preferred sectors. The light industry, by contrast, was usually 
allocated much smaller resources thus making it harder for directors of these enterprises 
to mobilize additional resources for the benefit of the locality (Illner, 1992a). Equally, 
the regions without any enterprise headquarters where only branch plants were located 
had only limited powers and less autonomy in mobilizing resources and therefore 
represented the disadvantaged periphery of Communist countries (Smith, 1996; Pickles, 
1998; Smith and Swain, 1998).
The importance of regional coalitions in Czechoslovakia was usually more 
pronounced in the more rural regions, especially in the recently (post-1945) 
industrialized areas in the eastern parts of the country (Illner, 1992a, p. 40). A classic 
example of this process which became very famous and widely publicized in 
Czechoslovakia of the 1980s was a cooperative agricultural farm (a kolkhoz) in a small 
village of Sluâovice in eastern part of the Czech Republic. The director and managers of
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this farm were exceptionally successful in combining their networks in the political 
hierarchy, which provided them with a source of recognition and legitimation by the 
Communist regime, with networks in the official economy (sectoral ministries, central 
planning committee and so on), and also with the informal networks based on 
reciprocity and market-minded rationality. The result of their networking activity was an 
almost 'perfect translation' (Gallon, 1991) which reconciled the differences between the 
official and the informal economy, enrolled both local actors and the nomenklatura at all 
levels, and played largely to the advantage of the locality. The processes of translation 
and enrolment created innovative forms of action and, although the managers of 
Agrokombinat could not ignore the official practices required by the Communist 
regime, their mediation produced practices which in terms of efficiency and rewards 
approached the capitalist standards.
The agricultural cooperative farm slowly diversified its activities from 
agriculture and food processing, first to construction, and later to retailing. The 
company first built-up and later supplied a national chain of supermarkets which were 
as a rule better supplied than most supermarkets in the country. Eventually they even 
started the first production of PCs in Czechoslovakia. The employees of the 
'Agrokombinat', as the agricultural coop was later renamed, enjoyed benefits unheard of 
in Czechoslovakia at that time: wages twice as high as the standard in similar jobs 
elsewhere (in a country with minimal wage differentiation), much easier access to 
holidays abroad, including even the summer camps in Italy for children of its employees 
(one should keep in mind that travelling to the West remained an unfulfilled dream for a 
vast majority of Czechoslovak citizens until 1989), cheap housing without waiting lists 
in houses constructed by Agrokombinat itself, and so on. The company subsidised many 
cultural and sporting events in the village, some of them of national importance, such as 
the national horse races for which a special stadium was built. The Agrokombinat 
constructed a huge supermarket in the village, far in excess of the needs of its 2000 
inhabitants, which was managed by Agrokombinat itself and had preferential access to 
supplies of goods which were otherwise hard to obtain. As a result the village soon 
became a shopping destination for weekend shoppers from as far as 100 kilometres
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away. One of the last projects which was meant as a symbolic demonstration of caring 
by the Agrokombinat's managers for the well-being of the community was a stretch of 
motorway five kilometres long constructed in the late 1980s which connected the edge 
of the village with the main national road (which presently has only two lanes!).22
tt is questionable, however, whether such economic success would have been 
achievable in a competitive market environment. The success of Sluàovice certainly 
involved the mobilization of local resources and the enrolment of local actors in the 
creation of innovative interpretations and practices. However, it was largely thanks to 
their close ties with the Communist Party bosses at all levels of the bureaucratic 
apparatus that the management of the Agrokombinat were able to access and mobilize 
the enormous resources which were far out of proportion and far in excess of the 
company's significance in the national economy. These resources clearly had to be taken 
from other enterprises in the national economy which as a consequence suffered further 
shortages. Moreover, it was only thanks to the networks of political support that the 
director of Agrokombinat could justify the use of semi-capitalist methods of 
organization and rewarding and which were largely responsible for its extraordinary 
economic success and which would not be tolerated elsewhere. The success of 
Agrokombinat Slusovice, however, was relatively short-lived and it evaporated towards 
the end of the 1980s when its director lost political support in the high ranks of the 
Communist Party.
Not every village, town or region could achieve such a privileged status as 
SluSovice since the national resources were limited. Nevertheless, in most parts of the 
country the mechanism of reciprocal networks between local nomenklatura and their 
clientele led to the establishment of some sort of local coalitions which involved the 
directors of local companies, members of local administration. Communist Party 
councils and other local people These, however, were rarely as well connected, closely 
knit, and as entrepreneurial as the local coalition described in the case of Slusovice.
. Quite often the regional coalitions were just ad hoc defensive mechanisms, the aim of
22The example o f Agrokombinât SluSovice. is based on my personal experience and several visits to the 
village during the mid-1980s.
93
which was simply to protect the local or regional interests rather than "a strategic 
collective vision of local economic development" (Smith and Swain, 1998, p. 37-8).
In practice there were great differences among localities in terms of the strength 
and cohesiveness of local coalitions since the local reach of the processes of translation 
and enrolment varied significantly. Some enterprise managers had good Vertical' 
contacts with people higher up in the Communist political and economic hierarchy, with 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party or with the sectoral ministries and 
planning committees. These networks represented the core of their clientele while local 
actors were neglected. Other managers had strong 'horizontal' ties with a localized 
clientele or other regional coalitions based around other enterprises. Some managers, 
such as those in SluSovice, might have had good vertical as well as horizontal networks. 
The result was a variety of regional institutional set-ups and a specific case of 
Communist uneven regional development.
It is also important to keep in mind that regions, even under the Communist 
regime, represented sites of multiple action frameworks, organizational logics, and often 
conflicting economic rationalities (Grabber and Stark, 1997a, b). Most regions and 
localities thus represented sites of co-presence, of both the networks and practices based 
on the entrepreneurial economic rationality of self-interest (and often the reciprocal 
exchange of goods, services and support) as well as the networks and practices based on 
the rationality of planning which could provide the official symbolic recognition and the 
political support. Each set of networks, practices and understandings represented a 
different action framework based on a different logic and means of recognition.
Every region, then, was characterized by a different form of coordination of 
diverse local action frameworks, by a different degree of openness and inclusiveness, as 
well as by different attitudes towards cooperation and negotiation of difference. Due to 
the peculiar organizational form of Communist economies, the crucial local coalitions 
and clienteles were usually centred around the management of local enterprises. The 
character of local institutional set-ups and the degree of their integration or 
fragmentation thus largely depended on the ability of local enterprise directors to
translate the meanings of the official practices and enrol diverse local actors in an 
alternative interpretation which was more acceptable for them.
In some regions the local coalitions therefore existed only in an elementary form 
and the action frameworks based on the officially recognized practices were almost 
entirely separated from the action frameworks of actors involved in the informal 
economy. The local nomenklatura in such regions were unable to negotiate their 
differences with the actors in the local informal economy and the local institutional set­
up was fragmented and split between different means of recognition and antagonistic 
action frameworks. Yet some other regions, such as SluSovice, were characterized by an 
alignment of diverse interests of local actors which often produced innovative action 
frameworks open to new ideas. In such regions, the locally-specific process of 
translation, mediated by local nomenklatura, could result in an integrated institutional 
set-up which benefited the whole locality.
Thus we can conclude that even in the centrally planned economies there existed 
substantial regional unevenness which also produced diverse preconditions for regional 
adaptability. This spatial unevenness stemmed from the differences in the action 
frameworks of local actors, as well as from the ways in which local coalitions were held 
together and institutionalized by locally-specific translations of the official practices 
prescribed by the Communist regime.
It is, however, somewhat problematic to talk about the institutionalization of 
local coalitions and clienteles in the context of Communist economies because, in the 
majority of cases, these were simply embryonic forms of institutions. The Communist 
regime favoured an extreme form of centralization and was hostile to expressions of 
local autonomy and democracy (Illner, 1992a; Dostâl, 1992). It resisted and effectively 
blocked any attempts at autonomous collective action and the local coalitions therefore 
never had the time to become fully institutionalized in a form based on a radically new, 
alternative system of recognition. Should the practices of any local coalition diverge 
substantially from the official logic of central planning, the actors would immediately 
run the risk of disruption and intervention by the Party bureaucracy just as eventually 
happened in the case of Slusovice.
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It is equally difficult to talk about the adaptability of local coalitions or clienteles 
because the economic system of central planning had no effective selection mechanism 
and criteria of competitiveness (Szelényi et a i,  1994; Mlôoch, 1997). It did not value 
the ability to adapt to change as it preferred no change at all and even discouraged 
innovation on the part of individual enterprises. The requirem ent of sym bolic 
recognition by the regime and subordination to the central plan thus largely restricted 
the scope for potential institutional mutations and the autonomous development of 
innovative organizational forms.
The lack of institutionalization of local coordination mechanisms together with 
the lack of motivation to adapt and innovate therefore represent some of the most 
critical weakness in the organization of the centrally planned economies, According to 
Smith and Swain (1998, p. 38):
"the Soviet system collapsed for essentially two reasons: first, the ineffectiveness o f  institutionalised 
networks to act as a vehicle for strategic collective action; and second, because the networks and 
institutions lacked the capacity to evolve solutions to unexpected developments."
It was only after the final collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 that 
local coalitions and clienteles could become official and legitimate means of 
autonomous regional development. Only then could these embryonic institutional forms 
reveal their adaptive capacity in a competitive, market-based environment.
CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL LEGACIES
The collapse of the Communist regime was caused by a set of internal contradictions 
which gradually undermined its own organizational principles. The soft-budget 
constraints, together with a system of clienteles which combined the networks of formal 
and informal economy, produced a viable coordination mechanism, but it also 
systematically weakened the efficiency of the official centrally planned economy and 
gradually intensified economic shortages (Komai, 1981; Moznÿ, 1991; Szelényi et a i, 
1994). The ineffectiveness of the official economy subsequently led to the increased 
need, on the part of the nomenklatura, to rely on the unofficial reciprocal networks of 
the shadow economy, as well as on the illegal, black market networks (Benaêek, 1997).
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This, of course, further diminished the legitimation of the political regime and the
leverage of the nomenklatura.
At the same time, the nomenklatura were constantly threatened by the 
unpredictable character of the symbolic capital of Communism which could have turned 
against them at any moment and could have removed them from their jobs. The 
guaranteed role of the Communist Party and the 'substantive rationality' of central 
planning as the ultimate means of recognition meant that no institutional form based on 
an alternative form of recognition was permitted. The absence of competition as a 
selection mechanism reduced the ability to innovate, to generate and to accommodate 
new practices and, as such, to create radically new interpretative possibilities (Mlôoch, 
1997; Smith and Swain, 1998). The shortages became ever more acute and the 
competitiveness of the Communist economies on the world markets constantly 
decreased. Ultimately, by 1989 when the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe were 
dismantled, the discontent with the system was so widespread that even most of the 
members of the nomenklatura, especially the economic nomenklatura, were already in 
favour of change (for more detailed analysis of the discontent of nomenklatura see 
Moznÿ, 1991; Szelényi et a i, 1994; or Eyal et a i,  1997).
The years of the Communist regime, however, left the socioeconomic landscape 
with a differentiated quality of institutional legacies. Some regions inherited embryonic 
institutional set-ups dominated by profit-based reciprocal networks, which in turn 
facilitated future interaction and coordination between the former local economic 
nomenklatura, enterprise employees, local black marketeers and so on. Other regions, 
on the contrary, inherited fragmented institutional set-ups with antagonistic relations 
between individual local actors and their clienteles. These differences were not 
institutionalized to the same degree, as they would have been in the case of capitalist 
societies. Nonetheless, the legacies with which the regions entered into the period of 
post-Communist transformation continue to have an important impact on present 
regional adaptability and the ability to create locally-based innovations.
The next chapter provides a summary of the post-1989 privatization and 
economic transformation of the Czech Republic which increased the competitive
97
pressure and the need for adaptation on the part of individual firms, as well as regions. It 
also describes how these changes affected the future development of the inherited 
networked local coalitions and how the process of internationalization transformed the 
institutional set-ups and forms of embeddedness in the post-Communist regions.
CHAPTER FOUR: PRIVATIZATION, 
INTERNATIONALIZATION AND REGIONAL 
RESTRUCTURING IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
INTRODUCTION
The collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern European countries in 1989 represented 
a kind of'rupture' in the evolutionary development of their socioeconomics. What 
followed was a period of economic and social reforms which aimed to make the 
socioeconomic system of these countries compatible with a capitalist ethos. This was to 
be achieved by triggering the processes of marketization, democratization and 
privatization (Smith and Pickles, 1998). The transformation, however, was not a 
straightforward 'transition' to capitalism, but rather a slow process of adaptation in 
which the inherited networks and practices were adjusted to the market-based economic 
environment, characterized by a particular form of rationality and specific principles of 
symbolic recognition. The outcomes of these changes were highly uneven over post- 
Communist Europe (Smith, 1996; Pavlinek and Smith, 1998; Pickles and Smith, 1998; 
Smith and Ferenôikovâ, 1998) as individual regions did not fare equally well in what 
was a major test of their adaptability. Different local institutional set-ups, with highly 
diverse preconditions for adaptability and competitiveness, were produced in these new 
economic circumstances.
The previous chapter explained the processes by which the variety of 
institutional legacies of networks, practices and meanings in centrally planned 
economies were produced. The aim of this chapter is to build upon these arguments and 
to present an analysis of the processes of privatization and internationalization that 
played a central role in redefining the character and use of symbolic and social capital in 
the post-Communist economy of the Czech Republic. It also aims to demonstrate that 
the seemingly homogeneous processes of privatization and internationalization resulted 
in a wide variety of locally-specific ways of reworking and reconfiguring the regional 
cultural and institutional legacies (Smith and Pickles, 1998; Smith and Swain, 1998).
The first section discusses the notion of 'rupture' in the socioeconomic 
development of the post-Communist countries. It also argues that the path-dependent 
and partly irreversible consequences of privatization will produce a variety of locally- 
recognized practices and meanings with different preconditions for the adaptability of 
individual enterprises, as well as regional institutional set-ups. The next three sections 
describe the political background of the Czech privatization and discuss the apparent 
disparity between its intended aims and actual institutional outcomes. This is followed 
by two sections which analyze the 'recombinant property' (Stark, 1996) created through 
the method of voucher privatization and the position of enterprise managers in this 
peculiar Czech form of capitalism. It is explained that the Czech managers were often 
put in charge of restructuring their clienteles and local coalitions, as well as playing a 
central role in transforming the institutional set-ups in their localities. The last two 
sections then analyze the role of internationalization in shaping the economic 
environment in the Czech Republic. They explain the importance of internationalization 
as a source of new symbolic power, examine the possible variety of its impacts on 
regional economies and also consider its potential for creating adaptable and 
competitive regional economies in the post-Communist countries.
SOCIOECONOMIC RUPTURE AND PRIVATIZATION: THE CZECH 
ATTEMPT TO DESIGN A FUTURE WITHOUT THE PAST
Rupture, privatization and regions
There is no doubt that the end of Communism represented a rupture to the 
socioeconomic evolution of Eastern European countries. The major changes caused by 
this rupture involved a radical reassessment of the existing forms of symbolic 
recognition, as well as a suppression of the forms of recognition based on the 
legitimation and rationality of central planning and allegiance to the Communist Party. 
The existence of a socioeconomic rupture, how ever, should not lead us to th ink that the 
post-Communist countries will automatically dismantle their old, locally-specific
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systems of practices, networks and meanings and replace them by a pre-given form of 
symbolic capital, or means of recognition imported from the West (Stark, 1995). This 
understanding, advocated by some Western multilaterals, has been rightly criticized 
(Stark, 1992; Gowan, 1995; Smith and Pickles, 1998). Moreover, some of these 
critiques (Stark, 1992, 1995) are equally critical of the notion of'transition' on the 
grounds that it implicitly assumes that the transformations taking place in Eastern 
Europe are a part of a transitory process which will lead to some 'standard' form of 
capitalism. Such a presumption is clearly wrong and to think it correct one would have 
to ignore the enormous variety of'transitions' observed in Eastern Europe (Smith and 
Pickles, 1998).
The notion of rupture in the socioeconomic evolution of Eastern Europe then 
does not imply a negation of the past. It marks the beginning of a contestation over the 
future direction of socioeconomic development, over the new definition of symbolic 
capital and the possible uses of networked social capital. This contestation is an open- 
ended process which consists of a major reworking, reconfiguration and transformation 
of the legacies of centrally planned economies (Stark, 1995; Stark and Bruszt, 1995; 
Grabber and Stark, 1997a, b; Mlôoch, 1997; Smith and Pickles, 1998).
These changes were characterized by attempts to increase competition and to 
adjust recognized practices to ones prevailing in Western countries. The actors, as a 
consequence of the rupture, were required to adapt from the certainty of a system 
dominated by one, official system of recognition to a system of plural, contested means 
of recognition characterized by selection and competing forms of symbolic capitals. 
Virtually all actors were induced to reevaluate the structure and contents of their 
network heritage and the character of their action frameworks. Many of the 'old' 
networks and practices based on participation and engagement with the Communist 
regime suddenly lost their value. Other networks and practices, often those associated 
with the informal economy and based mostly on reward by merit and reciprocity, 
suddenly increased their symbolic value.
The rupture found its concrete expression in the transformation of ownership 
rights, in privatization. Privatization was viewed as an essential part of economic
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reforms and the process of transformation in all post-Communist countries. The 
unprecedented scale of privatization meant that in the post-Communist countries this 
process became a major force which formed the new economic environment and 
decided on what parts of the Communist institutional legacies will survive the 
transformation, which will be dismantled and disappear, and which will be reorganized, 
reconfigured and adjusted (Smith and Swain, 1998, p. 39-43)! Privatization thus played 
a central role in shaping what became regarded as a recognized, efficient or 'normal' 
practice in the newly created private sector. It represented an irreversible translation of 
sorts which favoured certain practices, predetermined future development, and 'locked- 
out' other options for the future (Stark, 1992,1995).
The legacies of the past, however, played an important role in shaping attempts 
to reform the socioeconomic system as well as the ways in which the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises was carried out. Although the form and mechanisms of 
privatization adopted at the national level were partly path-dependent and reflected the 
"distinctive paths of extrication from state socialism" (Stark, 1992, p. 48), the concrete 
outcomes of such a rupture at the local/regional level were still within certain limits 
subject to contestation. As we shall see, the interaction of actors' social and symbolic 
capital and the contestation over the meanings of legitimate forms of action produced 
locally-specific outcomes. They produced new practices and meanings which, again, 
reflected the legacies of inherited local action frameworks and institutional set-ups. The 
process of privatization thus did not coerce all actors in all regions to suddenly change 
their practices and understandings in the same way. In response to a sudden redefinition 
of the means of recognition, the actors instead began to mediate and translate the 
meaning of the privatization through their own action frameworks. The reform policy 
administered at the national level was thus turned locally into a set of practices and 
meanings specific to individual regions and localities.
In other words, we can say that the new, locally-specific practices and forms of 
recognition did not represent the building of "capitalism 'on the ruins of socialism', but 
'with the ruins of socialism"’ (Eyal et a l, 1997, in reference to Stark, 1992). As we have 
seen in the previous chapter, the 'ruins' are locally-specific and in the case of the Czech
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Republic they are the ruins of the local coalitions, usually centred around the large, 
formerly state-owned enterprises. The character and content of the inherited networks, 
their prevailing forms of coordination, and the recognition of the key members of local 
coalitions by local actors, had in their own way influenced the locally-specific outcomes 
of privatization. All these aspects of local legacies influenced the translation of the 
privatization process into new practices and meanings which were, in turn, responsible 
for the different speeds of adaptation of regional economies to the new economic 
environment.
A major part of the legacy of central planning was also the dominant position of 
the large, formerly state-owned enterprises in their local labour markets. These 
enterprises often occupied positions of near-monopoly employers in their respective 
regions. The elaborate system of commuting to work established under the Communist 
regime created a pattern of large enterprises, each with their own commuting hinterland 
from which they attracted employees even over considerable distances (Hampl et al., 
1996; Smith and Swain, 1998). Due to this legacy, the large enterprises and the local 
coalitions centred around them were instrumental to the production of the meanings of 
privatization and marketization, and their distribution within regions (Clark and 
Soulsby, 1998; Smith and Swain, 1998) Even today the situation of the large, recently 
privatized enterprises often determines the economic standing of regions (such as the 
levels of unemployment, levels of income, skills and qualifications of local workers). At 
the beginning of Czech privatization in the early 1990s in particular, the networks of 
local coalitions centred around these enterprises represented the key channels through 
which the process of privatization was mediated. Much of this chapter therefore will 
deal specifically with the transformations of the social and symbolic capital of the 
people who managed the large state enterprises and who often had a major impact on 
the present shape of whole regional institutional set-ups.23
23The focus on the large, mainly manufacturing enterprises in this thesis is not to deny the importance of 
other smaller firms, new starts-ups and the increasingly important service industries (for their role in 
absorbing unemployment see TomeS, 1996). It only emphasizes that the formerly state-owned enterprises 
and the firms created by their privatization still represent the backbone o f most regional economies, 
largely predetermine the organization o f the socioeconomic space in the Czech Republic (Blaiek, 1996) 
and make many regions dependent on the networks o f  a dominant local employer.
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However, in order to explain the transformations of the inherited regional forms 
of embeddedness and the interactions of social and symbolic capital at the level of 
enterprise, we need to look at the national level first. We need to understand the 
framework set by privatization for reconfiguring local institutional legacies. The 
following sections therefore describe the political background and the actual techniques 
of privatizing the large enterprises - the so called 'large privatization' - and their 
consequences for the character of the rupture at the local and regional level.
The politics of Czech privatization
Privatization, as an important aspect of the socioeconomic rupture, played a key role in
shaping the emerging institutional form of the transforming socibeconomy in the Czech
Republic. The ideas underlying the Czech model of privatization, however, were
strongly influenced by concepts and ideas connected to the notion of rupture as a simple
'transition', as a complete dismantling of past institutional forms and a simple
installation of a new, capitalist system (Stark and Bruszt, 1995; Mlôoch, 1997;
Rychetnik, 1997). The actions and rhetoric of the decisive political actors in the Czech
privatization were based on neoliberal presumptions which systematically ignored or
underestimated the role of institutional legacies (Stark, 1995; Mlôoch, 1997; for a
frustrating but sincere retrospective confession of one key figure of Czech privatization
see Husâk, 1997). Their decisions were guided by a simplified notion of the 'market' and
the belief that the market can be created by a mere change of ownership rights, that is by
privatization. Privatization was also believed to destroy immediately the soft-budget
constraints, the intricate web of networks between enterprises and state ministries, and
to increase efficiency in the allocation of resources (Stark and Bruszt, 1995; Èâk, 1997).
At the same time, the existence of a market consisting of new owners was supposed to
guarantee competition and to increase the welfare of the whole economy, as presumed
in the standard economics textbooks (Rychetnik, 1997). In words of Lubomir Mlôoch,
"the designers o f Czeoh transformation reliod too much on the institution of private ownership per se, in 
its instrumental sense. They believed that economics is a.'self-supporting construct' o f sorts which - thanks 
to the self-interest o f private owners - frees the dynamic forces of the market economy and guarantees a 
rapid increase in the efficiency o f the economy." (Mlôoch, 1997, p. 44-45; my translation).
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Under the influence of simplistic ideas about the market economy, the 
Czechoslovak Government24 was keen to privatize and saw it as the centrepiece of its 
transformation strategy. Its main priority, however, was a simple change of property 
rights and the speed of this change was seen as a matter of utmost priority (Machâôek,
1992). The role of the state was supposed to be restricted to finding a mechanism for 
changing the property rights, while the painful restructuring and other unpopular jobs 
would be left to the impersonal and neutral 'market'. Thus the state would not intervene 
at the enterprise level and the Government could also escape from taking direct . 
responsibility for the future of enterprises (Mlôoch, 1997; Èâk, 1997).
The almost unlimited belief in the positive power of private ownership and a fast
privatization appears very clearly in the quote of DuSan Tfiska, one of the economic
advisors to the Government and also a designer of the Czech voucher privatization:
"Higher efficiency, financial discipline, discipline o f  management and restructuraiization [...] will come 
out o f a change in ownership. We do not have any other option to liberate ourselves from state, to breathe. 
Swift privatization is an unavoidable condition for this. If we do not succeed it would be better to let 
national property be stolen gradually by the nomenklatura management, as in Russia. This spontaneous, 
wild privatization would be less harmful than leaving the companies in the,hands o f the state." (quoted in 
MachâCek, 1992, p. 57-8).
The policy based on the faith of the key Czech politicians in this simplified 
notion of'market' was initially almost unopposed by any substantial and strong lobbying 
group (such as the enterprise managers in the case of Hungary or trade unions in 
Poland). This was largely because the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia was 
holding power almost unchallenged and had successfully suppressed any organized 
opposition until its end in 1989 when it capitulated unconditionally and without 
resistance (Stark, 1992). By this time the regime was entirely discredited, but the 
opposition was unprepared for taking over power. This lack of organized groups with 
alternative scenarios left the free-market radicals in the post-Communist Government 
with a free hand to act and implement their reform plans.
i
24I speak about Czechoslovak Government here as it was this one which until 1992 has been making all 
the crucial decisions related to privatization. After the June 1992 elections most o f the key neo-classical 
economists, including Vâclav Klaus (the ex-Federal Minister o f Finance and until 1997 the Czech Prime 
Minster) left the Federal Government o f Czechoslovakia and entered into the new cabinet o f the Czech 
Republic.
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The claims that 'any owner is better than the state' and 'the sooner the better1 
advocated by the Government economists around Vâclav Klaus, no matter how 
exaggerated, were widely accepted by the Czech public and made it possible to translate 
the neoliberal ideas and rhetoric into concrete privatization methods. Given these 
circumstances, the only major problem related to mass privatization was just a technical 
one: how to establish an efficient, profit-based competitive environment of new private 
owners if the personal savings of the local population were insufficient for buying the 
large industrial plants? Since the new Czech Government of PM Klaus brought to 
power by the 1992 elections was not willing to look for potential new owners abroad 
and to negotiate with them on the behalf of individual enterprises (Èâk, 1997; Hayri and 
McDermott, 1998), alternative methods for the mass or so called 'large privatizations' 
had to be sought instead.
The aims of large privatization25
The framework for large privatization was approved by the Czechoslovak Parliament in 
April 1991. Subsequently, the National Property Fund (NPF) was established with the 
aim to execute the decisions of the Ministry for Administration of National Property and 
its Privatization (or just Ministry of Privatization). Privatization was based on the 
submissions of privatization projects which were competitive, open to the public, with 
anyone allowed to submit one. However, the legal procedure was rather complex and 
required a good knowledge of the situation within the enterprise in question and thus 
gave the 'insiders', the current management and partly also the employees, a clear 
advantage (Kotrba, 1995; Mlôoch, 1997). To make sure that there was at least one 
project for every enterprise, the current management had been obliged by law to submit 
the so called 'basic project' for their enterprise.
The repertoire of privatization methods available offered five options:. 
transformation into a joint-stock company (corporatization), direct sale, public auction,
25This section describing the procedures of large privatization and the voucher method draws on 
MachâCek (1992), Brom and Orenstein (1994), Kotrba (1995), Husâk (1997), Mertllk (undated), and on 
the interviews at the Czech Ministry o f Industry and Trade (see the Appendix). Especially Kotrba (1995) 
provides a lbt o f detailed empirical information and time schedules o f the process, while Husâk (1997) 
provides lots o f interesting detail o f the 'behind-the-scene' privatization decisions.
public competition (tender), and free transfer to a municipal authority. However, only 
the first two methods are of interest here as the proportion of property privatized by the 
remaining three methods was almost negligible (only about 6 per cent of the total 
privatized property; for details see Kotrba, 1995 or Brom and Orenstein, 1994).
The method of corporatization meant that the state-owned company would be 
transformed into a joint-stock company and its shares would be, according to the 
specifications of the winning privatization project, either distributed amongst the public 
through the voucher method, sold to domestic or foreign investors, or very rarely, to the 
employees. Any combination of these transfers was allowed under the corporatization 
method. Some shares in the so called strategic enterprises could also be temporarily or 
permanently kept in state hands and administered by the NPF on its behalf.
The method of direct sale was a fairly standard privatization method which 
consisted of a transfer of property to an appointed buyer, either domestic or foreign. 
Direct sales to foreign buyers, unlike the corporatization method, required the consent of 
the Government26 while the direct sales to domestic buyers consisted mostly of 
management buy-outs. Domestic direct sales, however, were very rare, especially in the 
initial stage of privatization, as they were considered harmful to the future financial 
standing of a company (profits would be used for the repayment of the privatization 
loan). They were also unpopular for political reasons because they seemed to give an 
advantage to the former economic nomenklatura.
The privatization methods could have been combined at will, but in practice 
there was a strong political pressure from the designers of voucher privatization to 
maximize the use of the corporatization and the subsequent distribution of shares by the 
means of the voucher method (%àk, 1997; Hayri and McDermott, 1998). This procedure 
was presented as the most just one, offering everyone equal opportunities (Husâk,
1997). The corporatization method and distribution of shares by the voucher mechanism
26Another difference between domestic and foreign buyers was that the domestic ones were obliged to pay 
the nominal value o f an enterprise while the foreign ones had to submit a price based on an audit by an 
authorized firm and this price was further negotiable. This mechanism, originally intended as a 
discrimination against foreign buyers and a way o f squeezing more money out o f the foreign investors, 
often turned to an advantage for foreign buyers as the nominal book value was commonly well above the 
value based on Western standards o f auditing (interview with general manager o f Autometal Pribram).
eventually represented about 86 per cent of the total value of the privatized property 
while direct sales accounted only for some 7 per cent (Kotrba, 1995). The voucher 
privatization therefore became the decisive part of the whole privatization process in the 
Czech Republic (Brom and Orenstein, 1994).
The idea of voucher privatization gained ground among the governmental 
economists as early as 1990 as a politically popular way to 'privatize without money*. 
Although this method has never been employed on such a large scale before, the 
Czechoslovak state decided to apply it despite its highly unpredictable consequences for 
future enterprise governance and for enterprise restructuring. The central idea of the 
voucher privatization method was to distribute the property to citizens for a token cost, 
for a transaction fee equalling some 20 pounds (for details and description of the 
distribution mechanism see e.g. Machâôek, 1992 or Kotrba, 1995, p. 171-6). The 
citizens would thus become shareholders and direct owners who would, as the 
economics textbooks suggested, be guided by their own interests and responsibilities, 
exercise control over the managers and if dissatisfied would replace them. This rather 
naive and populist idea, which ignored the importance of the existing forms of 
governance soon became very popular among wide public.
. Although the government economists held that privatization would clarify the 
ownership rights and responsibilities of the new owners, the outcomes often turned out 
to be somewhat different. Apart from individuals exchanging their investment points for 
shares of the privatized enterprises, the voucher programme provided another 
mechanism which could transform the corporate governance of the privatized 
enterprises - the investment privatization funds (IPFs). After some heated discussions 
about the risk of a complete dispersion of ownership, the Government decided to permit 
the institution of IPFs arguing that these corporate bodies would represent an 
opportunity for entrepreneurial individuals to collect the investment points of other
i
people and invest them collectively on their behalf. Individual investors would then 
become shareholders of IPFs instead of the privatized enterprises themselves.
The success of IPFs was spectacular. They launched a massive advertising 
campaign that enormously increased public interest in voucher privatization and they
eventually collected some 72 per cent of investment points from the individual investors 
in the first wave of privatization and little less than two thirds in the second wave (Brom 
and Orenstein, 1994). The IPFs thus reduced the risk of a complete ownership dispersal. 
Most voucher-privatized enterprises were thus controlled by EPFs and those which were 
not usually lacked any clear corporate governance at all. However, apart from this 
positive role the IPFs also created another huge problem since all but one of the six 
biggest IPFs were funds established and owned by the large Czech banks (Brom and 
Orenstein, 1994; Kenway and Klvaôovâ, 1996). The banks through their IPFs thus 
became a crucial element of corporate governance in the voucher-privatized enterprises 
and indeed in the Czech economy as a whole.27
The outcomes and paradoxes
The enormous problem, or rather paradox, associated with the institutional outcome of 
privatization was that all the big Czech banks which owned the largest IPFs were 
themselves still majority state-owned. They were recently established institutions 
created by a split of the monopoly of the State Bank of Czechoslovakia in 1990 into 
several smaller, commercial banks (HmCif, 1994). These new commercial banks also 
inherited a proportion of the enormous loans which the State monobank provided to the 
state-owned enterprises in the past. The banks also inherited the long established web of 
personal networks that connected the bank employees and their traditional clients, the 
managers of privatized enterprises (Brom and Orenstein, 1994; Hmôif, 1994). The new 
banks were thus from the very beginning closely tied to their major clients through the 
credit networks (Mertlik, 1995; Kenway and Klvaôovâ, 1996), while the voucher 
privatization turned the banks into de facto owners of the enterprises and resulted in a 
dead-lock situation of mutual dependence between the enterprises and the banks.
The banks were poorly capitalized and therefore vitally dependent on their major 
clients' repayments. They were reluctant to start their bankruptcy procedures and hoped 
instead for state intervention. In the meantime, they prolonged the existence of soft-
27For details and interesting empirical findings o f the composition o f corporate boards in the voucher 
privatized companies see Brom and Orenstein, 1994.
budget constraints by postponing the bankruptcies and debt repayments. From the point 
of view of the banks, this strategy was well justified: a bankruptcy of one large 
enterprise would, due to the insolvency and a chain of secondary indebtedness between 
enterprises, trigger a domino effect of bankruptcies (Hmôif, 1994; Mertlik, 1995; 
McDermott, 1997). Such a development could clearly endanger the very existence of the 
banks themselves.
The fact that voucher privatization made the state-owned banks the key owners 
of Czech industry, had serious consequences for the corporate governance of many 
enterprises and also for the whole national economy. The Government of Vâclav Klaus, 
despite its continued liberal rhetoric, was eventually pushed to pour money into the 
banks, but often without controlling the further use of these funds.28 Voucher 
privatization thus produced a situation very similar to the soft-budget constraints of the 
centrally planned economy and created conditions conducive to the reproduction of 
many of the networks, practices and meanings inherited from the past. The banks, as the 
new owners, were supposed to act as the agents of restructuring yet did not have the 
means to carry out or control the restructuring of enterprises. Moreover, they also lacked 
the motivation to do so since the Government showed no clear signs of willingness to 
dismantle the soft-budget constraints. The banks that would be threatened by the 
closures of their unrestructured debtors thus preferred to postpone the painful 
restructuring and perpetuated the old ways of financing them (Mertlik, 1995; Stark and 
Bruszt, 1995; McDermott, 1997; Hayri and McDermott, 1998).
Another paradox of the voucher privatization was that the Czech Government 
has always been in its neoliberal approach strongly opposed to any evolutionary change 
which could potentially favour the existing nomenklatura managers: The Government of 
Vaclav Klaus has always stressed the need for a fast 'transition to capitalism' in the form 
of a 'shock therapy' (Machâôek, 1992; Husâk, 1997). The reconstruction or even state
28For details o f the mechanisms of state intervention through the web o f networks between the state- 
owned Consolidation Bank, the NPF, The Ministry o f Finance and The Ministry o f Privatization see 
Hmôif (1994) and Brom and Orenstein (1994): Brom and Orenstein (1994) also conclude that contrary to 
the neo-liberal image which the PM Klaus was trying to create, the "government involvement in the 
financial restructuring o f enterprises has been one o f  the most significant characteristics o f  economic 
reform in the Czech Republic" (p. 896).
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support of the old bank-enterprise and inter-enterprise networks was always against 
their declared principles. In reality, however, this Government had become a creator and 
an active supporter of 'recombinant property' (Stark and Bruszt, 1995; Stark, 1996), of a 
complex web of relations and claims to the property with no clear owner and no clear 
system of accountability. Under these circumstances it was the actors who controlled the 
networks between the banks, their IPFs, parts of the state bureaucracy (Consolidation 
bank, NPF, Ministries of Finance and Privatization), and the voucher-privatized 
enterprises, that were able to use the state money and coordinate the slow selection 
between the viable and non-viable networks and practices, as well as between viable 
and non-viable firms (Mertlik, 1995; Stark and Bruszt, 1995; McDermott, 1997;
Mlôoch, 1997; Hayri and McDermott, 1998). This development thus confirmed a 
continued decisive role for the enterprise managers, which is analyzed further in the 
next two sections.
MANAGERS, PRIVATIZATION AND UNEVEN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Coping with recombinant property: the role of enterprise managers
The existence of the recombinant property produced by Czech privatization brought 
mixed reactions among commentators and researchers studying the phenomenon. On the 
one hand, there was a major worry that the banks would behave irresponsibly and 
prolong the existence of soft-budget constraints. The companies would keep on 
hoarding resources, building up large conglomerates with the money from the banks yet 
without taking into account the Western profit-based rationality and the need for 
restructuring (for a critique along these lines see e.g. Cook, 1996; Lyons, 1996; Kapoor, 
1998; Harris, 1998). This, of course, would be a situation little different from the soft- 
budget constraints of the Communist economies and could not be sustained for long.
On the other hand, it has also been suggested that the Czech form of 
recombinant property might represent a useful symbiosis between the state, the banks, 
and the enterprises. The unexpected institutional arrangement produced by voucher
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privatization might give the enterprise managers the time to adjust their practices, to 
renegotiate the inherited networks with other enterprises and actors in local coalitions. It 
might also allow them to find new markets and strategies for future expansion 
(McDermott, 1997; Hayri and McDermott, 1998) while the banks and the state could 
monitor the behaviour of enterprises and selectively redirect their resources (Hmôif, 
1994; Hayri and McDermott, 1998). Such a development would allow the corporate 
sector to adapt in the medium term at least. This slower but evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary change might, according to some authors, secure more stable institutional 
arrangements and a better chance for the long term adaptability of enterprises (Stark and 
Bruszt, 1995; Stark, 1996; Grabber and Stark, 1997b).
The discussion about the extent to which the soft-budget constraints are still 
present in the Czech economy and how harmful they are continues. It is questionable 
whether this is a widespread phenomenon, but this kind of behaviour seems to be quite 
common in the bank-enterprise relations of some of the so called 'flag ship' enterprises 
(Rychetnik, 1997; Hayri and McDermott, 1998) where its effects appear to be 
detrimental (Kapoor, 1996).
• The outcomes of large privatization, however, varied between enterprises in the 
degree to which ownership rights, competencies and control were clarified. Equally, the 
reactions of the enterprise managers to the recombinant property varied. These reactions 
were influenced, to some extent, by the corporate control resulting from the 
privatization process. Privatization partly restricted management's manoeuvring space 
since it had a direct impact on the composition of the newly established corporate 
boards in privatized enterprises and the vigour with which these new people defended 
the interests of new owners. The process of privatization thus largely determined the 
degree of effective control of enterprises by their new owners which was specific to 
each enterprise.
However, the most common outcome of corporate governance in the voucher- 
privatized enterprises was for effective control to be provided by the management and a 
passive role for the new institutional owners, the banks and their IPFs (Brom and 
Orenstein, 1994; Mertlik, 1995). This institutional arrangement has therefore assigned a
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central role in enterprise restructuring to the managers of an enterprise, often the people 
who used to play a key role in local coalitions during the previous regime. The 
managers were put in a position where they themselves, in cooperation with the state- 
owned banks and parts of the state bureaucracy, were allowed to set the standard of new 
business practice in the post-privatization period. The key role in the system of 
recombinant property allowed the enterprise managers to create a peculiar Czech form 
of capitalism with its specific form of economic coordination (Stark and Bruszt, 1995). 
They could decide to a large extent about the future of enterprises and were permitted to 
benefit from the weak exercise of the ownership rights (Brom and Orenstein, 1994; 
Mertlik, 1995; Capek and Mertlik, 1996; Mlôoch, 1997).
The managers certainly did not have a monopoly over presenting the recognized 
meanings and practices to the same extent as the Communist party used to have in the 
past since the "building of capitalism' was a culturally contested process. Nevertheless, 
thanks to their position created by privatization, as well as their control over a unique 
set of networks and technical expertise (Brom and Orenstein, 1994; Clark and Soulsby; 
1995, Eyal et al., 1997), the enterprise managers played a prominent role in interpreting 
the new economic reality and endowing the new, capitalist practices with meaning.
Networks, symbolic power and regional unevenness
Despite the political rhetoric about the equal opportunities in privatization for everyone, 
the Czech privatization unintentionally turned the former economic nomenklatura into 
key players with a dominant role. The managers of voucher-privatized enterprises were 
not only allowed to preserve control over 'their1 enterprises, but they often also gained 
the responsibility for restructuring their old networked coalitions (Brom and Orenstein, 
1994; Clark and Soulsby, 1995; Eyal et a i,  1997; for a good analysis of the success of 
managers described as 'winners' of Czech privatization see Kotrba, 1995). The networks 
of the Communist period, as a consequence, survived privatization largely unaffected 
and although the legal status of managers and the form of property ownership changed, 
many of the people and their networks remained in place (Estrin et a i, 1995; Capek and 
Mertlik, 1996).
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The privatization process thus did not represent a very radical rupture in the 
development of the Czech socioeconomy. It did not remove the symbolic and social 
capitals of Communism and replace them by the 'market-, as the designers of voucher 
privatization had imagined. Instead, it gave the management an opportunity to re-gain 
recognition and legitimation and use the market as a source of symbolic capital in the 
new, profit-based capitalist environment. Given their strong position in the networks 
inherited from the previous regime and the relative freedom to act as de facto owners, 
the Czech managers were allowed to use their network heritage and accumulated 
symbolic power to constitute a system of recognized practices. In this way they could 
redefine the criteria of recognition, as well as secure their own legitimation in the 
nascent capitalist economy.
The new understandings of market and the capitalist practices thus started to 
evolve and develop gradually as a result of the effort by individual managers to translate 
and mediate (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991) the meanings of the new economic reality to 
their advantage.29 The way in which the managers began to translate the meanings of the 
capitalist practices inevitably reflected their embeddedness in the networks of their 
clienteles and the structure and contents of these networks. Privatization, in a sense, 
uncovered the 'quality' of clienteles controlled by individual managers and their 
compatibility with capitalist rationality. It uncovered the extent to which the individual 
enterprise directors had been dependent for their recognition in the past on the symbolic 
capital of Communism; or, on the contrary, to what extent they had been truly 
entrepreneurial and relied on the informal networks, which could be useful in the 
competitive capitalist conditions.
It can be expected that those managers who in the past used to rely on the 
support of a clientele and local coalition which valued the market rationality of 
reciprocal exchange would find it easy to build upon their old networks. Through the
29This description o f the behaviour o f managers presupposes that they are actually interested in preserving 
their privileged positions o f enterprise managers and that they want to run the enterprise in the future. 
However, it has been also pointed out that many managers o f Czech voucher-privatized enterprises instead 
o f looking for a longer term benefit by the means o f re-legitimizing their positions within their enterprises 
resorted to the short-term strategy of'tunnelling' or 'juicing' the enterprise, i.e. different forms o f  asset 
stripping (Mertlik, 1995; Mlôoch, 1997).
processes of translation and enrolment they could make their action frameworks 
compatible with Western capitalist rationality and thus preserve their recognition in the 
new environment. On the other hand, it can also be expected that the managers who in 
the past used to rely predominantly on the recognition derived from the allegiance to the 
Communist hierarchy would find it rather difficult to re-gain recognition. Their 
association with the official practices recognized by the Communist regime would make 
it hard for them to adjust their action frameworks to capitalist practices and adapt to 
profit-based rationality in a credible way.
The managers could not shed easily the heritage of their old networks and 
practices (Stark, 1992; Clark and Soulsby, 1995; Grabber and Stark, 1997b), and were 
therefore restricted in their actions by their inherited forms of embeddedness. The actual 
outcomes of post-privatization restructuring and the forms of'capitalism' thus varied 
across space since they reflected the locally-specific combination of networks, practices 
and rationalities inherited from the old local coalitions with the new forms of 
recognition and new practices associated with the rationality of capitalism. These 
interactions between the networked social capital and the different kinds of symbolic 
capital translated locally into concrete practices and meanings of privatization and thus 
into locally-specific institutional set-ups.
To explain the varied outcome of post-privatization restructuring in individual 
enterprises and regions it is thus not sufficient to study the outcomes of privatization in 
terms of the forms of ownership and control rights. These are important features but 
they only set the limits of freedom within which the managers were allowed to operate 
and act (Mertlik, 1995; Capek and Mertlik, 1996). The explanation of the actual 
restructuring process in individual regional contexts needs to explore the ways in which 
the enterprise managers started to rework the networks of their old coalitions and the 
ways in which they used these networks in an attempt to redefine the sources of 
symbolic power and means of recognition. In other words, an explanation of regional 
restructuring needs to analyze the role of enterprise managers in translating the 
meanings of capitalism and in enrolling other actors in a particular interpretation and 
reproduction of practices. These cultural processes, although aimed largely at
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legitimizing the positions of the managers themselves, also had a major impact on the 
constitution and stabilization of institutional set-ups in individual regions.
The managers were left in the new economic environment with two basic 
options or strategies for how to regain symbolic capital and thus maintain their 
recognition and legitimation. First, the management could try to mobilize parts of their 
networked heritage and further cultivate contacts with the banks, the state 
administration and other members of their old clientele. Through these networks it was 
possible to obtain more credits, write off debts, but also enter into cooperative ventures 
with other Czech enterprises, research institutes and trading firms. At the same time, 
they could try to persuade others that this was what capitalism should look like, that the 
best solutions were the home-grown ones (exploiting the image of Czech capitalism1) 
and that they were the most capable ones to carry out the project of restructuring. This 
strategy could be described as an attempt to regain symbolic recognition through a 
selective use of parts of the old coalitions and networks and by presenting them as 
compatible with the new, market-based capitalist system. Depending on how selectively 
these networks of social capital were used, the enterprise either kept running in pretty 
much the same way as before (i.e. extension of soft-budget constraints), or the practices 
were gradually adapted to the imperative of profit making and the enterprises developed 
into genuine domestic capitalist firms (Stark, 1996; McDermott, 1997, Hayn and 
McDermott, 1998).
Second, the management could try to establish entirely new networks and form 
new coalitions by internationalizing and linking with Western partners or investors. The 
practices o f Western firms would be used by local managers as the means of 
legitimizing their positions.30 This strategy was attractive mainly because it was 
relatively easy to use the presence of a foreign partner as a sign of acceptance by 
Western capitalism. Such acceptance often increased the local recogmtion of managers 
because for much of the Czech political establishment, as well as for the majority of
30Kotrba (1995 p 179) who conducted a detailed analysis o f the success of privatization projects o f 
voucher privatization gives empirical support for the theory that most foreign investment deals concluded 
within the framework o f Czech voucher privatization were guided by this strategy. He suggests that 
"direct sales to foreign buyers were carried out according to projects submitted by the management. In^  
many o f these cases, it was clear that the management worked as an agent o f those foreign companies.
116
Czech society, Western capitalism was the ultimate desired aim of transformation. The 
imported Western organization and production practices and their meaning could then 
be presented as the 'right' type of capitalism. They could be used locally as a source of 
symbolic capital and legitimation for the managers. This strategy would also enable the 
managers to get rid of parts of their old coalitions which they regarded as useless, to 
distance themselves from the domestic networks which might have been restricting their 
restructuring plans and give them a sufficiently strong backing to carry out their plans, 
even against local discontent and opposition.
This distinction is, of course, just a schematic one as most managers have 
probably been using a combination of both strategies, and a mixture of different 
networks as sources of recognition. What is important, however, is that the regional 
differences in the forms of restructuring can be explained by exploring the ways in 
which enterprise managers mediated the interaction between the respective symbolic 
capital of Western or domestic capitalism and their own networked social capital. The 
product of these interactions was the formation of locally-specific institutional set-ups 
which also created different preconditions for the adaptability and competitiveness of 
individual regions.
The rest of this chapter w ill focus specifically on  one o f  the strategies o f  
enterprise management, on internationalization. The following sections will explore the 
role of internationalization in the post-Communist transformation and will also analyze 
the reasons for its differentiated impact on individual regional economies.
INTERNATIONALIZATION VERSUS REGIONAL ADAPTABILITY?
The meaning of internationalization in the post-Communist context
i
Internationalization represents an important component of the rupture in the 
socioeconomic development of the post-Communist countries. Internationalization in 
this case means the opening of the post-Communist economies to the flows of foreign, 
and more specifically Western goods and capital, but especially to the practices,
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meanings and forms of recognition based on the capitalist, market-based form of 
rationality. The importance of internationalization in the transformation of post- 
Communist countries stems from the fact that most political regimes in these countries 
declared compatibility with the West as their prime aim. The indicators of increasing 
internationalization, such as the amount of foreign investments, percentage of exports to 
the Western countries were therefore, and often still are, regarded as a measure of 
success in transformation (see e.g. Meth-Cohn et a i, 1996; Nicholls et a i, 1998).
The term internationalization as used here thus describes a process in which 
individual actors, firms or regions are linked into the international economy. It is given 
preference to the term globalization as it does not have the connotation of global inter­
connectedness or of a homogenizing process on the global scale. Use of the term 
internationalization is also justified on the grounds that except for a few enclaves, such 
as some of the capital cities of the kind of Moscow, Prague or Budapest which are truly 
becoming centres integrated into global flows, for much of the regions in the post- 
Communist countries this does not seem to be the case (Smith and Pickles, 1998). 
Moreover, in most post-Communist countries the involvement of the state in regulating 
and controlling the impact of international contacts on the national economies is quite 
substantial (Èâk, 1997). Although these efforts were not always successful in the past 
(Gowan, 1995; Pavlinek, 1998), state involvement and its attempts to regulate the 
process of integration with the West also suggest the use of the term internationalization 
rather than globalization (Allen, 1995).
The process of internationalization was supposed to bring to the formerly 
Communist countries elements of the generally recognized, 'real', market environment 
and was associated with a substantial degree of symbolic recognition and power. In the 
Czech Republic, also, the integration with the West and the development of 
international networks were expected to act as a powerful force pushing the enterprise 
managers to accept a kind of 'Western capitalist1 rationality. The opinion that all 
Western firms possess the 'right' kind of know-how and expertise of'real' capitalism was 
quite widespread in the post-Communist societies of that time (Clark and Soulsby,
1995; Dôrr and Kessel, 1996).
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In reality, however, the institutional outcomes of Czech privatization meant that 
internationalization did not represent so much an external force 'pushing' the managers 
to adapt but became instead a process of their deliberate linking with Western 
companies. The enterprise managers sought to establish such networks and links in their 
effort to regain recognition and legitimation by tapping into the symbolic power which 
the post-Communist societies ascribed to Western capitalism. In the Czech case it was 
therefore rarely the case that the enterprises and regions were being pulled into the 
global economy by external forces and forced to adapt. On the contrary, the local actors 
often tried hard to attract foreign partners in order to use their networks and practices to 
their own benefit, unaware that such foreign involvement might have effects which in 
the future may be beyond their control. In any case, it was often local actors who, in the 
post-privatization period, began to mediate the meaning of internationalization and 
selectively used the practices imported by their Western partners.
Apart from the symbolic power which the contacts with Western firms carried, 
the process of internationalization was also usually characterized by some common 
features which were possible to observe directly. Compared to the action frameworks 
and rationalities of economic actors in the post-Communist countries, the practices and 
meanings brought through Western business contacts were quite distinct in several 
aspects. The process of internationalization, no matter whether in the form of export 
networks, direct investment or collaborative ventures, was likely to discipline local 
actors according to a particular form of efficiency and rationality, namely the criteria of 
market value. Stress oh the control of costs, intensification of production process, 
productivity of labour, as well as the quality of products were features typically 
associated with Western managerial practices brought about by internationalization. The 
Western companies which established contacts with post-Communist enterprises also 
tended to be financially strong (at least relative to the cash-starved Eastern European 
enterprises), they controlled the technological, organizational and marketing know-how 
which was broadly compatible with and often competitive in the Western markets. All 
these features, combined together, also meant that the productivity and competitiveness 
of internationalized enterprises were commonly higher than those of the firms without a
similar degree of internationalization (Smith, 1995; Zemplinerovd and Benâêek, 1996; 
Mertlik, undated; Swain, undated).
Despite these important common features, internationalization in no way implies 
that its influence on the restructuring of individual enterprises and regions will be the 
same. Nor does it mean that its impact on regional institutional set-ups will always be 
positive from the point of view of their long term adaptability and competitiveness 
(Smith and Ferenôikovâ, 1998; Smith and Pavlinek, 1998; Mertlik, undated; Swain, 
undated). The issue of positive and negative impacts of internationalization on regional 
economies is addressed in the last section o f this chapter.
The pros and the cons of internationalization: ’disembedded* regions and 
adaptability
The varied institutional outcomes of internationalization observed in post-Communist 
countries and regions (see Smith and Pickles, 1998; Smith and Pavlinek, 1998; Smith 
and Swain, 1998) is perhaps not very surprising given the differences in the locally- 
specific institutional arrangements inherited from the Communist period. Some authors, 
however, have argued that the differentiated impact of internationalization on the 
regional economies largely reflects the strategy adopted by the foreign partners (Dicken 
et a l, 1994; Sadler and Swain, 1994; Grabber, 1997; Smith and Ferenôikovâ, 1998). In 
many cases, it has been argued, the strategy of foreign firms has been responsible for the 
quick adjustment of the post-Communist enterprises to the value logic of Western 
capitalism, yet the only benefits flowing to the locality were the preservation of the 
employment levels and perhaps, but not necessarily, higher wages. Internationalization 
and foreign investment in particular have been criticized for the effect of 'disembedding' 
(Grabber, 1994,1997; Smith and Swain, 1998) enterprises from their local networks. 
The process of internationalization associated with this particular strategy arguably 
results in a kind of restructuring characterized by an import of Western ways of doing 
things, by 'cloning' Western organizational and institutional arrangements which 
subsequently suppress or replace the potentially beneficial parts of local institutional 
legacies (Grabber, 1994,1997).
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This particular form of internationalization might bring recognition and 
legitimation to local managers, but it also implies a much harsher selection criteria 
which might cause unnecessarily large losses (Grabber, 1994,1997). Apart from 
'streamlining' the production and increasing its productivity, the 'cloning' of Western 
practices is likely to reduce the variety of ideas, practices and meanings within local 
institutional set-ups and thus reduce the scope for locally-based innovative initiatives 
(Grabber, 1994; Smith and Swain, 1998; Mertlik, undated). Internationalization of 
enterprises along these lines often leads to a quick adaptation to the imperative of profit 
making, but, according to these authors, it also runs the risk of a loss of adaptability 
(Grabber, 1993c; Grabber and Stark, 1997b ). The 'cloning' and import of Western 
organizational forms are also likely to make it harder for actors to identify with a change 
of practices, to enrol other local actors in a common interpretation of facts and to align 
the differences between the action frameworks of diverse actors.
The empirical findings presented by these researchers show that this 'cloning' 
form of internationalization is quite common in the post-Communist countries (Grabber, 
1994, 1997; Smith and Ferenôikovâ, 1998; Pavlinek and Smith, 1998). The stress on the 
strategies of Western partners present in most of these studies, however, does not seem 
to account for the full complexity of internationalization and its role in regional 
restructuring. These studies implicitly presume a passive role for local actors in 
mediating the process of internationalization. They also tend to presume that foreign 
partners enter into a relationship with a fixed strategic vision which they subsequently 
implement, regardless of circumstances or the character of local institutional legacies. 
This is clearly a simplistic understanding of the complex cultural process which the 
internationalization of regions involves. Also, the limited enterprise-level evidence from 
Eastern Europe shows that the actual strategies of Western partners are shaped in the 
process of interaction with local actors and that enterprise restructuring is a result of the 
mutual adjustment of initial positions, adaptation and learning (Dorr and Kessel, 1996, 
1997).
Nearly all the contacts between the managers in the post-Cômmunist countries 
and their foreign partners started after 1989 from a point zero in terms of knowledge
about each other, or mutual trust. The scope for an adaptation of Western strategies to 
local conditions was thus constrained from the outset. Nevertheless, this initial 
disadvantage did not prevent many post-Communist managers from persuading their 
foreign partners about the value of local skills and abilities and from a gradual 
alignment of their different understandings and interpretations. In the case of the Czech 
economy especially, the privatization often left the managers in charge of enterprise 
restructuring, and therefore allowed them to negotiate with foreign partners and modify 
their initial strategic intentions. The disembedding effect of internationalization thus 
might have been reduced through the process of translation which resulted in a mutual 
adaptation, alignment and integration of local and Western action frameworks. In many 
cases, such as the ones described by Grabber (1994,1997), Swain (1994) or Smith and 
Ferenôikovâ (1998), this arrangement might, o f course, never be created and the 
disembedding effect may be detrimental to the regional economy. The local company 
would then remain isolated from the ties of its old local coalition and thus entirely 
dependent on the practices and networks of the foreign partner.
The concrete impact of internationalization on regions thus does not seem to be 
determined by the strategies of foreign firms. It depends more substantially on the 
ability of local managers to mediate the meanings of internationalization and to mix this 
process with selected elements of their old clienteles and with the action frameworks of 
local actors. However, the positive role of the institutional legacies from the Communist 
period in weakening the disembedding effect and increasing the positive effects of 
internationalization should not be overestimated. The old coalitions certainly 
represented a fairly flexible system of local coordination and governance which helped 
the enterprise managers to fulfil the plans and survive the insecurity of central planning. 
In order to adapt to the new conditions of profit-oriented economy these elementary 
coordination mechanisms nonetheless need to be cultivated. These networks might be 
of a collaborative nature, trust-based and as such might allow for a smooth mobilization 
of resources, but their rent-seeking Communist mentality (Grancelli, 1995; Mlôoch,
1997) needs to be transformed into relations based on the rationality of Western 
capitalism and criteria of profit making.
In this context the disembedding effect of internationalization, in contrast to 
those who stress its negative role (Grabber, 1994,1997\ Pavlinek and Smith, 1998), can 
be regarded as positive and even desirable. The disembedding of enterprises from their 
old networks and the introduction of a value regime compatible with the rationality of 
Western firms may be necessary to prevent the regional economies from degenerating 
into an institutional arrangement characterized by many conflicting claims to the 
resources of the privatized enterprise. This institutional form could restrict the efforts 
for collective, profit-oriented actions and would represent an "endurance of 
overembedded networks which are 'locked in' to the rationality of the old environment 
(Smith and Swain, 1995, p. 16; original emphasis; see also Smith, 1994,1995; Smith 
and Swain, 1998). In such situations the management of an enterprise is exposed to 
continuous demands for help or for sharing resources by former allies who try to 
legitimize their right to such an action by the history of the common, kin-like 
partnership.31
The disembedding from local networks caused by internationalization and the 
transfer of decision making to the hands of an external force indifferent to the claims of 
the members of local coalition may therefore be regarded as a positive development. 
The association with Western partners can be used by local managers as a source of 
recognition which allows them to avoid the trap of'overembeddedness'. As actors 
representing Western firms, the local managers can disentangle themselves from their 
old clienteles in which they are often regarded as peers with little legitimation for 
radically different action, especially if it is damaging to other members of the clientele 
(Clark and Soulsby, 1995; Dôrr and Kessel, 1996,1997). In this sense we can speculate 
that at least a partial disembedding from local networks is a precondition for a 
successful adaptation of local institutional legacies into an arrangement capable of 
'holding down' the process of internationalization (Amin and Thrift, 1994b).
31 See White (1990, p. 88) for a similar, but more general observation. White uses the term 'decoupling' 
rather then 'disembedding' but he also argues that the lack o f decoupling can be the main cause for 
underdevelopment in many countries where accumulation o f capital is hindered by similar requests 
characteristic o f the pre-modem socioeconomics.
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It seems, nevertheless, that the history o f past cooperation based on the informal 
networks of local coalitions from the Communist period can help to establish well 
functioning trust-based networks founded on capitalist rationality (see e.g. Kuczi and 
Makô, 1997). The existence of such networks can potentially make the task of 'holding 
down' the process of internationalization easier, but the parts of the old networked 
coalitions have to be used selectively. Many networks and practices thus would have to 
be abandoned as incompatible with the socioeconomic system of Western capitalism. 
The presence of foreign partners can be especially helpful in such situations. Their 
symbolic power can act as a guarantee of sorts that the market rationality and the 
practices compatible with Western capitalism prevail and do not give way to the 
perpetuation of unsustainable sofr-budget constraints.
The effects of internationalization on the regional economies are therefore 
neither positive nor negative per se and their impact is not solely a result of the strategy 
of Western firms. The actual outcomes of internationalization in terms of the network 
restructuring and the transformation of local institutional set-ups depend on the 
particular, locally-specific ways of'holding down' the international networks and 
practices. Local actors do not always represent passive elements in the process of 
internationalization, nor do they represent simple channels for implementing the 
strategy of foreign firms. On the contrary, they can often influence substantially the 
interactions between the symbolic capital of Western capitalism and local networked 
social capital, and can mediate the selective use and mixing of local networks, practices 
and meanings with the imported, Western ones.
The character of Czech privatization placed the enterprise managers in positions 
from which they could mediate the interaction of Western firms with local networks 
quite successfully. They were allowed to a great extent to translate (Latour, 1987) the 
meanings of international practices, to integrate them with the action frameworks of 
other local actors, and to align (Gallon, 1991) the differences between both local and 
foreign actors. The ways in which internationalization is mediated locally through the 
processes of translation and enrolment then decide whether the disembedding effect of
internationalization increases the ability to 'hold down' internationalization, or creates 
disembedded and dependent regional economies.
It may be expected that the mutual adjustment between local and Western actors 
and their inclusion in an integrated institutional set-up may potentially create shared 
meanings (Gallon, 1991; Shapin, 1998), as well as enrich their action frameworks and 
create innovative interpretative possibilities (Sabel, 1993,1994; Storper and Salais,
1997). If the attempts of local managers to re-legitimize their positions by 
internationalization follow this path and the managers prove capable of mediating the 
process of internationalization, the positive effect of disembedding may outweigh its 
potentially negative consequences. The regional economies would then very likely adapt 
to the market environment and become competitive and profitable relatively quickly 
(although perhaps not as quickly as in the case of'cloning' of W estern organizational 
models). More importantly, this form of internationalization would be also more likely 
to produce institutional arrangements based on locally-specific collective assets capable 
of evolving in order to adapt (Storper, 1995; Amin and Hausner, 1997; Amin, 1998) and 
therefore more likely to sustain adaptability and competitiveness over a longer period of 
time.
CONCLUSION: RUPTURE, INTERNATIONALIZATION AND REGIONAL 
ADAPTABILITY
The argument presented in this chapter is in line with the assertions of those 
geographers, economists and sociologists who see history and institutional arrangements 
of the past as a necessary clue to understanding the outcomes of the socioeconomic 
rupture and regional restructuring in Eastern Europe (Mertlik, 1995; Grabber and Stark, 
1997a, b; McDermott, 1997; Mlôoch, 1997; Smith and Swain, 1998). It has been argued 
throughout this chapter that in order to explain the actual outcomes of the rupture, we 
need to analyze the ways in which privatization transformed rather than removed the 
institutional legacies inherited from the previous socioeconomic system. It was also 
shown that the form and method of privatization, although important for understanding
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the control rights and corporate governance of privatized enterprises, is not sufficient in 
itself to explain the diverse paths of enterprise restructuring and the different speeds 
with which individual regions adapted to the rupture.
The chapter has argued, firstly, that in the Czech context the varied forms of 
enterprise restructuring and the success or failure of regional economies in adapting to 
capitalist rationality can be interpreted largely in relation to the efforts of local 
enterprise management to redefine the character of symbolic capital. The managers in 
most Czech enterprises were left in charge of restructuring enterprises which they 
effectively controlled. They were therefore motivated to use their networked social 
capital and transform the means of recognition in a way which secured the legitimation 
of their positions in the new economic environment. The process of privatization was 
thus translated by enterprise managers into new, locally-specific practices and meanings. 
It is the use of different types of the symbolic capital and their interactions with the 
specific elements of managers' networked social capital that, to a large extent, shaped 
institutional outcomes in individual Czech regions.
Secondly, the chapter has focused on internationalization as one possible and 
very powerful source of symbolic capital used by Czech managers. It has been pointed 
out that the symbolic power associated with internationalization can be employed by 
local managers to disentangle themselves from their embeddedness in the networks and 
practices of their old clienteles and local coalitions. The disembedding effect of 
internationalization, it has been argued, may in some cases be to the benefit of the 
regional economy and may help to create institutional set-ups capable of holding down 
the process of internationalization. At the same time, however,- this effect may also turn 
local enterprises into completely disembedded', powerless and dependent branch plants 
with all the negative consequences for their long term adaptability (see e.g. Grabber, 
1994, 1997; Sadler and Swain, 1994; Smith and Ferenôikovâ; 1998, Smith and Swain,
1998).
The arguments which depict Western investments in Eastern Europe as 
'cathedrals in a desert' produced by particular strategies of foreign investors (Grabber, 
1994; Sadler and Swain, 1994; Gowan, 1995; Swain, undated) have been criticized as
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deterministic and inadequate for explaining the ways in which internationalization 
transforms regional economies. This is largely because this approach tends to ignore the 
ways in which the mutual relations develop over time in the interaction between local 
and foreign actors. The argument presented here rather is that it is more appropriate to 
think about the impact of internationalization on regional institutional set-ups in terms 
of locally-specific translations (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991). The translation of the 
meaning of internationalization, as suggested in Chapter Two, is produced through an 
interaction between the particular social capital of local actors and the symbolic capital 
of Western capitalism. Through the cultural processes of translation and enrolment, 
local managers were able to give the process o f internationalization a concrete meaning 
which transformed the action frameworks of other local actors and gave the local 
institutional set-up its specific character.
Internationalization thus does not represent an external force which operates 
independently of its socioeconomic context, rather it is a force which modifies the 
networks, practices and meanings inherited from, in this case, the centrally planned 
economy; it transforms them and is also transformed by them. The compatibility 
between capitalist rationality and local institutional legacies, however, depends on how 
successfully the process of translation enrols both the foreign and local actors and aligns 
differences in their respective action frameworks. Furthermore, it has also been 
suggested that a successful translation and integration of'imported' practices, networks 
and meanings with 'old' local ones is not only possible, but can also become an 
important part of a process which creates adaptable institutional set-ups and competitive 
regional economies. These arguments will be further substantiated and supported by 
empirical findings in the chapters which analyze the material from the three case study 
regions.
CHAPTER FIVE: ON THE METHOD AND THE 
NATURE OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
The main concern and topic of this thesis is the uneven impact of internationalization in 
the Czech Republic. The previous theoretical chapters introduced the three key concepts 
of internationalization, embeddedness and adaptability which represent the basis of a 
general analytical framework. This framework, in turn, can be used for an explanation 
of regional transformations, as well as for an assessment of the differentiated ability of 
regions to 'hold down' the process of internationalization. The second half of the thesis 
represents an attempt to apply the analytical framework together with the knowledge 
about the Communist and post-Communist Czech socioeconomy to the analysis of 
regional economies. The empirical chapters Six, Seven and Eight thus strive to explain 
and assess the impact of internationalization on the adaptability and competitiveness of 
three selected regions in the Czech Republic.
The present chapter, then, represents a link between the two halves of the thesis 
and its aim is to characterize the adopted method of research. The theory developed so 
far, however, is not something to be proved by the empirical findings, nor is it a pre­
given framework which either 'fits' or does not 'fit* the empirical findings. The method 
of research described here is best understood as an iterative process in which the 
theoretical concepts were developed, confronted with the empirical reality, and 
reconceptualized in turn. It is a process which leads to a reflection and a refinement of 
the theoretical concepts. This chapter, then, aims to summarize this process of searching 
for a method of explanation adopted throughout the empirical part o f the thesis.
The chapter is in two parts and four sections. The first part starts with a section 
that explains the gradual development of the three key concepts of internationalization, 
embeddedness and adaptability. The following section describes how the iterative 
process, through which the relationships between the concepts and the empirical 
material crystallized, and generated a framework able to explain the regionally uneven
impact of internationalization. The positionality of a researcher undertaking qualitative 
research is also briefly addressed in this section.
The second part of the chapter starts with a section explaining the reasons for the 
selection of the case study method and the technique of semi-structured interviews, and 
elaborates on the way in which interviews were transformed into theoretically informed 
case studies. The next section describes the process of selecting industrial sectors, 
regions and enterprises for the case studies and introduces briefly each of the case study 
regions. The conclusion presents the aims and the structure common to all the empirical 
chapters.
SETTING UP THE METHODOLOGICAL POSITION
Internationalization, embeddedness and adaptability: developing the key concepts
The main motivation for conducting this research project was my urge to understand the 
reasons behind the uneven impact of internationalization in the Czech Republic. I was 
amazed by the profound impact that the process of internationalization - or more 
specifically 'Westernization' - had on many aspects of life in the Czech Republic, while I 
was also puzzled by the uneven spread of its positive and negative effects across space. 
The process of internationalization showed many common features across Eastern 
Europe. The import of Western notions of efficiency, profitability, the discipline of 
value, the stress on costs and quality, all strongly affected the behaviour of actors in the 
post-Communist societies that were increasingly confronted with internationalization.
To paraphrase Komai (1981), the main common characteristic of the process of 
internationalization can best be described as a "hardening' ot the soft-budget constraints 
of Communism.
Despite this common feature, however, the regional outcomes of .
internationalization appeared to be highly differentiated and uneven. In some regions the 
increasing degree of internationalization seemed to reinvigorate local development 
potential and create locally-based innovations, which laid the ground for the self-
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regenerating competitiveness of regional economies. In contrast, the same process 
worked through other regions to produce branch-plant economies and these regions 
increasingly became dependent on the external decisions of foreign firms.
Following recent arguments in economic geography (Grabber, 1993a; Amin and 
Thrift, 1994a, b), my aim was to explain this regional unevenness by employing the 
concept of embeddedness. During the initial stage, my understanding of the relation 
between this concept and the explanation of regional unevenness was strongly 
influenced by a critical realist methodology (Sayer, 1992). What I found particularly 
appealing about Sayeris approach was the distinction between necessary causal powers 
or mechanisms and contingent conditions. Within this framework the differentiated 
capacity of regions to 'hold down' the process of internationalization was to be explained 
as an outcome of the interaction between the general process of internationalization and 
the contingent, locally-specific forms of embeddedness. At that time my understanding 
of embeddedness was strongly influenced by an oversocialized, 'networked' approach 
(Cooke and Morgan, 1993; Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994) which seemed to correspond 
well with Sayefs critical realist methodology.
However, the first round of empirical work suggested that processes of cultural 
interpretation and mediation play an important role in shaping the locally-specific 
outcomes of internationalization. This finding stimulated further reflection on the causes 
and explanation of regional unevenness. It helped to uncover the inadequacy of my 
original understanding of embeddedness that .can be described as somewhat 
mechanistic. Such an understanding of embeddedness and its relation to the uneven 
impact of internationalization suffered from a rather crude, structuralist methodology of 
critical realism. Similar methodologies have also been criticized for their economism 
(Duncan and Savage, 1991; Pratt, 1991, 1995) and thus appeared unsuitable for an 
explanation of contested cultural processes.
More recently, then, I looked for a more suitable approach and my understanding 
of embeddedness gradually turned into a more culturally informed one. A central role in 
this 'shift' played the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1990, 1991) and actor-network 
theory of Latour (1987) and Gallon (1991) which made embeddedness a concept that
still remains essentially networked, yet acknowledges and accommodates the influence 
of power relations. The action of actors, in this understanding, is embedded in both 
networked relations of social capital and a system of practices and meanings which 
involve the relations of symbolic power of recognition (Bourdieu, 1977). The 
explanation of an uneven ability of regions to ’hold down’ internationalization thus 
required a method to provide a non-mechanistic explanation of the processes through 
which these power relations are transformed.
As a consequence of this reflection and reconceptualization of embeddedness, 
my understanding of internationalization has also changed: It has moved away from the 
original concept of a unidirectional, homogeneous force, towards an understanding 
based on the cultural theory and the contested process of interpretation of meanings 
(Bourdieu, 1993a; Hall, 1995). Internationalization, following this interpretation, 
acquires its locally-specific content through cultural mediation (Gallon, 1991) and 
through the reinterpretation of its meanings by local actors. Internationalization is thus 
both a material and a discursive process which either transforms the existing system of 
practices and meanings, or gives rise to a new one. The concrete meaning of practices 
associated with internationalization is specific to individual spatio-temporal contexts 
and depends on the process of contestation, on the interactions with existing cultural and 
institutional forms in which the actors are embedded. Such a process of cultural 
contestation is largely responsible for the differentiated impact of internationalization on 
regional adaptability.
Finally, as a consequence of the reconceptualization of embeddedness and 
internationalization, my understanding of the concept of adaptability has also been 
transformed. This concept was, in line with arguments of several economic geographers 
(Grabber, 1993a; Amin and Hausner, 1997; Grabber and Stark, 1997a; Amin, 1998), 
identified in the initial stage of my research as the means of assessing the impact of 
internationalization on locally-specific forms of embeddedness. However, in the process 
of searching for a suitable explanatory framework, my understanding of adaptability 
developed gradually from a concept based on a mere co-presence of diverse networks to 
one that involves a dynamic analysis of culture. In my present understanding, ah
explanation as well as an assessment of the impact of internationalization on regional 
adaptability needs to be based on an analysis of cultural processes. These cultural 
processes not only transform the local system of practices and create locally-specific 
meanings of internationalization, but they also change the capacity of local actors to 
reflect, to reinterpret meanings and to create alternative interpretations.
The research method as an outcome of a reflective and iterative process
This process of developing concepts, their confrontation with empirical reality and the 
task of reflection produced the method of analysis and explanation which informs this 
thesis. It can be said that the methodology evolved just as my understanding of the 
phenomena did. This evolution, however, was not a haphazard process, but the result of 
an iterative search, reflection and reconceptualization. During this process my 
understanding of causality has diverged substantially from the critical realist 
understanding of mechanisms. I still believe that the diverse ability of regions to 'hold 
down' internationalization can be explained through a causal analysis that can be arrived 
at through concrete and intensive research (Cloke et o/., 1991; Sayer, 1992). The 
refinement of the key concepts, however, highlighted the fact that the mechanisms of 
critical realist methodology are themselves contested and culturally conditioned and 
therefore do not represent a satisfactory foundation for an explanation of regional 
transformation.
The reflective 'loop' from the theory to the empirical work and back to theory 
thus resulted in a specification of the key concepts and in their refinement. The 
reflection on the relation between embeddedness and the uneven impact of 
internationalization brought to the fore the central role of culture in my understanding of 
causality. Most clearly this development can be demonstrated by the relatively late 
introduction of the cultural concepts of translation and enrolment. The importance of 
these concepts as a way of describing the cultural processes of mediating the meaning 
for others and making others involved only became clear as a result of interviewing 
experience. Only the interviews and concrete responses of interviewees stimulated 
further reflection and provided clues as to how the theoretical concepts of social and
symbolic capital are mutually transformed and how the relations of symbolic power can 
be altered by individual actors.
These developments in the theory complicated my original understanding of the 
term mechanism which, in turn, led to a reassessment of the adopted method and of my 
understanding of causal explanation. In m y presen t understanding, the explanation of 
the diverse ability of regions to 'hold down' the process of internationalization needs to 
be based on an analysis of causality in the process of cultural contestation. The 
processes of cultural contestation encode the economic processes (Bourdieu, 1993a; 
Crang, 1997), produce locally-specific meanings of internationalization and create 
diverse preconditions for the adaptability of regions. Moreover, the character and 
outcome of these processes can take us towards a causal explanation with the help of the 
analytical concepts of translation, enrolment (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991), as well as 
networks (Granovetter, 1985/1992), practices and the interpretation of meaning 
(Bourdieu, 1977,1990, 1993a, b). The causality in such an explanation is culturally 
informed and is therefore much less deterministic, much looser and open-ended. 
Nevertheless, I believe, that this culturally informed method resulting from an iterative 
search, reconceptualization and corroboration by empirical material represents a more 
nuanced way of explaining as well as assessing the impact of internationalization on the 
adaptability of individual regions.
The assessment of regional adaptability to which this method aspires is based on 
the presumption of a degree of irreversibility, stabilization and reproduction of cultural 
processes (Gallon, 1991; Law, 1991b). This irreversibility can provide some (although 
limited and probabilistic) understanding of future development and it forms the basis for 
a prediction of regional adaptability. At this point, however, the research method runs 
the inevitable risk o fa  subjective assessment. This risk is apparent in the case of 
concepts such as embeddedness and internationalization, which involve very 'soft' 
notions of understanding and meaning produced by individual actors. It is perhaps even 
more obvious in the case of judgements about and assessment of regional adaptability 
that also represent a normative claim with political implications for future actions. It is
thus important to acknowledge that such judgements are situated and that they carry the 
baggage of the researcher's own interpretations and understandings.
Inevitably, the judgements and empirical findings presented in the following 
three chapters cannot avoid this problem. Research is not a passive, uninterested process 
without any effects on reality. The method adopted here which aims to provide an 
explanation based on the interpretations given by individual actors cannot avoid the 
establishment of some sort of relationship with these people. In fact, these people and 
their interpretations presented in the empirical chapters also helped to construct, albeit 
unwillingly, the theoretical arguments presented in this thesis.
The method of causal explanation developed in this thesis acknowledges that the 
relationship between the researcher and the interviewees shapes the empirical findings. 
This approach does acknowledge that "all knowledges are shaped, contingent, and in 
some other world could be otherwise" (Law, 1991b, p. 6). The recognition of this fact 
nonetheless does not make the research presented in the following empirical chapters 
any less valid. It simply requires the researcher to be more reflexive and more aware of 
their position in interpreting and giving meanings to the empirical material.
It has to be stressed that this research started from a position which in no way 
intended to derogate the process of internationalization or the actors associated with this 
process. Neither does the research claim to provide answers to what represents the 'right' 
or wrong' kind of internationalization. Nevertheless, the work does aim to evaluate the 
impact of internationalization on the adaptability and longer term competitiveness of the 
case study regions. And this evaluation involves a strong element of personal value 
judgement which some of the interviewees might disagree with. Yet, the judgements 
about internationalization and regional adaptability are not arbitrary since the empirical 
material corroborates them and is also reflected in the theoretical arguments of the 
thesis,
The evaluation presented here is an outcome of a methodological approach 
constructed through an iterative process of reflection, confrontation with empirical 
reality and reassessment of the key concepts. This means that my values - although they 
are inevitably part of the research - do not pre-determine the outcome and findings of
the empirical research. The empirical findings, on the contrary, contributed to the 
reassessment of my values and attitudes, but not in a haphazard way. The empirical facts 
led to the refinement of the concepts, as well as the réévaluation of my position, which 
arguably made my personal attitude towards internationalization more open and 
balanced. At present I do not see internationalization as either 'good' or 'bad', but 
dependent on the local context. This, of course, does not reduce the degree of 
subjectivity and context-specificity of the empirical findings. What it does suggest, 
however, is that the findings were arrived at through a method of a rigorous search and 
corroboration by empirical material, which also involved a degree of self-reflection. The 
corroboration and reflection can, in turn, be used as a defence against accusations of 
voluntarism.
, MOVING TO THE EMPIRICAL WORK 
The method of case study and why three?
The nature of the methodology developed in this thesis suggests that the differentiated 
impact of internationalization on regional economies should be explained by analyzing 
the processes which constitute locally-specific cultural and institutional forms. Culture 
within this methodological framework is understood as a plural and contested entity, 
which results from multiple processes of translation and enrolment that stabilize 
institutional arrangements and give meaning to individual practices. The causality of 
explanation is based on the character of these cultural processes, on the interpretations 
of facts by individual actors who are themselves involved in the processes of translation, 
production of meanings and in the reproduction of practices.
Research based on such an understanding of causality requires an in-depth 
analysis of individual cases which could not he satisfied by data analysis or by statistical 
measurements in general. Moreover, this nature of causality did not even require a 
comparison of a large quantity of data for a great number of regions or firms. Instead, 
the stress on the role of cultural processes and the condition of an in-depth analysis
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necessarily restricted the research to a small number of analyzed units. The method of 
case study and o fa  culturally informed intensive research (Cloke et a l, 1991; Sayer, 
1992) thus seemed best suited for the methodological position developed so far.
Furthermore, semi-structured interviews were selected as a fitting technique for 
researching the character of cultural processes in each of the case study regions. This 
technique served as a rich source of detailed information about the ways in which 
individual actors interpret and understand certain facts and why they interpret them in 
such ways. The analysis of the understandings and interpretations, in turn, formed a 
basis for a 'softer* and more nuanced causal explanation of the uneven regional impact 
of internationalization. The semi-structured interviews served also as a good technique 
for finding out about the diversity of networks among interviewees and about the degree 
of their internationalization. This technique was further supplemented with secondary 
materials which allowed for a corroboration of the interview material (for details see the 
Appendix).
The actual process of interviewing required a transformation of the key 
theoretical concepts such as symbolic power, networked power or action framework into 
everyday speech accessible to interviewees. The strategy used during the interviews was 
to ask questions which set up a topic with the potential to reveal interviewee's attitude to 
a concrete set of events or individuals (e.g. Communist system of central planning and 
its collapse, suppliers and customers in the pre- and post-1989 period, foreign partners 
and negotiations with them). The open-ended nature of questions allowed the 
interviewees to describe in their own words their past actions, changes of attitudes and 
understandings on their part, as well as on the part of other actors. Supplementary, ad 
hoc questions, then, tried to pull out the reasons for such changes as perceived by 
individual interviewees. In this way the questions helped to uncover and identify what 
these actors valued as a source of symbolic power in the past and present; what 
significant changes occurred in their networked relations, and how did these changes 
come about; and.also, how these changes impacted on the wider institutional 
arrangement within the region.
For example, questions about the character of relations with other bodies 
(enterprises, planning boards etc.) in the pre-1989 period helped to assess the attitude of 
interviewees to the Communist past and the symbolic power associated with the 
previous regime. Similarly, by asking how the positions of interviewees did, or did not, 
develop in the mutual negotiation with foreign partners, their relation to the symbolic 
power associated with internationalization could be assessed. Questions about the 
personal histories of interviewees, their background, past work experience, or their role 
in privatization served as a basis for evaluating the changes in the networked power and 
social capital, as well as the transformation of their action frameworks over the period 
since 1989.
The nature of Czech privatization gave the managers of privatized enterprises an 
important role in the restructuring of enterprise networks and also in the negotiations 
with potential foreign partners (see Chapter Four). These people therefore often played a 
key role in the process of interpreting and translating the meanings of imported. Western 
practices and generally, in mediating the process of internationalization in individual 
localities. This is also why the managers of local enterprises which had experienced 
some degree of internationalization were selected as the main target group for the semi- 
structured interviews (for details about the selection of interviewees see the Appendix). 
The empirical research confirmed the original expectation about the importance of local 
managers and highlighted the fact that the particular outcomes of internationalization in 
the three regions were largely influenced by the actions of people who manage the 
enterprises in question. Unless the managers were recently replaced, they represented 
the best informants about the past socioeconomic developments in the enterprises and 
regions as well as the history of internationalization in the region and its role in 
transforming the local institutional set-ups.
The researcher's own judgements in evaluating and re-interpreting the empirical 
reality also became a prominent issue at this stage of research since the interviewees 
would, clearly, never use terms which form the basis of my analytical framework. The 
major task, then, was to convert the responses back into theoretical concepts and 
research themes without changing the essence of respondents' interpretation. As a result.
it was also here, in the confrontation with empirical material, that the critical reflection 
on the key theoretical concepts and their most substantial refinement took place.
Despite my attempt to pre-structure the interviews by asking related sets of 
questions and clearly separating each set (see the Appendix), most themes kept coming 
back in responses to questions from several different parts of interviews. Because of that 
I produced large sheets (format A l) with themes such as 'transformation of symbolic 
power1, 'network transformation', or 'change of understanding' as columns in the sheet. 
During the transcription stage quotes and notes were added to these columns from 
responses to questions originating from different parts of interviews. As further 
interviews from other companies were added on, a matrix of sorts was created which 
structured individual empirical case studies. The comparisons of quotes from different 
interviews within each region subsequently formed a basis for drawing conclusions and 
assessing the overall institutional set-up of regions.
Finally, one more point requires clarification at this stage. How many case 
studies are appropriate within this type of research project? I felt a need to include more 
than one case study into my research project, although I personally think that doing just 
one in-depth, intensive case study is perfectly justifiable. The decision to do three case 
studies, however, was not motivated by an effort to compare and contrast the differences 
among the three different regions. I believe that a larger number of case studies also 
increases the chances of corroborating the existing explanatory framework and adjusting 
it to what, at some stages of the research, might look as 'inconvenient' and contradictory 
information. This has been the main motivation for doing more than one case study and 
indeed, in the case of this research such a choice seems to have been fruitful. For 
example, the selection of three rather than one regional case study has shown that the 
explanation of the diverse impacts of internationalization is far less dependent on 
'structural' characteristics such as industrial sector to which my original, critical realist 
methodology gave a great importance. The diversity of material from the three case 
studies thus proved to be important in refining my original simple understanding of the 
key concepts and relations between them as well as in specifying the method of causal
explanation. The greater number of case studies therefore helped to increase the strength 
and rigour of the methodological framework.
From a more practical side, time was also a limiting factor in choosing the 
number of case studies. Doing field work abroad in the form of several consecutive 
visits usually allows a researcher less time for empirical w ork and this lim itation also 
played a role in deciding that the number of case studies stabilized at three. These three 
case studies do not pretend to be representative or typical examples, or examples of 
'good' or 'bad' forms of internationalization. They try, instead, to explore, explicate and 
corroborate by empirical material the relationships between the concepts of 
internationalization, embeddedness and adaptability. In this way the empirical case 
studies can potentially increase the usefulness and applicability of the analytical 
framework presented in this thesis.
The selection of regional case studies
The actual selection of the case studies was a four-step process: the first step was to 
select industrial sectors for case studies and the second one to select concrete regions. 
The third step involved a selection of enterprises and the fourth a selection of individual 
interviewees in these enterprises. Much of the third and the whole of the fourth step, 
however, are described separately for each of the regions in the Appendix.
The first step involved pinpointing industrial sectors with a substantial degree of 
internationalization. The data on foreign investment according to industrial sectors were 
actually the only reliable source of information about Western involvement in the Czech 
industry. From these data, the automotive and electronics sectors were identified as the 
ones that showed some interesting development. Both of these two sectors are 
interesting not just in quantitative terms .(i.e. large number of foreign investment 
projects and amount of capital invested), but also because they represent industrial 
activities regarded as some of the most technologically advanced, as well as some of the 
most 'globalized' and footloose (Dicken, 1992). Moreover, in post-Communist Eastern 
Europe these sectors were also generally regarded as those with the greatest
technological lag behind the capitalist West. Also, for this reason, it was important to 
see what the impact of internationalization was on precisely these two industrial sectors.
This selection was later confirmed by the fact that these sectors were, together 
with precise engineering, among the three sectors selected by Czechinvest (the Czech 
state agency for promotion of foreign investment) as preferential targets for foreign 
investment. Czechinvest, where I established contacts during the first stage of empirical 
research, also expected that foreign investment in these particular sectors could bring 
the greatest benefits to the national economy in the form of technological upgrading and 
an enhanced export performance (Czechinvest, 1995a, b).
The information from Czechinvest, combined with an extensive search of the 
Czech press and with some regional employment statistics (6SÜ, 1996,1997; MIT, 
1996), played a key role in the identification of regions that had a dominant position in 
the respective industries (i.e. automotive and electronics) as well as a substantial degree 
of international presence. In this way the second step of the selection process was 
accomplished, since three.regions clearly stood out in the way they matched the criteria. 
Two of the identified regions had a strong international presence and a dominant 
position in electronics (LanSkroun and Roinov pod Radhoâtëm) and the other similarly 
in the automotive industry (Mladâ Boleslav). These regions subsequently became the 
focus of the empirical case studies described separately in Chapters Six, Seven and 
Eight
The peculiar legacy of industrial development in the Communist Czechoslovakia 
played an important role in the third step of the selection process, that is, in the selection 
of enterprises that entered into the regional case studies. As a consequence of this 
legacy, the large, formerly state-owned enterprises still have a dominant position in the 
majority of regional economies in the Czech Republic. This was for the most part true 
also in the three regional economies in question. In each of the case studies, the selected 
dominant enterprises to a large extent determined the employment structure of the 
region as well as the kinds or quality of skills and qualifications of local people. Such a 
local institutional heritage, comprised of large enterprises, often represented the main 
attraction for foreign partners and therefore played an important role in the process of
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internationalization. For this reason, these dominant enterprises represent the main focus 
of the regional research. Newly established companies - both locally-owned SMEs or 
new greenfield foreign investments - are of concern in the empirical chapters only as far 
as their creation and functioning has been connected with restructuring of the large 
enterprise and thus critical to the performance of the regions analyzed in the individual 
empirical chapters.32
Chapter Six analyzes the region of LanSkroun in Eastern Bohemia (see Fig. 1) 
which until recently was dominated by an electronics company, Tesla LanSkroun, which 
represented the single most important employer in the region. This company faced 
serious economic problems in the early 1990s when the whole region was threatened by 
high unemployment. This negative development was reversed when the local 
management of Tesla attracted to the region a new greenfield investment initiated by a 
Japanese-AmericEm-British multinational AVX-Kyocera. The initial rationale for 
selecting the LanSkroun region was to analyze the impact of internationalization in what 
seemed to be a highly footloose foreign investment. During the field work in the area, 
however, it became clear that the foreign investor built upon the networks, practices and 
skills of local actors in a way that made internationalization and the restructuring of this 
region a success story in the eyes of both the local actors and their foreign partners. This 
chapter therefore explains how the process of internationalization in this region 
produced a well integrated and adaptable institutional set-up.
Chapter Seven analyzes the internationalization of the automotive region that 
surrounds the town of Mladâ Boleslav in north-eastern Bohemia. This town is a site of 
the main plant, as well as the headquarters of the largest Czech car manufacturer Skoda, 
and the region is comprised of a significant number of firms subcontracting to this 
company. The whole region represents an example of 'secondary internationalization', 
that is a process of internationalization, which involved a number of local automotive 
firms, triggered when the German multinational Volkswagen took over Skoda. The 
automotive industry and Skoda in particular were, from the outset of Czech economic 
reform, regarded as the 'national silverware' deserving special treatment and attention.
32For details o f the enterprise selection, as wel l as the selection o f interviewees, see the Appendix.
ffiolMIadé B oleslavL ^ / ^
j |R oznov p.R,
Motorway 
Main road
Kilometres V ien n a#
Figure 1: Location of the regional case studies
As a consequence, there has been an abundance of media coverage as well as some 
research by social scientists into the nature of this investment and of its consequences 
for Skoda itself (see, e.g. Gowan, 1995; Dôrr and Kessel, 1996; Martin, 1998; Pavlinek,
1998). However, substantially less attention and very little systematic research have 
been devoted to the consequences of the takeover for the role and the position of the 
local automotive subcontractors affected by the 'secondary internationalization'. Chapter 
Seven tries to fill this gap by analyzing the largely positive impact of 
internationalization on the short-term competitiveness of individual firms, but also its 
less impressive impact on the adaptability of the whole automotive region surrounding 
Mladâ Boleslav.
Finally, Chapter Eight analyzes the process of internationalization in the region 
of Roinov pod RadhoStèm in Eastern Moravia, which until the early 1990s was 
dominated by a huge electronics manufacturer Tesla Roinov. Tesla Roinov faced 
serious economic difficulties shortly after the break up of the Communist economic 
system and, unlike the previous two regions, this region actually experienced a serious 
economic hardship since Tesla eventually collapsed and was split into fifteen 
independent companies. The two main segments of the electronics industry that 
survived this break up, which were then internationalized independently of each other, 
are analyzed in this case study. The semiconductor firms were taken over and rescued 
by a financially strong Western investor, American electronics multinational Motorola, 
while the vacuum technology firms pursued more autonomous ways to 
internationalization. The case study analyzes the divergent forms of internationalization 
of both the foreign-owned and the locally-owned 'successors' of Tesla. It explains how 
the process of internationalization differed in each of the groups of electronics firms and 
why in some cases this process has increased the adaptability and competitiveness of 
firms and yet in others resulted in their dependence on foreign firms.
CONCLUSION: FROM METHOD TO THE EMPIRICAL CASE STUDIES
This chapter has summarized the process of developing the methodological framework 
that is used in the empirical analysis of the regional case studies. It has been explained 
how the relationships between the three key concepts of internationalization, 
embeddedness and adaptability shaped the method of empirical investigation. Similarly, 
it has also been stressed that the empirical findings shaped and corroborated the theory 
and gradually refined the methodological framework into one based on the causal 
analysis of cultural processes. Furthermore, this chapter also described how the case 
study regions analyzed in the remaining chapters were selected.
The main task of the following three empirical chapters is to explain the 
differentiated ability of the three selected regions to 'hold down' the process of 
internationalization and to assess the impact of internationalization on their adaptability. 
What is common to all three regions analyzed here is their increasing involvement in the 
international (Western) networks in the period after 1989. Actors in all the three regions 
thus had to adapt to the new conditions of Western economic rationality based on profit 
making and on the imperative of competitiveness. The responses were specific to each 
of the regions and resulted in unique forms of adaptation and 'holding down' of 
internationalization. What follows, however, is not an idiographic description of 
regional case studies, but the application of a common methodology to three different 
regional settings. The empirical chapters reinterpret the developments in the three 
regions since 1989 and provide a causal explanation of the processes through which 
internationalization transformed the existing networks, practices and meanings in which 
local actors were embedded. This is done by studying the interactions between the social 
and symbolic capital of selected actors, mostly managers of major local firms, who most 
often acted as mediators (Gallon, 1992, 1998) of the process of internationalization. The
individual chapters analyze the processes of translation and enrolment through which
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these actors transformed the existing forms of embeddedness and created new 
institutional and cultural forms with different degrees of innovative potential and long 
term adaptability.
All the case studies are presented and structured in a similar way. They start with 
a theoretically informed account of the regions' past, with a particular focus on the 
period after 1989 when the process of radical change and internationalization began.
The historical section is generally followed by an attempt to substantiate and explicate 
the theoretical arguments of the previous chapters. This is done by exploring specific 
facets of the embeddedness of those local actors who played a key role in the process of 
internationalization. This part of the analysis focused mainly on the transformation of 
the actors' network heritage, on the analysis of their network interactions (Granovetter, 
1985/1992; Swedberg and Granovetter, 1992) and on the transformation of their 
symbolic powers of recognition and legitimation (Bourdieu, 1977,1990,1991). In this 
manner, the role of internationalization in transforming the action frameworks of 
selected local actors is assessed.
The remainder of each case study then turns towards an analysis of the cultural 
processes which created the locally-specific meanings of internationalization. These 
sections analyze and explain the character of processes through which local actors 
translated the meanings of internationalization, enrolled others (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 
1991) in their interpretation and, in turn, transformed the specific system of shared and 
collectively reproduced practices. On this basis, the empirical chapters strive to explain 
the different forms of alignment (Gallon, 1991) of diverse local action frameworks and 
the role which internationalization played in integrating or fragmenting the regional 
institutional set-ups.
Finally, towards the end the case studies, I try to assess whether the process of 
internationalization transformed the local institutional set-ups in a way that creates 
innovative understandings and new interpretative possibilities among local actors, as 
well as increased their ability of collective reinterpretation (Sabel, 1993,1994; Amin 
and Hausner, 1997; Storper, 1997; Amin, 1998). In this way, the chapters explain the 
success or failure of regions in 'holding down' the process of internationalization (Amin 
and Thrift, 1994b) and assess their chances for locally-based innovativeness and long 
term adaptability (Grabber, 1993b, c; Grabber and Stark, 1997b).
CHAPTER SIX: THE REGION OF LANSKROUN: 
FROM LOCAL RECOGNITION TO 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS33
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter, as well as of the two remaining empirical chapters, is to 
substantiate and inform the theoretical discussion developed so far. This is done by 
applying the key theoretical concepts to the analysis of regional transformations in the 
post-Communist Czech economy. The present chapter looks at the impact of one of the 
largest foreign investments in the post-1989 Czech electronics industry - the Japanese- 
American-British company AVX - and on its impact on the small regional economy of 
LanSkroun in Eastern Bohemia. The economy of this region was previously almost 
entirely dominated by one single large employer, an electronic enterprise called Tesla 
LanSkroun, whose networks and networks of its management largely dominated the life 
of the whole area. This, however, was not unusual for enterprises in the Communist 
period. What makes this particular empirical case interesting is the role which foreign 
investment played in preserving the local networked heritage and local coalition centred 
around the key actors responsible for running the enterprise in the past. Although 
internationalization transformed substantially the action frameworks of actors in the 
region, the crucial local networks largely survived internationalization and remained 
concentrated around the same people, albeit dispersed from Tesla into several new 
firms, including AVX. This fact subsequently allowed the people central to local 
networks to translate the meanings of internationalization and align them with a system 
of locally-specific practices and meanings recognized by local actors.
This chapter, then, is more than just an illustration of the way in which the
|
process of internationalization transforms locally-specific forms of embeddedness. It is 
also an interesting and important example of a concrete form of interaction between the
^Sections o f  this chapter have been published previously as a part o f  a paper entitled 
Internationalization, and institutional and regional change: restructuring post-Communist networks in 
the region ofLanskroun, Czech Republic, Regional Studies, vol. 32, no. 5 (October 1998), pp. 673-685.
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networked social capital of local managers and legitimation by Western symbolic capital 
which was responsible for an unusually successful form of regional restructuring. 
Although the foreign firm today dominates the region almost to the extent to which it 
was once dominated by Tesla, the empirical findings suggest that internationalization of 
the regional economy of LanSkroun helped to create an innovative and adaptable 
institutional set-up which successfully integrated elements of the new, 'imported' 
practices and meanings. This chapter attempts to explain the processes through which 
such a successful institutional set-up has been produced.
The first three sections introduce the companies that represent the focus of 
empirical investigation and analyze the reasons by which local managers became 
successful mediators of privatization and internationalization. The fourth section 
analyzes the process of network restructuring which accompanied privatization. It 
argues that the crucial and distinct feature o f the process of internationalization in the 
LanSkroun region has been the successful effort of local managers to re-gain recognition 
and legitimation in the new economic environment without cutting off their local 
networks. The resulting arrangement subsequently allowed local managers to mediate 
the international meanings and practices and enrol other local actors in the process of 
adaptation. The penultimate section analyzes this issue, while the final section 
documents the important role that the locally-specific processes of translation and 
enrolment played in mobilizing a large number of local actors, in stimulating the start­
ups of engineering and design SMEs and in increasing the adaptive capacity and 
competitiveness of the LanSkroun region.
t e s l a  l a n Sk r o u n  in  t h e  p o s t -c o m m u n is t  t u r m o i l
The region and identification of firms
The region ofLanSkroun is located in Eastern Bohemia near the historical boundary 
with Moravia (see Fig. 2). The economy of the area has traditionally been associated 
with light industry. Small scale, cottage-type textile industry existed in the area for
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nearly two centuries, and production of textile machinery and other kinds of engineering 
also have a long tradition here, backdating from the 19th century. During the first half of 
this century the textile industry was concentrated in several larger enterprises and the 
regional industrial base was supplemented by a number of electrical and mechanical 
engineering firms, thus producing a fairly diversified industrial structure of mostly small 
and medium sized enterprises. Such was the situation at the end of the World War II.
With the advance of Communism in Czechoslovakia in the second half of 1940s, 
electrical engineering, and later electronics, came to dominate the region. This time, 
however, the style of industrialization followed the Communist model with 
concentration of investment and production in a single huge electrical engineering and 
electronics enterprise called Tesla LanSkroun.34
The predecessor of Tesla was established in 1944 as a subsidiary of a German 
firm supplying capacitors to the Nazi army. After the Communist coup of 1948 the firm 
started to grow even faster by absorbing the technological equipment and production 
capacity of other smaller factories and enterprises that were nationalized by the regime. 
As time went on, Tesla LanSkroun became the most dominant enterprise in the area 
resulting in a typical Communist-style situation of'one town - one enterprise' (see e.g. 
Premusovâ, 1989; Illner, 1992a; Smith and Swain, 1998). The economic fortunes of the 
LanSkroun regional economy gradually became almost entirely dependent on the 
successes and failures o f Tesla.
In 1990, Tesla employed some 3,500 workers in a town of 10,000 inhabitants 
and the only other employer of comparable size was a branch plant of a paper mill 
employing another 800 workers in Lanàkroun (interviews). Tesla not only provided jobs 
for the majority of families in the town and its hinterland but, because it was the only 
enterprise which also had its headquarters based in the town and its wider region, Tesla 
was also responsible for provision of much of the local education and social services, 
including health care, housing, kindergarten, a secondary school specialized in electrical
34The name Tesla was a generic one used by all electronics and low-voltage electrical engineering firms 
in former Czechoslovakia. This name was introduced during the process o f concentration o f  production in 
a limited number o f  large enterprises which followed shortly after the nationalization o f industry by the 
Communist regime. In order to distinguish between individual plants the name o f  a town or a region was 
usually added after the name Tesla.
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engineering, thé local cultural centre, and so on. The enterprise also provided catering 
for its employees, package holidays in the Tesla-owned holiday facilities in several 
localities across the country and it provided transport to the factory for its employees 
from surrounding villages. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Tesla Lanàkroun became a 
very important and powerful entity within the organizational structure of Czechoslovak 
electronics industry. And indeed, thanks to the attention which the Communist regime 
paid to the electronics industry for strategic (i.e. military) reasons it was a relatively 
powerful enterprise, even in terms of the whole Czechoslovak economy. It controlled 
directly three branch plants in the Czech Republic and another one in Slovakia and, 
together with four other equally big and powerful electronics enterprises, made up a 
conglomerate called VHJ Roznov which was responsible for all of the electronics 
production in former Czechoslovakia.35
Given this legacy of dependence on Tesla the process of identification of major 
enterprises and actors shaping the economic transformation in the region of Lanàkroun 
logically started in Tesla itself. The aim of this investigation was to find out about the 
main actors who controlled the enterprise and who play or played central roles in the 
local coalitions, and who were central to the post-1989 restructuring of local networks. 
The second major target company to be interviewed and included in the regional case 
study was the new foreign investor in Lanàkroun: the Japanese-American-British 
company AVX. AVX did not directly takeover Tesla but the investment was closely 
associated with Tesla both physically, as the firms are located side by side and they even 
share the same address, and also personally, whereby many former managers of Tesla 
joined the managerial ranks of AVX36. Since its careful and humble beginnings in the 
early 1990s, AVX developed into the largest employer in the region. The aim of 
interviews at AVX was, first, to identify the networks and main actors responsible for 
thé realization of the investment deal; second, to assess the impact of this investment on
35 Another one of the four was Tesla Roînov described as a  case study in Chapter 8.
36The personal links among enterprises referred to throughout the empirical chapters were reconstructed 
partly through the interviews, partly through the database o f business register at the Czech Ministry o f 
Justice, and partly through the information in the catalogues o f major Czech firms (Hoppenstedt Bonnier, 
1996, 1997). For details see the Appendix.
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the networked social capital of the main actors; and third, to establish the processes 
which subsequently transformed to the local institutional set-up and its adaptability.
Only later, during the early stage of the field work did it become clear that in 
order to appreciate fully the changes that internationalization brought to the local 
network heritage and to action frameworks of local actors, it was equally important also 
to include in this case study information about the small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in the Lanàkroun area. These firms and their networks also represent an 
important part of the network heritage of the Tesla enterprise. The majority of local 
SMEs were formed after 1989 as splinter firms from Tesla and since then many of their 
owners and managers have become central to knitting together the local entrepreneurial 
networks with those of the foreign company and the creation of a specific local 
institutional set-up. So, in addition to interviews in Tesla and AVX them selves, another 
three interviews have been added. These together with some secondary empirical 
material allowed for the inclusion of the importance of SMEs in explaining the success 
of a new, aligned and internationalized institutional set-up in the LanSkroun region.
Local managers; the key actors of network restructuring
As was previously noted, the management of Tesla Lanàkroun enjoyed a relatively 
powerful position within the Czechoslovak economy. One of the consequences was that 
they entered the post-Communist period with a rich heritage of networks which 
included a wide portfolio of customers in the Eastern bloc and also a dense web of 
contacts and networks with other electronics enterprises in former Czechoslovakia. 
Unfortunately, as all the old partners elsewhere in Czechoslovakia and especially in 
Eastern Europe generally themselves ran into serious financial difficulties, much of 
these networks proved to be largely useless shortly after the collapse of the COMECON 
market. However, the social capital of networks acquired by the management of Tesla
I ' * *Lanàkroun was not limited only to these. This particular management seemed to be quite 
entrepreneurial and innovative even in the times of Communism, always eager to copy 
some of the embargoed Western technology smuggled into Eastern Europe at high cost 
through some very obscure channels (interviews). They also kept an active contact with
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the state foreign trade company Kovo, the only means of contact with the West and the 
only possible legal source of information about Western technology and practices at that 
time. Another illustration of the pro-active, autonomous approach of the old 
management of Tesla and their readiness to do more than explicitly demanded by central 
planning, is the fact that they did not wait for any governmental action in respect of the 
future privatization. Instead, they have become more pro-active, looking for example for 
a foreign partner on their own almost immediately after the borders were open, in early 
1990, before the post-Communist Government decided its own restructuring strategy. 
They were apparently quite aware of the shortcomings of their own production 
technology, keen to learn from their Western competitors and keen to acquire new sales 
outlets to substitute for the uncertain ones in the East. Yet they were also quite confident 
of the value o f their local networks and local skills and expertise (interviews in AVX 
and Strojstav).
Thus even while using the required and officially recognized symbolic capital of 
Communism as the necessary precondition for the effective managing of the firm, the 
pre-1989 management of Tesla, which consisted mostly of skilled technicians, was 
primarily interested in further development of the local technology of capacitor 
production and in catching up with the developments in the West. As a former member 
of middle management of Tesla who presently holds a position of similar rank in AVX, 
remarked in relation to former top management of Tesla:
"There were plenty o f capable individuals there who got involved [with the Communist party] and did it 
[managed the company] in a sensible way." (2 3 .6 .1997)37
Thanks to this reputation, and recognition by its employees, the management of 
Tesla did not face very strong local opposition in the period after 1989. Neither did the 
management undergo any substantial personal changes as the managers of Tesla were 
not regarded with suspicion by local people. Their past was more associated with 
entrepreneurial qualities. Their association with discredited political activities and 
cooperation with the Communist Party were largely seen as a necessary evil that was a
37For specifications o f the interviews see the list o f interviews in the Appendix at the end o f the thesis. 
However, the names o f some o f the companies on the list have been changed in order to preserve 
confidentiality o f interviewees who wanted to remain anonymous.
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part of their jobs during those years (interviews and informal discussions with local 
people). As a consequence of this the managers of Tesla often found it relatively easy to 
preserve their recognition and legitimation and to transfer them into the post- 
Communist times, despite their past involvement with the Communist Party. Tesla s 
management thus remained in the privileged position which made them the key actors in 
the reorganization of the networked local coalition, as well as in shaping the practices, 
meanings and forms of recognition in the post-Communist economic environment in the
whole regional economy of Lanàkroun.
As mentioned already, the management of Tesla started to look for Western 
partners when the political situation permitted. However, their motivation to do so could 
be interpreted in at least two possible ways. One is that the management of Tesla felt 
responsible for 'their1 enterprise and the whole community, for the members of their 
local clientele. The company managers were largely concerned about the well being of 
the community and did not want to see their old local coalition hit by economic hardship 
and high unemployment which would certainly have soared if the enterprise closed. This 
kind of thinking among the managers of Tesla is best illustrated in the following quote 
from an interview with a  senior manager of'residual' Tesla38 who refused to join AVX 
and remained loyal to his old company despite initially taking an active role in the 
negotiation with foreign partner. Instead he accepted a much less rewarding job in the 
management of ailing Tesla, a job with only a small chance for advancement success 
and small remuneration. When asked about the motivation to search for foreign 
partners, a search in which he was actively involved, he replied:
"Otherwise there would have been a rather substantial unemployment in this region [...] It is a foreign firm 
[AVX] but if it wasn't here these buildings would fell down one day and only unemployment would 
remain. Even the regional authorities were worried that this [situation] could cause social unrest [...] So 
we want to stabilize the enterprise [i.e. secure employment for local people] so that people here dont spit 
at us and then retire." (11.6. 1997)
th e  mode of thinking and motivation of these 'old' managers who remained in Tesla
;■
even after the arrival of AVX to Lanàkroun thus can be described as an effort to satisfy 
the needs of their local coalition, of local people they knew and felt responsible for.
38The term residual' Tesla is used here to describe what is left o f Tesla LanSkroun today. The company 
which still exists under the old name but is much smaller than it used to be before the privatization.
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Internationalization to them was just the means of achieving this goal and of securing 
more economic benefits for local actors.
The second possible interpretation is that the management of Tesla searched for
foreign partners and for an association with the generally recognized and accepted
Western form of capitalism in order to strengthen their own legitimation and recognition
vis-a-vis their local clientele. For this purpose, the Western investors, their practices or
even their mere presence could provide the local managers with sufficient backing and
legitimation. This approach is well illustrated by a quote from a former manager of
Tesla and at present a manager of AVX who stressed the role of Western advisors in
formulating and justifying the restructuring strategy of Tesla in the early 1990s.
"In spring 1990 we hired a wonderful British consulting company which provided us with a vital self- 
reflection^...] They said: "Produce capacitors. That is what you know how to do. Buy all the rest. Get rid 
o f  all the extra burden." And so we did it and now we live according to that philosophy." (11.6. 1997, 
original emphasis).
However, only a few minutes later in the same interview he remarked in relation to the 
practice of contracting-out:
"Our partners in England contract out even the maintenance o f  machinery. We keep it in house. It is our 
own know-how, that's how we do it" (emphasis added)
On this and several other occasions it thus became clear that the local managers who 
initiated the contact with foreign partners effectively controlled the interpretation of the 
meanings of Western capitalism and adapted the imported international practices to the 
specific local conditions and to their own understandings. The last two quotes thus serve 
as an example of this ’strategic' motivation to internationalize which took the form of a 
selective acceptance of Western advice in relation to the restructuring of the enterprise 
and the local networked social capital. Advice by Western advisors in itself had a strong 
symbolic authority, especially in the years immediately after the revolution of 1989.
However, the meanings of such advice were interpreted and put into practice by 
concrete individuals, by local managers acting on the behalf of their local community. 
Local managers acted as local representatives enjoying special recognition, authority 
and legitimation and thanks to that they were also put into the position of mediators 
(Gallon, 1991, 1998) o f the meanings of Western practices. They could use such
154
practices as the new recognized standard of behaviour and as the means o f their own 
legitimation in the new capitalist environment. In this way the managers thus secured a 
transfer of the control of symbolic capital from the Communist to capitalist 
environment.
As will become clear later, both these interpretations of management's 
motivation for internationalization are equally plausible and in fact it is most likely that 
they operated simultaneously. Not only did the individual members of management 
interpret the situation differently, but most also used different interpretations and 
translations of meanings of Western capitalism in different contexts and in enrolling 
different audiences (Latour, 1987). So ultimately the motivation of local managers for 
internationalization through linking up with a Western investor was underlined by two 
partly clashing and partly complementary understandings. One was a sense of 
responsibility for 'their1 locality and local clientele with all the social capital of networks 
and symbolic power of recognition they had accumulated and controlled there. The 
second one was the attraction of an alternative symbolic capital of Western capitalism 
that was promising an even greater recognition and greater symbolic power that could 
in turn be used for transforming the local system of practices.
Privatization and search for foreign partners
The search for foreign partners was not at all easy. According to a present member of 
the top management of Tesla, the management in early 1990s approached a total of 
more then 250 Western firms operating in their particular area of speciality; that is, 
production of passive electronic components and capacitors in particular. Initially, quite 
a few of them expressed interest and several of them even signed letters of intent to 
establish joint-ventures. In the event, only two of these contacts actually materialized 
into cooperative production which, later, as these manufacturing cooperatives grew, 
separated from Tesla into independent fully foreign-owned firms.
The search for foreign partners by Tesla coincided with the loss of traditional 
markets and the inability to sell its low quality products to the West. The resulting 
financial difficulties were complicated further by the fact that, at the same time, the
enterprise was also included into the voucher privatization program. In the case of Tesla 
Lanàkroun, this privatization scheme had quite unfortunate consequences. The company 
was privatized in the first wave of voucher privatization and although the management 
was already at an advanced stage of negotiations with some of the foreign investors, 
their efforts to reverse the decision of Ministry of Privatization were in vain 
(interviews). The ownership of Tesla was entirely dispersed to some 10,000 
shareholders, both individuals and investment privatization funds (IPFs). At the end of 
voucher privatization the EPF with the largest holding owned a mere 1.5 per cent o f the 
stock. There were no clear owners, no clear corporate governance, and the management 
of Tesla wa§ left with decision-making powers as well as the responsibility towards 
their local clientele.
The dispersion of ownership of Tesla, however, substantially complicated the 
possibility of engaging a foreign partner in Tesla directly. All potential foreign partners 
demanded control over any possible business venture with Tesla, but the ownership of 
Tesla Lanàkroun was already established by the outcome of voucher privatization. So 
instead of a direct foreign takeover the company management had to focus on other 
forms of cooperation with foreign partners, such as foreign subcontracting and the 
attraction of a greenfield investor.
On the other hand, the paradoxical but positive side effect of the dispersion of 
ownership was that it allowed the management of Tesla de facto unhindered control of 
the enterprise and its resources. It gave them the opportunity to hold together the old 
networked coalition through the symbolic recognition and authority which they had 
acquired under Communism, while simultaneously trying to secure a foreign partner for 
Tesla as a possible means of confirming their recognition by association with elements 
of the new Western symbolic capital. Voucher privatization and the dispersal of Tesla's 
ownership thus effectively established an environment quite helpful to management 
efforts to adjust their symbolic recognition associated with their past role as 'leaders' of 
the local networked coalition to that of symbolic capitalists of a new kind: to mediators 
of the meanings of international, Western capitalism.
Out of the large number of foreign firms contacted by Tesla's management only 
two contacts led to the establishment of a new, fully foreign-owned enterprises in 
Lanàkroun. Both of these initially involved relatively simple, labour intensive tasks. 
Tesla provided the labour force and the foreign partners brought the contracts. One of 
these cooperative ventures is an Austrian firm Schott, which today employs some 500 
employees in a labour intensive process of producing components for electronic 
transistors. It uses cheap local labour, does not demand very high qualifications and 
today only cooperates with Tesla on the issues of infrastructure (provision of electricity, 
heating, sewage treatment and so on) because it operates on land leased from Tesla. 
Since the beginning, the new venture did not develop much further from its original 
status as a cheap assembly plant with little integration into local networks and it brings 
little more than employment opportunities (interview with manager of Tesla Lanàkroun, 
11.6. 1997).
Much more interesting, however, is the second foreign electronics company 
which also developed initially from a simple cooperation agreement with Tesla.
Through a massive investment by Japanese-American-British firm AVX, this originally 
small scale project gradually developed into a large independent foreign company which 
today produces in Lanàkroun one third of the world's output of tantalum capacitors.
The first contact between Tesla and AVX dates from April 1990 when AVX 
started to scan Eastern European producers of electronics components in a search for 
potential partners. Eventually, they decided to try to cooperate with Tesla, in the first 
instance by seconding several of Tesla's employees in December 1990. Legally these 
workers were still employed by Tesla and AVX 'borrowed' them to test them on tasks 
requiring high labour intensity and low qualifications. In the next year AVX increased 
the number of 'borrowed!workers and started to assemble capacitors from imported 
parts. The foreign firm also decided to lease some premises from Tesla and a year later 
AVX had already 700 directly employed workers in Lanàkroun. In May 1994 when 
AVX opened a new plant next to the old Tesla's and transferred a whole production line 
from Germany to Lanàkroun, the number of former Tesla employees who found new 
jobs in AVX climbed to just over 1,000.
In the meantime the 'residual' Tesla was reaching the lowest point of its post- 
1989 crisis. The enterprise had to reduce the number of employees from 3,500 in 1990 
to less then 1,000 in 1993. The present management of Tesla, with the help of their old 
contacts with a foreign trade company Tesimpex,39 tried to establish Tesla as a second­
er third-tier supplier of passive electronic components to several Western electronics 
multinationals (interview with manager of Tesla LanSkroun, 11.6. 1997). However, 
despite low production costs and substantial improvements in quality, results remained 
far behind initial expectations. There has been some success, especially from the mid- 
1990s onwards, yet the managers openly admit that the prospects for Tesla are rather 
bleak in the face of the severe international competition and the lack of financial 
discipline shown by many of their customers. Expensive credits and also a lack of 
experience on Tesla's side in international trade negotiations were mentioned as reasons 
for worse than expected results (interview with manager of Tesla LanSkroun, 11.6.
1997). The only motivation for continued efforts of Tesla's managers seems to be their 
sense of responsibility for what is left of thé once powerful Tesla company.
However, Tesla's management maintained active contacts with their new foreign 
neighbour AVX and, during the three year trial period, Tesla played the role of a 
supporting organization providing training for workers who were later to be transferred 
from the ailing Tesla to AVX. In this way, Tesla avoided any massive shedding of 
labour and relied upon AVX's recruitment to offset its own redundancies. The managers 
of Tesla thus prevented any social upheaval in the region as well as maintained the 
support of local people, who represented members of their old networked coalition. On 
the other hand, it should also be stressed that in the beginning, cooperation with AVX 
also had its shady side as the foreign partner systematically shifted the responsibility and 
risks involved towards the management of Tesla during this period. The whole of the 
local community thus had to bear the bulk of the risk associated with the possible failure
39This company name has been changed for reasons o f  confidentiality. However, this name appears again 
in the Chapter Eight because the same company was found, quite unexpectedly, to be involved also in 
some o f the electronics companies in RoZnov (see Chapter Eight). This fact only confirms a  great degree 
o f personal interconnectedness between enterprises which formerly belonged to the same VHJ.
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of cooperation and with AVX's potential withdrawal. However, as we will see. in the 
following section, the risk eventually yielded a benefit for the locality.
AVX AND LOCAL NETWORKS: A WAY TO COMPETITIVENESS?
The role of local managers: securing recognition and adjusting local networks
At the time of the field work in the summer of 1997, AVX employed some 1,800 people 
directly in its new, state-of-the-art plant, and according to estimates, at least the same 
number of people indirectly in firms that subcontract to AVX (AVX, 1997). The scale 
of its local operations is now such that the local labour pool is almost empty.and the 
company has had to bus people in from as far as 50 kilometres away. The future 
expansion in situ has been postponed because of the local shortage of labour.
The production of capacitors, however, employs mostly medium qualified, cheap 
labour. Although AVX has a small R&D department in LanSkroun too, most of the jobs 
it provides locally are of a routine kind on the assembly line. The effect of AVX's 
presence in the region might thus appear similar to most other foreign labour intensive 
branch plants in other locations in Eastern Europe (Sadler and Swain, 1994; Swain, 
1994). I believe, however, that the case of Lanàkroun is different because of the way the 
activities of AVX have been integrated with the networks of Tesla's management and 
through them also with other local economic activities.
A crucial aspect at the early stage was the fact that AVX decided to entrust 
people from the management of Tesla with the organization of the venture. The clearest 
example of this is the fact that a former general manager of Tesla became a general 
manager and a member of the executive board of AVX plant in Lanàkroun. Clearly, he 
brought all his networks and contacts with the local community to the new position with 
him. This choice of new general manager was effectively a formal sign of legitimation 
by AVX and of its recognition of the importance of local managers and their business 
and networking skills. Such a decision provided the newly promoted local actors with 
an opportunity to base their recognition on the association with what was locally
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regarded as the new and legitimate system of practices o f Western capitalism. By 
allowing local people to achieve recognition in this way AVX created an enormous 
motivational stimulus for local managers. But perhaps even more importantly it 
established conditions conducive to the exploitation of local networks and expertise.
This period provided both the management and employees of Tesla with a 
mixture of opportunity and threat The position of management could have been 
endangered if they failed to deliver performance required by foreign partners. Should 
the foreign firm withdraw, the local managers would lose both their new recognition 
and privileges. On the other hand, should the local managers prove capable of meeting 
Western standards, the foreign partners would stay and the local mediators of Western 
capitalism would further increase their symbolic power of recognition. The new sources 
of symbolic power could bring benefits far greater than anything the Communist 
economy could ever have offered them: far higher financial remuneration, much greater 
freedom to realize their potential qualities without the hindrance of Communist party 
intervention, and perhaps even recognition on the international scale, in the AVX 
headquarters in Britain and Japan.
In other words, AVX allowed the newly established local economic elite 
sufficient space to mobilize their symbolic and social capital accumulated during the 
Communist period and adjust it to the new situation. And the new local managers of 
AVX made good use of this opportunity. For example, the local management fulfilled 
the production targets planned by AVX headquarters for 2 years in just 10 months 
(interview with manager of AVX, 11.6. 1997). This helped to gain the appreciation of 
the foreign partner and also made AVX look again and closer at the value, reliability 
and usefulness of local skills and networks such as contacts with local subcontractors, 
local R&D sources, and good contacts with local and district administration. AVX thus 
started to realize that the networks, practices and meanings associated with the action 
frameworks of local actors were a valuable asset which could best be exploited by 
AVX's association with local managers. This, in turn, strengthened the position of 
Tesla's management in relation to AVX and increased the self-esteem and confidence of
local actors. A good illustration of this comes from a quote of a British AVX executive
at the opening ceremony of the new plant in LanSkroun in May 1994.
"There are places with lower labor costs than the Czech Republic. But if  you take the skills and the 
education level, we found that this has been the best place we can come to." (quoted in a company 
brochure after the newspaper The Prague Post without specifying the date)
Also, a Czech member of AVX management, when asked about the reasons for the 
success of the venture mentioned five major reasons, three of which were directly linked 
to the preservation o f old networks in the locality. These were first, the industrial 
traditions and presence of qualified and skilled workers and technicians (which the 
management of Tesla represented and were able to identify), second, the support of local 
engineering firms owned by the former employees of Tesla (the contacts with whom 
were furthermore best secured through the networks of Tesla's mangers), and third, a 
supportive local administration (also supportive because of their close ties with the 
managers).
Equally, the ordinary employees of Tesla faced substantial opportunities and 
threats during this period. The threat of loss of employment and economic hardship in 
< the event of Tesla's collapse were largely out their control. They had to rely on the local 
managers as the representatives of their local coalition and hope that in exchange for 
loyalty the managers would do their best to secure an acceptable solution to the crisis. 
On the other hand, should the deal with foreign partners be successful, many local 
workers felt that they could also achieve better appreciation of their skills and abilities. 
The new symbolic environment of capitalism and its form of rationality seemed better 
suited to such appreciation and could possibly bring them greater recognition too. 
Sometime around 1992, that is as the situation in Tesla became critical and the 
negotiations with AVX started to look promising, many former employees of Tesla 
started to leave the company. Most of them transferred directly to AVX, but some, 
especially skilled designers and technicians who felt undervalued in Tesla and were 
entrepreneurial^ minded, started to establish their own businesses (interview with a 
middle manager of AVX, 23.6. 1997).
The production of capacitors requires a fairly sophisticated, highly specialized 
and customized purpose-built machinery. Their construction is a classic small batch
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production process. This machinery had also been produced by .Tesla in the past and 
although it did not quite meet the Western technological standards in 1989 it was about 
2-3 times cheaper than the imported machinery (interview with owner and manager of 
Strojstav, 19.6.1997). As soon as the borders were opened to embargoed goods after 
1989, it became clear that some of the highly qualified people of Tesla were very quick 
at learning from their Western counterparts. Small start-up companies founded by 
Tesla's former designers and technicians started to appear everywhere around 
LanSkroun.
Today there is a whole range of firms in Lanàkroun and the surrounding region 
that were established either as splinter companies separated off from Tesla during its 
privatization or as new start-up firms founded by people who left Tesla. They include 
not just the production of customized machinery for the production of capacitors but 
also the manufacturing of spare parts for such machinery, the design engineering of new 
machinery and other related activities (interviews; database of the Ministry of Justice). 
These firms quickly caught up with their Western competitors in quality standards while 
still keeping the prices substantially lower. Owners of these firms managed to bring 
together some of the most skilled workers and designers of old Tesla and in a short time 
they were able to beat their Japanese competitors in a tender for a supply of machinery 
to AVX. AVX spends some 200 million K6 annually40 on the purchase of machinery in 
the whole of Czech Republic. According to one of the interviewees most of this sum is 
spent directly in the tiny economy of Lanàkroun region (interview with manager of 
AVX, 11.6.1997) which makes AVX responsible for a substantial local spin-off effect.
It is, however, not just the supplies of machinery that produced spin-off effects 
in the regional economy. There is a total of 131 firms of all sizes (including self- 
employed individual entrepreneurs with no other employees) in the region of Lanàkroun 
who subcontract to AVX (AVX, 1997).41 Some 30 of these firms specialize in machine
40This is nearly 4 million pounds which represents a huge sum in the country where average monthly 
earning in 1997 was less then 200 pounds and the low-qualified employees o f AVX in LanSkroun were, 
according to a company brochure, earning just some 100-150 pounds per month.
41 For some idea o f the quantitative importance o f  this figure it can be compared with the total o f some 
150 firms and self-employing entrepreneurs registered by the database o f Czech Ministry o f Justice for the 
town o f  LanSkroun alone. This, o f  course, is a  smaller territorial unit than the whole region for which the
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and design engineering and other activities directly related to the production of 
customized purpose-built machinery. The rest of them provide everything from catering, 
security and transport to locksmithing and construction works.
The success of such small and medium sized firms in the region of Lanàkroun 
can, in part, be attributed to individual entrepreneurs and their personal entrepreneurial 
abilities. But their common feature, and often a decisive force behind their success, was 
the opportunity provided by AVX. This opportunity, on the other hand, is closely 
associated with the fact that the responsibility for the rearrangement and restructuring of 
networks of social capital in the region, although done on behalf of AVX, was left to the 
competence of local managers. Without the previous mutual acquaintance of owners of 
newly established firms and the management of AVX (consisting of Tesla's former 
employees), the benefits to the local economy in the form of spin-off effects would 
never have been realized to such an extent. Clearly, the success of small local-, 
companies in establishing their networks with AVX is linked to the knowledge of 
potential production linkage. And, as we shall see later, the role of local managers, their 
detailed knowledge of the local networks and of the action frameworks of other local 
actors proved to be very important for the success of local subcontractors and for the 
character of local processes of translation and enrolment.
The particular form of interaction and intermingling of the Western symbolic 
capital with the social capital of the key economic actors in the region of Lanàkroun 
described above is, I believe, what makes this particular case study quite an unusual and 
perhaps unique example of internationalization. AVX imports all major components in 
the production of capacitors and uses its plant in Lanàkroun as a mere assembly plant, 
which, at first sight, resembles a cliche of foreign investment in Eastern Europe 
(Gowan, 1995). Nevertheless Lanàkroun does not represent just another example of a
region where the strategy of a foreign investor created a disembedded regional economy
!
with limited local linkages and with negative consequences for regional adaptability 
(see e.g. Grabber, 1994,1997; Sadler and Swain, 1994).
number o f suppliers is given. However, this figure provides at least some measure o f the importance o f  
AVX for the regional economy o f LanSkroun.
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One feature that the case of Tesla Lanàkroun and AVX shares with such 
accounts is the fact that local managers used their liaison with a foreign partner to 
secure their positions and also to use the disembedding effect of internationalization 
(Smith and Ferenôikovâ, 1998, Smith and Swain, 1998) both to free themselves from 
local resistance and from various and often excessive demands for help and support 
from the members of their old networked coalition (MoSnÿ, 1991). The fact that they 
succeeded in securing such recognition, even at the national level, can be demonstrated 
by the character of the opening ceremony of new AVX plant in Lanàkroun in May 1994. 
The aim of this ceremony was to demonstrate and confirm the success of local managers 
in 'building capitalism' and it clearly served the purpose of strengthening their 
recognition. The ceremony was attended by representatives of nationally distinctive 
bodies, emblems of the new economic reality of Czech Republic, such as Ministry of 
Industry and Trade, several major Czech banks, and most of all, by the presence of the 
Czech Prime Minister Vâclav Klaus who applauded the efforts of Lanàkroun managers 
in securing a major foreign investment deal without any request for state support or tax 
holidays for foreign investors (interviews, AVX, 1997). Equally important, however, 
was the participation of local actors, of members of the local municipal council and 
district council, local schools, and owners of local firms subcontracting to AVX (AVX, 
1997) which clearly indicated that the disembedding effect of internationalization had
been limited in extent.
The major and important difference of Lanàkroun in comparison with cases
described by Grabber (1994,1997) or Swain (1994) in former GDR and Hungary is that 
the Czech managers in AVX did not turn the disembedding effect and the symbolic 
power of their own recognition into a sim ple reception of Western practices and their 
blind implementation on the behalf of their foreign partner. The former managers of 
Tesla Lanàkroun who were promoted to managerial posts in AVX did not use the power 
of symbolic recognition associated with their new positions simply to shed their local 
network heritage as a useless legacy of a stigmatized past. Instead they used the new 
symbolic power in a way that enabled them to coordinate the process of selection of 
elements of the old local networks and used them in the process of creating locally-
specific translations of the Western practices and meanings. They did not replace their 
old practices and routines with entirely new ones imported from the West. Rather they 
used elements of Western practices and routines, blended them with parts of their old 
networks, routines and practices and reconstituted them into a new system of practices 
and meanings recognized by other local actors.
Internationalization and transformation of local networks and practices
So far the changing forms of embeddedness of the main economic actors in the region 
of Lanàkroun have been described. It has been shown that it was the process of 
interaction between the local networked social capital and the Western symbolic capital 
which was responsible for such a change. In this section the discussion will turn to the 
consequences that the locally-specific interactions of social and symbolic capital have
for the action frameworks of local actors.
It becomes clear from the previous discussion that the positions of the main 
actors of economic life in Lanàkroun have changed quite substantially since 1989. Some 
of the former managers of Tesla acquired important positions in AVX, other former 
managers, technicians or workers of Tesla became owners of new local firms and all of 
these people had to adjust their practices, perceptions, and understandings in order to 
make them compatible with those of their Western partners. Even the managers who 
remained loyal to Tesla and stayed in its managerial ranks had to change their practices 
and adjust them to the new economic environment, to new demands by new customers 
and the new rules of capitalist financial discipline.
All these changes were closely connected with an increase of networking 
activity, with the activation of large number of networks that all the main economic 
actors in Lanàkroun were able to mobilize or newly construct. This sudden surge in 
network-building and network-mobilizing activity was also responsible for an influx of 
a large number of new Western practices and routines. These combined with the older, 
already present practices, which began to produce new meanings, and thus transform the 
action frameworks of local actors. The post-Communist change in Lanskroun associated 
with internationalization can thus be understood also as an increase in local cultural
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complexity, as the hybridization (Hall, 1995) o f a rather sterile cultural environment of 
Communism and an increase of variety of local action frameworks which had to co­
exist and somehow accommodate their differences. What is crucial, however, from the 
point of view of this analysis is how exactly were the differences between practices, 
meanings and understandings negotiated in  the context of a local culture. That is, how  
did the local mediators align their differences, translate the new meanings and enrol 
other local actors in the interpretations of facts, and what consequences did this process 
have for the adaptability of the regional institutional set-up.
It has been argued in Chapter Two that a major precondition for regional 
adaptability is the existence of local mediators who, through a successful process of 
translation, enrol other local actors and align and adjust their different interests and 
understandings (Gallon, 1991). Such translation with a local ’reach' allows for a 
collective adaptation of local actors which also leads to a mutual redefinition of actors 
and a reinterpretation of their action frameworks (Murdoch, 1995; Storper, 1995;
Storper and Salais, 1997). This process, in turn, is likely to create new interpretative 
possibilities for local actors as well as innovative forms of action (Sabel, 1993, 1994). It 
has also been stressed in Chapter Two that the adaptability of regional economies can be 
threatened if the mutual adjustment of actors' action frameworks becomes excessively 
hegemonic and closed-off from alternative interpretations of the reality and that such 
hegemony can eventually lead to a local institutional lock-in (Grabber, 1993b, c).
The empirical analysis in respect to these issues attempted to establish the 
identities and collective self-definitions of economic actors interviewed in the area of 
Lanàkroun. It analyzed their attitude towards other firms, especially to their Western 
partners or main Western customers who represented the main local power in the 
process of internationalization, towards their locality or region and other local 
institutions (local and regional governments, chambers of commerce, and other possible 
bodies) and also analyzed their understandings of the market environment.42
All the interviewees both in AVX and Tesla as well as in the small and medium 
sized subcontractors of AVX, expressed highly ethical stances in relation to the market.
42For details o f interview structure see the Appendix.
The majority of interviewees regarded the market more as a partnership rather than as a 
competitive struggle. Also, in respect of customer and supplier relations the 
interviewees showed a high appreciation of relations based on honesty and mutual trust 
and stressed the importance of ethical behaviour and long-lasting commitments to a 
successful cooperation. Rather surprisingly this attitude was found even with the 
management of'residual' Tesla which has already experienced the quite unethical 
approaches of several new Western customers. Despite this, the interviewee confirmed 
the continued commitment of his company to the ethical stance which seems to be 
strongly rooted within the system of meanings and practices recognized by local actors. 
This fact was nicely summarized in the words of one of the AVX managers in respect to 
his firm's relations with their customers: "This is a situation where you mustn't cheat 
[...] And we don't even dream of trying any tricks!" (11.6. 1997).
Similar opinions were expressed even more strongly in the case of relations 
between AVX and its local subcontractors, where the interviewees stressed the 
importance of old personal friendships and shared working experience in Tesla which 
allowed actors to communicate within a system of shared meanings and understandings 
which made possible easier resolution of potential conflicts. Such was the case with an 
interviewee who owns a local machine-building company, Strojstav, which supplies 
AVX with single-purpose machinery:
"It helps, definitely, that we know people there personally. [...] Cooperation in relation to improvement o f 
the quality o f machinery is our everyday business. Both with their [AVX's] production [department] and 
their designers who say for example: "these parts here dont last very long. I don't know whafs the 
problem with them." And so we try to solve the whole problem in its complexity. That’s the standard 
[form o f communication]. And that's what we value." (19.6. 1997)
When asked about the intensity of communication with AVX the same interviewee 
replied:
"Thafs our daily routine. Yesterday it was until midnight because o f the new machine [which this firm is 
designing and producing for AVX]".
It does not come as a big surprise, however, that people who spent many years working 
together in one company preserved their networks, contacts and friendships which 
outlived the privatization and reduction in size of Tesla. These days it is precisely these 
networks, and the practices, routines and meanings associated with them, that make the
interaction and coordination between local firms smooth. Despite internationalization of 
some of the networks, the managers and owners of local firms between themselves still 
preserved a system of shared understandings and expectations based on the trust 
produced though the past translations and alignment of their action frameworks.
The im portance o f  such old acquaintances and trust produced through an 
alignment among local actors becomes even clearer from the experience of one of 
middle managers in AVX who is responsible for the start up of a second AVX plant at 
another location in the Czech Republic. He complained bitterly about problems 
encountered in this locality in comparison to LanSkroun, about the difficulties in 
communication with people that he has to work with there, people who do not 
understand what he means and do not respond in the ways he expects them to (interview 
with middle manager of AVX, 23.6. 1997).
In LanSkroun such networks, practices, and the understandings and meanings 
associated with them, survived the disintegration of Tesla and the reorganization of the 
regional economy. The former employees of Tesla dispersed into several independent 
firms and as a conséquence the practices they recognize have usually diverged as did the 
structure of their networks. Nevertheless, these people remained able to negotiate and 
adjust their diverse systems of meaning and practices with those of other local actors, to 
communicate with each other and to retain a sense of a shared collective identity. What 
seems to be even more important than this, however, is the fact that the local networks 
based on old friendships and shared meanings have also been enriched by parts of the 
international networks and by the particular interpretation of practices and meanings 
brought to the region by AVX. One of the interviewees commented on this process in 
the following way:
"People meet with each other. [This includes] not just those from AVX [i.ç. Czech employees of AVX], 
but also people from England. They communicate with our people [i.e. employees o f local subcontractors 
o f AVX]. [...] Our people meet with the English, young people have the opportunity to learn the language, 
they go to England [the European headquarters o f AVX] and even further to the world and they leam." 
(interview with an owner and manager o f Strojstav, a firm subcontracting to AVX, 19.6. 1997)
The internationalization of the region was thus not restricted only to the investment by 
AVX in the plant assembling capacitors. Instead the international networks that AVX 
brought were used by the Czech management of AVX and translated into locally-
intelligible and comprehensible practices and meanings spread through local networks.
In this way the new, international practices and meanings were accommodated also into 
the action frameworks of other local firms and individuals and helped them to adjust 
their old practices and routines to the process of internationalization. One of the 
interviewees described at length how, at the time of the collapse of Tesla and at the 
beginning of AVX's operations in LanSkroun, many former designers of Tesla were 
uncertain about their future and doubtful whether they could survive if they set 
themselves up as an independent firm (interview with a middle manager of AVX, 23.6. 
1997). According to another account, many owners of the new start-ups were persuaded 
by their former colleagues who became managers in AVX that the success of AVX 
could also bring prosperity to their firms. The interviewee further described that 
eventually, under the influence of local managers, AVX took a strategic decision to 
source locally:
"They said: "let's try it! Why shouldn't our people be capable o f producing the special machinery when 
they had been doing it in the past? Why should they not be able to do it now? " And so they did give it a 
go and we are happy that we succeeded to establish ourselves as their supplier. [...] And today one third o f 
the technological equipment in their [AVX] production hall is o f Czech provenance, (interview with a 
manager and owner o f  Strojstav, 19.6. 1997)
Many more local firms and their owners were enrolled in a similar manner in the 
process of adaptation to the particular interpretation of internationalization mediated by 
local AVX management. The interests, skills and capacities of local actors were brought 
to bear on the overall success of the AVX investment and to contribute to the mutual 
satisfaction of the foreign investor and of themselves.
The last quote as well as other interviews with former leaders of the local 
networked coalition suggest that the Czech management of AVX succeeded in building 
upon the existing sense of community which characterized the local institutional set-up 
inherited from the Communist period and reconstituted it into a richer one constructed 
out of a mixture of networks, practices and meanings which are both inherited from the 
past and 'imported' from the West. To paraphrase David Stark (1992), it is not.an 
institutional set-up built on the ruins of Communism but with the ruins of Communism 
(Eyal et a i, 1997). The new practices, meanings and understandings are 'held together' 
by a particular translation of internationalization represented as a new common 'project'.
The aim of this project was to adapt to the principle of profitability in a capitalist 
economic environment which, if successful, could benefit all the actors concerned. 
Several interviewees stressed that actors have to constantly assess each other in order to 
accomplish this project and to satisfy the new standards set by the foreign partner. At 
the same time, however, the common past and the existence of shared meanings 
produced through the process of past translations (Gallon, 1998) makes local actors 
open to trust each other's interpretations (Sabel, 1993) and 'holds together1 their diverse 
action frameworks.
The importance which the Czech managers of AVX attached to their project of
adaptation to Western capitalism and the reinvigoration of the LanSkroun economy with
the help of AVX is clearly expressed in the following quote:
"The only thing I fear is that we ourselves could spoil it all. I am really worried when I see lack o f  
discipline, when [our] people don't realize how a big thing is at stake here." (interview with a former 
manager o f Tesla, now a manager in AVX, 11.6. 1997)
The local managers of AVX enrolled with substantial success many other regional 
actors in this project. They allowed them to take part, to interact and communicate with 
the foreign partners despite often conflicting interests and attitudes to foreign 
investment. Some of the more conservative of local actors, such as the present 
management of the 'residual' Tesla, expressed some reservations about the limited 
benefits AVX brought to the region and they (rightly) described it as a branch plant. 
Even these people, however, regard the efforts of their former colleagues who left for 
AVX with respect and see the presence of AVX in LanSkroun generally in a positive 
light:
"The disadvantage o f  foreign owner is that at the end you only have here the operators who work on the 
machinery. And although they are skilled workers the intellectual property lies elsewhere. [...] When the 
cost [o f labour] rises they will move perhaps further East. But when they leave one day the factory will 
still be here, no one will knock it down. [...] Perhaps then they [AVX] will bring something else here, 
something more sophisticated. But this is not a thing to worry about. [...] But it [the investment by AVX] 
was a plus for the region, it helped the region as a whole." (interview with a manager o f  Tesla, 11.6. 1997)
This quote brings us back to the notion of regional adaptability from the other side. So 
far, it has been demonstrated that the meaning of internationalization mediated by local 
AVX managers was inclusive, had a good local 'reach' and enrolled most of the key 
economic actors in Lanskroun region. It allowed them to take part in the process of
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adaptation which helped to preserve a shared, trusting attitude among local actors and 
aligned their different action frameworks This process which closely resembles a 
perfect translation, as described by Gallon (1991), smoothed mutual communication 
among actors and the mobilization of their networks. These are all typical features of a 
successful way of accommodating a new impulse, as well as a process of adaptation 
which produced an aligned and integrated local institutional set-up.
The above quote, however, brings to attention the risk of overdependence. It 
highlights the possibility of the excessive hegemony of one single interpretation which 
might make the action frameworks of local actors and their firms far too similar. And 
indeed, as described thus far, the action frameworks of firms in LanSkroun region seem 
to be constructed around one single shared project tailored narrowly to the 
subcontracting needs of AVX. This would come perhaps as no great surprise in the case 
of LanSkroun with its history of a one-enterprise regional economy, where the majority 
of distinct and recognized economic actors share a common history and a heritage of 
networks and practices that they all acquired as employees of Tesla. In such a case, the 
possibility of AVX withdrawing from the locality, mentioned by the present-time 
* manager of Tesla (although unlikely in the near future) could pose a similar threat to the 
locality as the crisis in Tesla a few years ago.
The AVX assembly plant could indeed move to a cheaper international location 
and only then would the overdependence of the local economy on AVX and its 
institutional lock-in become visibly acute and obvious. In the present day, by any 
estimation, such a decision would hit the regional economy very seriously and suddenly 
make many of its institutionalized practices and routines obsolete. This can be said with 
a substantial degree of certainty, despite the fact that it is usually difficult to assess the 
exact reasons and mechanisms of regional institutional lock-in before it actually occurs 
(Grabber, 1993b, c). However, despite the risks of overdependence and institutional 
lock-in, the evidence gathered in the Lanâkroun region seems to suggest that even if 
AVX decided to leave today, there is already a seedbed of an autonomous locally-based 
innovative economic activity in the region. The final section of this chapter shows how 
the group of local subcontractors of AVX in the sector of design and manufacturing of
specialized machinery potentially represent a source of long term adaptability for the 
Lanâkroun regional economy.
Internationalization and adaptability
Firms producing specialized customized machinery were set up in and around 
Lanâkroun several years ago, often with the hope that the foreign company would also 
provide work for them. In some cases this hope was even stimulated by local AVX 
managers who realized the potential mutual benefits in local sourcing (interviews with 
middle manager of AVX, 23.6. 1997 and with manager and owner of Strojstav, 19.6.
1997). The success of these firms, which led to the satisfaction of their owners, as well 
as of AVX, often surprised the owners themselves. Today, however, the owners of local 
machine-building firms are already aware that their products and abilities are demanded 
and valued elsewhere in the world. Furthermore, they have come to realize the risks 
associated with overdependence on just one customer. AVX still remains their main 
customer, but they are systematically trying to diversify their customer base.
The case of one particularly successful company producing customized 
machines is illustrative. Their success is largely due to the extensive networks of its 
owner, a formal 1980s general director of Tesla. This man fully exploited all the 
contacts and qualifications he accumulated in all his previous jobs in Tesla where he 
first worked as a designer, later as a head of department responsible for design and 
production of specialized machinery, then as a director of Tesla Lanâkroun itself, and in 
the late 1980s as a director of the whole VHJ Tesla Roinov. The contacts this man has 
with other electronics companies in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and also with 
people who worked previously in a state-owned foreign trade company helped in further 
diversifying away from AVX and even to the international expansion of his firm. This 
firm; is no longer entirely dependent on AVX as its only customer. Approximately 50 
per cent of the firm’s production is represented by supplies to AVX, but the rest goes to 
other mostly foreign customers, either to multinationals established in the Czech 
Republic or to customers in the sophisticated Western markets such as Philips or 
Siemens. Nevertheless, the relationship to AVX, which is largely based on the long-
cultivated trust and old friendships of former colleagues from Tesla, still remains vital 
and very stable.
Similarly, in the relations between different local firms that subcontract to AVX, 
old friendships and acquaintances seem to play an important role. This is well illustrated 
by the fact that the sharing of orders between competitors when one firm runs out of its 
production capacity is a fairly common practice, as two quotes of managers of local 
SMEs confirm:
"When we need to produce something and we know [that we can't manage]... or if the production o f  what's 
demanded [by the customer] is problematic, say, it would slow down production in other departments, or 
we don't have the production capacities ourselves, we give it to someone else in here. But that's normal. 
Classic cooperation, as everywhere here in the area." (interview with a manager o f  local machine-building 
firm Metalstroj, 17.6. 1997)
"We had a contract [...] We couldn't finish it in time on our own. And so Elektrostroj [changed name o f 
another local firm] helped us. They are trustful partners. 1 brought the contract, they did the job, we 
supplied it [to the customer]. Both sides were happy. And they go: "Mr. Novâk [changed name o f the 
interviewee], what will be next? Can we count on it [future cooperation]?" And I go: "if, for a change, you 
have something [a contract] next time, sure, I would also be [interested]... . The price which I agreed for 
this equipment and which 1 consulted with Elektrostroj [name o f the other local firm], that's exactly what 
they got. So we didn't keep not a single per cent for mediation to ourselves. Thafs what I call 
trustfulness." (interview with a manager o f local machine-building firm Strojstav, 19.6. 1997)
The dense web of networks among the several dozen local machine-building and design 
firms in the region, on4he one hand, thus represents an important way of pooling local 
resources, skills and competencies. On the other hand, it also represents the means by 
which new practices and techniques, often resulting from interaction with foreign 
partners and customers, are spread locally. The circulation of information about 
possibilities of new contacts, supplies, and practices among these firms seems to be 
facilitated by the existence of a substantial degree of cross-ownership among them, even 
among potential competitors. In some cases it is even the local managers of AVX who 
have stakes in some of the local SMEs that subcontract to AVX (interviews, database of 
the Ministry of Justice). This fact is likely to increase the inflow of information about 
the changing demands of AVX and its competitors, as well as to bring a greater variety 
of practices and to sustain the reinlerpretatioii of their meanings by the local SMEs.
Even the problem of R&D for local engineering and machine-building SMEs 
appears to have been solved by subcontracting from other small local engineering 
design firms. These are mostly owned by former designers of Tesla who at present work 
predominantly for AVX on a subcontracting basis. However, the contracts from local
machine-building firms and from other customers are increasing in importance for them 
too. The numerous pre-1989 contacts between Tesla employees and several Czech 
technical universities and other research institutions are also now used as a source of 
R&D by local machine-building firms.
To summarize from what is inevitably an incomplete picture of the production of 
customized machinery in Lanâkroun, it seems to be the case that AVX not only 
provided these firms with the Opportunity to work as its subcontractors. It also, by 
appointing local people to managerial posts in the AVX plant in Lanâkroun, provided 
the local managers with the time to mediate the meaning of internationalization locally. 
The attitude of AVX gave local managers an opportunity to encourage and reassure the 
local engineering design and specialized machinery subcontractors that they could 
establish themselves as independent specialist producers in their respective sectors. 
When asked whether AVX really played such an important role in reinvigorating the 
regional economy, one of the interviewees, an owner and manager of a successful local 
manufacturer of customized machinery, expressed his opinion on this issue in a clear 
and almost emotional way:
"Oh definitely. And we value that highly." [phone call] "This kind o f entry o f  [foreign] capital is exactly 
the one that would benefit the whole o f  this republic [Czech Republic] and would help us [the country] the 
most. And it is bilateral for us and the foreign firm. [...] We say: thanks God that AVX came here. They 
give us work and feed us." (manager o f  Strojstav, 19.6. 1997)
It seems that the particular translation o f the meanings o f internationalization in the 
local context enrolled the owners and managers of local SMEs in a common effort to 
use internationalization as a means of strengthening the regional economy and bring 
benefits to local actors. In combination with a particular local network heritage, the 
processes of translation and enrolment also helped to establish a dense web of networks 
of specialized machine-building and engineering design firms. The process of 
internationalization thus helped to preserve much of what was useful in the old 
networks and the local expertise, know-how, skills and traditions, yet also helped to 
enrich and diversify the variety of practices and networks within the region.
The local SMEs seem to be on the path to establishing themselves as 
independent and self-confident business entities. Several of the local producers of
machinery were particularly successful in using the international contacts to 
transform their action frameworks through integrating different parts of their old 
networks, practices and meanings with the ones of their Western partners and 
customers.
The elements of old action frameworks which seem to be valuable now as before 
are an open and trusting attitude towards other members of local networks and the 
ability to talk through problems. These characteristics increase the chances that new 
impulses will stimulate a collective reinterpretation of existing practices. Moreover, the 
positive institutional features are also combined with detailed knowledge and specific 
skills related to the manufacturing of capacitors, as well as links with sources of R&D, 
foreign trade companies and other actors in the locality which, together, translate into 
innovative solutions and ways of coping with problems.
The practices and meanings which local SMEs adapted from their Western 
customers were also numerous. They were, for example, a more disciplined approach to 
the production process and its organization, a precision of manufacturing and the 
importance of the quality standards, and closer attention to marketing and formal ways
of communicating with customers (interviews).
Despite the co-presence and an increasing variety of networks, practices and 
meanings in the locality, all the major local economic actors still actively communicate 
with each other and mutually shape each other's practices, expectations, meanings and 
understandings. In other words, they negotiate and align the differences between their 
respective action frameworks. The result of these continuous adjustments seems to be a 
well integrated, institutional set-up which, by mixing and adjusting the old' and the 
'new* institutional forms, also creates innovative interpretative opportunities for local
actors (Sabel, 1994; Grabber and Stark, 1997b).
All the local actors interviewed seemed to be aware of the necessity to remain 
open and to accommodate new impulses from the external environment. Moreover, their 
past experiences show that they have been able to translate and accommodate them in 
their action frameworks, as well as use them to increase the integration of the local 
institutional set-up. If this proves to be the case in the future, the risks of regional
institutional lock-in may be avoided even if AVX does decide to move elsewhere in the 
future.
CONCLUSION: ON THE WAY TO COMPETITIVENESS
This chapter has analyzed the process through which locally-specific form of 
embeddedness in the Lanâkroun region was transformed by the arrival of a foreign 
investor. What makes this particular region interesting, and indeed, probably quite rare 
in Eastern Europe, is the fact .that the process of internationalization and the subsequent 
accommodation of Western practices into the action frameworks of local actors 
produced what seems to be an adaptable and competitive regional institutional set-up. In 
this sense the case of AVX investment in Lanâkroun contradicts some earlier research 
which questioned the positive role of internationalization in the reinvigoration of 
regional economies in Eastern Europe (Grabber, 1994,1997; Sadler and Swain, 1994; 
Swain, 1994) or which put in doubt the usefulness of foreign investment in post- 
Communist countries altogether (Gowan, 1995). The empirical findings in the region of 
Lanâkroun go against the stereotypical image of Western investors who ignore the 
potential of the local network heritage.
The chapter argued that the success of the Lanâkroun regional set-up can be 
attributed to locally-specific interaction between the networked social capital of local 
actors and the symbolic power enjoyed by their Western partners. This interaction 
allowed local actors, in particular the former managers of Tesla who took managerial 
jobs in AVX, to become mediators of the meanings and practices of internationalization. 
This, in itself, is not particularly unusual in post-Communist regions experiencing some 
degree of internationalization. What is, however, quite unusual about the role of AVX 
managers in Lanâkroun is the fact that they also kept active their old contacts in the 
region. Through them they enrolled a large number of other local actors, mostly owners 
of newly established SMEs, in the process of adaptation to the international practices. In 
this way, the managers of AVX strengthened their local recognition and control over the 
networks in the region. What is even more unusual, it seems, is that they also
successfully persuaded their Western partners about the usefulness of such networks and 
about the value o f local ways of doing things. As a consequence of this successful 
move, the mangers could turn their control over the social capital of local networks into 
a source of recognition in relation to their foreign partners in AVX.
The bilateral recognition enabled the Czech management of AVX to enrol both 
their foreign partners as well as a substantial number of local actors, firms and their 
owners in a particular interpretation of reality which seemed to bring benefits to both 
sides. The owners of local SMEs could identify with the process of adapting to the new 
requirements of internationalization, as they could see in it direct benefits to themselves 
in the form of contracts from AVX. Similarly, the foreign investor realized the potential 
of cheap local supplies and so its attitude towards local networks and practices gradually 
evolved into one of acceptance and appreciation. The processes of translation and 
enrolment thus allowed for a mutual adjustment of the action frameworks of both the 
local and Western actors and for an alignment of their interests.
The mutual adjustment of diverse action frameworks seems to have, in turn, 
produced an integrated institutional set-up which allows for blending and combining the 
elements of old networks, practices and meanings with the new. Western ones. It seems 
that the process of adaptation to the international meanings and practices has been 
conducive to a locally-based, collective reinterpretation of the systems of meaning 
recognized by individual actors. Equally important in the case of Lanâkroun is the fact 
that the action frameworks of local actors, especially of owners of the local machine- 
building and design firms, are being internationalized largely independently of each 
other. This increases the inflow of diverse practices and meanings into the locality and 
results in a greater diversity of local action frameworks. This fact, however, did not 
deprive local actors of the possibility of communicating with each other. Instead, it 
enriched the spectrum of networks available to them and enabled local actors to draw on 
a larger 'pool' of diverse practices and interpretations of other local actors. The process 
of internationalization therefore produced an institutional set-up which created the scope 
for new forms of action and for innovative interpretative possibilities (Sabel, 1993,
1994). It seems that this development could continue in the future and that the region 
might avoid the risks of an institutional lock-in and overdependence on AVX.
The empirical findings presented in this chapter do provide a basis on which one 
can argue that even in the post-Commumst regions, under certain circumstances, the 
process of internationalization might have a central role to play in the constitution of 
adaptable and competitive regional economies. It can be further argued that central to 
such a success is the character of the process through which the meanings of 
international practices are mediated by local actors and accommodated locally. The 
empirical findings of this chapter suggest that the cultural processes of translation and 
enrolment which led to a mutual adjustment of both the positions of local and foreign 
actors, to the mutual appreciation and use of each other's networks might be a 
precondition for such an innovative and competitive institutional set-up. Furthermore, 
the enrolment of a large number of local actors in the process of adaptation gave these 
actors the motivation to adapt and thus unleashed local development potential. A 
process of adaptation which enrols a large number of actors is likely to produce a greater 
diversity of responses and therefore to increase the chances for collective 
reinterpretation and locally-based innovative forms of action.
The conclusions drawn from this empirical case study, however, should be 
treated with circumspection. Despite the success achieved so far, it is also important to 
be aware that this region is only at an initial stage of developing into a self-sustainable, 
intemationally-competitive economy. Equally, one should not be tempted to draw any 
simple normative conclusions from this case study. It needs to be stressed that the 
institutional set-up which Lanâkroun inherited from the Communist past represented a 
unique system of networks, practices and shared meanings which cannot be found in 
exactly the same form elsewhere and which had a good potential for an integration into
international networks.
I -
The outcome of internationalization and the way the regions adapt to it thus 
depend partly on the character of their inherited institutional set-up. Not all regions 
might be able to offer their foreign partners networks, practices, and skills which they 
find beneficial. Similarly, not all local managers enjoy such à local recognition that
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allows them tdcontroï and mobilize local networks to the extent that the managers of 
AVX do. Although examples such as Lanâkroun seem rather rare among post- 
Communist regions dominated by foreign investment, there does appear to be scope for 
other regions to turn their collective institutional assets into a source of adaptability and 
self-sustaining international competitiveness.
CHAPTER SEVEN : THE REGION OF MLADÂ 
BOLESLAV: AN ADAPTIVE BUT FRAGMENTED 
REGIONAL SET-UP?
INTRODUCTION
The focus o f this chapter is a much larger and a much looser region than is the case with 
the other two regions discussed. This case study deals with the internationalization of a 
set of automotive manufacturers which subcontract to the major Czech car manufacturer 
Skoda and which are concentrated in the area that surrounds the main Skoda plant in 
Mladâ Boleslav. Skoda was the only major producer of passenger cars in Communist 
Czechoslovakia. In 1991, when the Czechoslovak Government decided to privatize the 
company by a direct sale to the German car manufacturer Volkswagen (VW) it also 
made a systematic effort to gain the maximum possible multiplier effects for the whole 
national economy from its sale. For that reason, a special clause was incorporated into 
the agreement between the Government and Volkswagen which guaranteed that a 
-proportion of locally-sourced parts would be used by Skoda, most of which originated 
from the subcontractors located in the region of Mlada Boleslav. This chapter then, 
deals only partly with the VW-Skoda venture itself, as its main concern is with the 
analysis o f the impact of this investment on the local automotive suppliers.
The unique feature of the Mladâ Boleslav region in the Czech context is that 
internationalization took place here largely due to a deliberate policy of the Government 
which tried - by means of the sale of Skoda to VW - to integrate the Czech automotive 
firms into the networks of Western car manufacturers. The German investor had a 
strong interest in bringing local suppliers up to its Western standards and also actively 
encouraged further foreign investment in the local automotive companies. As such, the 
case study of Skoda's subcontractors provides an interesting example of a 'secondary' 
internationalization of a regional economy where many Western investors established 
themselves locally in order to supply the VW-§koda plant in Mladâ Boleslav. Given the 
number of foreign investors which have come to the region of Mladâ Boleslav since
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1991, this government policy seems to have been successful. This chapter, however, 
goes beyond the quantitative significance of foreign direct investment in the region and 
tries to assess the impact of internationalization on the coordination and adaptability of 
the local institutional set-up (Amin and Hausner, 1997). This is achieved by analyzing 
the cultural processes through which the managers of local automotive companies 
mediated the meanings of internationalization locally (Gallon, 1991; Murdoch, 1995). 
This analysis reveals that the process of internationalization has contributed to the 
isolation of the action frameworks of individual Skoda's suppliers and increased the 
fragmentation o f the regional institutional set-up.
The first two sections of this chapter introduce the automotive region of Mladâ 
Boleslav and explore the role played by the Skoda-VW deal in stimulating further 
internationalization of the region. The next two sections employ the concepts o f social 
and symbolic capital to analyze the restructuring of Skoda's subcontractors following its 
takeover by VW. It is explained that the close links with Skoda which the 
subcontracting firms inherited both enabled and restricted the actions of their managers 
and pushed them to accept a particular form of internationalization advocated by 
’Skoda's new owner. The remaining sections analyze the inconsistency between the 
seemingly uniform, imported. Western practices which Skoda-VW tried to impose on 
its local suppliers and the actual variety of effects such internationalization had on these 
firms. These sections identify several segments of automotive firms in the region 
characterized by different forms and impacts of internationalization. They explain how 
and why the meanings of internationalization were or were not 'softened' by local 
mediation and what consequences these processes had for the adaptability of each 
segment of local subcontractors. The final section pulls together these findings and 
seeks to assess the effects of internationalization on the adaptability, innovativeness and 
long term competitiveness of the whole regional institutional set-up.
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THE SALE OF §KODA AND ’SECONDARY INTERNATIONALIZATION*
Skoda and the automotive 'region* of Mladâ Boleslav
Mladâ Boleslav is the location of the headquarters and the main production plant of 
Skoda. It is a medium-sized town by Czech standards with some 50,000 inhabitants, 
located in the north-eastern part of Bohemia in an area with a long engineering tradition 
dating to the 19th century. Skoda itself is the third oldest car manufacturer in Europe 
(Pavlinek and Smith, 1998) and also many of its local subcontractors draw on an 
engineering tradition going back almost a century (interviews).
The territorial focus of the case study is an area with a radius of some 50 
kilometres around the town of Mladâ Boleslav, which includes part of the territory of 
four administrative districts (see figure 3). The largest number of Skoda's subcontractors 
were traditionally located here and indeed, most Czech automotive subcontracting 
industry is concentrated within this area (see figure 4).
This area, however, does not represent a 'region* in a sense close to that 
described in the other two case studies, where one single enterprise dominates the 
employment and economic networks of the whole region. The region described in this 
chapter is looser and the strong subcontracting links with Skoda are the only unifying 
features of this otherwise fairly complex and heterogeneous space (for a discussion of a 
similar notion of a loose and heterogeneous region, see Allen et al., 1998). The 
domination of this region by the automotive industry and by the networks and corporate 
culture of Skoda varies between its different parts and is certainly less hegemonic than 
the enterprises described in the other two case studies.
Having said that, it should also be stressed that the cumulative number of 
employees of the automotive companies included in this empirical study represents 
between 10 and 20 per cent of the workforce of the whole region.43 The sense of 
interconnection and belonging to the' automotive complex among all the interviewed 
companies is strong and so is the feeling of being dominated by and vitally connected to
43This is an estimate based on the interview information and the regional employment statistics (CSÛ  
1997).
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Figure 3: Local labour markets of Skoda-VW and its 
subcontactors in the region of Mladâ Boleslav
Skoda. To employ a spatial metaphor it can be said that among Skoda s subcontractors 
there is a feeling of gravitation towards a common hub represented bythe town of Mladâ 
Boleslav. All the personal and commodity networks of the subcontractors meet in 
Skoda's headquarters in Mladâ Boleslav and it is also here that the managers of local 
automotive firms usually meet with one another and leam about the others activities 
(interviews). The sense of a 'regional unity' among subcontractors of Skoda is also partly 
a result of the Communist past, when some of today's subcontractors were still a part of 
the powerful state-owned enterprise AZNP or belonged to the same VHJ as Skoda.44 
Many personal bonds and networks of the past survived the foreign takeover of Skoda 
largely untouched and continue to play an important role in preserving the sense of 
integrity within this automotive region.
As already mentioned, this chapter does not deal directly with the enterprise 
Skoda Auto, as Skoda is officially called today. Instead, the main focus is the cluster of 
Skoda's subcontractors in the surroundings of Mladâ Boleslav. However, in order to 
understand the character of internationalization of this automotive region and to explain 
the changes in regional forms of embeddedness, it is essential, first of all, to understand 
the history and the details of Skoda's takeover.
Skoda's history and its role in internationalization of the regional economy
AZNP Skoda Mladâ Boleslav, as the full name of the company used to be, was one of 
the most powerful enterprises in Communist Czechoslovakia. It was also one of the 
biggest industrial enterprises in the country and as the only mass manufacturer of 
passenger cars in Czechoslovakia it was a source of much of the pride of Czech 
industrial traditions and skills. Skoda employed directly some 17,000 workers, provided 
work for more than 80 subcontracting firms throughout Czechoslovakia (Zâk, 1997) and
44AZNP (Automobilové zâvody - nârodni podnik or Automobile Works - national enterprise) was the 
name under which Skoda existed in the 1980s when it included the main plant in Mladâ Boleslav plus 12 
different branch plants in the Czech Republic, most o f which were split into independent companies 
during Skoda's privatization. Two o f these are also part o f this case study. VHJ Ceskoslovenské 
automobilové zâvody (Czechoslovak automobile works) was one o f the major industrial conglomerates in 
Communist Czechoslovakia but it disintegrated in late 1980s during one o f the attempts to rationalize the 
centrally planned economy. At the time o f its existence the VHJ included Skoda itself as well as majority 
of its traditional subcontractors, including some which entered into this case study.
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indirectly gave jobs to as many as 100,000 people (MIT, 1996). About 50 per cent o f the 
Skoda's production was exported and about one fourth of its exports went to the 
Western markets. These foreign sales represented one of the few sources of freely 
convertible Western currency for the Communist economy (Ekonom, 1996) which 
further strengthened Skoda's position as a 'national champion' entitled to special benefits 
and privileges. Some of these benefits were also redistributed to its major 
subcontractors. Skoda, and to some degree its subcontractors in the automotive industry, 
had access to the most advanced technology available in the Eastern bloc as well as 
privileged access to sources of Western currency which enabled them to purchase on 
occasion technology from the West (Ekonom, 1996).
However, with the increasing technological gap between the East and the West 
and with the increasing economic difficulties of the Communist countries, attempts to 
innovate the products of Skoda were getting ever more difficult (Ekonom, 1996). The 
last such attempt took place in the latter half of 1980s with the model called Skoda 
Favorit. In 1989, as a consequence of this massive innovation project (that is in terms of 
the Communist economy), Skoda and most of its subcontractors were left with huge 
investment loans to be paid back. This situation coincided with the collapse of the 
Communist regime and the subsequent surge of car imports from the West. It was 
obvious that in such an environment Skoda could neither compete with its 
technologically outdated products for much longer, nor could it pay off its debt.
The first post-Communist Government of Czechoslovakia therefore decided to 
use the former 'national champion' as a show case of the post-Communist Government's 
determination to open and reform the economy. As early as 1990, only a few months 
after the collapse of the Communist regime, the Czechoslovak Government decided to 
privatize Skoda by establishing a joint-venture with a major Western car manufacturer.
Eventually, the ministerial committee selected the German multinational Volkswagen
«
(VW) as the most suitable candidate (MIT, 1996). In the first stage, in 1991, VW gained 
a 31 per cent minority stake in the joint-venture which was later increased in several 
instalments and by 1997 VW owned 70 per cent of Skoda.
The implications of the decision to privatize Skoda went far beyond those 
immediately connected with the financial transaction however. As the first major 
foreign investment deal after 1989, the sale also had great symbolic and political 
significance. The huge size, novelty and implication of one of the sources of Czech 
industrial pride ensured that this project was very closely observed by the Czech public 
with a mixture of anxiety and unrealistically high expectations (Dôrr and Kessel, 1996,
1997).
The actual economic consequences of the takeover, however, were equally 
important. Some of them were established in advance as a list of conditions by the 
Czechoslovak Government and later specified in its agreement with VW. The German 
multinational was selected because it seemed to be the candidate most able to satisfy all 
the requirements of the Government which included: preservation of the trade mark 
Skoda, preservation of a guaranteed level of production, investment and local content of 
subcontracting, as well as development of new products (MIT, 1996).
Despite some later problems in the relations between VW and the Czechoslovak 
Government, which made the enforcement of some of these requirements problematic45, 
the main strategic economic goals of the Czech side were largely fulfilled. The new 
joint venture invested heavily in the modernization of its production technology, it 
improved the quality of its products, and started to expand its export volume (for details 
see Dôrr and Kessel, 1996,1997; Cook, 1998; Pavlinek and Smith, 1998; Martin, 1998). 
Today Skoda Auto employs nearly 22,000 employees (19,000 in Mlada Boleslav itself), 
which is well above the pre-1989 levels, and with a turnover of 90 billion Kô is the 
largest company in the Czech Republic (Skoda Auto, 1998). In 1997 the company 
accounted for 5.5 per cent of Czech GDP and for 8 per cent of Czech exports (Cook,
1998). The production has increased steadily from 174,000 cars in 1994 to 357,000 in
45The problems and conflicts in the relations between VW and Czechoslovak (and later Czech) 
Government stem mostly from a legal ambiguity o f some parts o f the agreement. Until present the causes 
of the conflict are subject to much controversy as the actual agreement has remained secret. The accounts 
o f the causes for the conflict range from inaccurate and biased descriptions o f V W s predatory behaviour 
(see e.g. Gowan, 1995), to more balanced accounts which admit the failure to meet the requirements on 
both sides (see Dôrr and Kessel, 1996, 1997; MIT, 1996; Éâk, 1997; Pavlinek and Smith, 1998). An 
interesting explanation has been provided by two researchers who obtained access to the details o f the 
original agreement (Hayri and McDermott, 1998) and who blame the problems on the inaction o f  the 
right-wing cabinet o f  Vâclav Klaus that came to power in 1992 (i.e. after Skoda was sold to VW).
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1997, with a corresponding rise in exports whereby some 70 per cent of all Skoda cars 
produced in 1997 were exported (Skoda Auto, 1998).
More to the point, because of the special attention paid to the local 
subcontractors of Skoda in the agreement, the Skoda-VW joint-venture also became a 
powerful means of further internationalization of the Czech economy (£âk, 1997, 
Pavlinek, 1998). The increase of Skoda's sales and exports involved not only finished 
cars but also the consequent increase in production of components and spare parts. In 
1997, when the company produced 357,400 cars, it also spent 55 billion Kô (around 1 
billion pounds) on supplies, of which 37.5 billion Kô (nearly 700 million pounds) went 
to the Czech-based firms that provided 60 per cent o f parts and materials. Skoda's 
demands will rise sharply if the planned output of 500,000 cars a year by 2000 is 
achieved (Cook, 1998; Skoda Auto, 1998). Moreover, VW s takeover of Skoda also 
stimulated an influx o f a large number of other foreign investors who were keen to 
establish their plants locally (Cook, 1998). These decided either to take over existing 
subcontractors of Skoda or to establish new greenfield sites. The total number of these 
foreign automotive investments in the whole of the Czech Republic was estimated at 80 
in 1998 (Cook, 1998) and the effect of this 'secondary' internationalization was 
strongest in the region of Mladâ Boleslav itself (see figure 5).46
At the present time, it appears as if the desired goal of the Czechoslovak 
Government has been successfully fulfilled. Thanks to the condition of local 
subcontracting, the sale of Skoda to VW stimulated further internationalization of the 
economy and therefore pushed Czech automotive firms to restructure their production 
and adjust to the practices recognized by the Western firms. Furthermore, it seems that 
much of this positive effect of internationalization is concentrated in the region of 
Mlada Boleslav, directly in the area surrounding the main Skoda plant. One interviewee
46[n May 1996 there were 44 joint-ventures and 24 greenfield foreign investments in the Czech 
automotive components industry (after newspaper MF Ones, May 15 1996, quoted by Pavlinek and 
Smith, 1998). Unfortunately, the data on an exact number o f Skoda's subcontractors located in the Mladâ 
Boleslav region is not available because Skoda regards such information as a company secret. 
Nevertheless, I was able to compile a reasonably accurate list o f subcontractors which together with a map 
published in Pavlinek-(1998) (see Fig. 5), confirms the expectation that there is a tendency for automotive 
foreign direct investment to concentrate within a short distance o f  the Skoda p lan t
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summarized the overall positive impact of Skoda's takeover on its subcontractors and 
the whole Czech economy in the following terms:
"The takeover by Volkswagen had an enormous significance. You will probably be writing about how 
many people are employed in the automobile industry in the Czech Republic, how many o f  them are 
connected with VW, how many people are employed in all the sphere. So it has an enormous importance, 
because, I think, it was the first company that made this kind o f  deal with the Government. Second, it was 
an automotive firm and automobiles are, quite logically, always at the edge o f  technological development 
and all the backward linkages, many other things [are affected]. And then the automotive industry has the 
shortest cycle o f  innovations. So also from this point o f  view it was very significant. Another significant 
factor was that Volkswagen or Skoda started to teach the firms a different way o f  thinking.[...] It was a 
tough lesson, because the rule had been that one would get a contract for free... there is a real struggle 
over them [the contracts] now, the negotiations are tough and people leam to negotiate with someone they 
never dealt with before. This is a very different attitude... So these are the positives. It opened the door for 
us to the first court o f  the castle' [meaning the world automotive markets] where the system o f  global and 
forward sourcing is also being used. And many o f  Czech suppliers have a chance to penetrate these 
structures."
However, the same interviewee also retained some ambivalence regarding these same 
effects of internationalization on local actors and firms:
"It has also its negative side. There is an enormous pressure on costs and prices. The negotiations are 
tough and many firms lose the contracts in the competition." (interview with a manager o f  SAP, 1111 
1996)
The issue of balance between the positive and negative effects of internationalization 
raised in this quote represents the focus of the following sections of this chapter. These 
analyze the processes through which VWs 're-education' of its Czech subcontractors 
translated into particular meanings of internationalization and transformed the action 
frameworks of people who manage the local automotive firms.
COPING WITH THE HERITAGE OF STRONG TIES: SOCIAL AND 
SYMBOLIC CAPITAL AMONG §KODA'S SUBCONTRACTORS
The enabling role of strong ties: internationalization as a source of symbolic power
The companies included in this case study represent a diverse range of production 
processes and skills and they represent about a half of Skoda's subcontractors located in 
the automotive region of Mladâ Boleslav.47 Among them are producers of components
47This is my own estimate for year 1997 when the interviews were conducted. It is based on older sources 
o f  information about the foreign owned subcontractors o f  Skoda (MIT, 1996), on materials acquired from 
PR department o f  Skoda Auto, and on the information extracted from the interviews.
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as diverse as car brakes, shock absorbers, seat fasteners, or seat upholstery (see figure 
3). An effort was also made to include into the sample both the subcontractors that 
supplied Skoda before 1989, as well as those that only started to subcontract after VW s 
takeover, and both the Czech- and foreign-owned ones (for details see the Appendix).
Despite the heterogeneity of the selected automotive firms there is one major 
unifying feature. It is the close ties with Skoda and their shared vital dependence on it as 
the main customer. The dependence on Skoda is not surprising given the previous 
history of the companies in question. Most of them are traditional suppliers of Skoda 
and two of them even used to be branch plants directly owned by Skoda. Although the 
majority of Skoda's traditional suppliers used to have a more diversified customer base 
in the past, this situation changed rapidly during the early 1990s mainly due to the 
persistent economic difficulties other traditional customers, especially the Czech truck 
manufacturers. The importance of strong networks with Skoda became prominent soon 
after its takeover by VW since Skoda was one of the few Czech companies that, thanks 
to VW, never experienced financial difficulties and thus represented a reliable and 
highly desirable customer. Furthermore, these networks also came to play a central role 
in spreading the meanings of internationalization and in transforming the action
frameworks of Skoda's local subcontractors.
Similar to most Eastern European industry, the subcontractors of Skoda were 
technologically backward, they lacked money for investment and some of them were 
also heavily indebted. The managers of local subcontractors were quite aware of these 
existing problems and knew that, as independent Czech manufacturers, their position in 
the market could be threatened by the sale of Skoda to a Western investor. When asked 
about their motivation for linking up with foreign partners the replies of managers were 
often remarkably similar:
Skoda] " (interview with manager in General Plastics, 25.4. IWl)
Airdoors, 13.5. 1997)
Yet despite these problems there was a major advantage which the subcontractors of 
Skoda enjoyed in comparison with most industrial enterprises in the Czech Republic. 
With the looming prospects of a takeover by a financially strong Western multinational, 
the old links with the car manufacturer, and to some extent also the proximity to Skoda's 
plant in Mladâ Boleslav, suddenly became important assets. The prospects of a 
profitable business of subcontracting to a member of the VW group became the source 
of a networked type of power (Allen, 1997) for all the established subcontractors of 
Skoda in the region. Unlike most Czech firms that had to struggle to attract the attention 
of foreign investors, the suppliers of Skoda could, at least temporarily, exploit this 
source of power in negotiations with potential foreign investors. Thus when asked about 
the origin of contact with foreign partners and the reasons for being selected by them as 
the target company, the answers of the managers were quite unusual for Eastern 
European companies.
"We were in a position when we could choose a foreign partner because we were such a lucrative 
enterprise." (interview with a manager o f Supercable, 28.5. 1997)
"T-Plast approached us because we were selected as a potential good producer [for a partnership]. [...] 
They were probably interested because we were a pretty well organized firm and also because it is at a 
spitting distance to the [Skoda] plant." (interview A with a former general manager o f T-Plast, 5.6. 1997)
"The whole selection process was done in such a way that we selected them. There were several firms 
interested to come here." (interview with a manager o f Autobrakes, 14.5. 1997; original emphasis)
Such empowerment through the network heritage made the position of local managers 
relatively strong even in negotiations with major Western automotive firms. Their 
companies suddenly became so attractive that it made the task of negotiating the terms 
of joint-ventures or foreign takeovers far less arduous.
The managers of Skoda's subcontractors were thus offered an opportunity to 
link-up with foreign investors. Such association could, in turn, be used as a source of 
new, Western symbolic capital and power of recognition in relation to Skoda and to
i
other Czech companies. Moreover, by means of this association local mangers could 
also legitimize their own privileged positions in their company. With the backing of 
foreign investors it was much easier to get rid .of inconvenient obligations associated 
with some parts of the old networks, such as the ones towards the bankrupting truck
manufacturers or towards the members of old local networked coalitions. The contacts 
with Western partners also gave the managers the symbolic recognition which allowed 
them easier access to credit sources (usually on better terms than any Czech firm could 
get) for technological upgrading and paying off debts, if there were any. Quotes by two 
interviewees give some idea about the difference that the presence of foreign partners 
made to the local firms in this respect:
"Four years ago [when the firm was still only in negotiations with foreign partner] we had to beg banks 
[for credit] [...]. Today we are in a situation when they fight for us as their customer." (interview with 
general manager o f  Metalpress, 13.6. 1997)
"As a part o f  ASO [a Czech manufacturer, original owner o f  this plant] we really had great financial 
difficulties. [...] After the takeover everything changed as if  someone had waved a magic wand. [...] Today 
we have to defend ourselves against banks that try to persuade us to take loans from them!" (interview 
with a financial manager o f  Monto, 21.5. 1997)
The technological upgrading and reorganization of production that local managers 
implemented with the backing of their new foreign partners also helped to increase the 
quality of products. This further improved the chances of success for their local firms in 
the competition for contracts from Skoda and, as a consequence, assured that there was 
no need for major reductions in labour force. Interestingly, there were no substantial lay­
offs in any of the companies interviewed. On the contrary, some managers complained 
about the shortage of labour in the area where Skoda "sucks in all unemployment" and 
"pushes the wages far too high" (interview with manager of Metalpress, 13.6. 1997).
The absence of any major redundancies made the efforts of managers to gain or 
maintain recognition in their respective localities and among their employees that much 
easier. The respectable standing of managers in the eyes of local people was further 
facilitated by earnings well above the national average caused by the extremely low 
unemployment levels in the area (around 2-3 per cent in 1997). .
The interviews suggest that in some cases the local managers did not even feel 
the need to use local networks as a source of recognition and legitimation. Several 
interviewees confirmed this lack of interest in local networks and in local affairs 
generally. One interviewee when asked about the nature of his contacts with other local 
bodies even angrily replied that he does not care about other local bodies and networks 
because "they all just want money from us" (interview with general manager of
Supercable, 28.5.1997). Strong local networks and a sense of responsibility for the 
regional economy which were so prominent in the case of LanSkroun are features largely
absent among subcontractors of Skoda.
This lack of interest in local networks and local affairs generally can be partly 
seen as a reflection of the relative ease with which the positions of local managers were 
re-legitimized by the presence of Western investors. Local management thus usually did 
not feel a need to protect themselves against uncertainty by having a stake in other local 
businesses or by cultivating supportive networks with other firms in the region which 
could provide a from of hedging against uncertainty. As a consequence, the networks of 
the large majority of managers in Mladâ Boleslav region are relatively isolated. They are 
closely associated with Skoda and/or their foreign partners alone but the links with local 
administration or with other local firms (in a form of interlocking directorates which is a 
common feature in the other two case study regions) is virtually absent (different 
interviews; database of the Ministry of Justice). It seems that instead of relying on local 
networks, the managers have put all their effort into negotiations with their foreign 
partners and the construction of stable relations with Skoda which served as the
dominant form of recognition.
One of the preconditions for such recognition was the restructuring of the
enterprises which, with the help of foreign partners, usually took place very rapidly 
(interviews). The subsequent increases in volume of production, labour productivity, 
quality and profits observed in the majority of Skoda's subcontractors (interviews; 
Rihovâ, 1998) were a sufficient argument to confirm the positions of Czech managers 
within their companies and in relation to their foreign partners.
From the foregoing it follows that the heritage of strong ties with Skoda made it 
relatively easy for the managers of local suppliers to secure links with foreign capital 
and thus strengthen their recognition by VW executives. In order to confirm their 
positions the managers had to implement an enterprise restructuring which typically 
consisted of an import of the latest Western technology and practices. These, in turn, led 
to a relatively quick adaptation to the criteria of efficiency specified by VW. However, 
the w ir in g by the symbolic power of Western partners also allowed local managers to
•disembed' themselves from the obligations of local networks (Smith and S wain, 1998).
As we shall see in the next section, however, the heritage of strong ties with Skoda 
combined with the disembedding effect was not always positive for the local automotive
suppliers.
Restrictive role of strong ties: reducing the scope for action
Aside from their strong position in negotiations with foreign partners, all the managers 
of Skoda's subcontractors also had to accept the fact that Skoda-VW had a very strong 
opinion about what the market environment for its subcontractors should look like.
VWs main aim was to undermine the powerful position of the semi-monopoly enjoyed 
by some of its local subcontractors and to increase competition in order to achieve best 
quality for lowest price (Dôir and Kessel, 1996,1997; PavHnek, 1998; PavUnek and 
Smith, 1998). Subsequently, this strategy had a strong influence on the action 
frameworks of Skoda's suppliers as it began to shape the particular understandings of
and give meaning to the notions of market and efficiency.
The interviews indicate that the issues of quality and cost were prominent in the 
particular interpretation o f internationalization presented by the management of Skoda- 
VW. The managers of subcontracting firms thus had to come to terms with the 
international meanings and practices and accommodate them into their existing action 
frameworks. Otherwise they could lose their contracts with Skoda, as well as their 
recognition in the new, internationalized economic environment.
The new meanings of the market and the nature of competition based on the 
criteria of cost and quality also had major repercussions for the stability of existing 
subcontracting relations. One of the managers of a company, recently established 
through a foreign greenfield investment, summarized quite clearly the officially declared 
attitude of Skoda-VW towards its local subcontractors:
"Here you can't talk o f stability. In the market economy it [stability] is a kind o f technical term with many 
will and who will not be a supplier." (interview with manager o f UCJ, 10.6 1VV/)
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To achieve ever lower costs of supplies and to break the powerful position of its 
existing subcontractors Skoda tried to increase the competition among these 
subcontractors by all means possible. Although the German management of Skoda had 
agreed to protect Czech subcontractors through guaranteed contents of local supplies, 
they also made it quite clear that there could be no guarantee of contracts for present 
suppliers who would not comply with their criteria. Quality of supplies was usually an 
even greater problem for Czech subcontractors than costs and also here Skoda's position 
was quite firm. One of the interviewees described Skoda's purchasing policy in respect 
of quality in these words:
"They [Skoda after V W s takeover] changed the whole system o f  purchasing when they introduced the 
system o f  auditing o f  suppliers. The rule is fairly straightforward: those who dont get enough points in the 
audit cant become a subcontractor. O f course, if  they [Skoda] have no other option, they might grant an 
exception. But then they rather go for supplies from abroad. They would rather start sourcing from abroad 
than risk an unstable quality o f  production. [...] Many Czech subcontractors couldnt com e to understand 
this and kept bombarding them [Skoda] with questions about whether they would rely on them as future 
suppliers. And they patiently [...] explained to them over and over again that the local suppliers are the 
best option for them, but that they must comply with certain standards o f  quality. And many Czech firms 
lost the contracts because they didn't adapt to the pressure for improved quality that they [Skoda] put on 
them. [...] Today there are plenty o f  foreign firms that start to build up their own plants which are going to 
become our competitors [...] These try to cut a slice from Skoda's contracts for themselves." (interview  
with a manager o f  General Plastics, 25.4. 1997)
Both Skoda and the Czech managers of its subcontractors were quite aware that it was
very hard for Czech firms to meet stringent criteria of quality and cost and survive in
conditions of increasing competition without the help of foreign partners (interviews in
ASO, General Plastics, Airdoors). Despite the guaranteed element of Czech
subcontracting in Skoda cars the company did not wish to lose time and so it pushed the
local subcontractors to form collaborative ventures with foreign firms or to agree on
foreign takeovers. To keep the local suppliers on the tips of their toes Skoda-VW used
methods such as the one described by one interviewee in this way:
"They [Skoda] are trying co have two suppliers for each part. One has a guaranteed 80 percent o f  their 
purchases and the other one 20 percent. In practice, however, they buy all 100 percent from one. [...] It is 
a back-gate for Skoda, a Damocles' sword o f  sorts, a threat over every supplier that if  they don't supply as 
they [Skoda] demand - and this concerns not just the quantity but also at an acceptable price - so they can 
always go for the other one with whom they agreed on 20 percent o f  supplies. Although they don't buy 
anything from them, they always have the option o f  cutting o ff  [the original supplier]." (interview A witty 
former general manager o f  T-Plast, 5.6. 1997)
In this context the initial strong position of Skoda's subcontractors looks rather different. 
The networks with Skoda which represented a source of symbolic power also made the
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managers of local subcontractors strongly dependent on the interpretations of 
internationalization advocated by VW. The narrow orientation towards Skoda and lack 
of other networks restricted the capacity of several local managers to create alternative 
meanings of internationalization and to mediate them through locally-based processes of 
translation and enrolment. They were therefore left with no choice but to accept VWs
practices.
Nonetheless, the Czech managers of Skoda's subcontractors did have a choice 
between two basic strategies. Either they could bow to the pressure and accept a foreign 
partner, or they could pursue an independent, domestic strategy of restructuring. In the 
first case the managers' strategy would be based predominantly on the acceptance of 
foreign managerial and organizational practices with their stress on quality and cost 
control. This usually led to rapid restructuring but often with the substantial 
simplification of and losses to the network heritage of firms (Grabher, 1994,1997). The 
local managers would become the agents of restructuring on behalf of the Western 
corporations. In this way they could appropriate the new symbolic capital and power 
which in the eyes of local people was associated with foreign, Western capitalism. The 
Western practices and organizational principles, together with the audit ratings and top 
quality awards from Volkswagen, or international awards of quality (ISO) which are 
proudly displayed in the offices of general mangers, would be used as the new source of
legitimation and recognition.
In the second, alternative scenario, the managers would instead promulgate the 
Czech way of restructuring as the valid and legitimate one. They could use their 
networked social capital in an attempt to enrol other local actors and negotiate the 
differences between their practices and the imported Western ones represented by the 
demands of Skoda. Equally these managers had to increase quality and control the 
production costs of their supplies in order to secure the contracts with Skoda. If they 
were successful their efforts could also bring them recognition and legitimation and 
become a source of symbolic power. In this case, however, such recognition would be 
achieved through a difficult and time consuming process of search and adjustment 
(Stark, 1996; Stark and Grabber, 1997b). The managers would achieve recognition
through a process o f mediation and translation (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991) which 
could potentially result in a collective adaptation and a locally-based reinterpretation of 
the imported practices. However, Skoda-VW had little enthusiasm for such time 
consuming experiments. So obviously this strategy involved the enormous risk of Skoda 
losing its patience and the mangers of local suppliers losing the vital contract with 
Skoda as well as their symbolic power and recognition.
In fact Skoda-VW maintained a systematic pressure on its Czech suppliers to 
join forces with Western partners (PavHnek, 1998; PavHnek and Smith, 1998) rather 
than negotiating specific conditions with individual suppliers. The intention was that the 
foreign partners would take over the responsibility for and become an efficient means of 
transferring VWs, or more generally Western, practices and concepts to its Czech 
subcontractors (Cook, 1998). It is little wonder that most subcontractors then bowed to 
the pressure from Skoda's management and established joint-ventures or arranged 
takeovers in which the foreign partners were expected to play a mirror role to the one 
that VW played in Skoda itself. When asked about the motivation for linking with 
foreign partners one of the interviewees described the situation and pressure he had to 
face in the following way:
"Volkswagen had been at Skoda for more than a year and we still didn't have a foreign partner. So, o f 
course, the pressure was enormous to prove [to them] that we had a cooperative attitude, that we could 
make an agreement with someone [...] that we could secure a partner for a joint-venture in order not to 
lose our main customer. [...] Volkswagen to some extent preferred [Czech] firms that were able to make 
an agreement and collaborate with a Western partner. This was a decisive factor in favour o f  the decision 
to secure the direct participation o f a foreign partner. [...] But the Western partners, especially at the 
beginning, in 1990 and 1991, were very aggressive. They looked at us as if  we had just climbed down 
from the trees. And also their conditions were set up in such a way." (interview with general manager o f 
ASO, 14.5. 1997)
The above quote documents not just the pressure on the management of local 
subcontractors to pair with foreign firms, but in the latter part it also hints at the 
negative attitude of foreign firms towards the heritage of local networks and practices. 
Foreign firms usually had very little knowledge about the actual state of local 
production technology, practices and routines and often lacked respect for them. Their 
perceptions were often dismissive and the foreign partners were not even very much 
interested to learn about the locally-specific system of networks, practices and meanings 
in which local actors operated. Understandably, the situation was very unfavourable to
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any attempts to mediate the meanings of internationalization and to reconcile and 
negotiate the differences between local practices and those imported by Western 
investors.
Negative attitudes were very common especially at the initial stage of
negotiations when many foreign investors rushed to follow VW and wanted to establish
themselves locally through takeovers (interviews)48. Many foreign investors simply
wanted to take over existing suppliers in order to establish a cheap production base in
the proximity of Skoda and often behaved in ways which were unacceptable to local
firms. Such was also the experience of a Czech-owned supplier SAP. When asked why
his company had not attempted to link up with a Western firm the manager replied:
"Of course [we did try]. We tried that with a German company called Krugel, which is owned by the 
American firm MCM [both names changed]. [...] The negotiations were very long and we expected MCM 
to buy a part o f  our production facilities but at the end they were not fair in the negotiation and it appeared 
that they were only interested in gaining the [local] market So we quit this negotiation. But it became 
clear that in the long run we couldn't exist without some kind o f  collaboration [with foreign partners]. We 
can’t operate just on our own in the future. And so presently we negotiate and cooperate with many 
companies." (interview with a manager o f  SAP, 11.11. 1996)
The quote also shows that despite the negative attitudes of many Western investors the 
Czech managers still often had little choice but to negotiate a deal with them. The 
suppliers were under pressure from Skoda-VW to speed up the process of pairing with 
foreign partners because without such foreign participation they were unable to secure 
the necessary financial resources and know-how sufficiently quickly. This time pressure 
was very significant because if the supplier did not satisfy the requirements of VW and 
the negotiations with foreign partners dragged on or even failed, VW did not wait, it 
■- simply quit. In such cases the chances of Czech-owned suppliers to win back the 
contract they had once lost were minimal (interviews in General Plastics and ASO).
Given these circumstances the Czech managers generally lacked the motivation 
and the time to mobilize their old networks, enrol other local actors and demonstrate the 
potential strength of local action frameworks to their foreign owners. Usually there was 
also only a very short period of mutual 'testing' between local and foreign firms before 
the takeovers or joint-ventures materialized. It was not uncommon for a foreign investor
48For similar attitudes among many V W s managers in Skoda at the beginning o f  the joint-venture see 
Dôrr and Kessel (1996).
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to be selected byiâ state committee in a competitive tender (interview with general 
manager of Supercable). The positions of the Czech managers were thus usually 
unsuitable for working together with their foreign partners on the mutual adjustment of 
expectations, understandings and practices.
In the interest of expediency, many Czech managers turned to the imported 
Western practices as a source of symbolic recognition and became resigned to their role 
as mediators (Gallon, 1991, 1998) of the Western practices and meanings. Instead, after 
the entry of foreign capital, their activity was often restricted to that of an efficient 
channel for implementing the imported practices according to the guidelines of foreign 
partners. Only two out of the sample of eight 'old' (i.e. pre-1989) suppliers of Skoda 
opted for the strategy of independent restructuring without a foreign partner. Even these 
two companies cooperate with foreign partners and have stakes in joint-ventures with 
Western firms (see the Appendix) while the rest of the 'old' suppliers preferred to accept 
foreign owners rather than risking an independent but less certain future.
This, however, does not mean that all the companies where the Czech 
management opted for a foreign joint-venture or a foreign takeover would necessarily 
follow a way of restructuring 'typical' for all foreign-owned enterprises. There is no 
inherent reason why foreign participation and the pressure for high quality and low 
prices should always lead to the same loss of network heritage and a suppression of 
local action frameworks. Moreover, the acceptance of VWs practices alone does not 
mean that all the managers interpreted them in the same way and that these 
interpretations had the same consequences for their long term adaptability. It is to a 
closer analysis of these issues which we will turn in the remaining sections of this 
chapter.
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONALIZATION: TOWARDS 
HOMOGENIZATION OR VARIETY?
Introduction of Western practices and the variety of their understandings
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The internationalization of the Skoda's subcontracting networks had a major impact on 
the local institutional set-up and on the action frameworks of its suppliers. The efforts of 
Skoda to increase the competitiveness of the environment in which local subcontractors 
operated and to change the character of local practices were largely regarded as 
legitimate by the majority of subcontractors (interviews). Skoda's subcontractors also 
had to accept and adapt to V W s m ethod of global andforw ard sourcing w hich did not, 
however, meet with the same degree of local support and understanding. The way in 
which the managers understood this method, as well as the meaning they gave to 'the 
capitalist market*, openness and trust in business, represent the focus of the following 
analysis. Such analysis, it is argued here, can evaluate the actual impact of the VWs 
investment on the action frameworks of local managers and their firms, and indeed on 
the whole regional institutional set-up. By exploring the managers' interpretations of the 
practice of global and forward sourcing we can understand how local actors actually 
adapted to the process of internationalization. In other words, this analysis can show us 
how the Western ways of doing business affected the locally-specific systems of 
practices and meanings. It can also serve as a basis for assessing whether the Western 
practices did or did not increase the integration between the diverse local action 
frameworks and thus create preconditions for innovative interpretations and 
adaptability.
The method of global sourcing consists of comparing the costs of individual 
components from suppliers all over the world and VW uses this method on a global 
scale both before and after signing the contracts with suppliers. Subsequently VW uses 
the information gathered about the comparative prices of components to further push its 
suppliers to minimize their costs. After the takeover of Skoda, VW extended this system 
to its Czech suppliers too. However, the managers of automotive firms in the region of 
Mladâ Boleslav often expressed resentment towards the continuous pressure to lower 
the price of supplies, which, according to many of them, would not stop even if their 
supplies apparently achieved the required criteria of high quality and low costs. All the 
interviewees stated that Skoda was forever trying to discover more about the production 
costs of the parts they supplied and the majority agreed that the system of auditing is
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primarily aimed ^.achieving this. Despite some minor differences, all the,-- , ; 
subcontractors also admitted that thanks to the methods of auditing and global and 
forward sourcing, VW knows in some detail about their production costs and profit 
margins. What worried the managers and what they particularly disliked was that Skoda 
was using information from these audits in order to acquire leverage over them, to 
disempower them and push down their profit margins in a way that some of them saw as
pointless and unfair.
It is worth quoting the comments of the interviewees at length as each reveals a
somewhat different interpretation and understanding of the new practice. Each quote
thus also suggests a different consequence of internationalization for the action
frameworks of actors.
"In the first round global sourcing probably got rid o f the greatest .. I don't want to say cheaters, but those 
who had excessive profits. But now, when things are stabilized, it is just plenty o f work and the overall 
result is zero." (interview B with manager o f T-Plast, 5.6.1997; original emphasis)
A similarly reserved attitude to the practice of global and forward sourcing was 
expressed by other interviewees:
"Skoda can read our cards pretty well. [...] You have probably heard o f Lopez and his methods o f global 
and forward sourcing. It consists o f comparing the prices o f purchased inputs before the actual mass 
production starts but also dufing production itself. They ask for offers also from companies that are not 
supplying them [at present]. So they know pretty much exactly at what cost who supplies V W s plants 
anywhere else in the w orld . And these prices are a standard for us and also for our subcontractors [...] But 
this [global sourcing] is in a way a dangerous and imprecise method. It is not always objective because 
individual suppliers can make mistakes. Either mathematical or just make a wrong estimate and then offer 
the price And VW does ask whether there has been a mistake. But if the price is the lowest one they 
would nonetheless use it [in price negotiations]. [...] But Skoda, or Volkswagen, is such an attractive 
customer that no supplier, or... hardly ever does a supplier dare to say that they will not supply at such a 
price and refuse a whole contract." (interview with a manger o f KOB Electric, 29.5.1997)
"This is the Lopez effect by which the car manufacturers in many cases dictate, or try to dictate the prices 
in such a way... 1 can understand the people from their purchasing department because they are rewarded 
for doing exactly this. Then it [the choice] is either, I will go under my price and try to get die money back 
elsewhere, or, I decide not to accept such offer. [...] Such bargaming is common and sometimes, think, 
it's useless. But I can't quit the customer because o f th a t [...] Although I don't particularly like it, one 
gradually gets used to it." (interview with a manager o f Metalpress, 13.6. 1997)
In other cases, however, the attitude towards Skoda's practice of global sourcing was 
relatively positive and it was not regarded as damaging:
"Everyone would like to know the production costs o f their supplier. Skoda, I think, knows our costs quite 
well in order to be certain that the prices o f our products fall within a range where there is no risk o f our 
supplying them at a rate below our actual cost o f production. That would cause bankruptcy and destroy a 
reliable supplier for our customer, that is ourselves. At the same time the prices are in ranges that 
correspond to the usual standards o f profitability [of automotive suppliers]." (interview with manager o f 
Autobrakes, 13.5. 1997)
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The variety o f interpretations suggest that Skoda did not successfully enrol all its 
subcontractors in a shared understanding of the new practice. The process of 
internationalization imposed the basic criteria of a highly competitive environment on 
all local suppliers. However, instead of enrolling the managers of supplying firms and 
aligning their action frameworks and interests with Skoda's, it produced a variety of 
interpretations and responses. The local managers did not identify themselves with the 
practice and did not accept it willingly. Although VW made most local managers accept 
the importance of the cost and quality criteria, the quotes suggest that in many cases the 
acceptance of Western criteria and forms of rationality did not produce a perfect 
translation (Gallon, 1991). From VW s point o f view, the introduction of global sourcing 
was not uniformly successful as this practice was left to a variety of interpretations 
which were often at odds with those of VW. As a result of an imperfect translation and 
lack of enrolment, the practices of VW were generally not accepted as 'normal' and the 
process of internationalization failed to produce trust in shared meanings or the mutual 
adjustment of actors.
Furthermore, virtually all interviewees (with only two exceptions) stated that the 
use of tricks aimed at a reduction in the cost of supplies was a very common practice of 
Skoda's, while only less than half of them regarded this practice as an acceptable one or 
as 'normal' in the market environment. The others regarded it with reservations, some 
called it unethical and only possible because of the powerful position that Skoda has 
enjoyed. Under such circumstances it does not come as a surprise that VW was not able 
to enrol local managers and align its own interests with those of local actors.
The different interpretations and the lack of shared meanings was further 
exacerbated by the method of communication used by Skoda in relation to its suppliers. 
As part of its method of global and forward sourcing, Skoda communicates with its 
subcontractors independently and only uses information about others as a source of 
pushing them in price negotiations and playing them off against one another (interviews 
in T-Plast, KOB Electric, Autobrakes). The practices introduced by VW thus seem to 
intentionally prevent managers of local subcontractors from communicating with each 
other. This aspect of Skoda's practice, it seems, further exacerbates the lack of mutual
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trust among subcontracting firms in the region. It prevents local actors from achieving 
an alignment and mutual redefinition of their positions (Gallon, 1991,1998; Murdoch,
1995) which, in turn, could ease the mobilization of local resources and smooth the 
adaptation of the whole region to the process of internationalization thereby creating 
novel interpretative possibilities (Sabel, 1993,1994; Storper, 1995; Storper and Salais,
1997).
The failure of Skoda-VW to produce a shared system of meaning and to 
cultivate a trusting and open attitude among local firms has also complicated the attitude 
of local managers towards the car manufacturer. It seems that instead of an openness 
and trust, the relations between Skoda and its local suppliers are often characterized by 
the withholding of strategic information. These features have been confirmed by several 
managers and are expressed in the three following quotes:
"Openness is dangerous, I would say; if we were entirely open in relations with Skoda... We managed, 
under the pressure from our new foreign owner, to lower costs. [...] And I think that in this respect 
openness in relation to Skoda would not be good. They would immediately push us to lower our prices 
farther. We could perhaps lower our prices but we need the maximum possible profit in order to pay back 
the enormous debt [that the Monto has to pay back to its foreign owners in instalments to compensate for 
the sum that the foreign partner spent on its takeover] (interview with a manager o f Monto, 21.5.1997)
"It is probably not right to tell them everything quite openly because they are constantly trying to pressure 
you. If they said: "look, tell us your production costs and we will guarantee you a 30 percent margin...
Then why not! But they would never say that." (interview B with manager o f T-Plast, 5.6. 1997)
"A certain reserve should be maintained. Complete openness could be just being silly. [...] It is needed, 
right, this openness, but it has its limits [...] Complete openness - no. It is not good when the partner sees 
too deep into your cards." (interview with a manager o f General Plastics, 25.4. 1997)
However, the opinions on the role of trust and openness in relations with Skoda and in 
market relations generally varied quite substantially among local managers. Some 
interviewees regarded the practice of trust and openness towards their partners as a 
matter of mutual 'testing', something which is possible to arrive at or has already been 
achieved in relations with Skoda:
"I see it [openness.in customer relations] more as an advantage. [...] From the short term perspective it can 
be unpleasant because they then teach us a lesson [since they are allowed to see the weaknesses]. But from 
the long term perspective it is good." (interview B with manager of Airdoors, 13.5. 1997)
"Openness, openness... Every company has its secret. Openness must only be to a certain extent. But for 
good relations with Ikoda, and I think the relations are good at all levels o f management, so here the 
openness is to some extent needed and is even necessary." (interview with a manager o f Metalpress, 13.6.
1997)
At the level of relations with customers in general, the managers seemed to be much 
more positive and willing to commit themselves to the risks of working with their 
foreign partners. One of the interviewees remarked in respect of this.
"I personally think that openness is to the merit o f the thing [relations with customers]. It is also a matter 
o f trust If you are correctly informed you know much better what to expect And thafs what matters." 
(interview with a general manager o f KOB Electric, 29.5. 1997)
The varied opinions expressed by local managers suggest that they were generally quite 
reserved in their openness in relation to §koda itself, but at the same time many of them 
personally regarded trust and openness as a desired and essential part of market relations 
compatible with the process of internationalization. Most interviewees also made a clear 
distinction between the actual state of their relations as opposed to their desired quality. 
Furthermore, several managers also contrasted the character of their relations with 
Skoda-VW with the ones they had with their other foreign partners or owners who 
sometimes developed a greater degree of understanding for the specificity of local 
action frameworks.
The findings confirming the diversity of interpretations and meanings assigned 
to the practices advocated by VW are, I believe, of great importance. They suggest that 
many suppliers of Skoda in this region (both Czech and foreign-owned) are managed by 
people who value trust, open relations and mutual understanding and who did not accept 
the practice of tough price competition as a necessary part of internationalized market 
relations. Only a small minority of local suppliers, it seems, accepted the imported 
practice and its logic of low cost competition at its face value. On the contrary, the 
management of several suppliers of Skoda showed a clear preference for negotiation and 
mutual adjustment of different practices and meanings. They were very critical of the 
cut-throat competition presented by Skoda as a part of the new, recognized 
subcontracting practice. The explanation of such diverse responses can help us to 
understand how exactly the action frameworks of local actors were transformed by the 
process of internationalization and it also brings us closer to assessing the impact of 
internationalization on the adaptability of the Mlada Boleslav region. These are the 
issues tackled in the following sections.
Translating the meanings of Western practices
Skoda-VWs proclaims that the tough criteria of global sourcing are applied universally 
to all its automotive suppliers in order to increase the competitiveness of their products 
(see e.g. Cook, 1998). However, the discrepancies between these statements and the 
diverse interpretations of the imported Western practices by local managers have been 
observed in the great majority of companies. This was the case in Czech-owned as well 
as foreign-owned suppliers, and equally among the 'old', pre-1989 suppliers as well as 
the newly established, greenfield foreign investments. The discrepancies between the 
universal application of subcontracting practices and their diverse impact on the local 
firms can, in my opinion, be interpreted in two possible ways.
The first possible explanation implies that Skoda has advocated a cut-throat 
competition but in practice has used a differentiated approach towards individual 
subcontractors and is more tolerant of some suppliers than others. In some cases the car 
manufacturer has tolerated alternative interpretations of Western practices and has given 
its suppliers an opportunity to negotiate the differences between the rationality of global 
sourcing and their respective action frameworks. The second possible explanation of the 
discrepancy is that the Czech managers have simply resisted the meanings of market and 
internationalization advocated by VW. They have preserved different views about the 
practices of subcontracting despite the strict rationality and uncompromising attitude of 
VW. This implies that local actors do not accept whole-heartedly the interpretation of 
Western practices presented to them and instead attempt to 'soften* them by looking for 
alternative interpretations and increasingly relying on other networks than those of 
§koda-VW. In reality, both these explanations seem to be correct and the simultaneity 
of both processes has been confirmed by the empirical findings.
Firstly, there seems to be some evidence that Skoda really does treat its suppliers 
differently. Often, as the following quotes show, it seems to be a consequence of a 
heritage of strong networks and personal bonds between managers of subcontracting 
firms and the people in the managerial positions in Skoda.
"The relations with Skoda are so good that we can say: "we need 'x' now..." And they will help us. On the 
other hand they might forget something and we help them by producing it overnight. These are the 
advantages o f being right next to each other [12 kilometres apart] and also o f the fact that our relationship
goes back many years." (interview with a manager of Metalpress, a company that used to be a branch
plant o f Skoda, 13.6.1997)
"We have the advantage in the form of contacts we have there [in Skoda], Today it is not enough to 
used to work as a production manager in Skoda before 1990, 5.6.1997)
"Contacts with Skoda were traditionally very close. Even personal because people knew each other from
a manager o f Airdoors, a company that used to be a branch plant o f Skoda, 13.5. 1997)
The fact that in each case the managers entered the post-Communist period with a 
slightly different network heritage and different quality of personal ties with Skoda had 
an important impact on the way the internationalization of Skoda transformed their own 
action frameworks. The quality and stability of these networks allowed local managers 
to mediate the meanings of internationalization presented by VW. Through personal 
interventions and interactions in these networks, the meanings of imported practices 
were translated by local managers and selectively combined and accommodated into 
their existing action frameworks. In this way, and despite the seeming uniformity of the 
criteria imposed by VW ,.elements of local action frameworks entered into the process of 
shaping a 'softer1 meaning of internationalization in these firms. The exceptional quality 
of their networks thus allowed some managers of local subcontractors to align their own 
interests with those of Skoda, and to enrol their partners in Skoda in a translated 
meaning of internationalization which allowed them to see it as a process bringing 
benefits to both sides. Nevertheless these translated meanings of internationalization did 
not usually involve the enrolment of other local actors, other local firms or members of 
local authorities. The process of adaptation to internationalization was thus limited to 
the managers of subcontracting firms themselves. Moreover, this process has not been 
universal amongst the local suppliers, but has been limited to a small number of them
which had good personal contacts in Skoda.
Secondly, some suppliers of Skoda seemed to have developed stable relations 
with other partners than Skoda-VW. These networks provided local managers with an 
alternative understanding of an acceptable practice and gave them scope for softening
the harsh criteria advocated by VW. This group of firms is quite heterogeneous and 
consists of two distinct subgroups.
On the one hand, there are the two suppliers mentioned previously as having 
opted for a 'Czech way' of restructuring without foreign partners. The management of 
these firms openly admitted to a negative experience with foreign investors and instead 
they expressed a strong appreciation for local networks. Interestingly, they are also the 
companies with the greatest degree of diversification of sales which are mostly directed 
to export markets. These firms are thus less dependent on Skoda as their main customer. 
Moreover, they are the companies with the largest locally-based R&D departments from 
the sample and.their managers seemed to have used their domestic and local networks to 
enrol other local firms, as well as research institutes, in the process of adaptation to 
internationalization. Through their networks they could mediate the meanings of 
Western practices imported through VW or other Western partners. These new 
international practices and networks were, in turn, more or less successfully integrated 
into the existing action frameworks of these firms as well as those of their Czech 
partners (interviews with managers of ASO and SAP). Subsequently, the managers of 
these-firms created an alternative understanding of internationalization which prevented 
them from accepting uncritically the practices advocated by VW.
On the other hand, the foreign automotive firms coming to the region as a part of 
the secondary internationalization also played an important role as a source of 
alternative interpretation of international practices. Quite often these foreign partners 
entered into cooperation with the local subcontractors of Skoda with expectations and 
understandings which diverged from those of VW. There is some evidence that a more 
open and trusting attitude gradually developed in the relations between these foreign 
firms and local managers. Although the management of local subcontractors usually 
lack the strong local networks of the Czech-owned suppliers, it seems to be the 
networks with their foreign partners through which the alternative meanings of Western 
capitalist practice were created (interviews in General Plastics, KOB Electric, Airdoors). 
The persistence of action frameworks incompatible with the interpretations officially
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advocated by Skoda-VW can then be explained by the specific character of relations 
with Western partners other than VW.
Most local managers of foreign-owned suppliers initially had a fairly restricted 
position in translating the meanings of internationalization. However, their interaction 
with Western partners was a dynamic process which developed over time (interviews in 
KOB Electric, Autobrakes, T-Plast) in a way not dissimilar to the learning process 
observed directly in the Skoda-VW by Dôrr and Kessel (1996). These authors explain 
that in the initial stage after the takeover of Skoda, German managers were highly 
sceptical and cautious to use any local routines, practices and informal networks.
Instead, they had the tendency to dictate to Skoda's employees their own accustomed 
ways of doing things. Later on, through a daily communication and interaction, most 
German managers started to appreciate the role of the locally-specific action 
frameworks. This recognition increased mutual understanding and eventually led to an 
adjustment of practices and an alignment of interests on both sides (Dôrr and Kessel,
1996,1997).
The next two quotes indicate that a similar process is under way among some of 
the local subcontractors of Skoda. Their foreign partners slowly came to realize the 
potential of the skills and practices of local managers, as well as the potential of 
networks they control within their enterprises and in other local firms.
"The Czech managers are slowly gaining a good name with foreign investors. And these days many o f  
them even work in the headquarters o f  big foreign firms." (interview with a manager o f  Autobrakes, 14.5. 
1997)
"The system o f  first rank suppliers [o f Skoda] is still being built up. And so the [foreign] firms start to 
establish themselves locally because so far they have been largely supplying from abroad. [...] And now 
also these firms that came here start to build up their technological and design background locally to make 
sure that they are not just assembly plants; that they are capable to provide the customer [i.e. Skoda] with 
a complex service - from design and construction u f plans, production o f  tools and equipment, supply o f  
samples and everything leading to mass production." (interview B with a manager o f  T-Plast, 5.6. 1997)
Some of the managers of local automotive firms thus apparently persuaded their foreign 
partners about the usefulness of their networked heritage and action frameworks. Or, 
from the other side, the foreign partners discovered and appreciated the potential of 
local skills, networks and ways of doing things to such an extent that they started to shift 
some of their core activities from the West to the region of Mladâ Boleslav to support 
their production facilities there (interview B with a manager of T-Plast). The existence
of this phenomena suggests that the local managers together with their foreign partners 
started to look for ways of adjusting their differences which produced an alignment of 
their interests (Gallon, 1991) and an agreement on a mutually acceptable meaning of 
internationalization. The process of translation allowed local actors to retain elements of 
their old practices and networks, enrich them by the imported Western practices and 
networks and combine the two in an innovative way (interviews in KOB Electric, T- 
Plast, Autobrakes).
The Western partners subsequently provided local managers with an opportunity 
to avoid excessive dependence on Skoda through a diversification of sales (interviews in 
KOB Electric, General Plastics, Autôbrakes). Similar to the Czech-owned suppliers, the 
networks with foreign partners and the process of translation thus helped these firms to 
'soften' the competitive pressure from Skoda-VW by creating alternative meanings of 
internationalization. Moreover, the process of translation and the alignment of interests 
also enabled local firms to draw on the extensive networks of their new Western owners 
and use them as a source of new practices and technologies (interviews in T-Plast) or as 
a source of R&D (interviews in General Plastics and KOB Electric). Although at present 
these firms often lack extensive local networks and the process of their adaptation does 
not involve other local actors, the links with foreign partners alone might prove to be a 
sufficient basis for their future adaptation.
The two explanations of the discrepancy between the character of 
internationalization advocated by VW and its actual impact on the action frameworks of 
local automotive firms have an important common feature. The findings for both groups 
of firms suggest that VWs highly competitive ideal was softened by the process o f  
translation, thereby creating a subcontracting practice based on alternative meanings of 
internationalization. There are* however, also important differences in the way 
internationalization has been translated and mediated by managers of Skoda's 
subcontractors.
Firstly, there is a small group of Czech-owned firms that rely increasingly on 
contacts with other Czech as well as foreign firms. The use of diverse local and 
domestic networks has allowed them to mediate the meanings of internationalization,
spread them through their networks and enrol a great variety of actors in a 
reinterpretation of their action frameworks. These firms thus adapted themselves to the 
process of internationalization and enrolled diverse local and domestic actors in the 
process of that adaptation.
Secondly, there are foreign-owned local suppliers whose managers used either 
their good networks with Skoda or their networks with foreign partners (some used 
both) in a process of mediating the meaning of internationalization. The managers of 
these firms successfully enrolled either representatives of Skoda or their foreign partners 
in their translated meaning of Western practices. The immediate effect o f such a 
mediated form of internationalization was usually beneficial for the local firms. The 
processes of translation and enrolment enabled local managers to access and utilize a 
pool of practices, capabilities and resources of Western partners which sometimes 
resulted in innovative forms of action. However, the managers of these suppliers 
customarily had a neutral or even negative attitude towards local networks (interviews 
in General Plastics, Airdoors, Autobrakes). Since the Czech management of these firms 
simply did not need the support of local actors and networks for their own recognition, 
their attempts to translate the meanings of internationalization had a limited local 'reach' 
and typically involved enrolment of only a small number of local actors (usually just the 
local managers themselves and some of the more skilled designers and technicians).
Also, in this latter group the activities of managers resulted in a successful 
adaptation of their firms to the process of internationalization. For the most part, 
however, this adaptation has not stimulated diverse local responses which could have 
triggered locally-based innovations. Unlike the form of adaptation to 
internationalization described in the two Czech-owned suppliers of Skoda or in the case 
ofLanâkroun, this case represents an adaptation dependent largely on external networks. 
It is an adaptation more similar to that described by Smith and Ferenôikovâ (1998) in 
their study from central Slovakia where "foreign investment has not been the catalyst to 
the development of local production linkages" and its benefits have been restricted to "a 
small, core group of technicians" (p. 167). Such a form of adaptation is usually quick
and in the short term beneficial to the company, but it often represents a one-off 
adaptation which does not lead to a sustained and autonomous ability to innovate. .
Towards homogeneity: importing Western enclaves
So far it has been mentioned that there are two segments or groups of Skoda's suppliers 
which can be distinguished in the region of Mladâ Boleslav. In both the Czech-owned 
suppliers as well as in the foreign-owned ones their mangers tried to adjust the official 
practice advocated by VW and, in one way or another, translated the meanings of 
internationalization. However, the empirical work also discovered another segment of 
suppliers present in the area where much less positive developments have been 
observed.
Several subcontractors of Skoda accepted the 'dictate' of Skoda's competitive 
pressure at its face value, as they seemed to have focused simply on cost competition 
and the squeezing of labour costs. The local managers in these firms represent some sort 
of'transmitters' or 'distributors' of Western models o f management. Internationalization, 
in the case of these subcontractors, has usually meant an import of both technological 
equipment and organizational practices with little concern for the specific character of 
local action frameworks. This development can be described as a 'substitution' of one 
action framework by another whereby Western practices are imported without much 
effort to negotiate and mediate the differences between them and the existing, locally- 
specific ones. Such substitution typically makes suppliers very adaptive and flexible in 
the short term and has been quite successful in allowing them to meet the quality and 
price standards of Skoda-VW. However, these highly labour intensive firms produce 
goods in assembly plants with no local R&D at all and their only competitive advantage 
is low production costs .-Typically they also have very few effects on the locality beyond 
direct employment (interviews in UCJ and Supercable).
The uncritical import o f Western practices, the simplified understanding of the 
notion of market and market rationality, together with a low degree of respect for local 
networks characterize the action frameworks of people who manage these firms 
(interview in Supercable). These characteristics are then responsible for the virtual
absence of a mutual adjustment between local and Western actors. The opportunity to
use internationalization as a means for a mutual redefinition of actors' positions and a
reinterpretation of their systems of meaning (Gallon, 1991; Murdoch, 1995) is missed
because the local actors are largely ignored and not represented. The potential to create
new interpretative opportunities (Sabel, 1994) and develop locally-based sources of
innovation and competitiveness is therefore wasted. A classic example of this
problematic form of internationalization is summarized in the following quote:
"We produce whatever our customer department [in Germany] manage to get [i.e. which contracts they 
win]. We are entirely flexible. And it depends on them which o f  the customer orders are placed here. [...] 
This type o f production does not have any high demands on R&D [...] It is a matter o f  production costs, 
that is mainly o f  labour costs." (interview with a general manager o f Supercable, 28.5. 1997)
This quote suggests that this particular firm is in the position of a classic branch plant, 
without any autonomous decision-making powers and with only a limited ability to 
influence its future development. Such firms, although not very numerous in the sample, 
still comply with the form of internationalization advocated by VW. They deliver goods 
at low cost and in high quality, but they are likely to remain vulnerable if the economic 
circumstances were to change. As such they epitomize the problems of foreign 
investment that represent 'institutional clones' of Western firms recently criticized by 
Grabher (1994, 1997) or Swain (1994).
It would be wrong, however, to equate this form of internationalization with all 
foreign-owned suppliers o f Skoda. There is evidence that neither all greenfield foreign 
investment (interviews in KOB Electric and T-Plast), nor all foreign takeovers 
(interviews in General Plastics and Metalpress) necessarily fit into the category of a 
foreign branch plant stereotype. The empirical findings thus contradict any structural' 
explanation of the impact of internationalization based on either the forms of ownership 
or the type of investment. They confirm that it is the character of the cultural processes 
of translation and enrolment which decide the outcomes of internationalization; that is, 
the ways in which actors reinterpret the meanings of international practices and 
accommodate them into their action frameworks.
Summary of findings: towards a fragmentation of the region institutional set-up
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The effects of internationalization in the Mladâ Boleslav region have been very diverse. 
This diversity reflects differences in the networked social capital of local managers, 
especially their contacts with the management of Skoda, and the specific interactions of 
their social capital with the symbolic capital of Western investors. These interactions 
took the form of cultural processes of enrolment and translation which produced 
different, more or less mediated meanings of internationalization.
However, the process of internationalization was mediated by local actors 
largely independently of each other. The combined effect of a lack of communication 
between local automotive firms and the competitive pressure of VW which played them 
against one another resulted in their isolation and the seeming incompatibility of their 
respective action frameworks. The consequence of this isolation and a lack of alignment 
between diverse local action frameworks is a fragmented regional institutional set-up. In 
particular, the form of internationalization advocated by Skoda-VW had impeded the 
communication between different groups of actors and Skoda's inability or 
unwillingness to produce a perfect translation and enrol local firms in a shared 
interpretation of internationalization has split the regional economy into an isolated set 
of enterprises.
On one side, there is a small group of Czech-owned suppliers who diversified 
their networks by independent expansion abroad and decreased their dependence on 
Skoda. The managers of these firms rely on a diverse portfolio of networks with 
Western partners or customers which they use as a source of local recognition and an 
alternative meaning of internationalization. At the same time, they have also cultivated 
their local networks through which they have enrolled a substantial number of local 
firms and research institutions in the adaptation to internationalization. As such, the 
action frameworks-of these firms appear to represent an innovative and economically 
successful mixture of local and Western practices, networks and meanings.
Then there is the largest group of local suppliers who are foreign-owned and 
generally lack the rich heritage of locally-based networks. The management of these 
firms achieved an alignment of interests and understandings either in their relations with 
Skoda, or with their foreign owners. This, in turn, allowed them to mediate and translate
the meaning of internationalization. However, the process of translation mediated by 
these managers did not usually have a substantial local 'reach' and did not create a 
shared collective interpretation of Western practices among other local firms and actors. 
Nevertheless, this particular translation still seems to align the action frameworks of the 
local managers with those of their foreign partners and thus enables local firms to use 
the networks of their Western partners as a means of responding to change. This 
institutional arrangement may become a source of competitiveness for the automotive 
suppliers in the Mladâ Boleslav region, even though they do not have a strong 
attachment to their locality. However, the lack of enrolment of other local actors 
suggests that these firms will not be able to sustain the production of new interpretative 
possibilities (Sabel, 1993,1994) in the long term. These firms might therefore be 
competitive and able to adjust to change thanks to their international networks, but they 
are less likely to become independent and innovative international players (Grabber,
1994,1997).
Finally, there is also a relatively small segment of local suppliers that come very 
close in their character to the institutional 'clones' of Western automotive branch plants 
rightly criticized by Grabher (1994). These suppliers simply transplanted Western 
practices, technology and organizational principles to a local context and removed the 
existing ones. Such firms compete successfully at present, but their future seems largely 
dependent on the low cost of local labour as their main competitive advantage. Their 
system of rigid and imposed practices is entirely dependent on their Western owners and 
is unlikely to adapt independently to alternative practices in the future.
The process of internationalization thus brought a great variety of new, 
international networks and practices, meanings and understandings m the region of 
Mladâ Boleslav. However, the process of adaptation to and accommodation of such 
meanings and practices has not been particularly inclusive and has not been translated 
locally into a shared system of meanings. Instead, the process of internationalization in 
this region resulted in a highly diverse, but not very well integrated,/ragmenW 
institutional set-up. It produced a juxtaposition but not an integration or an alignment of 
the diverse action frameworks present in the region. As such, the regional economy of
Mladâ Boleslav is characterized predominantly by isolatèd pockets of adaptive, 
internationally connected, but not very innovative firms.
CONCLUSION: ADAPTABLE OR ADAPTIVE REGION?
The takeover of Skoda by the German car manufacturer Volkswagen had a series of 
very important consequences for the whole region of Mladâ Boleslav. It triggered a 
major wave of secondary internationalization as many other Western automotive firms 
started to flock into the area and looked for potential partners among local suppliers of 
Skoda. VWs investment thus secured the continued production of the technologically 
advanced products in Skoda and made negotiations of local suppliers with foreign 
investors easier. This development was also responsible for the exceptionally low levels 
of unemployment in and around Mladâ Boleslav. So far, these effects have been 
observed as positive and generally in line with the aim of the Czechoslovak Government 
to use the sale of Skoda as a tool for reinvigorating the local automotive industry (2âk, 
1997; Cook, 1998; Martin, 1998).
Under closer inspection, however, the impact of internationalization on the 
action frameworks of local actors looks much more ambiguous. In this chapter, it has 
been demonstrated that the relative ease with which the managers of local 
subcontractors of Skoda attracted Western partners and gained legitimation of their 
positions was also one of the reasons why these managers often lost interest in local 
networks. Furthermore, the method of global and forward sourcing applied by VW to its 
suppliers restricted communication among local firms and exacerbated their isolation 
from local networks. The process of internationalization thus produced a fragmented 
regional institutional set-up.
This institutional set-up is characterized by a great diversity of action 
frameworks. In some cases there are worrying indications of institutional 'cloning' 
(Grabber, 1994, p. 177). Through this strategy foreign investors are trying to increase 
the competitiveness of local automotive firms by simply replacing existing practices and 
networks with imported Western ones. In other cases, a few Czech-owned firms
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combined elements of their own action frameworks with the process of 
internationalization in a complementary and innovative way that seems to go a good 
way towards them developing into independent, internationally competitive players.
However, neither institutional cloning nor the successful internationalization of 
locally-owned firms present the dominant type of internationalization in this region. The 
greater part of Skoda's suppliers are foreign-owned companies in which the activities of 
local managers produced a degree of alignment of their interests and those of their 
foreign partners or/and of Skoda. These 'softened' the original form of 
internationalization advocated by VW and enabled the local managers to translate the 
meanings of internationalization. Nevertheless, such activities remained largely 
restricted to the boundaries of individual companies and the process of adaptation has 
been restricted to negotiation and the mutual adjustment of practices between a small 
group of local managers on the one side and their Western partners and representatives 
of Skoda-VW on the other. In other words, the process of translation has had limited 
'reach' within the locality and resulted in a one-off adaptation which failed to enrol a
diverse range of other local actors.
The process of internationalization thus made the adaptability of most local 
companies dependent on a limited number of mostly external networks. These provide 
access to strategic information or sources of Western R&D and might secure a sufficient 
inflow of alternative practices essential for future adaptation and competitiveness. Such 
an arrangement together with the high skills and levels of qualifications, as well as the 
low labour costs, thus make the short term competitive prospects for most local 
automotive companies look good. The problem is that their adaptability and 
competitiveness are dependent on an inflow of practices and meanings through external 
networks over which the local actors have only a limited control. This is caused by the 
isolation of local actors and firms from each other; by the fragmentation of a regional 
institutional set-up which reduces the ability of local actors to use novel practices and 
meanings for the locally-based collective reinterpretation of their action frameworks. 
The present situation is at least partly a product of the Skoda-VW's attitude which 
apparently wants to keep its local subcontractors as a flexible source of cheap supplies
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and prevents them from communicating with each other. The fierce competition 
advocated by VW then makes an alignment of interests among local actors difficult and
unlikely.
The regional set-up of Mladâ Boleslav consists of a great diversity of action 
frameworks with a variety of networks, practices and meanings. However, its 
fragmented character prevents local actors from drawing freely on this institutional 
diversity and from creating independently new, innovative interpretative possibilities 
(Sabel, 1994; Amin and Hausner, 1997; Grabber and Stark, 1997b). The automotive 
region of Mladâ Boleslav thus seems to be more adaptive than adaptable (Grabber, 
1993b, c, 1997). Local actors are able to access diverse international networks through 
which alternative practices and meanings can be mobilized and used as a means of 
adaptation, but the region is unable to hold down' the process of internationalization 
(Amin and Thrift, 1994b) because its fragmented set-up reduces the potential for 
locally-based innovativeness and long term adaptability.
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE REGION OF ROZNOV: 
THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL MEDIATORS FOR 
REGIONAL ADAPTABILITY
INTRODUCTION
The last case study takes us to the small region of Roinov pod RadhoStëm in Eastern 
Moravia. The present chapter focuses upon a regional economy which, unlike the two 
previous ones, underwent a deep economic crisis in the first half of the 1990s. It 
documents the privatization and the economic collapse of the dominant local employer 
Tesla Roinov, and its break up into 15 independent firms. The focus of empirical 
research, however, is not on all the 15. Rather, the chapter concentrates on two major 
groups of firms referred to here as the 'successors' of Tesla Roinov. Each of the groups 
pursued one of the two major manufacturing programmes of Tesla Roinov: the 
production of semiconductors (silicon wafers, chips and integrated circuits) and the 
production of vacuum components (mainly TV tubes and TV sets). Although all the 
firms in these two groups have their origins in the former Tesla Roinov, they 
nevertheless represent a diversity of transformation paths, in particular by virtue of the 
fact that the process of internationalization played very different roles in each of them. 
The results of their transformation range from a successful internationalization through 
foreign takeover to independent internationalization of locally-owned firms and from a 
successful expansion to the mere survival of some firms and the bankruptcy of others. 
The differentiated impact of internationalization on individual firms within one region, 
therefore, makes the Roznov case study a particularly interesting object for analysis.
The aim of the chapter is to explain how the process of internationalization has 
been mediated and its meanings translated by individual actors and to demonstrate that
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the differences in the character of local mediation can produce institutional 
arrangements with a highly varied degree of adaptability. Moreover, the case study also 
shows that internationalization may create diverse prospects for the adaptability of local 
firms, despite the relative homogeneity of their initial conditions. The example of
Roinov thus demonstrates that in the volatile environment of post-Communism, the 
ability (or inability) to mediate the meaning of internationalization through the 
processes of enrolment and translation can be a matter of survival or death for some 
industrial enterprises and perhaps even for whole regional economies.
The first sections of the chapter chart the history of Tesla Roinov and its 
important role in the industrialization of this peripheral part of the Czech Republic.
Then they describe the complex privatization and break up of Tesla Roinov and set the 
scene for the analysis of the key electronics subsectors that survived the death of Tesla 
Roinov - the semiconductor and the vacuum components. The following two sections 
analyze the processes which transformed the forms of embeddedness o f Tesla's 
'successors' during the regional economic crisis of the early 1990s. The diversity of 
attitudes towards and understandings of the process of internationalization among local 
managers is analyzed in terms of interactions between the managers' networked social 
capital and the different forms of symbolic capital. The last two sections of the chapter 
look in more detail at how the process of internationalization has affected and 
transformed the action frameworks of local managers in the two major groups of Tesla's 
'successors'. They analyze the ways in which the process of internationalization was 
translated locally into a system of meanings and practices specific to each of the groups 
of Tesla's successors. It is explained here how the actions of individual managers 
transformed the local institutional set-up and created diverse preconditions for the long 
term adaptability of their firms. The chapter concludes by assessing the prospects for the 
future adaptability and competitiveness of the whole regional economy of Roinov.
FROM RURAL PERIPHERY TO A HIGH-TECH REGION AND BACK?
i
History of Communist industrialization in Roinov
The town of Roinov pod Radhostëm is located in Eastern Moravia in the region called 
Wallachia (see figure 6). This part of the country adjacent to the Slovak border is 
located in what has traditionally been the most peripheral part o f  the Czech Republic.
Approximate labour markets of 
the three regions
VZ  h l a d A
BOLESLAV
PR A H A LANSKROU
ROZNOV
0 Kilometres
TEROSIL
SBteon chips and wafers 
TE6LÀ SEZAM USA^zoch Republic
Integrated drcuHs 250 employees TVC
USArCzech Republic 
700 employees
TV tubes 
(Bancrupt)
NOW  JICIN
FRYDEK-MISTEK
German-Czech Republic 
100 employees
VSET1N
TV tubes 
Czech Republic 
TOO employees
RAD1QN
electronic m ^ te f e ^ ^ Tsnf
Key to  text labels 
COMPANY
Manufactured goods 
Country of ownership 
Number of employees Mld-1997 0 Kilometres1
Figure 6: Local labour market of ‘successors’ of 
Tesla Roznov
Pastoralism, subsistence farming and later on a basic tourist industry were the main 
economic activities in the area long into the twentieth century. Until World War II, 
Wallachia was one of the poorest and least industrialized regions in the Czech part of 
Czechoslovakia, characterized by high rates of birth, unemployment and emigration.
This was also one of the reasons why the Communist regime, with its stress on equality 
and levelling of regional differences, decided to 'stabilize' the local population by 
providing new local jobs in the industry. In 1949, the greenfield investment project of an 
electrical engineering plant called Tesla began in the small town of Roinov, right in the 
mj/Wl» of a mountain valley, among the pastures and smallholdings of Wallachian
farmers.
The Communist policy of industrialization was relatively successful in the case 
of this rural periphery. The attractive natural surroundings and possibilities of gening a 
flat in the newly built housing estate brought many technical graduates from Prague and 
other cities to Roinov (interviews in Terosil). Also many graduates of the newly 
established Roinov electro-engineering secondary school who left to study electronics 
and other technical disciplines at universities elsewhere were returning to the town and 
found jobs in Tesla. As one of the interviewees (who himself joined Tesla as a young 
recruit in its early days) commented on that period:
former general manager o f Terosil, 23.5. 1997)
The company traditionally enjoyed very good relations with the Czechoslovak Ministry 
of Electrical Engineering as several people who initially helped to set up Tesla Roinov 
later progressed up to high ministerial ranks (interview with a former general manager 
of Terosil). Largely thanks to these contacts, and partly also due to its central location in 
the former Czechoslovakia, the management of Tesla lobbied successfully for the 
location of a major electronics investment project in Roznov in the 1970s.
■ This was another major breakthrough in the history of Tesla Roinov and the 
whole region. A massive investment project was launched with the aim to create the 
most advanced and high-tech electronics enterprise in the country. The two strategic 
production programmes were semiconductors and vacuum components. Heavy spending
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on R&D made Roinov a location with a truly high-tech status in the former 
Czechoslovakia. The industrial investment was, according to the logic o f  Communist 
planning, accompanied also by the construction of a large new housing estate which 
increased the number of Roinov's inhabitants by nearly 70 per cent between 1970 and 
1990 to its present level o f  18,000 people. In the 1980s, Tesla Roznov was at its highest 
point in terms of size as well as economic and political power. The enterprise employed 
at different times between 8,500 to 10,000 employees (different interviews) many of 
whom were commuting daily from the villages in the mountain valley and even from the 
adjacent parts of Slovakia. The town and the whole region became almost totally 
dependent on the developments in Tesla. The managers of Tesla - unlike the fairly 
powerless local council - were able to mobilize enormous resources at the national level 
for the benefit of the locality (comp. Illner, 1992a) and had the networks as well as the 
power to transform the town and its surroundings. This was the time when "Roinov was 
just another word for Tesla" (interview with former general manager of Terosil, 23.5.
1997).
The power of Tesla Roinov was not restricted only to its immediate region. It 
also controlled several branch plants around the country. Even more important was the 
fact that in the early 1980s, in connection with the huge investment project, the 
company was chosen as the headquarters ofVHJ Tesla Roinov, a conglomerate of Tesla 
Roinov and another four Czechoslovak electronics enterprises (including among others 
also Tesla Lanâkroun). The VHJ together employed some 36,000 people and was 
responsible for the whole electronics industry in the former Czechoslovakia. Tesla 
Roinov thus became one of the most important and powerful enterprises in the country
and, indeed, in the whole of the Communiât block.
As was typical of large industrial enterprises in the Communist times the 
production programme of Tesla Roinov was very wide indeed. The portfolio of 
activities ranged from production of semiconductor materials, semiconductor 
components (mainly integrated circuits) and vacuum components, to electronic 
equipment for industrial control, equipment for medical and scientific purposes, 
measuring and testing equipment, design and production of specialized machinery for its
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diverse production lines and a few smaller specialized activities. All of these products 
were supported by a massive R&D base.49
The company, like many similar enterprises of Communist times, comprised 
numerous departments with diverse activities. Apart from those activities directly 
related to its highly diverse production programme, Tesla was also involved in a large 
number of activities which in Western firms would be subcontracted.50 This was a 
widespread strategy intended to provide for a maximum self-sufficiency and to smooth 
the production process (see e.g. Pickles, 1998; Smith and Swain, 1998).
On the other hand, Tesla did not have a sales department as it was not producing 
any consumer goods and the majority of its products were delivered according to 
production plans as inputs to other electronics industry enterprises, either in 
Czechoslovakia or in other COMECON countries. The little that was produced over the 
planned quotas of deliveries to other industrial companies, was exported to the non- 
Communist markets through a state-owned foreign trade company Kovo. Tesla thus had 
very little control over its sales networks and, according to several interviewees, often 
did not know the customers to whom their products were sold.
At the end of the 1980s, Tesla Roinov ended up with massive debts of 2 billion 
Kô (about 40 million pounds) from its ambitious investment projects. The company 
was supposed to pay off the debts from its future profits realized on the domestic and 
COMECON markets. These plans, however, were interrupted by the anti-Communist 
coup of 1989 which changed the political system as well as undermined the privileged 
position of Tesla within the system of central planning.
49The R&D department o f  Tesla Roinov employed some 1,600 people and was one o f  the largest among 
industrial companies in Czechoslovakia. The legacy o f  this is reflected in the fact that even today there are 
3 per cent more university graduates in the population o f  R oinov than is the Czech national average 
(Local council o f  Roinov pod RadhoStêm, 1998). Although the size o f  Tesla's R&D department is 
certainly impressive; some interviewees expressed scepticism about its effectiveness saying that 1,000 o f  
the 1,600 employees were actually not doing anything (interview with general manager o f  Tesla Sezam).
50These included the production and trade in chemicals and technical gases used in the production o f  
semiconductors, the recycling and processing o f  precious metals used in some o f  its production processes, 
or the production and distribution o f  heat, water, gas and electricity with which Tesla also supplied the 
whole town o f  Roinov. Furthermore, Tesla was also an owner o f  a local secondary school specialized in 
electronics, o f  a kindergarten, a local stadium and several hotels. It had its own transport department, its 
catering department, and also a construction department which built and maintained much o f  the Roinov  
housing estate constructed in the 1980s.
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Collapse, disintegration and privatization of Tesla Roinov
The economic collapse of Tesla Roznov that followed shortly after 1989 was faster than 
in most other industrial enterprises. In fact, Tesla Roinov experienced a sequence of 
shocks that hit the company one after another. The first shock came in the form of a 
collapse of the Eastern European markets. By 1992, both Soviet and East German firms 
which represented the largest foreign customers of Tesla Roinov either ceased to exist 
(former GDR) or stopped paying for the deliveries (former USSR). This was particularly 
bad news for the semiconductor department of Tesla which supplied over a half of its 
production to foreign markets (interviews in Tesla Sezam and Terosil).
The second shock occurred almost immediately after the first one: the opening of 
tire Czechoslovakian market to Western goods in 1990-91 very soon revealed that the 
massive investments in Tesla Roinov were sunk into technological equipment that was 
only capable of'competition' in the shielded markets of Communist countries. Tesla 
with its somewhat dated products found it very hard to compete with highly competitive 
Western firms. This was especially acute in the area of consumer electronics, 
particularly in the production of TV sets. Although Tesla Roinov itself did not produce 
TV sets, its vacuum components department was nonetheless largely dependent on sales 
to the Slovak TV manufacturer Tesla Grava. Before 1990 the domestic demand for TV 
sets from Tesla Grava, and consequently also for Tesla Roinov's supplies of 
components, surpassed supply and people had to wait several months to buy a TV. 
However, in the early 1990s the TVs produced by Tesla Grava were becoming hard to 
sell and Tesla Roinov was forced to reduce its output of TV components (interviews in
TVC and TPT).
As the situation worsened, Tesla Roinov ran into serious problems and had to 
stop several of its key productions. This situation was common in many other parts of 
Czechoslovakia. The worrying aspect was that both the key production specialities of 
Tesla Roinov ran into trouble so suddenly and almost simultaneously. Additionally, 
there was the enormous debt that Tesla was supposed to pay off. To make matters even 
worse, the sheer size of Tesla had became a huge social problem in an area with very 
few alternative employment opportunities. Roinov suddenly turned into problem region
number one in the Czech Republic with record unemployment rates (OECD-CCET,
1996). Between the years 1990 and 1991, when elsewhere in the Czech Republic 
unemployment was still a rare occurrence, the number of redundancies in Tesla reached 
about 2,400 in a town that previously provided around 12,000 jobs (Okres Vsetin,
1994). By 1992 the number of Tesla's employees dropped to some 5,000, just about a 
half of the previous level and, according to one of the interviewees, the number of 
unemployed in the region reached nearly 6,000 (interview with general manager of 
Terosil). At the same time, the future of the remaining jobs in Tesla was highly insecure 
and several thousand more were threatened with job losses. Such was the situation at the 
beginning of privatization which itself spelled the end to Tesla Roinov.
Rather surprisingly the attitude of the Czechoslovak Government was not 
helpful at all. The poSt-Communist Government of Czechoslovakia was mainly 
interested in breaking the strong ties between large enterprises and the sectoral 
ministries. Since several ministers of the Government at that time deemed the 
electronics industry as a whole unreformable and uncompetitive with Western products, 
they refused to grant the manufacturers in this sector any protection or help. On the 
contrary "the electronics industry was labelled as 'class enemy' number one." (interview 
with general manager of Tesla Sezam, 6.5. 1997) and the Government decided to 
liberalize foreign trade immediately thus enormously increasing competition on the
domestic market (interviews).
Reflecting on this period most managers were quite bitter as this quote shows
quite clearly:
"The Government declared: "the electronics industry will not be needed any longer". They argued that the 
industry did not have any perspective, that it did not have a good standard anyway. And they simply 
ceased to support the industry completely and sacrificed it all." (interview with former general manager of 
Terosil, 23.5. 1997)
The attitude of the post-Communist Government entirely undermined the power of the 
management of Tesla Roznov which was built around its strong networks with the 
governmental bodies of the previous regime. The post-1989 economic transformation 
also revealed another problem: Tesla Roinov entirely lacked its own sales networks and 
hflH no experience in selling and marketing its products whereas these suddenly
appeared to be a much more important source of power. However, the old management 
of Tesla Roinov initially seemed not to understand this. Their attitude was split between 
a mixture of pride for local achievement and the fear of the huge responsibility for the 
local community that prevented management from a radical action. This group of old 
managers perceived the size of their enterprise as a major source of bargaining power 
and they did not want to be seen as those responsible for its disintegration. This 
thinking, as the following quote confirms, largely determined the transformation 
strategy in the early years of post-Communism:
"The management at the revolutionary times [i.e. immediately after the events o f  1989] had a vision that 
they will be able to put the whole enterprise in order again. But then they realized that it was really 
impossible to walk against the wind... They had the idea that at least their name will not be associated with 
a liquidation o f  this enterprise that has been here for 35 years. But it was an entirely foolish idea. So then 
they thought that as long as the whole disintegration can be coordinated from above [i.e. by the top 
management] the enterprise would not be liquidated and they would be able to run away from it without 
taking any responsibility." (interview with general manager o f  Tesla Sezam, 6.5. 1997)
As this effort proved futile the majority of managers accepted that the company could 
not be reformed at its present size. What followed was a rather chaotic break up of the 
enterprise. Changes in the top management became a common place, often under 
pressure from the powerful trade unions, the enterprise lost leadership, several new 
companies broke away from Tesla in an attempt to go private but later merged with 
Tesla again (interviews).
Finally, in May 1992 after long negotiation Tesla Roznov ceased to exist and 
was split into fifteen new companies, the 'successors' or 'posthumous children' of Tesla 
as they are commonly referred to by the local people. Out of the fifteen new firms there 
were nine limited liability companies with a small size of inherited property (under 50 
million Kô of inherited assets, i.e. just under 1 million pounds).51 The major part of the 
Tesla's property, however, was transferred into six joint stock companies only three of 
which were actually.manufacturing firms.52 The three manufacturing joint stock firms
5'Two o f  them produce specialized machinery used in the manufacturing o f  electronic components, two 
others produce chemicals, two specialized in the production o f  medical and measuring equipment, one in 
construction, and two remaining limited liability companies were from the beginning intended for 
liquidation as the 'dust bin' companies with some o f  the Tesla's debts and with the property that was 
impossible to sell (Okres Vsetin, 1994; Tesla Sezam, undated;, database o f Ministry o f  Justice).
520u t o f  the three remaining non-manufacturing joint stock firms one acquired the property o f  Tesla 
related to its service industries - catering, hotels, transport. Another one privatized the energy, heat, water 
and gas network o f  Tesla, and the last one privatized the department o f  construction and construction 
design (Okres Vsetin, 1994; Tesla Sezam, undated; database o f  Ministry o f  Justice).
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inherited the crucial parts of the Tesla's production programme which the top 
management thought capable of independent existence. These were the production of 
vacuum components (mainly TV tubes), which was transferred to a company called 
Tesla Vacuum Components (TVC), and the production of semiconductor technology 
which was split between semiconductor materials (silicon wafers in Terosil) and 
semiconductor components (mainly integrated circuits produced by Tesla Sezam).
The firms with limited liability were generally much smaller units (at the time of 
their establishment they employed together some 1,500 employees) and were privatized 
by direct sales for cash. The much larger joint stock firms (in 1992 the six companies 
together inherited some 5,000 Tesla's employees) were far too expensive for any 
individual to buy and therefore were set aside for the voucher privatization programme.
It was also these companies that took over the largest part of the debts of Tesla Roipov 
because the debt was split according to the book value of the 'inherited property 
(interviews; Okres Vsetin, 1994; Hoppenstedt Bonnier, 1996,1997).
Given the serious problems and bleak prospects for Tesla many qualified people 
started to leave the company during this stage. Most of them established their own 
businesses, often based on the skills and abilities they acquired in Tesla such as small 
firms of locksmiths, bricklayers and so on. Quite a few also established small 
electronics firms with specialized production, usually with just a handful of employees 
and with links to one or several bigger 'successors' of Tesla. However, in 1992 when 
Tesla was breaking up, these firms had only a limited capacity to absorb the redundant 
workers. The major part of the population of Roinov region was thus dependent on the 
future of the three large manufacturing joint stock companies that, at the time, employed
together some 4,000 local people.
The developments in the three electronics joint stock companies will be the 
primary concern of the rest of this chapter. First, because they represent the continuation 
of the major electronics production programmes of Tesla Roinov, and second, because 
they also 'inherited' the bulk of the employees of Tesla Roinov. The transformations of 
these three new companies therefore became decisive for the future of the Roinov 
region and for the majority of its inhabitants. The small 'successors' of Tesla will only be
mentioned and referred to as long as their networks and activities are related to the 
transformation of action frameworks and the restructuring of the network heritage of the 
three major manufacturing joint stock companies.
The split of Tesla Roinov introduced a whole new set of actors - the new owners 
and managers of the Tesla's 'successors'. These were mostly local people who often 
worked previously in the lower managerial ranks of Tesla or as its designers and 
technicians. Despite their common past, however, their understandings and 
interpretations of the new economic situation differed substantially. The different 
understanding of individual new managers were reflected in their different strategies of 
securing symbolic capital and recognition. Some of the new managers were now much 
more in favour of international contacts than the old management of Tesla, which had 
hoped for a state intervention and a revival of the Eastern markets. Some managers in 
Roznov even saw Western partners and investors as the only way of survival for their 
companies. Yet others still decided to rely on networks with state bodies and traditional 
customers. Also, the attitudes towards the heritage of local networks in Roinov differed 
substantially among managers of the successors' of Tesla.
The following sections analyze the divergent restructuring paths of the two 
major groups of electronics manufacturers in Roinov. They seek to explain their diverse 
experiences with the process of internationalization and the transformation of local 
action frameworks as the outcome of interactions between the networked social capital 
of the new managers and different forms of symbolic capital and recognition.
SOCIAL AND SYMBOLIC CAPITAL: DIVERSITY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 
AND ATTEMPTS AT INTERNATIONALIZATION
The results of the voucher privatization were quite unfortunate for the three largest. 
manufacturing 'successors' of Tesla because none of them found a new owner that 
would give them a strong corporate governance. In none of them did privatization bring 
a majority owner with a strategic vision. In TVC, some 60 per cent of shares were 
distributed among 65,000 individual shareholders, 10 per cent to investment funds
(IPFs), while another 30 per cent remained unsold in the possession of the state-owned 
National Property Fund (NPF). Similarly, in the semiconductor firms, the ownership 
was very ambiguous. In the case of Terosil only 7 per cent of shares were sold to 
individual owners and 3 per cent to IPFs. The remaining 90 per cent stayed in the hands 
of the NPF because the demand did not meet with the supply in the distribution 
mechanism of voucher privatization. Also, in Tesla Sezam only 51 per cent of shares 
were distributed to individual shareholders while the rest remained unsold in the hands 
of the state (interviews in TVC, Tesla Sezam and Terosil). Since the NPF did not have 
the capacity to manage the hundreds of companies which remained under its 
administration, the de facto control and decision making powers were left to the 
managers of the three companies.
Semiconductor firms in Roinov: internationalization as a way out of a crisis
In the case of the two semiconductor firms and especially in the case of Tesla Sezam the 
freedom given to management was almost unlimited. Their old technology was 
considered uncompetitive and the old networks so useless that nobody was actually 
interested in taking on the responsibility for the ailing company. This was perhaps not 
surprising given the huge size of debts tied to the outdated technology that the 
'successors' had inherited from Tesla Roinov. The present general manager of Tesla 
Sezam described the situation in this way:
"The management that took over the responsibility for the company [i.e. including the interviewee 
himself] was virtue out o f a trouble [meaning there was no benefit o f becoming a manager at that point]. I 
have always declared this and I am not ashamed o f th a t Because we just didn't know what to do with it! 
Everyone could see that the company was dying by à slow death, the markets were disappearing, nobody 
had any idea what we could do about it, nobody wanted to take the risk. And nobody had their own money 
that they could invest into such a venture. [...] At the beginning o f privatization we had a debt o f 300 
m i l l i o n  KÔ [6 million pounds], with a pile o f liabilities, an enormous quantity o f inventories that no one 
would buy and lots o f property that was o f no use at all. In other words, with totally nonsensical assets."
(6.5. 1997)
Given these circumstances, and also because the management quite openly and publicly 
explained the situation, most employees were ready to tolerate harsh restructuring 
measures that followed shortly afterwards:
"After the privatization I immediately made all the employees redundant. At the same time, however, 1 
told them that those who were willing to look for a way out o f the trouble would be accepted back. But for 
the time being all employees had to be made redundant in order to be entitled at least to a financial 
compensation. So within two months we shrunk from 1,600 to 300 employees. And surprisingly, no one
killed me as you can see (laugh). But seriously, the situation was so dramatic that people realized there 
wasn't a solution to this. And [we started to look for a solution] with this small and well organized group 
of people; [people] who had at least the faintest idea and who believed that it wasn't possible, that we 
could not be so stupid when we had been producing this stuff here for so many years and had been doing 
it pretty well and knew how... That we simply have to find new outlets somewhere." (interview with the 
general manager o f Tesla Sezam, 6.5. 1997)
So despite the harsh restructuring measures introduced by the new management, their 
attitude of caring for the local community, together with a strong belief in the potential 
of local skills and abilities, did not disappear. In Terosil, a close ally and a subcontractor 
of Tesla Sezam, similar sentiments of caring were also apparent:
"Well, it seemed to us that an entry of foreign capital could speed up the whole process o f upgrading the 
production. Also another aspect played a role in this - some kind o f  social concern. The unemployment 
here was really high and should a foreign investor come here it would have been some sort o f guarantee of 
jobs, (interview with general manager o f Terosil, 5 .5 .1997)
With this motivation and attitude, both Terosil and Tesla Sezam started to look for new 
customers and potential foreign investors in the West. Terosil was initially more 
successful and established several subcontracting links with electronics manufacturers
. in Germany, Japan and the UK.
Tesla Sezam, on the other hand, encountered one failure after another in its 
negotiations with foreign investors and all its projects with different foreign partners ran 
into sand. Out of the 170 letters that were sent to different companies throughout the 
world none of the contacts materialized into a stable collaboration or export venture 
(Ekonom, 1998). In the meantime the company was living from casual sales of small 
amounts of integrated circuits to different domestic and foreign customers and slowly 
sinking under its enormous debts. However, even during this period of deepest crisis, 
the management of the two companies and, especially of Tesla Sezam, kept their old 
networks active and remained optimistic about the potential of local skills and expertise. 
In an effort to keep many options open, the managers of Tesla Sezam cultivated close 
contacts with other electronics firms, both local and elsewhere in the country. The 
company also continued to cooperate with several Czech research institutions and 
despite the lack of orders was still paying its best designers and R&D workers in order 
to preserve its innovative potential and its capacity to develop independently new 
products in the future (interview with general manager of Tesla Sezam).
During 1993, Terosil was still somehow muddling through and managed to sell 
just enough silicon wafers and chips to reduce its losses accumulated over the previous 
years. The debts of Tesla Sezam, on the other hand, were getting out of control and the 
only way to prevent it from bankruptcy was a debt-equity swap suggested by the 
company's management. The management eventually persuaded some of its main 
suppliers to take part in this financial operation while all the major banks refused to be 
involved. Finally, in the autumn of 1993, the efforts of the managers of the two 
companies were rewarded. At that time the general manager of Tesla Sezam established 
the first contacts with the American electronics company Motorola on behalf of both his 
company and Terosil. This contact proved decisive for the future of the two companies. 
However, according to the man who himself was central to these negotiations, the initial 
stage was very difficult indeed. The Americans had no idea at all about conditions in the 
post-Communist countries and it took quite a long time before a degree of mutual 
understanding was established.
"Motorola reacted to our requests by replying: "if you want something come over [i.e. to the USA] and 
show us." Completely unlike other partners who knew what the situation was like in Eastern Europe and 
knew how poor everyone was here, unable to travel to the other side o f the globe. But Motorola didn't 
know the conditions here at all. [...] So we eventually gathered the money somehow and travelled there.
We tried to show them all that has been done and achieved here so far, but they simply didn't believe us, 
they didn't think it possible. They thought we were just trying to fool them. Since that time it took another 
two years before we started to understand each other. And the frequency o f the visits o f Motorola people 
to Roinov started to increase.
[...]
They [Motorola] didn't believe that the technological quality here could be such, that we could have all 
this knowledge. However, very soon - and they are really good at discovering this - they realized that there 
is a know-how here [in Roinov] and that the local human potential is o f a very high standard. The 
organization o f production was, o f course, at the level o f ancient Rome and Greece. So they just hinted 
that if we expected anything from them we needed to change things and they also hinted a bit how we 
should do it. Later they came back again to have a look at what we had done about it. [...] After two years 
of testing what we can do with our empty hands and naked ass [i.e. with an old technology and no money] 
they decided that we had done enough to persuade them. So only then we got the first one month contract 
from them. Then a two month contract, then a three month, then half a year, then five years. And now we 
have a seven year contract with them with a condition that as long as we fulfil their requirements the 
contract will be automatically extended." (interview with general manager o f Tesla Sezam, 6.5. 1997)
One interviewee described the changes that followed the establishment of the stable 
relationship with Motorola as a fairy tale. And indeed, the economic data about Terosil 
and Tesla Sezam show an unprecedented turnaround. Even though in 1993 the two 
semiconductor companies from Roznov were able to supply integrated circuits three and 
half times cheaper than Motorola, by 1997 Tesla Sezam was able to further increase its 
productivity of labour 10 fold and reduce its production costs three, fold (interviews;
Czech Business and Trade, 1997). Profits started to sky-rocket and debts accumulated 
from the past disappeared. Thanks to the stable sales to Motorola the huge debts of 
Tesla Sezam were paid off by 1997. Also, Terosil, due to the increased sales, started to 
generate profits from 1994 and managed to pay off all its debts inherited from Tesla 
Roznov by 1997 (Tesla Sezam, 1998; annual reports of the companies).53 Moreover, 
Motorola also rented the local companies its own technological equipment which 
quickly improved the quality of products from Roznov. Both Terosil and Tesla Sezam 
were therefore soon certified for their quality by several major electronics producers 
throughout the world.
In no way was this turnaround a straightforward process. It took several years of
mutual search, redefinition and adjustment of positions, practices and expectations on
both sides. All the managers stressed the initial cautiousness and the length of the
testing period. All these complications, however were an essential part of the process of
search which eventually led to mutual adaptation, trust and understanding.
"All the procedures associated with it [the quality standards of Motorola] - through a myriad o f minor 
misunderstandings - we started to implement. First through controls every quarter o f a year, then monthly, 
today even weekly. And it really started to work! The profitability and yields jumped behind the levels we 
have even dreamt of. In Motorola [headquarters] they just stared at that. Today our assembly operations 
[...] are by far the most efficient in the whole network o f Motorola's assembly plants." (general manager of 
Tesla Sezam, 6.5. 1997)
With the help of the foreign partner, the two companies which were once 
struggling on the verge of bankruptcy suddenly became attractive partners for banks too. 
The simple fact that Motorola signed the contract for the supply of integrated circuits 
from Tesla Sezam gave the company's management an enormous symbolic power. Such 
an act of recognition by a major Western corporation immensely increased the symbolic 
value of the Rostov company and was a sufficient guarantee for a loan three times as 
high as its assets. This was clearly something absolutely unthinkable just a few years 
earlier.
53 At the time of the field work (June 1997) some 350 employees o f Tesla Sezam on one o f its several 
production lines alone were producing three times as many semiconductor components than the whole 
semiconductor department o f Tesla Roinov did with several thousand employees in the mid-1980s 
(interviews). >
Slowly, as the supplies to Motorola started to dominate the sales of both the .
Rofcnov semiconductor companies, the American partners lost their initial cautiousness.
In 1996, after long negotiations with the National Property Fund, Motorola decided to
take over controlling stakes in the two companies. The deal was finalized in spring 1997
(i.e. just weeks before my field work in Roznov). The managers of Terosil and Tesla
Sezam, however, did not expect any major changes in the mutual relationship after the
takeover. In the words of the general manager of Tesla Sezam:
"They [Motorola] didn't buy us. They just became the owners o f our stock in order to prevent any 
uncertainties, so that no one else can intervene. Otherwise all we do is not from the capital o f Motorola. It 
is our capital [meaning the capital accumulated from retained profits o f  Tesla Sezam], The crucial thing 
was to stabilize the ownership relations [of the two companies]. It is not meant to allow Motorola to live 
out o f  our dividends and yields. Motorola sees the advantage o f the relationship in the fact that there is a 
potential here that can be expanded, that we can produce at prices different from theirs [i.e. lower], and 
also, I think, in a quality that three years ago we had to leam. But today in many respects we are better 
than the ones who taught us how to achieve it." (6.5. 1997; original emphasis)
Similarly the general manager of Terosil was quite confident about the good intentions 
of their new owner:
"The new owner [Motorola] didn't buy us in order to profit on the value o f our shares but because they are 
our customer. [...] [Because] almost 50 per cent o f  our production goes to one o f  the firms controlled by 
Motorola." (5.5. 1997)
Altogether the contact with Motorola came at a critical time to rescue the two 
semiconductor firms from bankruptcy (certainly in the case of Tesla Sezam which 
already had a governmental proposal for its liquidation in its hands!). Despite a rather 
strong dependence on one dominant customer - and now also a new owner - the 
relationship does not seem to conform to the stereotype of a branch plant economy at 
all. The managers of the two companies used the contact with their American partners 
as a source of symbolic capital and recognition, as means of legitimizing their positions 
and also used the newly acquired symbolic power in negotiations with other Czech 
firms and banks. However, unlike in the cases described by Grabber (1994, 1997) or 
Smith and Pavlinek (1998), this process did not seem to have any major 'disembedding' 
effects on the local networks of the two companies.
The management of Tesla Sezam and Terosil have never abandoned their old 
networks and even during the periods of deepest crisis they preserved and kept active 
both their local and national networks. The social capital of these networks then acted as
means of securing local recogmtion and legitimation with which the managers backed 
up their attempts at internationalization and which confirmed their role as mediators of 
its meaning (Gallon, 1991,1998). Once the relationship with Motorola was established, 
the local managers were able to exploit their local recogmtion.
The established position of these managers in the local networks and their 
knowledge of local system of meanings and practices allowed them to mobilize local 
actors, their skills and abilities, which the foreign investor found attractive. The positive 
attitude of local managers towards the local networks thus allowed for an interaction 
between the symbolic capital of the Western partner and the networked social capital of 
other local actors too. Once the foreign investor discovered the local innovative 
potential, the managers were able to strengthen their positions vis-a-vis their American 
partners by stressing their role of gatekeepers who controlled the local networks and 
resources. However, before we start to analyze the process of translating the meanings 
of internationalization and its impact on regional adaptability, we will turn to the other 
major electronics plant in Roinov, the vacuum components manufacturer TVC.
Vacuum components: end of TVC and internationalization of its remnants
Tesla Vacuum Components (TVC) was the largest of Tesla Roinov's 'successors' in 
terms of employment. It inherited some 2,500 of its former employees as well as the 
largest chunk of its huge debt. Similar to the two semiconductor companies, the 
management of TVC was also left with a great degree of freedom in the decision 
making, although unlike the semiconductor division of Tesla, the vacuum technology 
division did not lose its main customer straight away. Its new management thus initially 
did not face such a hopeless situation requiring radical and immediate action.
Traditionally, the largest customer for vacuum components from RoZnov was a 
Slovak TV manufacturer Tesla Orava. The production of TVs in Tesla Orava after 1989 
failed to reach the capacity for which the plant was built, while TVC was only operating 
at one third of its capacity as a consequence of Tesla Orava's difficulties. Nevertheless 
this linlc provided TVC with some stability and continuity to its production and its new 
management was hoping for the revival of the domestic market and of Tesla Orava
(interviews in TVC and TPT). The problems in the Slovak TV manufacturer, however, 
were getting worse and in late 1992 the company almost ceased to produce. Although 
later the situation in Tesla Orava got slightly better, the Slovak manufacturer in the 
meantime decided to phase out the products for which TVC was subcontracting its TV 
tubes. Unfortunately, TVC was using a licensed technology which it was unable to adapt 
to the new requirements and Tesla Orava made it clear that TVC could not rely on them 
as a customer for much longer. To make matters worse, Czechoslovakia split at that 
time (1.1.1993) which made further subcontracting to Tesla Orava an export contract 
exposed to severe international competition and to higher risk because of foreign 
currency transactions.
On the positive side, the management of TVC succeeded to restructure part of its 
debt. Thanks to the reasonably good contacts of TVC’s management with some of the 
state-owned banks and parts of the state administration, the banks agreed to write-off 
some of its enormous debts which approached 1 billion Kô (some 20 million pounds, 
about twice as much as the assets and the yearly turnout of TVC). However, the TVC's 
management was unable to diversify their networks and secure any major customer or a 
stable flow of orders. One of the interviewees commented on the attitude of the 
management in the following way:
"They were accustomed to large orders from one, monopoly customer [i.e. Tesla Orava]. And suddenly 
that disappeared almost overnight. Well, and TVC was totally unprepared for this in terms o f their 
marketing abilities." (interview with the liquidator o f  TVC, 7.5. 1997).
The management tried to compensate for the lack of marketing ability and foreign 
contacts by cultivating their networks with the state-owned banks and extracting further 
credits. This, however, was not sufficient to provide them with recognition and 
legitimation in the new economic environment. The debts of TVC kept piling up and the 
economic criteria eventually triumphed over the political ones. In 1993 no bank was 
willing to provide them with any further loans and the suppliers of TVC stopped 
delivering because the company was insolvent. When TVC's local electricity supplier, 
another 'successor1 of Tesla Roznov, decided to cut off the supplies in the summer 1993 
TVC had to send its remaining 1,300 employees for an obligatory holiday (Prace, 18.5 
1993; Ôeskomoravskÿ profit, 21.10. 1993).
At this stage the management of TVC were already looking intensively for 
alternative outlets but with only limited success. All the contacts they established 
resulted in sales of only a limited number of goods that could not revive the whole 
company. Finally, the management of TVC came to a conclusion that the search for a 
m ajor foreign investor was useless because both the Western customers that TVC had 
some contacts with - Toshiba and Samsung - were uninterested in taking over the 
company (Hospodâfské noviny, 29.7. 1993).
TVC's management also hired a German management consultancy company. On 
their advice and in cooperation with its main sales partner - a Czech foreign trade 
company Tesimpex (name changed) - they put together a restructuring plan. The 
employees of Tesimpex were people who formerly worked in the state-owned foreign 
trade company Kovo which exported the products of Tesla Roinov to the Western 
markets. Tesimpex therefore seemed to have both good relations with the TVC's 
management in Roinov, as well as a good knowledge of the demands and opportunities 
of the Western markets.
According to the restructuring plan, three new companies were established at the 
break of 1993-94: TPT, TLT and TTV. The first two were established in cooperation 
with Tesimpex and these took over the bulk of the TVC's production programme (i.e. 
TV tubes), as well as some 1,100 of its former employees. Tesimpex took a 100 per cent 
stake in TPT and a minority stake in TLT which was controlled by the management of 
TVC. Moreover, Tesimpex as a trade company provided the marketing and sales 
networks while the real estate, the technological equipment, and licences were rented 
from TVC. The third company called TTV was established jointly by members of the 
top management of TVC and their German partners who also own a majority stake in 
this company. Its main activity is the assembly of TV sets from imported kits and their 
sale on the domestic market (interviews in TVC, TTV and TPT). TVC itself "turned 
from a manufacturing into a legal company and a company that manages real estate" 
(general manager of TVÇ quoted in Mladâ Fronta Ones, 31.8. 1995).
The main trick of the restructuring plan was that the three new firms lost any 
legal responsibility for the enormous debt of TVC. Once this transformation was
finished, TVC stopped paying for deliveries or meeting its outstanding debts, taxes and 
social insurance. Eventually, in 1994, six of its largest suppliers started a bankruptcy 
procedure against TVC which at the time of my field work was still underway.54 
According to the liquidator of TVC:
"The company had no ehanee of a survival. They were unable to find new markets. They looked for new 
owners and foreign investors but all came to nothing. Japanese and several others came here to look 
around but nobody wanted to buy it because o f the enormous debts. At the time o f the bankruptcy it was 
one and half billion KC! [roughly 30 million pounds]. And such a debt would hammer down any new 
owner. So when there was no other way out there was still the option o f stealing what was left o f the 
company, the remaining property. And in TVC it was only just starting to happen [when the bankruptcy 
procedure began]." (interview with the liquidator o f TVC, 7.5. 1997)
The management of TVC certainly had a bad start to their attempt at company 
restructuring and it is important to note that the conditions of competition vary between 
particular segments of the market. The production of vacuum television components in 
Eastern Europe is subject to enormous competition from the Western electronics giants. 
Compared to semiconductors it is a product with a more saturated market which makes 
it harder for a new entrant to succeed (interviews).
On the other hand, it seems that the management of TVC did not do all they 
could to save the company from bankruptcy. The opinion of another interviewee shows 
the role of the management of TVC in a highly negative light. Unlike the liquidator of 
TVC, who actually came to Roinov only at the beginning of the bankruptcy procedure, 
the interviewee quoted below owns a small company that also separated off from Tesla's 
vacuum technology department and has been in touch with TVC's management ever 
since the privatization of Tesla Roinov:
"I think it [the production o f vacuum components in TVC] had a pretty good standard there. They had a 
Japanese technology there which was bought under a licence at an immense cost [...] And this 
technological equipment was physically liquidated, broken down. It was all destroyed. Because they [the 
management of TVC] said: "We will bring a foreign company here and they will give us a new, much 
better technology instead;; [. ]^ TVC simply didn't care about anything. And that's why they didn't survive. 
I think that all depends on people. And they did have a chance to survive." (interview with an owner and 
manager of Radion, 6 J .  1997; original emphasis)
54The unfinished bankruptcy procedure is also the reason why the information in this section is based 
mostly on secondary data (mainly on newspaper articles). Another source o f information about TVC was 
an interview with its liquidator and with managers o f its 'successors'. At the time o f my field work the 
former managers o f the company were not present in Roinov any longer and the liquidator - for legal 
reasons - refused to give any information on their whereabouts.
A closer look at the restructuring of TVC thus gives a completely different picture from 
the two semiconductor firms. The management of TVC reduced substantially the 
diverse network heritage of the company as the new managers were not interested in 
contacts with local firms or actors (interview in Radion). They preferred instead the 
strong links with the big state-owned banks hoping that because of its size neither the 
government authorities nor the banks would let it go bust (interview with the liquidator 
of TVC). These networked relations improved the situation for some time, but they did 
not provide a long term solution and gradually weakened the financial position of the 
firm. Moreover, the unwise reduction of the company's local network heritage combined 
with the failure to diversify its networks and an early commitment to 
internationalization did not provide the management of TVC with sufficient recognition 
and legitimation in relation to local actors in Roinov, to other Czech companies, and 
also in relation to potential foreign partners. In other words, the networks based on 
contacts with the state bureaucracy alone were unable to provide a sufficiently credible 
source o f  symbolic recognition in the new economic environment Without such 
recognition, TVC's management remained largely isolated and too closely tied to a 
limited number of old networks which were unable to provide any radically new, 
innovative solutions.
The failure to secure local recognition was reflected in the fact that the best 
qualified employees of TVC started to leave at the first opportunity (interview with the 
manager of TPT). Also the fact that its domestic suppliers (but apparently not the 
banks!) lost faith in the future of the company and eventually started the bankruptcy 
procedure (interview with the liquidator of TVC) can be interpreted as a result of a loss 
of recognition and legitimation in the eyes of former trading partners.
At the local level, the lack of recognition was exacerbated by the failure to 
preserve or strengthen the existing web of local networks. The bad relations between 
TVC and other successors of Tesla were mentioned by several interviewees. In 
particular, the negotiations over the split of Tesla's debts in which TVC played a major 
role caused quite a lot of tension in the relations between TVC and other successor 
firms which blamed TVC for trying to transfer unfairly large portion of the debt to them
(interview with manager of Radion). This, together with serious financial difficulties in 
virtually all the 'successor* firms, led to a complete loss of a sense of common enterprise 
and many local actors lost interest in future cooperation. A manager of one of the small 
successors of Tesla attributed the deterioration of relations largely to the management of 
TVC when he remarked bitterly:
"Here, in this industrial area, we started to increase distance from each other. Everyone simply just minds 
their own business. But that's the circumstances that pushed us to that. And the inter-personal relations 
have really deteriorated a lot. It is like falling out with your brother!" (interview with manager o f Radion, 
6.5. 1997)
In this way the management of TVC lost control over the diverse networks in the region 
which could have been used as a basis for a symbolic recognition and a means of 
legitimizing their restructuring efforts locally. The enrolment of other actors than state- 
owned banks in their restructuring project could have potentially provided the TVC's 
managers with alternative interpretations of their difficult situation and innovative 
solutions to it, such as the debt-equity swap which Tesla Sezam arranged with its major 
suppliers. Instead, the attitude of TVC's managers resulted in the loss of any ability to 
mobilize the inherited networks of their company and a gradual withdrawal of support 
even from those local firms that were themselves initially keen on cooperation. The 
management of TVC thus remained largely isolated from local networks. Under such 
circumstances, even if TVC succeeded to attract a foreign partner, the process of 
internationalization would probably have resulted in an arrangement characteristic of the 
dependent, disembedded Western institutional 'clones' (Grabber, 1994, 1997; Sadler and 
Swain, 1994) without the ability to produce innovative forms of action locally.
The prospects improved marginally with the establishment of the three new 
companies. With the help of Tesimpex, both TPT and TLT established some export 
networks and TTV together with its new German-Czech owners managed to gain about 
12 per cent of the domestic market in TVs (interviews in TPT, TTV and TVC). These 
achievements and the modest profits these firms generated brought their managers some 
local recognition, or more accurately, local acceptance. Despite that, however, the 
legacy of TVC still persists in Roinov. The three vacuum technology firms that 
separated off from TVC inherited from their predecessor a very poor social and
symbolic capital, indeed: "a second rank, a second garniture of employees" (interview 
with production manager of TPT, 7.5 1997) and bad or non-existent relations with other 
local firms and bodies (interviews in Radion and TTV). For these firms there was little 
to build upon in terms of networked social capital which, in turn, made it harder for 
them to gain symbolic recognition in the e y e s  of foreign partners. Their position 
remained weak and vulnerable in relation to Western customers which, at present, is 
still reflected in the instability of their export networks. These networks lack completely 
the trust produced through mutual search, adjustment and the production of shared 
meanings which characterize the international networks of the two semiconductor firms.
The sales in these companies fluctuate widely and the employees have to cope
with irregular working hours according to the changes in the demands of the Western
customers. "We are trying to make our employees flexible" was the way the manager of
TTV (26. 5. 1997) described the fact that sometimes their company works only four
days a week because of these fluctuations. In other words, the three 'successors' of TVC
compete largely on the basis of a cheap local labour which seems to represent their only
substantial source o f power in relation to Western customers or partners. This was also,
rather reluctantly, confirmed by the production manager of TPT when he said:
"Our costs are rising all the time, especially due to inflation. And the costs o f  TVs go down all the time as 
well. We are as if  squeezed in a pair o f scissors. [...] And we can only succeed on the market thanks to the 
fact that we import and export [i.e. import components and export the whole TV tubes] and that we can 
deduce the import tariffs.[...] Otherwise on the domestic market our products would be totally 
uncompetitive. [...] We operate on the segment o f  market where there is a very tough price competition. 
The largest companies such as Philips or Panasonic started a battle for a redistribution o f  markets this 
year. And logically, this started by pushing the prices [of components] down as much as they can." 
(interview with production manager o f  TPT, 7.5. 1997)
The three successors of TVC simply buy components world-wide with the help of 
Tesimpex or the German partner respectively and use Roznov as a cheap assembly 
location. For the time being at least the activities of these three companies together 
employ more than one thousand local people who would otherwise be unemployed. The 
following sections will analyze the role of local managers in translating the meaning of 
internationalization and creating diverse preconditions for regional adaptability. They 
will thus try to answer how adaptable the Roznov companies are in the long term and 
how stable are the jobs they provide.
DIVERSE FORMS OF INTERNATIONALIZATION AND THE REGIONAL 
ADAPTABILITY
The process of internationalization affected to some extent all the electronics 
manufacturers in Roznov. The semiconductor firms Terosil and Tesla Sezam 
established a stable relationship with the American multinational Motorola, while the 
three vacuum component firms that separated off from TVC internationalized their 
networks with the help of a Czech foreign trade company (TPT and TLT) or o f their 
new German partner (TTV). Although the origin of all the successors of Tesla Roinov 
was the same, the character of internationalization varied in each of the cases. This was 
primarily because the concrete result of internationalization reflected the ways in which 
the local managers used their networked social capital and whether they succeeded or 
not to transform it into a new source of symbolic power. More importantly, the 
particular meanings o f  internationalization mediated by the managers also transformed 
the action frameworks of other local actors. The process of internationalization thus 
translated locally into a specific system o f practices and meanings which had important 
but diverse consequences for the adaptability of individual firms and groups of actors in 
RoZnov.
Semiconductor firms in Roinov: internationalization as a way to local integration
As already mentioned, the managers of Terosil and Tesla Sezam kept backing their 
attempts at internationalization by preserving and cultivating their network heritage 
throughout the times of crisis. In this way, they were using their closely knit local 
networks based on old acquaintances as the media for presenting their views and their 
caring attitude which, in turn, increased their local recognition, The management of the 
local semiconductor firms thus seemed to be very successful in what has been described 
in theoretical terms in Chapter Two; that is, they used their networks for presenting a 
particular interpretation of an aspect of reality and for mediating its meaning (Latour,
1987; Gallon, 1991), and through this process they increased their own symbolic power 
(Bourdieu, 1977,1991).
The key aspect of the new, internationalized economic reality as presented by the 
managers of Terosil and Tesla Sezam was the stress on fairness and openness as well as 
inclusiveness in both local and international relations. From the empirical findings it 
seems that a central role of'strategic guidance' (Amin and Hausner, 1997, p. 17) in 
spreading this attitude and enrolling other actors in its reproduction was played by the 
present general manager of Tesla Sezam. This man enjoys a reputation among local 
people for his uncompromising sense of fairness and for an interest in the welfare of his 
employees and local community (interviews). Since he also played a key role in the 
negotiations with American partners, his local recognition enabled him to mediate the 
meanings of internationalization locally and to take an active part in 'energizing' and 
mobilizing a variety of local and nationwide networks.
The attitude of openness and stress on the role of trust was also very obvious
during the interview with the general manager himself. When asked about the role of
trust in business relations and in the relationship with Motorola he replied:
"This was one o f  the things which Motorola found interesting about us. That even at the time when we 
were in loss I was still in favour o f  absolute openness, a true openness in relations. Both in the positive 
and the negative matters. [...] We didn't have any other chance but to persuade our partner that we are 
open, that we have nothing to hide and that we have no hidden intentions. [...] And Motorola, 1 must stress 
- and that is several times underlined - is a very tough and demanding partner but also a highly fair one. 
What they expect from their suppliers they are ready to fulfil themselves in relation to us." (6.5. 1997)
The attitude of openness on the side of the local managers was thus reciprocated from 
the side of several key employees at Motorola. According to one interviewee. Motorola 
was even a founding member of an association of fair business in the USA (interview 
with former general manager of Terosil). Furthermore, Tesla Sezam has quickly gained 
a similar reputation in the Czech Republic55, which increased the symbolic power of its 
management and further improved the relationship with Motorola. Once this 
relationship was stabilized, the managers of the two semiconductor firms therefore
55In 1996, for example, Tesla Sezam was awarded a special national prize for its openness and disclosure 
o f business information (Lidové noviny, 26.8. 1996).
enjoyed a favourable position for mediating the meanings and understandings of
internationalization.
The interviews also revealed that the managers of Tesla Sezam and Terosil 
actively supported a positive interpretation of internationalization and a positive picture 
of their foreign partners, which they then spread through their local networks. In this 
way, the local managers were able to enrol both the representatives of Motorola and 
local actors (employees of their own firms, owners of other local firms and members of 
local council) in a common project (interviews; Tesla Sezam, 1998). They aligned their 
interests and understandings (Gallon, 1991) by presenting a mutually beneficial 
interpretation of internationalization and therefore eased the communication between 
actors with diverse action frameworks. When the contact with Motorola started to bear 
fruit, the local managers found it relatively easy to translate the practices of their 
partners into practices understandable to local actors and compatible with the meanings 
they recognized. The advantageous position which Tesla Sezam and Terosil achieved in 
the corporate hierarchy of Motorola was thus at least partly a reflection of the activity of 
their managers who produced a near 'perfect translation' (Gallon, 1991, p. 145) of 
internationalization that is acceptable and attractive to all or most parties involved.
From the point of view of regional adaptability, an important aspect is that the 
operations of Motorola in Roinov are run by local people who did not isolate 
themselves from their locality and local networks. There is a whole web of networks 
that link the managers and employees of the two semiconductor companies with other 
successors of Tesla Roinov and with many local start-ups often owned and run by 
former employees of Tesla Roinov. Tesla Sezam itself has stakes in five other local 
firms that are in one way or another connected with the electronics industry and which 
represent their extension to several more specialized and applied activities (e.g. special 
measuring equipment, electronic equipment for solar energy panels, medical equipment 
such as tomographs, thermoregulating equipment and so on). Terosil and its 
management also have stakes in several local firms (database of the Ministry of Justice). 
Both Tesla Sezam and Terosil subcontract from several local firms including some of
the 'successors' of Tesla Roinov, such as the manufacturers of special machinery for the 
production of silicon chips.
Through all these contacts and networks Tesla Sezam and Terosil pass on 
particular meanings of internationalization, the practices of fair business, and their 
understanding about the positive role of their American partners. Through interactions 
in these networks, a sense of common purpose is strengthened, and also mutual trust is 
enhanced. All the interviewees also expressed a very ethical attitude to market 
transactions and stressed that they would not trade with anyone using what they 
regarded as unfair practices (e.g. use of tricks in price negotiations). Most interviewees 
also made it clear that their relations with other local businesses go beyond mere 
business transactions. Often these relations are based on old friendships, since the 
partners live as direct neighbours in Roinov.
The form of internationalization mediated through the activities and networks of 
local managers thus found its expression in a shared system of meanings and 
understandings which allow actors to mix elements of both local and imported (i.e. 
Western) meanings, practices and skills. The processes of translation and enrolment 
allowed the variety of meanings and practices to circulate through local networks and to 
be shared and mobilized by actors when needed. The process of enrolment involved not 
just firms in the locality, but stretched to other local bodies. So when asked about links 
with the local council, which today is staffed mostly by former employees of Tesla 
Roznov, the general manager of Tesla Sezam said:
"We sort o f spread the [caring and cooperative] ideology around here and towards the town council. For 
example about the care for the environment, undoing the sins o f the past It is partly under pressure from 
Motorola but I think that by now we accept it for our own." (6.5. 1997)
Clearly this caring and cooperative attitude is not new, as the ties between Tesla Roinov 
and the locality have traditionally been very strong. However, in its present, reinvented 
form the caring is shaped by combining elements of old local practices with 
international. Western ones (Stark, 1992; Stark and Grabber, 1997b). The use of old 
practices and organizational forms to construct new, internationalized ones is best 
documented by the R&D venture between Motorola and Tesla Sezam, which also 
demonstrates the innovative potential of such institutional arrangements (Stark, 1996).
Even before Terosil and Tesla Sezam actually started the regular subcontracting 
to Motorola, the management of the two companies used the fact that Motorola's people 
realized the research potential of designers in Roinov. The local managers were quite 
aware of the impossibility of paying for the highly qualified specialists, as well as of the 
high risk of'brain drain'. In order to preserve a source of R&D close at hand in Roinov, 
they pushed forward the idea of integrating local R&D capacities with the research 
network of their American partner. Eventually they succeeded and Motorola initially 
selected the best 15 designers of Tesla Sezam and employed them in the newly 
established Motorola Czech Design Center in Roinov. Later on, in 1995, a set of 
application laboratories were added which were also financed by Motorola. Today, the 
Center employs some 50 specialists and its capacity is used jointly by both Motorola 
and the two local semiconductor firms (interview with general manager of Tesla 
Sezam). Thanks to this, other local companies closely connected with Tesla Sezam and 
Terosil also directly or indirectly benefit from the R&D base funded by Motorola. The 
Design Center thus provides new impulses and information about the latest 
technological developments for the whole set of electronics firms in the area.
Tesla Sezam also revitalized another tradition and a set of networks inherited 
from the time of Tesla Roznov. In an attempt to further support local traditions in the 
research, design and manufacturing of semiconductors, the company strengthened its 
traditional close cooperation with several technical universities both in the Czech 
Republic and in Slovakia and invited them to send their best students for practical study 
periods in the company (Tesla Sezam, 1998). Similarly, the semiconductor firms started 
once again to subsidise the local secondary school which specialized in electronics and 
some of the activities of the local council (interviews in Tesla Sezam and Terosil). In all 
these cases, however, the revived traditions and practices are being revived selectively. 
They still often represent a form of caring for local community, but they already involve 
a capitalist rationality of profit making and employ the international networks and 
practices as an essential part of local activities.
It seems that both the production and R&D activities of Motorola in Roznov 
have become quite central to its world-wide operations. For the foreseeable future there
is no threat of Motorola's withdrawal since the foreign investor, on the contrary, has 
impressive future plans for its establishments in Roinov. The Americans plan to invest 
a further 45 million US $ and to increase the present employment levels from 800 by a 
further 50 per cent by the end of the century (interviews).56
The semiconductor 'successors' of Tesla Roinov have therefore managed to 
make full use of their stable, long term relationship with Motorola. Their managers 
successfully transformed the control and knowledge of local networks into a source of 
recognition by the Western multinational, which also increased their recognition and 
appreciation among domestic and local actors. This recognition, in turn, empowered the 
local managers to create and spread a new, collectively shared system of meanings, as 
well as to enrol both Motorola and the local firms and actors in a process of mutual 
adaptation.
The process of translation made diverse actors respect and recognize each other's 
networks, skills and practices and produced a form of trust which enabled them to mix 
elements of their action frameworks. In other words, the local managers aligned the 
positions of heterogeneous actors (Gallon, 1991) and established a situation which made 
actors reflect on their system of practices and meanings (Murdoch, 1995; Storper,
1995). The resulting mix and integration of diverse networks and practices then led to a 
collective reinterpretation and production of locally-based innovations (Sabel, 1993; 
Storper, 1997).
The institutional set-up which resulted from the translated meaning of 
internationalization thus seems to be well integrated. It allows both local actors and their 
foreign partners to draw on a variety of practices, skills, routines, as well as 
understandings and interpretations that are brought to the locality through networks of 
various actors. So far, this set-up has proved to be quite adaptable, because the majority 
of actors are simultaneously involved in several diverse networks and open to new 
impulses. If they also sustain the ability to enrol others in accommodating the new
^6The stability and strength of the position o f Tesla Sezam and Terosil in the corporate structure of 
Motorola is quite apparent from such paradoxical situations when, for example, the Roinov companies 
are able to get better terms for imported inputs than Motorola's plants elsewhere. This is because the 
Eastern European operations of Motorola are regarded by many suppliers as a long-term; crucial customer 
for the future (interviews in Tesla Sezam and Terosil).
practices and reinterpreting them locally, the long term adaptability of these firms will 
very likely be preserved.
’Successors1 of TVC: internationalization as an increased instability
The successors of TVC provide quite a different story of internationalization. The three 
new firms clearly illustrate the problem of firms that are largely powerless and lack the 
adaptable capacity due to limited access to alternative networks. Their understanding of 
internationalization is largely shaped by the volatile demands of the market and their 
foreign customers. Although the managers expressed their wish for stable customer 
relations, they were nonetheless pushed to accept the notion of the market as a 'rough' 
place where the stronger Western companies exploit the cheap and powerless Eastern 
European ones.
The almost complete absence of local networks on the part of these companies 
does not mean in itself that they lack adaptability altogether. The problem is that the 
networks which link local managers to their Western customers show a lack of stability 
and are thus unable to act as channels for mobilizing alternative practices and as a 
means of adaptation. These networks are characterized by a deficit of mutual 
commitment, alignment of interests and openness. Such features, in turn, prevent local 
actors and their foreign partners from creating a shared system of expectations and from 
a mutual adjustment of their action frameworks that might have resulted in a new 
interpretation of existing practices.
The lack of information openness and trust in relations with Western partners
which stops the manufacturers of TV components from creating a more positive
meaning of internationalization, was described by one interviewee in these words:
"Of course they are [informed]. Not all o f them but, say, Philips before they started to subcontract from us 
they conducted both a technical and economic audit here. [...] But from their side it is slightly more 
complicated. We have to deliver at their whistle. We must guess according to our marketing knowledge 
and information what their sales will be like. They [foreign customers] give us some sort o f  outlooks but 
these often diverge from the reality by far." (interview with production manager o f TPT, 7.5. 1997)
Clearly, the management of local vacuum technology firms are in a difficult position. It 
is hard to change the attitude of their Western customers unless they can see that the 
Roznov firms have more to offer than cheap local labour. Given the damage inflicted
upon the network heritage by the TVCs activities, the management of the three new 
companies seem to have little to offer. The lack of local networks makes it difficult for 
them to gain the local recognition and symbolic power required to mobilize extensive 
local networks. The absence of local recognition, then, makes it hard to enrol other local 
actors and use their skills and abilities as a means of persuading foreign partners to 
commit themselves to a long term involvement in the region.
The managers of the three new vacuum component firms have largely resigned 
as local mediators (Gallon, 1991, 1998) who shape the meaning of internationalization. 
Instead of trying to negotiate differences between practices recognized locally and those 
recognized by their foreign customers, they seemed to have learned to cope and survive 
in conditions of unstable order. They have began to take this instability as an inevitable 
aspect of internationalization (interviews in TPT and TTV).
Due to this particular interpretation of internationalization, the managers seemed 
to be happy about their position as low cost manufacturers filling in occasional gaps in 
the market. They did not appear to mind that the marketing (in the case of TPT and 
TLT) was done for them by the trade company and that the international networks were 
effectively out of their control. Similarly, in relation to R&D, there were some worrying 
indicators of dependence and a loss of autonomy. None of the three companies had an 
R&D department and the interviewees admitted with different degrees of openness that 
they were not even trying to change the situation:
"On R&D we try to cooperate with our suppliers, we let them do it. The technology goes ahead very 
quickly here and financing a large R&D base is a very expensive matter. We are not a multinational 
company. We don't have the financing means as they do. [...] We operate in the middle range o f technical 
standard. And our products are not exactly at cutting edge o f technology." (interview with sales manager 
o f TTV, 26.5. 1997)
And similarly in another case:
"R&D is very expensive in this particular sector. [...] And we can't really design a TV tube on our own. 
When we want to start a production of a new model we can only do that in cooperation with a major 
foreign firm, say Toshiba. We have to buy the know-how. We have neither the specialists nor the money 
to develop certain parts o f a TV" tube. All we do is a practical application, adaptation o f the technology 
and so on. But to produce our own model, that we simply can't manage." (interview with a production 
manager o f TPT, 7.5. 1997)
In the past, there was a strong tradition of R&D in vacuum components in Roznov, and 
even after the break up of Tesla some small local firms attempted to keep this tradition
alive (interview with manager of Radion). Also, due to the lack of interest and support 
from the TVCs management (who were the main inheritor of the vacuum technology 
R&D facilities of Tesla Roinov), this innovative potential disappeared. The most 
qualified people left the company for activities in other kinds of business (interviews in 
TPT and Radion) and those who remained have lost an interest in radically new forms 
of action. Employees have largely lost motivation and so did other local firms in 
technologically related manufacturing activities. In contrast to the case of the 
semiconductor firms, no web of supportive networks with other local firms emerged.
The smaller vacuum technology firms such as Radion, which were themselves unable to 
carry out major R&D investments could have been easily enrolled in the adaptation to 
the process of internationalization and might have become a source of alternative 
interpretation and innovation. Instead, they continue to struggle at the edge of 
bankruptcy (interviews in Radion and TVC). The lack of enrolment as well as a virtual 
absence of common interests and a shared system of meaning thus made the vacuum 
technology firms isolated and therefore more vulnerable when faced with the process of 
internationalization.
It is not impossible that the TV tubes manufacturer, TPT, and its subcontractor, 
TLT, will in the future develop a more stable relationship with one of their large 
Western customers. It is unlikely, however, that without a web of networks that could 
'hold down' the process of internationalization this change would create new, locally- 
based interpretative opportunities (Sabel, 1994). Further internationalization of these 
firms would thus hardly change their status as dependent, low-cost assembly plants, 
unless they developed networks through which the meaning of internationalization 
could be mediated and reinterpreted locally. However, in a situation where the 
management is unable to achieve sufficient local recognition and has lost the key 
employees with specialized skills and expertise, the chances for revitalizing the network 
heritage and increasing the adaptability of these firms look rather slim.
A similar situation is evident in the case of the TV manufacturer, TTV, which is 
a simple assembly plant with virtually no local networks and innovative potential 
(interview with manager of TTV). Although its management succeeded in building up a
sales network serving the Czech market, the company is still facing serious problems.
At the time of the field work, the management were worried about the future of their 
firm which was threatened by cheaper products from a newly established Japanese 
greenfield plant elsewhere in the Czech Republic. This erased TTV's only advantage of 
low labour cost and undercut it by greater economies of scale.
The new management of TPT and TLT appointed by Tesimpex, as well as the 
management of TTV appointed by the new German partners, were quick at adjusting 
their managerial practices to the disciplining rule and rationality of Western capitalism. 
These practices were implemented quite successfully and the companies currently 
generate small profits (interview with the liquidator of TVC). However, the new 
practices were largely restricted to routine activities aimed to stop further increases in 
production costs. This task was completed, but the restructuring has been achieved with 
little effort to adjust the Western practices to the local ways of doing things, or to 
combine them innovativelly with the action frameworks of diverse actors within the 
region. This is in part understandable because the vacuum components firms, due to the 
’previous activities of TVC, are largely isolated from other local actors and their 
networks. The scope of operations of these firms is partly limited by their technological 
equipment which is expensive and difficult to change, but it is also limited by the action 
framework of their managers. Their action frameworks are associated with a particularly 
limited understanding o f internationalization which only stresses the continuing 
pressure on costs and quality and relies on routine practices and a small number of sales 
networks.
Overall, it seems that in the case of the vacuum components firms in Roznov, 
the process of internationalization produced a fragmented institutional set-up. It is 
characterized by a simple import and copying of certain Western practices which restrict 
the action framework of managers to a routine behaviour. Although two out of the three 
of these firms are actually Czech-owned, their institutional set-up resembles the 
'disembedded' foreign-owned branch plants which have only limited contact with their 
locality (Grabber, 1994,1997; Swain, 1994). The vacuum components firms thus 
missed the opportunity to use internationalization as a source of new interpretative
possibilities and innovativeness. They can be seen as mere providers of jobs who 
survive thanks to cheap and competitive local labour costs, but whose adaptability and 
long term competitiveness are highly questionable.
CONCLUSION: INTEGRATING LOCAL VARIETY
The collapse of Tesla Roinov and its subsequent internationalization have brought 
financial discipline compatible with Western symbolic capital to the Roinov region. 
Moreover, the process of internationalization has also helped to overcome the deep 
regional economic crisis of the early 1990s. It increased the diversity of networks and 
practices within the locality and created preconditions for innovativeness and 
adaptability among several key local firms. The same process, however, resulted in a 
lack of adaptability and increased dependence within other local firms. This case study 
has thus demonstrated that the process of internationalization can have a highly diverse 
impact on firms within one region, even if they share a common past and an equally 
inconvenient network heritage.
Furthermore, this chapter has also demonstrated the usefulness of the concepts 
of social capital and symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990), as well as translation and 
enrolment (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991) in explaining the diverse outcomes of 
internationalization. The examples of the Ro2nov semiconductor and vacuum 
components firms show that the differentiated impact of internationalization on the 
adaptability and competitiveness of each of them does not depend on a presence of 
diverse international networks alone. The impact of internationalization depends, to a 
large extent, on the ability of actors to mediate and 'hold down' this process locally 
((Amin and Thrift, 1994b). It-has been demonstrated here that these differences are a 
reflection of the ability of local actors to gain the symbolic power, to become mediators 
and thus gain the control over the meaning of internationalization. Subsequently, the 
mediators, through cultural processes of translation and enrolment, may integrate the 
diverse action frameworks present in the region and use the meanings of 
internationalization in a way that increases local innovativeness.
On the one hand, the managers of the semiconductor firms retained the support 
of local networks which helped them to maintain local recognition and symbolic power. 
This, in turn, enabled them to translate the meanings of internationalization for other 
local actors, enrol them in the adaptation to its demands and spread through their 
networks positive interpretations of internationalization. The result of their activities 
was an alignment of diverse action frameworks and trust between actors, which further 
stimulated their reflexivity and created innovative, locally-based interpretative 
possibilities (Sabel, 1993,1994; Storper, 1997).
The management of TVC, on the other hand, preserved only certain elements of 
their company's networked heritage which were unable to provide them with a credible 
source of recognition either locally or in relation to foreign partners. This deficit of 
recognition and negative attitude towards local networks on the side of TVC also made 
the position of its successors unsuitable for local mediation. Without local networks and 
sufficient recognition, the three vacuum component firms were unable to 'hold down' 
the process of internationalization in a creative way and were reduced to a position of 
dependent assembly plants without an autonomous innovative potential.
The process of internationalization has not benefited all actors in the Roinov 
region to the same extent and the polarization between well and poorly paid workers or 
between successful and unsuccessful firms certainly does exist in the region. 
Nevertheless the overall assessment of the situation gives more reasons for optimism 
than pessimism. Internationalization has not turned Roznov into an imported Western 
enclave where the benefits are restricted to a core group of selected employees, as in the 
case studies by Smith and Ferenôikovâ (1998) or Smith and Pavlinek (1998). In Roinov 
the future of the regional economy looks more promising because the form of 
internationalization associated with the local semiconductor firms is gaining an edge. In 
the Roinov region's case, for the most part, the local actors control the meanings of 
imported practices, interpret them in a way which stimulates openness and inclusiveness 
in mutual relations and therefore increases the integration of the regional institutional 
set-up. As the situation stands now, there are many indicators that Motorola's 
commitment to the locality is a long term one and the prospects for future cooperation
are better than ever. The semiconductor industry in Roinov is thus likely to grow and 
increase its dominance, perhaps even to the extent to which Tesla Roznov once 
dominated the regional economy (interviews in Tesla Sezam and Terosil). The chances 
are therefore, that mediated form of internationalization will continue to be a source of 
new practices and meanings that will be reinterpreted locally and mixed selectively with 
local ones.
In the case of the vacuum components firms which face serious problems, even 
their complete collapse would hardly represent a major threat to the stability of the 
RoinoVs regional economy. The increasingly dominant semiconductor industry in 
Roinov could compensate for such a loss and could possibly absorb the redundant 
workers. Perhaps if the inclusiveness exhibited by the managers of the semiconductor 
firms is maintained, they could eventually enrol and integrate the actors presently 
associated with the action frameworks of the vacuum component firms. Although their 
understanding of internationalization is quite different, this development does not seem 
that unlikely since the links between the two already exist in the form of good personal 
relations between the managers of Tesimpex and Tesla Sezam (interviews; Database of 
the Ministry of Justice). We can only speculate what innovations a closer integration 
between the two might bring.
The future of Roznov region will most probably continue to be dominated by the 
semiconductor industry. Unlike the past, however, this specialization is likely to be 
more resistant to an institutional lock-in, as the management of both the semiconductor 
firms maintain a wide range of international, domestic and local networks. These 
contribute to continuous reflection and innovations within their own firms, as well as in 
other firms in the region. The process of internationalization in Roznov has clearly 
played a central role in creating this institutional set-up which is responsive to change 
and looks likely to maintain its adaptability and competitiveness also in the future.
CONCLUSION
The research question and the theoretical work
The motivating question set up in the Introduction to this thesis was what makes some 
regions in post-Communist countries able to 'hold down' (Amin and Thrift, 1994b) the 
process of internationalization in a way that enhances their adaptability and 
competitiveness. The theoretical, as well as the empirical parts o f this thesis, suggest 
that there is no simple answer to the question. It has been argued instead that to answer 
such a question we need to 'unpack' the notion of local culture, or local forms of 
embeddedness, responsible for the different ways in which internationalization is "held 
down' in individual regions and localities. Moreover, this research has argued that the 
concept of internationalization needs to be scrutinized and problematized in order to 
provide a qualified response to the research question set up at the beginning. The answer 
to this question thus does not consist of a list of requirements or factors which 'explain' 
a successful and productive accommodation of internationalization within a region. An 
appropriate response to the original research question, then, requires first of all an 
elaboration of a framework within which the key concepts of internationalization and 
embeddedness may be analyzed.
It has been argued that internationalization does not represent a homogeneous 
force exerting the same influence on all regions, nor is it a unidirectional force which 
transforms local forms of embeddedness in a way 'pre-given' by the strategies of 
Western firms. Internationalization, as understood in this thesis, represents both a 
discursive and a material process which transforms the ex isting  forms of embeddedness 
and is transformed by them. In other words, internationalization is a process which only 
gains its meaning through locally-specific interactions with existing forms of regional 
embeddedness and through the mediating activity of individual actors. This thesis has 
therefore argued for, as well as developed, an approach which explores the impact of 
internationalization based on an analysis of such interactions and mediation.
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The concept of embeddedness as understood here represents a system of 
networked personal relations (Granovetter, 1985/1992), together with the relations of 
symbolic domination and power (Bourdieu, 1977,1990) in which actors operate. The 
research has further shown that the notion of embeddedness can be broken down into 
more specific concepts of networked social capital, symbolic capital and power and that 
it can be explored in a dynamic and non-functional way by means of analyzing the 
cultural processes of translation and enrolment (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991). All of 
these concepts can, in turn, be employed in constructing a framework for explaining the 
diverse effects of internationalization on regions and their differentiated ability to 'hold 
down' this process.
The analytical framework advocated in this thesis thus moves beyond the 
quantitative assessment of internationalization which focuses on indicators such as the 
amount of invested capital, number of jobs created through internationalization, or the 
number of local subcontracting linkages. These indicators are not unimportant yet they 
are not sufficient to gain a full picture of the overall consequences that 
internationalization has for regional economies. The concrete outcomes of 
internationalization, as argued here, are a product of the mutual constitution and 
reconstitution of both embeddedness and internationalization. The core of this thesis is 
therefore the development of an alternative framework capable of assessing the effects 
of internationalization on regional forms of embeddedness, including the character of 
the power relations within localities.
The response to the question - what allows some regions to hold down' 
internationalization in a way which increases their adaptability and competitiveness? - 
thus requires that we analyze the cultural processes through which in ternationalization is 
'weaved into' the action frameworks of actors and into regional institutional set-ups. The 
development and elaboration of an analytical framework suitable for this task represents 
not only a basis for a response to the research question, but also the main contribution of 
the thesis to the existing literature about the uneven impact of internationalization on 
regional economies.
The main foci of the approach applied in this thesis are the locally-specific 
networks and cultural processes through which the process of internationalization is 
mediated and translated into concrete practices and meanings. The outcomes of 
internationalization in individual regions are perceived as a process which re-shapes 
existing forms of embeddedness, but their concrete effects are the product of specific 
combinations of practices and meanings of both Western and local actors. The mixing 
of the two is mediated by those actors who orchestrate recognition and who control the 
meaning of internationalization; that is, the local mediators (Gallon, 1991) who enjoy 
the symbolic power which, in turn, allows them to orchestrate recogmtion within the 
locality.
The adopted analytical framework thus combines existing geographical research 
with the network analysis of NES (Granovetter, 1985/1992; Swedberg and Granovetter, 
1992), work of Pierre Bourdieu (1977,1990,1991) and actor-network theory (Latour, 
1987; Gallon 1991). In so doing it brings dynamism to Bourdieu's theoretical work and 
modifies actor-network theory in a way which makes it suitable to a regional analysis 
and represents a rather unusual, culturally informed approach to the analysis of the 
uneven impact of internationalization. The approach outlined aimed to blur the artificial 
boundary between economic and cultural practices and, through the empirical work, 
helped to demonstrate that economic practices are also culturally constructed. Moreover, 
the empirical work hopefully has also demonstrated that such an approach is a valid one 
and represents a fruitful way for assessing regional adaptability.
However, the combination of the three theoretical strands within the analytical 
framework was not without its problems. These were gradually uncovered in the course 
of empirical work which helped to identify the overlaps between them, as well as 
highlighted the fact that each of these strands has a different strength and contributes to 
a specific aspect of empirical analysis. The strength of Bourdieu's approach lies mainly, 
within its ability to explore and analyze the stability and reproduction of power relations, 
and locally-specific forms of rationality which are largely beyond the control o f  
individuals. On the other hand, ANT, and also NES, stress the need for analyzing the 
processes of change. NES stresses the networking activity of individuals, while ANT
adds an emphasis on the power aspects of network building. The preoccupation of ANT 
with processes of translation and enrolment^ through which actors put intermediaries 
into use, stabilize meanings and create partly irreversible forms of rationality and power 
relations, thus move beyond the ambition of NES and partly overlap with Bourdieu's 
concern for stability of power relations.
In other words, although the empirical work demonstrated that symbolic power 
permits local mediators to stabilize the meanings of internationalization through the 
cultural processes of translation and enrolment (Latour, 1987; Gallon, 1991), this 
approach still raises other issues about theory and method. What I see missing in my 
approach when reflecting back on the research process, is a more detailed analysis of the 
concrete m aterial and non-material arrangements through which the new meanings are 
turned into locally-intelligible and collectively reproduced practices and 'technologies'. 
These technologies form part of networks as understood by ANT (Gallon, 1991; 
Murdoch, 1995,1997). Moreover, such technologies or intermediaries often do, at a 
later stage, become recognized symbols of power which secure the reproduction of 
established practices and power relations. They therefore represent an essential link 
between the two major theoretical strands, the ANT and Bourdieu's approach. 
Furthermore, it also became clear in the course of empirical work that the nature of 
processes, through which the intermediaries and technologies were stabilized, has often 
played a major role in the relative adaptability and competitiveness of enterprises and 
regions.
Should I be able to conduct a similar research project once again, I would 
therefore pay more attention to the notion of culture and especially the processes of 
cultural meditation, translation and enrolment. Namely, I would concentrate not only on 
the key networks through which actors' actions were carried out, but also on the 
managerial concepts and practices transmitted through them and modified by actors. 
Such a research project would analyze, for example, how internationalization translated 
locally into new management practices, marketing strategies, new ways of negotiating 
with suppliers, the concept of'lean production' and how the stabilization of new
meanings influenced the power relations, as well as the process of adaptation within 
regions.
However, the change of focus towards the stabilization of intermediaries and the 
development of technologies that reinforce routines, practices and controlled behaviour 
would also increase the domination of ANT within my analytical framework. Such a 
change would also most probably lead to an adoption of a different research 
methodology. A detailed research into the processes of translation and enrolment at the 
level of individual enterprises would, then, require a longer term observation, more in- 
depth interviews, preferably repeated ones, and also other research techniques such as 
non-participatory observation or an analysis of the ways in which enterprises present
themselves to outsiders or insiders.
In the hypothetical case of repeating the same research once again, the approach 
of NES would thus lose much of its importance as somewhat redundant compared with 
the analytical concepts of ANT. The approach of Pierre Bourdieu would still remain 
important, but the empirical analysis would put more emphasis on the cultural processes 
characteristic o f  ANT, instead of Bourdieu's concepts of social and symbolic capital.
Nevertheless, these critical reflection on the adopted analytical framework do 
not, I believe, undermine it. They suggest, instead, that research is an open-ended 
process of constant discovery and re-thinking which results from the interaction 
between theoretical and empirical work. Moreover, the findings presented in this thesis 
are sufficient to demonstrate that the differences in the character of processes of 
translation and enrolment can give different meanings to Western symbols. Their results 
can either empower or disempower local actors and can lead to an innovative process of 
adaptation, or to a simple acceptance of imported practices and dependence. Further 
elaboration on the character of translation and enrolment could, however, potentially 
establish more specific circum stances that are likely to lead to a success or failure in 
translating internationalization and 'holding it down'.
The way in which the analytical framework of the thesis has been developed 
implies that there are no easy answers as to why in some regions internationalization 
increases their adaptive capacity, while in others the same process increases their
dependence on foreign firms and decreases their ability to become self-regenerating 
growth poles. The complication of the response to the research question, however, does 
not mean that it is impossible to answer. As has been shown in the empirical chapters of 
the thesis, the analytical framework concerned with the character of cultural processes 
can provide some clues as to why internationalization m some regions led to a mere 
institutional 'cloning' of Western organizational forms (Grabber, 1994,1997), while in 
others it allowed for a creative adaptation of existing institutional forms to Western 
capitalist rationality. The processes of translation and enrolment shape the actual impact 
of internationalization within regions, they transform the existing regional institutional 
set-ups and create diverse preconditions for the adaptability of regions. As such, the 
cultural processes of enrolment and translation represent the core of a culturally 
informed explanation of the diverse outcomes of internationalization and a key to a
more nuanced response to the original research question.
Apart from developing a framework for analyzing the regional impact of 
internationalization, the thesis has also presented some normative claims. These are 
related to the character of cultural processes through which internationalization can be 
accommodated locally in a way which makes localities adaptable and innovative. Such 
claims have been further substantiated by the empirical case studies presented in this 
thesis and they represent a more specific 'answer' to the question: what can •hold down' 
the p r o c e s s  of internationalization locally? This 'answer1, however, does not represent a 
claim to any universal, generalized truth which would imply that internationalization 
can reinvigorate any regional economy. The concrete results of internationalization will 
always be, at least partly, dependent on entities which are beyond the control of 
network-builders and which can subvert the translating and enrolling efforts of actors 
(Murdoch, 1997). Nevertheless, the empirical case studies suggest possible lessons 
about the kind of cultural processes and mediation that are likely to increase the posif 
effects of internationalization on regional adaptability.
The research question and empirical evidence
The findings of the three empirical case studies clearly show that internationalization 
can play an important role in stimulating regional economies and turning them into 
adaptable and self-sustaining growth poles with a locally-based innovative potential.
The positive impact of internationalization, however, is conditional. Each of the 
empirical chapters, in mm, suggests something about the circumstances that may 
increase the ability of regions to 'hold down' the process of internationalization in a 
productive way.
Chapter Six, which analyzed the experience of the Lanàkroun region, shows that 
the reinvigoration experienced by this regional economy as a consequence of 
internationalization is related to the ability of local actors - the managers of AVX - to 
mediate the meaning of internationalization in a manner which enrols other local actors. 
In this way, the process of internationalization not only enriches the local institutional 
set-up by the incorporation of new, international meanings and practices, but it also 
allows for a greater number of diverse interpretations and responses. In the case of 
LanSkroun, this diversity o f interpretation has nonetheless not prevented local actors 
from communicating with each other and building on the interpretations of others. The 
meaning of internationalization has been controlled by local actors and used by them as 
the basis for a collective reinterpretation which, in many cases, strengthened the 
networks among local actors themselves. At the same time, the process of 
internationalization also adjusted these networks to a new profit-oriented rationality, 
enriched the local action framework by new international networks and widened the 
spectrum of interpretative possibilities available to actors. The local control over the 
meaning of internationalization, combined with the way in which the diverse 
interpretations of internationalization have been coordinated and 'held down' in the local 
institutional set-up, increased the ability of a number of local actors and firms to 
accommodate a greater variety of alternative meanings: It became an essential part of 
local ability to learn to adapt, as well as a source of localized innovation which makes 
the regional economy increasingly independent of foreign partners.
Chapter Seven demonstrated through the case study of the Mladâ Boleslav 
automotive region that the mediation of internationalization alone does not guarantee
the greater adaptability of the region. This chapter has shown that an inflow of 
international meanings and practices and their accommodation might be restricted to a 
limited number of local actors. Such a form of mediated internationalization does not 
result in the enrolment and collective reinterpretation of other local actors. The 
outcome, therefore, isolates the action frameworks of a small group of local managers 
from the majority of local actors. The meaning of internationalization is mediated and 
controlled locally, yet it remains under the control of a local elite. The process of 
internationalization thus did not lead to a collective reinterpretation, nor did it produce 
shared meanings that would enable actors to identify with the process of 
internationalization. Internationalization in this example made the local automotive 
industry capable of immediate adaptation. The lack of enrolment and alignment of 
interests among local actors, however, prevented the region from using the inflow of 
international practices for creating autonomous, locally-based innovations and resulted 
instead in an institutional set-up that does not improve the chances for long term 
regional adaptability.
In a similar vein to Grabber (1994, 1997), Chapter Seven demonstrated that the 
form of internationalization, characterized by an uncritical import or 'cloning* of 
Western institutional and organizational principles (which have also been identified 
among some firms in region of Mladâ Boleslav), is even more damaging to the long 
term adaptability of regions. The process of internationalization in such cases is not 
mediated and adjusted to local conditions and its potential for creating new 
interpretative possibilities is wasted. Even worse, the meaning of internationalization is 
not under the control of local actors. This kind of internationalization, then, makes 
regions vulnerable to decisions made elsewhere and puts their adaptability and 
competitiveness at risk.
Finally, Chapter Eight argued that the impact of internationalization in Roinov 
has been predominantly beneficial for reasons similar to those of Lanskroun. In Roinov 
the picture is more complex than in Lanskroun because of the distinct 
internationalization paths followed by different local firms, some of which have 
completely failed to adapt. This case study nonetheless confirms the conclusions drawn
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from the previous empirical chapters. In Rofcnov the managers of Tesla Sezam and 
Terosil successfully positioned themselves as the local mediators of internationalization 
and simultaneously preserved their rich heritage of local networks. Moreover, they did 
not merely content themselves with a successful adaptation of their own firms to 
internationalization but used their networks and symbolic power to enrol a number of 
local actors in their interpretation of internationalization. Local actors were thus allowed 
to take part in the adaptation too. They felt they also had a stake in the changes and 
willingly contributed their skills and abilities, as well as adjusted their action 
frameworks to the demands of internationalization. Each of these actors interpreted the 
meaning of internationalization in a slightly different way and so these adjustments 
produced a diversity of responses. More to the point, the sense of common enterprise 
produced through enrolment did not prevent local actors from exchanging their 
experiences both among themselves and with their foreign partners in Motorola. The 
combination of local practices with international ones, facilitated by local mediation and 
translation, increased the local institutional and cultural diversity in a constructive way.
It made internationalization the basis on which actors collectively redefined their 
understandings in a way which increased their innovativeness, while it allowed the key 
local firms to diversify their networks and to avoid dependence on their foreign partners.
The conclusions drawn from the experience of these three regions thus confirm 
what was suggested in the theoretical part of the thesis. Firstly, they confirm Grabber's 
argument that a form of internationalization which suppresses existing forms of regional 
embeddedness and replaces them by imported Western institutional forms is likely to 
decrease adaptability and reduce the innovative potential of regions (Grabber, 1994, 
1997; Grabber and Stark, 1997b). In order to use the potential of internationalization in 
a creative way, the process needs to be mediated locally by actors who enjoy local 
recognition. Such mediation, which is likely to increase: the positive effects of 
internationalization, is achieved through a successful process of translation that involves 
the mutual adjustment of practices between local and foreign actors. The success of 
such a translation depends, in turn, on the ability of the mediators to align the interests 
and understandings of diverse actors, to create an atmosphere of trust which is
conducive to negotiation and learning from mutual differences (Sabel, 1993). Moreover, 
this kind of a locally-mediated form of internationalization empowers local actors, 
identifies them with the changes and motivates them to adapt. It also enriches the action 
frameworks of all actors involved in the adaptation by allowing them to draw on each 
other's interpretations and practices. The empirical findings further confirmed that a 
gradual and mediated form of adapting to internationalization is more likely to produce 
innovative interpretations and forms of action (Stark, 1992,1995, 1996; Sabel, 1993, 
1994; Grabber and Stark, 1997b).
Secondly, the contrast between the experience of Mladâ Boleslav region and that 
of Lanàkroun shows that the mutual adjustment is an essential, but not a sufficient 
precondition for a creative form of adaptation to and 'holding down' of 
internationalization. Another important aspect of a successful 'holding down' is the 
ability of local mediators to enrol other actors in adapting and constituting the meanings 
of international practices. The enrolment of diverse local actors implies that others can 
contest the meaning of new practices without threatening the integration and cohesion 
of the local institutional set-up. Every extra actor enrolled in the adaptation process 
increases the chances that the new practices will be interpreted in a different way. The 
diverse interpretations are then integrated and aligned with those of others and become a 
part of the collective process of reinterpretation. The inclusiveness and openness in the 
process of translation and enrolment not only facilitate interaction among local actors, 
but also increase the diversity of responses in the locality which may in turn trigger off a 
sustained production of new interpretative possibilities (Sabel, 1994). From the point of 
view of adaptability of the whole regional institutional set-up, this inclusiveness and 
ability to remain open to alternative interpretations is equally important as the ability to 
align the differences between local and foreign actors. Such an inclusive 
accommodation of internationalization can stimulate locally-based innovations and 
strengthen the region's ability to 'learn to adapt' (Amin, 1998).
Answering the research question
To return to the original research question - what 'holds down' the process of 
internationalization? - the theoretical and empirical findings of this research can be 
summarized in two main points. First, the process of mediating the meanings of 
internationalization locally is likely to align the interests and the positions of local and 
foreign actors, and therefore increase the chance that regional economies adapt to 
internationalization in ways which strengthen their innovativeness. And second, the 
enrolment of a greater diversity of actors, together with an inclusiveness and openness 
in accommodating the meanings of internationalization, increases the chances of 
sustaining locally-based innovativeness and regional adaptability in the long run.
These conclusions, however, should be treated with circumspection and should 
not lead to over-generalized 'prescriptions' for successful ways of internationalizing 
regional economies. This is because the empirical findings of this thesis also confirmed 
that the diverse outcomes of internationalization reflect the locally-specific forms of 
embeddedness which were inherited in the form of institutional legacies from the 
Communist past. All the inherited networks, their properties as well as practices and 
meanings recognized by actors, play a major role in 'holding down' internationalization 
in locally-specific ways. These legacies have developed over long periods of time and 
their character varies largely from one region to another. The unevenness of these 
institutional legacies is more than likely to result in uneven regional development in the 
future (Swain and Hardy, 1998) and certainly not all regions will prove capable of 
mediating the process of internationalization in productive ways. This is not a reason for 
undue fatalism however, but a simple acknowledgement of the fact that some regions do 
not possess the collective assets and institutional legacies that are easily adjusted to 
Western capitalist rationality, or that are attractive for Western partners (Swain and 
Hardy, 1998; Van Zon, 1998).
On the other hand, all regions possess some form of collective assets. The ability 
to recognize their potential and use them in innovative ways which are perhaps not 
obvious, but which might turn them into a source of competitiveness (Amin, 1998), is 
largely a matter of the abilities of local mediators. In this respect, the empirical findings 
of this thesis give reason for a cautious optimism. A further important finding of this
research is that the institutional legacies of Communism are, in principle, compatible 
with the Western capitalist rationality of profit making, greater accountability, cost- 
efficiency and quality. All three case study regions were able to adapt to this form of 
rationality, albeit with different degrees of success. Moreover, the findings also 
demonstrate that under specific circumstances the process of internationalisation can 
reinvigorate regional economies in post-Communist countries and can even exploit and 
strengthen the locally-based development potential.
The existence of regional economies such as LanSkroun (Chapter Six) or 
Roinov (Chapter Eight) confirm the suggestion put forward by David Stark (1992,
1995,1996; Grabber and Stark, 1997b) that the recombinant forms of capitalism 
produced by a gradual adjustment of post-Communist legacies have the potential to 
create innovative institutional arrangements. It seems that the slow, evolutionary change 
experienced by these two regions was one of the preconditions of their successful 
internationalization. It gave local actors enough time as well as motivation to adjust 
themselves to the demands of capitalist rationality, while it also gave them the self- 
confidence to use selectively parts of existing institutional legacies. Local actors were 
thus able to combine their diverse local and domestic networks and practices with 
international ones. Furthermore, the local actors themselves could control the meaning 
of internationalization, be empowered by the process of internationalization itself, and 
therefore avoid a complete dependence on their foreign partners. Under such 
circumstances it seems, that regions in the post-Communist countries can successfully 
'hold down' the process of internationalization and selected parts of their inherited 
institutional legacies can even become new sources of competitiveness. This specific 
from of internationalization which allows for the development of new institutional 
forms by combining old and new practices smoothes the process of adaptation and is 
likely to lead to a more 'organic', stable and adaptable institutional arrangements 
(Hodgson, 1988; Stark, 1992,1995,1995; Amin and Hausner, 1997; Grabber and Stark, 
1997b; Mlêoch, 1997). The findings of Chapters Six and Eight then demonstrate that at 
least in some post-Communist regions this process may result in regional set-ups which 
are able to compete successfully with the adaptable and innovative regions of the West.
The challenge for researchers, as well as for the policy-makers of the post- 
Communist countries, is to find ways of exploiting the potential of regionally-specific 
institutional legacies by combining them selectively with elements of Western practices 
and meanings. This selective mixing-up and combining cannot bring equally satisfactory 
results in all regions as the outcome of this process is partly dependent on the character 
of existing forms of embeddedness and on their evolutionary trajectory.
The contribution of this thesis to such a challenge is the specification of 
circumstances and forms of action which increase the chances that internationalization 
will exploit the creative potential of existing forms of embeddedness in regions where 
such potential exists. There is obviously no simple answer to this challenging and highly 
political issue. However, the empirical findings presented here suggest two crucial 
preconditions for a successful combination of existing, old and the new, international 
practices and meanings. The first of these is the creation of conditions which enable 
actors to negotiate and mutually adapt to each.other in a way which empowers local 
actors and allows them to become the mediators of internationalization; that is, those 
who control its meaning. The second is the ability of local mediators to make as many 
local actors involved as possible, to empower them by giving them a stake in the 
adaptation and making them part of a collective reinterpretation of reality. Although not 
all regions have an equally strong development potential, they all can mobilize and 
exploit whatever potential exists. The success of regions in mobilizing locally-based 
capacities and competencies generally depends on these two aspects of a local 
institutional arrangement: the ability of local actors to become recognized mediators 
with the power to translate, enrol and align diverse interests, and on their ability to make 
others accept a particular translated interpretation of facts, to share power with others 
and to strengthen a common feeling that others also have a stake in the process of 
adaptation.
The reinvigoration of regional economies through a successful adaptation of new 
impulses also has relevance for wider and more general issues of regional development. 
This research has shown that the analytical framework based on the concepts of social 
and symbolic capital and the cultural process of translation and enrolment, is a fruitful
way for explaining a region’s ability to ’hold down' the process of internationalization. I t . 
is sufficient, I believe, to demonstrate that the specific character of cultural processes 
and power relations within regions are at the centre of any successful exploitation of 
regional development potential. The understanding of these processes and relations 
should therefore be a focus of future attempts at explaining and assessing the different 
ability of regional institutional set-ups to accommodate a variety of practices and 
interpretations and, more generally, to respond to change.
Such research, however, opens another substantial research avenue for the 
future.it opens the complex issue of the relationship between the competitiveness or 
adaptability of regions and the form of local democracy. Will a local democracy which 
is capable of empowering and involving diverse local actors in an inclusive and 
innovative way also contribute to the future adaptability of regions? In this sense, the 
research presented in this thesis is just the beginning of a debate over a much larger 
issue facing the post-Communist countries, as well as countries with long established 
democratic traditions.
APPENDIX
Interviews
The major part of the empirical work took a form of semi-structured interactive 
interviews. In the initial part of the research these were conducted with state officials at 
the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) and in Czechinvest, a state agency for 
promotion of foreign investment (May and June 1996). At the second stage, additional 
interviews were conducted at the MIT and at the same time pilot interviews were 
conducted with managers of three automotive companies and three electronics 
companies in different parts of the Czech Republic (October and November 1996).
In the final stage, the top managers of the selected companies in the three case 
study regions were contacted. First, by a letter specifying the aims of the project and 
outlining the structure of the interview and second, by telephone call to specify suitable 
date and time for an interview. This stage of field work was carried out between April
and June 1997.
With the exception of the initial interviews with state officials, the interviews 
were taped. The two exceptions were when interviewees refused to be recorded for the 
fear that their recorded answers could be misused. The semi-structured character 
enabled the interviews to adjust flexibly to the attitudes of interviewees and make them 
more interactive whenever the interviewees showed a willingness and interest to spend 
more time elaborating on individual issues. As a consequence, the length of interviews
also varied between 40 minutes to up to two hours.
The interviews with state officials were largely informative and helped to focus 
the empirical research by providing essential information about the major involvement 
of foreign firms in the Czech electronics and automotive industry as well as potential
sources of further information. The pilot interviews and the final interviews then '
followed a similar structure which was, how ever, adjusted and fine-tuned between the 
pilot and the main project. The structure of interviews was also adjusted between the 
pilot and the main group of interviews in order to allow for a modified interview
structure and specific questions related to the newly established foreign-owned 
companies in the sample which were not part of the privatization process.
Interview structure of the main case study interviews:
1. History of the company
- main supplier and customer networks
- networks and links within the locality in the past (with local government, other 
firms)
- attitude of interviewees to the Communist past
2. Process of privatization
- history of privatization
- identification of the main actors
3. Extent of networks restructuring
- role of new owners/managers in shaping the network heritage, in changing the 
financial position of the company, in transforming the practices
- changes in the structure of customers, degree of internationalization
- motivation for changing the structure of networks and for internationalization
4. Characteristics of the new networks
-stability of the new networks, form of communication with foreign partners
- attitude towards trust and understanding of the market relations
- three model situations (involving different business tricks) aimed to find out 
about a) the character of relations with the firm's main Western customers/ 
partners; b) about the established business practice; c) about the personal 
standpoint of interviewees in relation to what they understood to be 'normal' 
business practice
5. Information about the company and personal information about the interviewee
- importance of R&D
-number of employees and the position of the company in the regional economy
- character of relationship with other local bodies and firms at present
- personal history of the interviewee aimed to find out about the self-definition 
of the interviewees, about their personal ties and attitudes towards local 
community and other actors in the locality
The interview structure in the case of newly established, foreign-owned firms was 
adjusted in a way which suppressed the part on privatization and added more emphasis 
. on the motivation for the foreign investment itself. For a greater part, however, the 
interviews remained identical.
i _
Interviews were held in the following firms and institutions:
A) The initial stage
Czechinvest - one interview (head of Regions Department)
Ministry of Industry and Trade - two interviews at the Department of Special Project, 
Section of Automotive Projects (head of the Department and two its employees) and one
at the. Department of Metallurgy, Engineering and Electro-engineering Industry 
(employee of the Department in charge of electronics industry)
B) The pilot stage
Ministry of Industry and Trade - one interview in the Department of Special Project, 
Section o f Automotive Projects and one at the Department of Metallurgy, Engineering 
and Electro-engineering Industry
Automotive firms:
Magneton (strategy manager, 5.11. 1996)
Autometal (general director, 6.11. 1996)
. SAP (*). (marketing manager,. 11.11.1996)
Electronics firms:
Tesla StraSnicè (MIT employee in charge of the liquidation, 23.10. 1996)
Delong Instruments (owner and manager, 1.11. 1996)
Tesla Karlin (deputy general manager, 8.11.1996)
C) The main group of interviews in each of the case study regions 
LanSkroun:
AVX (interview A: customer service manager, 11.6. 1997), 100 % foreign ownership, 
greenfield investment
Tesla Lanâkroun (financial manager, 11.6. 1997), Czech ownership, voucher privatized 
Metalstroj (*) (manager 17.6. 1997), majority Czech ownership, privatized by direct 
sale
Strojstav (*) (owner and manager, 19.6. 1997), C zech ow nership, new ly established 
AVX (interview B: plant manager, 23.6. 1997), 100 % foreign ownership, greenfield 
investment
Mlada Boleslav:
General Plastics (*) (sales manager, 25.4. 1997), majority foreign ownership, direct sale 
to foreign partner
Airdoors (*) (interview A: general manager, 13.5.1997), majority foreign ownership, 
direct sale to foreign partner
Airdoors (*), majority foreign ownership (interview B: sales manager, 13.5. 1997), 
majority foreign ownership, direct sale to foreign partner
Autobrakes (*) (sales manager, 14.5. 1997), majority foreign ownership, joint-venture 
with existing Czech manufacturer
ASO (*) (general manager, 14.5. 1997), Czech ownership, voucher-privatized, stakes in 
several joiht-ventures with foreign partners
Skoda-VW, (PR department employee, 20.5.1997), majority foreign ownership, direct 
sale to foreign partner
Monto (*) (financial manager, 21.5. 1997), 100 % foreign ownership, direct sale to 
foreign partner
Supercable (*) (plant manager, 28.5. 1997), 100 % foreign.ownership, direct sale to 
foreign partner
KOB Electric (*) (general manager, 29.5. 1997), 100 % foreign ownership, greenfield 
investment
T-Plast (*) (interview A: former general manager, 5.6.1997), 100 % foreign ownership, 
partly a foreign takeover and partly a greenfield investment
T-Plast (*) (interview B: development manager, 5.6. 1997), 100 % foreign ownership, 
partly a foreign takeover and partly a greenfield investment
UCJ (*) (general manger, 10.6. 1997), 100 % foreign ownership, greenfield investment 
Metalpress (*) (sales and financial manager and joint owner, 13.6. 1997), majority 
foreign ownership, joint-venture
Roàiov pod RadhoStëm:
Terosil (interview A: present general manager, 5.5. 1997), originally voucher privatized, 
presently majority foreign ownership
Radion (*) (owner and manager, 6.5. 1997), Czech ownership, direct sale 
Tesla Sezam (general manager 6.5. 1997), originally voucher privatized, presently 
majority foreign ownership
TPT (*) (general manager, 7.5. 1997), Czech ownership, newly established 
TVC (liquidator, 7.5. 1997), Czech ownership, voucher privatized 
Terosil (interview B: former general manager, 23.5. 1997), originally voucher 
privatized, presently majority foreign ownership
TTV (*) (sales manager, 26.5.1997), majority foreign ownership, foreign takeover 
Tesimpex (*) (member of the board of directors, 19.6.1997), Czech ownership, newly 
established
(*) company name changed for reasons of confidentiality 
Number of refusals:
In four cases the management of the companies refused to be interviewed. Three of 
these occurred in the Mladâ Boleslav region where two potential interviewees refused 
for reasons of company confidentiality. One interviewee in the same region refused due 
to time constraints and also lack of suitable alternative interviewee in his company. One 
refusal for the same reasons occurred in the region of Roinov.
Secondary materials
The interview material was also supplemented by a substantial amount of secondary 
materials from various sources which also played an important role in selecting the 
companies which entered into the case study sample. The role of secondary materials 
was twofold. Firstly, to identify the companies that suited the selection criteria of the 
research (i.e. the degree of internationalization and links with AVX, Skoda-VW and 
Tesla RoZnov in each of the respective regions). Secondly, for gathering the maximum 
possible relevant information that helped to focus the interviews and provide a source of 
information for cross-reference with the interview material.
The major source of secondary information about the case study companies were 
newspaper and journal articles published in the Czech Republic over the past eight years
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(since 1990) which were extracted from a CD-ROM press database published by 
Albertina.57 Other important sources of secondary information were different firm 
catalogues: Hoppenstedt Bonnier (1996,1997) a catalogue of major companies in the 
Czech Republic which provided lists of members of corporate boards and their changes 
over time as well as basic economic indicators of most of the interviewed enterprises; 
Catalogue of the Czech and Moravian Electrical and Electronic Association (in 
English); Adresâf SdruÂem automobilového prùmyslu (Address book of the Association 
of Automotive Industry) (December 1995 edition); Roôenka 1996 Sdruiem 
automobilového prùmyslu (Yearbook 1996 of the Association of Automotive Industry) 
All of these provided additional information about production programme of individual 
enterprises, their history, and also essential contact addresses. Furthermore, some extra 
secondary information was gathered from special address books, internal materials or 
through personal communication with interviewees in Czechinvest and in MIT.
Finally, some secondary empirical information was only gathered during the 
interviews (company annual reports, brochures and presentation materials) or after the 
actual field work was finished. An indispensable source of such information was the 
business register of the Czech Ministry of Justice (http://www.justice.cz/) which, 
unfortunately, was made available on the internet only when my field work was 
finished. Nevertheless this source provided some crucial supplementary information 
about the personal links between individual interviewees in the case study region and 
about interlocking directorates and cross-ownership in some of the companies included 
in the case studies.
Selection of enterprises
The secondary sources mentioned above helped to direct the actual selection of 
enterprises to be included in the sample. Given the specific criteria for selection in 
individual regions some additional sources were also used for the identification of 
suitable candidates for interviews.
57I wish to express my thanks to my friends TomâS Drtinaand Radek Mu2fk in Incoma Praha who 
allowed me to use this database.
> In the case o f Lanâkroun, the original focus on AVX and Tesla Lanâkroun was 
later broadened to include some additional interviews with other local companies that 
reflect the local spin-off effects of the AVX investment. Time constraints combined 
with a relatively late recognition of the importance of these local networks for the actual 
impact of internationalization resulted in a relatively small number of interviews in this 
region. However, this defect was sufficiently compensated by the quality and 
information-richness of these interviews. All the interviewees in this case study 
appeared to be central to local networks, had close, personal relations with other local 
SMEs and also provided a cross-check of the information.
In the case of the subcontractors of Skoda-VW, the main selection criteria were 
the subcontracting links with this company, that is, companies affected by the 
'secondary internationalization'. For this purpose some of the above mentioned 
secondary empirical material together with different lists of Skoda's subcontractors 
proved crucial. Despite all the effort however, I was not able to get hold of an up-to-date 
and complete list of suppliers because Skoda regards such information as a company 
secret. I was, nevertheless, able to reconstruct and compile a reasonably accurate list of 
subcontractors from older lists, from newspaper information and partly also from the 
information gathered during the field work itself. The secondary materials also played 
an important role in directing the selection so that both the 'old', pre-1989 suppliers of 
Skoda and the new ones, established recently through greenfield foreign investments 
were included. Moreover, the inclusion of both Czech-owned and foreign-owned 
suppliers of Skoda was also made possible largely due to the extensive search of . 
secondary materials.
Finally, in the case of Ro&iov, the selection of companies was based on the links 
of existing firms with the now liquidated Tesla Roznov. These firms were selected in 
order to fit into one of the two major electronics specialities of Tesla Roznov: the 
production of either vacuum components or semiconductors. Apart from the common 
secondary sources, an important role in the process of selection was the findings of an 
earlier research project carried out in this area by the Department of Geography, 
Masaryk University in Brno (Okres Vsetin, 1994). This report provided background
information on the break up of Tesla Rofcnov, on the situation in its individual 
'successors' and on the degree of their internationalization.
Selection of interviewees
All the interviewees were people who either worked at the selected companies as 
managers at the time of the field research or who until recently had occupied these 
positions. The letters sent to the interviewees specified the structure of interview and the 
issues that were to be discussed. In cases when the addressees (i.e. the top managers) 
were themselves unable to answer these questions - usually because they joined the 
company only recently - they were asked to suggest an alternative interviewee with the 
relevant knowledge. In several cases two interviews were also carried out within one 
enterprise. One with the former and another with a present member of the top 
management. In other cases my personal contacts (either from Czechinvest or contacts 
of friends and colleagues) or recommendations of some of the interviewees helped to 
identify additional suitable interviewees whose opinions acted as an important form of 
- cross-check for the validity of the empirical material.
Bibliography:
Allen, J. (1995): Crossing borders: footloose multinationals? in: Allen, J. and Ch. 
Hamnett (eds.): A Shrinking World?, pp. 55-102. Oxford University Press and The Open 
University, Oxford and Milton Keynes.
Allen, J. (1997): Economies of power and space, in: Lee, R. and Wills, J. (eds.): The 
Geographies o f  Economies, pp. 59-70. Arnold, London.
Allen, J., Massey, D. and Cochrane, A. (1998): Rethinking the Region. Routledge, 
London.
Allen, P. M. (1988): Evolution, innovation and economics, in: Dosi, G., Freeman, C., 
Nelson, R., Silverberg, G., Soete, L. (eds.): Technical Change and Economic Theory, 
pp. 95-119. Pinter, London and New York.
Amin, A. (ed.) (1994): Post-Fordism: A Reader. Blackwell, Oxford.
Amin, A. (1998): An institutionalist perspective on regional economic development. 
Paper presented at the EGRG Seminar Institutions and Governance', July 3 1998, UCL, 
London.
Amin, A. and Graham, S. (1997): The ordinary city. Transactions o f  the Institute o f  
British Geographers, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 411-429.
Amin, A. and Hausner, J. (1997): Interactive governance and social complexity, in: 
Amin, A-and Hausner, J. (eds.): Beyond Market and Hierarchy, pp. 1-31, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham.
Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (1992): Neo-Marshallian nodes in global networks. IJURR, vol. 
16, no. 4, pp. 571-587.
Amin, A. and Thrift, N.( 1994a): Living in the global, in: Amin, A. and Thrift, N.(eds.): 
Globalization, Institutions, and Regional Development in Europe, pp. 1-22. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.
Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (1994b): Holding down the global, in: Amin, A. and Thrift, N. 
(eds.): Globalization, Institutions, and Regional Development in Europe, pp. 257-260. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (1995): Institutional issues for the European regions: from 
markets and plans to socioeconomics and powers of association. Economy and Society, 
vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 41-66.
Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (1997): Globalization, socio-economics, territoriality, in: Lee, 
R; and Wills, J. (eds.): The Geographies o f  Economies, pp. 147-157. Arnold, London.
Arthur, B. (1989): Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by 
Historical Events. Economic Journal, vol. 99, no. 1 (March), pp. 116-31.
Asheim, B. (1992): Flexible specialization, industrial districts and small firms: A 
critical appraisal, in: Emste, H. and Meier, V. (eds.): Regional Development and
Contemporary Industrial Response: Extending Flexible Specialization, pp. 45-63. 
Belhaven Press, London.
Asheim, B. (1997): Learning regions' in globalised world economy: towards a new 
competitive advantage of industrial districts? in: Taylor, M. and Conti, S. (eds.): 
Interdependent and Uneven Development, pp. 143-176. Ashgate, Aldershot.
Asheim, B. and M. Dunford (1997): Regional Futures. Regional Studies, vol. 31, no. 5, 
pp. 445-455
AVX ( 1997): A company brochure.
Barnes, T. (1997): Introduction; Theories of accumulation and regulation: bringing life 
back into economic geography, in: Lee, R. and Wills, J. (eds.): The Geographies o f  
Economies, pp. 231-247. Arnold, London. :
Beckert, J. (1996): What is sociological about economic sociology? Uncertainty and the 
embeddedness of economic action. Theory and Society, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 803-840.
Benâôek, V. (1997): Private entrepreneurship and small businesses in the transformation 
of the Czech Republic, in: Grabber, G. and D. Stark (eds.): Restructuring Networks in 
Post-Socialist Societies. Legacies, Linkages and Localities, pp. 209-241. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.
Blaiek, J. (1996): Nové institucionâlm râmee ekonomiky a regionâlm rozvoj: veiké 
finny a sektor progresivmch vyrobmch sluieb. (New institutional frameworks for the 
economy and regional development: large enterprises and the sector of progressive 
production services.) in: Hampl et al. (eds.): Geografickâ organizace spoleânosti a 
transformaëni procesy v Ccskc republice {Geographical organization o f  society and 
transformation processes in the Czech Republic), pp. 303-314. Charles University, 
Faculty of Natural Sciences, Prague.
Bourdieu, P. (1977): Outline o f  a Theory o f  Practice. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. French original (1972) translated by Richard Nice.
Bourdieu, P. (1979): La distinction: Critique sociale du judgement. Les éditions de 
Minuit, Paris.
Bourdieu, P. (1990): In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology. Polity 
Press, Cambridge,
Bourdieu, P. (1991): Language and Symbolic Power. Polity Press, Cambridge.
Bourdieu, P. (1993a): The Field O f Cultural Production. Polity Press, Cambridge.
Bourdieu, P. (1993b): Sociology in Question. Sage, London.
Brom, K. and Orenstein, M (1994): The privatised sector in the Czech Republic: 
government and bank control in a transitional economy. Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 46, 
no. 6, pp. 893-928.
Burt, R. S. (1993): The Social Structure of Competition, in: Swedberg, R. (ed.): 
Explorations in Economic Sociology, pp. 65-103. Sage, New York.
-   - -- —  ----— - - . . .  . *  '  *- •
Gallon, M. (1986): Eléments pour une sociologie de la traduction. L'Année 
Sociologique, vol. 36, pp. 169-308.
Gallon, M. (1991): Techno-economic networks and irreversibility, in: Law, J. (éd.): 
Sociology o f Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination, pp. 132-161. 
Routledge, London.
Gallon, M. (1998): Introduction: the embeddedness of economic markets in economics, 
in: Gallon, M. (ed.): The Laws o f  the Markets, pp. 1-57. Blackwell, Oxford.
Capek, A. and Mertlik, P. (1996): Organizational change and financial restructuring in 
the Czech manufacturing enterprises 1990-1995. Czech National Bank, Prague, mimeo.
Clark; Er and Soulsby, A.(1995): Transforming former state enterprises in the Czech 
Republic. Organization Studies, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 215-242.
Clark, E, and Soulsby, A. (1998): Organization-community embeddedness: the social 
impact of enterprise restructuring in the post-Communist Czech Republic. Human 
Resources, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 25-50.
Cloke, P., Philo, C., and Sadler, D. (1991): Approaching Human Geography: An 
introduction to contemporary theoretical debates. Paul Chapman, London.
Cook, J. (1996): Czech Republic: Survey. Business Central Europe, July/August 1996, 
pp. 37-50.
Cook, J. (L998): Skoda Auto's new model - Ripple effect. Business Central Europe, 
April 1998, pp. 36.
Cooke, P. and Morgan, K. (1993): The network paradigm: new departures in corporate 
and regional development. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, vol. 11, 
pp. 543-564.
Crang, P. (1997): Introduction: Cultural turns and the (reconstitution of economic 
geography, in: Lee, R. and Wills, J. (eds.): The Geographies o f  Economies, pp. 3 - 15. 
Arnold, London.
CSÜ (1996): Okresy Ceské republiky v roce 1995. {Districts o f  the Czech Republic in
1995), CSU (Czech Statistical Bureau), Praha.
CSÜ (1997): Okresy Ceské republiky v roce 1996. {Districts o f  the Czech Republic in
1996). CSÜ (Czech Statistical Bureau), Praha.
Czech Business and Trade (1997): Interview with general manager of Tesla Sezam. 
Czech Business and Trade, no. 9 (September), p. 24.
Czechinvest (1995a): Study of Czech Automotive Industry. Czechinvest, Prague.
Czechinvest (1995b): Study of Czech Electronics Industry. Czechinvest, Prague.
David, P. (1985): Clio and the economics of QWERTY. Journal o f  Economic History, 
vol. 75, no. 2, pp. 332-337.
David, P. (1993): Path-dependence and predictability in dynamic systems with local 
network externalities: a paradigm for historical economics, in: Foray, D. and Ch. 
Freeman (eds.): Technology and the Wealth o f  Nations: The Dynamics o f  Constructed 
Advantage, pp. 277-300. Pinter, London.
Dicken, P. (1992): Global Shift (2nd ed.). Paul Chapman, London.
Dicken, P., Forsgren, M. and Malmberg, A. (1994): The local embeddedness of 
transnational corporations, in: Amin, A. and N. Thrift (eds.): Globalization, Institutions, 
and Regional Development in Europe, pp. 23-45. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Dôrr, G. and Kessel, T (1996): Transformation as a learning process. Experiences with 
joint-ventures in the Czech Republic and an example of a new modem form of 
organizingLproduction, Emergo-Journal.of Transforming Economies and Societies, 
vol. 3, no. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 44-57.
Dôrr, G. and Kessel, T (1997): Kreativm, ale ne jednoduchâ spoluprâce: zkuàenosti z 
èesko-nëmeckého joint-venture Skoda-Volkswagen (Creative but not an easy 
cooperation: Experiences from the Czech-German joint-venture Skoda-Volkswagen). 
Working paper no. FS H 97-601, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.
Dosi, G. and Orsenigo, L. (1988): Coordination and transformation: an overview of 
structures, behaviours and change in evolutionary environments, in: Dosi, G., Freeman, 
C., Nelson, R., Silverberg, G., Soete, L. (eds.): Technical Change and Economic 
Theory, pp. 13-37. Pinter, London and New York.
Dostâl, P. {1992): Introduction, in: in: Dostâl, P., Illner, M., Kara, J. and Barlow, M. 
(eds.): Changing Territorial Administration in Czechoslovakia: International 
Viewpoints, pp. 1-13. Instituut voor Sociale Geugrafie, Amsterdam.
Duncan, S. and Savage, M. (1991): New perspectives on the locality debate. 
Environment and Planning A, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 155-164.
Ekonom (1996): Kde je chyba? ÜspëSnë ztrâtovÿ rozvoj mladoboleslavské automobilky 
je  dost tëzké pochopit. (Where is the mistake? The successful and loss making 
development of the car manufacturer in Mlada Boleslav is hard to understand.) Ekonom, 
no. 14, pp. 41-42.
Ekonom (1998): Motorola Teslu nechtéla. (Motorola did not want Tesla). Ekonom, no. 
14, pp. 21.
Estrin, S., Brada, J., Gelb, A., Singh, I. (eds.) (1995): Restructuring and Privatization in 
Central Eastern Europe: Case Studies o f  Firms in Transition. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk 
and London.
Eyal, G., Szelényi, I., Townsley, E. (1997): The theory of post-Communist 
managerialism. New Left Review, no. 222, pp. 60-92.
Gambetta, D. (1988): Can we trust trust? in: Gambetta, D. (ed.): Trust: Making and 
Breaking Cooperative Relations, pp. 213-237. Blackwell, Oxford.
Gertler, M. (1997): The invention of regional culture, in: Lee, R. and Wills, J. (eds.):
The Geographies o f  Economies, pp. 47-58. Arnold, London.
Glasmeier, A. (1994): Flexible districts, flexible regions? The institutional and cultural 
limits to districts in an era of globalization and technological paradigm shift, in: Amin, 
A. and Thrift, N.(eds.): Globalization, Institutions, and Regional Development in 
Europe, pp. 118-146. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Gowan, P. (1995): Neo-liberal Theory and Practice for Eastern Europe. New Left 
Review, no. 213, 3-60.
Grabber, G. (ed.) (1993a): The Embedded Firm. On the socioeconomics o f  the industrial 
networks. Routledge, London.
Grabber, G. (1993b): Rediscovering the social in the economics of interfirm relations, 
in: The Embedded Firm. On the socioeconomics o f the industrial networks, pp. 1-31. 
Routledge, London.
G rabber, G. (1993c): The weakness of strong ties: the lock-in of regional development 
in the Ruhr area, in: The Embedded Firm. On the socioeconomics o f  the industrial 
networks, pp. 255-277. Routledge, London.
Grabber, G. (1994): The disembedded regional economy: The transformation of East 
German industrial complexes into western enclaves, in: Amin, A. and Thrift, N.(eds.): 
Globalization, Institutions, and Regional Development in Europe, pp. 177-196. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.
Grabhef, G. (1997): Adaptation at the cost of adaptability? Restructuring the Eastern 
German regional economy, in: Grabber, G. and Stark, D. (eds.): Restructuring Networks 
in Post-Socialist Societies. Legacies, Linkages and Localities, pp. 107-133. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.
Grabber, G. and Stark, D, (eds.) (1997a): Restructuring Networks in Post-Socialist 
Societies. Legacies, Linkages and Localities. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Grabber, G. and D. Stark (1997b): Organizing diversity: evolutionary theory, network 
analysis and postsocialism. Regional Studies, vol. 31, no. 5, pp. 533-544.
Graham, S. (1998): The end of geography or the explosion of place? Conceptualizing 
space, place and information technology. Progress in Human Geography, vol. 22, no. 2, 
pp. 165-185.
Grancelli, B. (1995): Organizational change: Towards a new East-West comparison. 
Organization Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 1-25.
Granovetter, M. (1985/1992): Economic action and social structure: the problem of 
embeddedness, in: Swedberg, R. and Granovetter, M. (eds.) (1992): The Sociology o f  
Economic Life, pp. 53-80, Westview, Boulder, CO (originally published in American 
Journal o f  Sociology, vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 481-510).
Granovetter, M. (1990): The Old and the New Economic Sociology: a history and an 
agenda, in: Friedland, R. and Robertson, A. F. (eds.): Beyond the Marketplace: 
Rethinking Economy and Society, pp. 89-112. Aldine de Gruyter, New York.
280
Granovetter, M. (1991): The Social Construction of Economie Institutions, in: Etzioni, 
A. and Lawrence, P. R. (eds.): Socioeconomics. Towards a New Synthesis, pp. 75-81.
M. E. Sharpe, Armonk and London.
Granovetter, M (1993): The nature of economic relationships, in Swedberg, R. (ed.): 
Explorations in Economic Sociology, pp. 3-41. Sage, New York.
Granovetter, M. (1995): The economic sociology of firms and entrepreneurs, in: Portes, 
A. (ed.): The Economic Sociology o f  Immigration, pp. 128-165. Russel Sage 
Foundation, New York.
Grotz, R. and Braun, B. (1993): Networks, milieux and individual firm strategies: 
empirical evidence of an innovative SME environment Geogrqfiska Annnaler B, vol. 
75, no. 3, pp. 149-162.
Hakansson, H. and Johanson, J. (1993): The Network as a Governance Structure: 
interfirm cooperation beyond markets and hierarchies, in: Grabber, G. (ed.): The 
Embedded Firm: On the socioeconomics o f  the industrial networks, pp. 35-51 . 
Routledge, London.
Hall, S. (1995): New Cultures for Old. in: Massey, D. and Jess, P. (eds.): A Place in the 
world? Open University, Milton Keynes, pp. 175-213
Hampl et al. (ed.) (1996): Geografickâ organizace spoleânosti a transformaânlprocesy 
v Ceské republice (Geographical organization o f  society and processes o f  
transformation in the Czech Republic). Charles University, Faculty of Natural Sciences, 
Prague.
Harris, F. (1998): The end of empires. Business Central Europe, July/August, pp. 25-26.
Harrison, B. (1992): Industrial districts: old wine in new bottles? Regional Studies, vol. 
26, no. 5, pp. 469-483.
Hausner, J., Jessop, B. and Nielsen, K. (eds.) (1995): Strategic Choice and Path- 
Dependency in Post-Socialism: Institutional Dynamics in the Transformation Process. 
Edward Elgar, Aldershot.
Hayri, A. and McDermott, G. A. (1998): The network properties of corporate 
governance and industrial restructuring: a post-socialist lesson. Industrial and 
Corporate Change, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 153-193.
Helper, S. (1993): An exit-voice analysis of supplier relations: The case of the US 
automobile industry, in: Grabber (ed.): The Embedded Firms. On the socioeconomics o f  
the industrial networks, pp. 141-160. Routledge, London.
Hirschman, A. O. (1970): Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA.
Hodgson, G. (1988): Economics and Institutions. Polity Press, Cambridge.
Hodgson, G. (1993): Economics and Evolution: Bringing Life Back into Economics. 
Polity Press, Cambridge.
281
Hodgson, G. (1994): The return of institutional economics, in: Smelser, N. J. and 
Swedberg, R. (eds.): The Handbook o f  Economic Sociology, pp. 58-76. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton.
Hodgson, G. (1997): Notes on habits, institutions and evolution, mimeo.
Hodgson, G. (1998): Evolutionary and competence-based theories of the firm. Journal 
o f Economic Studies, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 25-56.
Hoppenstedt Bonnier (1996): Vyznamné podniky Ceské Republiky 1997 (Major 
Companies in the Czech Republic). Hoppenstedt Bonnier, Praha.
■ Hoppenstedt Bonnier (1997): Vyznamné podniky Ceské Republiky 1998 (Major 
Companies in the Czech Republic). Hoppenstedt Bonnier, Praha.
HmÔif, M. (1994): Reform of the banking sector in the Czech Republic, in: Bonin, P. J. 
and Székely, I. P. (eds.): The Development and Reform o f  Financial Systems in Central 
and Eastern Europe, pp. 221-256. Edward Elgar, Aldershot.
Husâk, P. (1997): Budovâni kapitalismu v Cechâch: rozhovory s TomdSem Jezkem 
(Creating Capitalism in the Czech Country: interviews with TomâS Jezek).Vo\\ox 
Globator, Praha.
Illner, M. ( 1992a)rMunicipalities and industrial paternalism in a 'real socialist' society, 
in: Dostâl, P., Illner, M., Kara, J. and Barlow, M. (eds.): Changing Territorial 
Administration in Czechoslovakia: International Viewpoints, pp. 39-47. Instituut voor 
Sociale Gebgrafie, Amsterdam.
Illner, M. (1992b): K sociologickym otâzkâm mistm samospravy (On sociological 
issues of local administration). Sociologicky casopis, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 480-492.
Ingham, G. (1996a): Review Essay: The New Economic Sociology'. Work, Employment 
and Society, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 549-564.
Ingham, G. (1996b): Some recent changes in the relationship between economics and 
sociology. Cambridge Journal o f  Economics, vol. 20, pp. 243-275.
Johnson, R. (1993): Editor's Introduction: Pierre Bourdieu on Art, Literature and 
Culture, in: Bourdieu, P. : The Field O f Cultural Production, pp. 1-25. Polity Press, 
Cambridge.
Kapoor, M. (1998): Sink or swim. Business Central Europe, February 1998, pp. 11-13.
Kenway, P. and Klvaôovâ, E. (1996): The web of cross-ownership among Czech 
financial intermediaries: an assessment. Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 48, no. 5, pp. 797- 
809.
Komai, J. (1959): Over-Centralization in Economic Administration: A Critical Analysis 
Based on Experience in Hungarian Light Industry. Oxford University Press, London, 
Translated by John Knapp.
Komai, J. (1981): Economics o f  Shortage. Elsevier, London.
Kotrba, J. (1995): Privatization process in the Czech Republic: players and winners, in: 
Svejnar, J. (ed.): The Czech Republic and Economic Transition in Eastern Europe, pp. 
159-198. Academic Press, San Diego.
Kuczi, T. and Makô, C. (1997): Towards industrial districts? Small-firm networking in 
Hungary, in: Grabber, G. and Stark, D. : (cds.)i Restructuring Networks in Post Socialist 
Societies. Legacies, Linkages and Localities, pp. 176-189. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford.
Kysilka, P. (1989): Stinové fîdici systémy a  reforma {Shadow Coordination Mechanisms 
and the Reform). Ekonomicky ustav CSAV, Praha.
. a.
Latour, B. (1983): Give me a laboratory and I will raise the world, in: Knorr-Cetina, K. 
and Mulkay, M. (eds:): Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study o f  Science, 
pp. 141-170. Sage, London.
Latour, B. (1987): Science in Action: how to follow scientists and engineers thorough 
society. Open University Press, Milton Keynes.
Law, J. (ed.) (1991a): A Sociology o f  Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and 
Domination. Routledge, London.
Law, J. (1991b): Introduction: monsters, machines and sociotechnical relations, in: Law, 
J. (ed.): A Sociology o f  monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination, pp. 1- 
23. Routledge, London.
' Local council ofRotnov pod RadhoStëm (1998): website (in Czech) http:// 
www.roznov.cz/mesto/profil.htm
Locke, R. M. (1996): The composite economy: local politics and industrial change in 
contemporary Italy. Economy and Society, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 483-510.
Lorenz, E. H. (1988): Neither friends nor strangers: informal networks of subcontracting 
in French industry, in: Gambetta, D. (ed.): Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative 
Relations, pp. 194-210. Blackwell, Oxford.
Lundvall, B.-A. (1992): Introduction, in: Lundvall, B.-A. (ed.): National Systems o f  
Innovation, pp. 1-19. Pinter, London.
Lundvall, B.-A. (1993): User-producer relationships, national systems of innovation and 
internationalization, in: Foray, D. and Ch. Freeman (eds.): Technology and the Wealth 
o f  Nations: The-Dynamics o f Constructed Advantage, pp. 277-300. Pinter, London.
Luhmann, N. (1979): Trust and Power. John Willey, Chichester.
Lyon, F. (1997): An examination of the concept of trust: Interlocking contracts in 
vegetable production and marketing in Brong Ahafo Region, Ghana. Paper presented to 
Workshop on Rural Markets after Liberalisation: Institutional Perspectives and the 
Policy Agenda, Wye College, University of London, 3-4 July, 1997.
Lyons, R. (1996): House of Cards. Business Central Europe, October.1996, pp. 35-36.
283
Machâêek, J. (1992): Privatization: more than an economic goal. East European 
Reporter, vol. 5, no. 1. January/February, pp. 55-58.
Malmberg, A. (1996): Industrial geography: agglomeration and local milieu. Progress in 
Human Geography, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 392-403.
Malmberg, A. (1997): Industrial geography: location and learning. Progress in Human 
Geography, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 573-582.
Martin, R. (1998): Central and Eastern Europe and the International Economy: The 
Limits to Globalization. Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 7-26.
Massey, D. (1995): Spatial Divisions o f  Labour (2nd ed.). Macmillan, London.
Massey; D: (1991): A global sense of place. The Making o f  the Regions (D103, Block 
6), pp. 12-51, The Open University Press, Milton Keynes.
Mayhew, A. (1994): Culture, in: Hodgson, G„ Samuels, W., Tool, M. (eds.): The Elgar 
Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics (first volume, A-K), pp. 115- 
119. Edward Elgar, Aldershot
McDermott, G. A. (1997): Renegotiating the ties that bind. The limits of privatization in 
the Czech Republic, in: Grabber, G. and D. Stark (eds.): Restructuring Networks in 
Post-Socialist Societies. Legacies, Linkages and Localities, pp. 70-106. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.
Meegan, R. (1995): Local worlds, in: Allen, J. and Massey, D. (eds.): Geographical 
Worlds, pp. 53-104. Oxford University Press and The Open University, Oxford and 
Milton Keynes.
Mertlik, P. (1995): Czech privatization: from public ownership to public ownership in 
five years? Prague Economic Papers, vol. 4, no 4, pp. 321-336.
Mertlik, P. (undated): Czech industry: organizational structure, privatization, and some 
consequences for its performance. Institute of Economics, Czech National Bank,
Prague, mimeo.
Meth-Cohn, D. et al. (1996): Survey: Foreign investment Business Central Europe, 
April 1996, pp. 39-55.
Misztal, B. A. (1996): Trust in Modern Societies. Polity Press, Cambridge.
MIT (1996): Internal materials of the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade (report on 
the history of Skoda and the Skoda-VW joint venture, a list of Skoda's subcontractors 
and a list of Czech electronics manufacturers). ,
Mlcoch, L. (1997): Ceskâ ekonomika a spolecnost mezi minulosti a budoucnosti: 
Instituiciomlm pohled {Czech Economy and Society between the past and the future:
An Institutional Viewpoint). Nârodohospodâfskÿ ùstav J. Hlâvky, Praha.
Morgan, K. (1997): The learning region: institutions, innovation and regional renewal. 
Regional Studies, vol. 31, no. 5, pp. 491-503.
Mo2nÿ, I. (1991): Proé taksnadno... Nëkteré rodinné dùvody sametové revoluce. {Why 
so easily... Some familial causes o f  the velvet revolution), Sociologické nakladatelstvi, 
Praha.
Murdoch, J. (1995): Actor-networks and the evolution of economic forms: combining 
description and explanation in theories of regulation, flexible specialization and 
networks. Environment and Planning A, vol. 27, pp. 731-757.
Murdoch, J. (1997): Inhuman/nonhuman/human: actor-network theory and the prospects 
for a nondualistic and symmetrical perspective on nature and society. Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space, vol. 15, pp. 731-756.
Nelson, R. (1994): Evolutionary Theorizing about Economic Change, in: Smelser, N. J. 
and Swedberg, R. (eds.): The Handbook o f  Economic Sociology, pp. 368-402. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton.
Nelson, R. and Winter, S. (1982): An Evolutionary Theory o f  Economic Change.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Nicholls, A., Kapoor, M., Cook, J. (1998): Survey: Foreign investment. The larger 
battle. Business Central Europe. May 1998, pp. 41-54.
OECD-CCET (1996): Regional Problems and Policies in the Czech Republic and the 
Slovak Republic. OECD, The Centre for Co-operation with Economies in Transition 
(CCET), Paris.
Okun, A. (1981): Prices and Quantities: A Macroeconomic Analysis. Blackwell,
Oxford,
Okres Vsetin (1994): Okres Vsetin: studie regionâlniho rozvoje (The Vsetin district: 
regional development study). Department of Geography, Masaryk University, Brno.
Pavlinek, P. (1998): Foreign Investment in the Czech Republic. Professional 
Geographer, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 71-85.
Pavlinek, P. and Smith, A. (1998): Globalization through inward investment: the uneven 
regional impacts of foreign direct investment in the Czech and Slovak Republics. 
Regional Studies, forthcoming.
Pels, D, (1997): Mixing metaphors: politics or economics of knowledge? Theory and 
Society, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 685-717.
Pickles, J. (1998): Restructuring state enterprises, in: Pickles and Smith (eds.): 
Theorising Transition, pp. 172-196. Routledge, London.
Pickles, J. and Smith, A. (eds.) (1998): Theorising Transition: The Political Economy o f  
Change in Central and Eastern Europe. Routledge, London.
Polanyi, K. (1944/1957): The Great Transformation: The political and economic 
origins o f  our time. Beacon Press, Boston.
Portes, A. (1995): Economie sociology and the sociology of immigration: a conceptual 
overview, in: Portes, A. (éd.): The Economic Sociology o f Immigration, pp. 1-41. Russel 
Sage Foundation, New York.
Powell, W. W. (1991): Nether market nor hierarchy: network forms of organization, in: 
Thompson et a l (eds,): Markets, Hierarchies and Networks: The coordination o f  Social 
Life, pp. 265-276. Sage, London.
Powell, W. W. and L. Smith-Doerr (1994): Networks and economic life, in: Smelser, N.
J. and Swedberg, R. (eds.): The Handbook o f  Economic Sociology, pp. 368-402.
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Pratt, A. (1991): Discourses o f locality. Environment and Planning A, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 
257-266.
Pratt, A. (1995): Putting critical realism to work: the practical implications for 
geographical research. Progress in-Human Geography, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 61-74.
Premusovâ, J. (1989): Vazby mezi podniky a ùzemlm v lokâlnfm reprodukônûn râmci 
(Relationships between enterprises and territory in the context of local reproduction). 
Sociologicky âasopis, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 171-182.
Ray, L. (1995): The Rectifying Revolutions? Organizational Futures in the New Eastern 
Europe. Organization, vol. 2, no. 3/4, pp. 441-465.
ftfhovâ, K. (1998): Lokalizace automobilového a dodavatelského prùmyslu v Ceské 
republice (Localization of automotive industry and its subcontractors in the Czech 
: Republic), unpublished MA thesis, Fakulta nârodohospodâfskâ, V§E, Praha.
Robbins, D. (1991): The Work o f  Pierre Bourdieu. The Open University Press, Milton 
Keynes.
Rôna-Tas, Â. (1998): Path-dependence and capital theory: sociology of the post- 
Communist economic transformation. East European Politics and Societies, vol. 12, no. 
1 (winter 1998), pp. 107-131.
Rychetmk, L. (1997): A multidimensional approach to the transformation strategy in 
Central Eastern Europe: the case of the Czech Republic. Paper presented at the EAEPE 
Conference, Athens, 6-9 November 1997.
Sabel, C. (1993): Studied trust: building new forms of cooperation in a volatile 
economy, in: Swedberg, R. (ed.): Explorations in Economic Sociology, pp. 104-144. 
Sage, New York.
Sabel, C. (1994): Learning by monitoring: the institutions of economic development, in: 
Smelser, N. J. and Swedberg, R. (eds.): The Handbook o f Economic Sociology, pp. 137- 
165. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Sadler, D. and Swain, A. (1994): State and market in eastern Europe: regional 
development and workplace implications of direct foreign investment in the automobile 
industry in Hungary. Transactions o f  the Institute o f British Geographers, Vol. 19, no. 
4, pp. 387-403
Sako, M. (1992): Prices, Quality and Trust. Inter-firm relations in Britain and Japan. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Samuels, W. J. (1995): The present state of institutional economics. Cambridge Journal 
o f Economics, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 569-590.
Sayer, A. (1992): Method in Social Science: A realist approach. 2nd edition. Routledge, 
London.
Sayer, A. (1995): Radical Political Economy. A Critique. Blackwell, Oxford.
Sayer, A. (1997): The dialectic of culture and economy, in: Lee, R. and Wills, J. (eds.): 
The Geographies o f  Economies, pp. 16-26. Arnold, London.
Scott and Storper (1992): Regional development reconsidered, in: Emste, H. and Meier, 
V. (eds.): Regional Development and Contemporary Industrial Response: Extending 
Flexible Specialization, pp. 3-24. Belhaven Press, London.
Shapin, S. (1998): Placing the view from nowhere: historical and sociological problems 
in the location of science. Transactions o f  the Institute o f  British Geographers, vol. 23, 
no. 1, pp. 5-12.
Simonetti, R, (1998): Evolutionary theories of technological and economic change, in: 
Simonetti, R.,. Mackintosh, M., Costello, N., Dawson, G., Himmelweit, S., Trigg A. and 
Wells, J. (eds.) Firms, pp. 327-358. The Open University Press, Milton Keynes.
Skoda Auto (1998): Annual company report for 1997 (web page http://www.skoda- 
auto.cz/).
Smelser, N. J. and R. Swedberg (eds.) (1994): The Handbook o f Economic Sociology. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Smith, A. (1994): Uneven development and the restructuring of the armaments industry 
in Slovakia. Transactions o f  the Institute o f  British Geographers, Vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 
404-424
Smith, A. (1995): Regional economic restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe: the 
case of Slovakia. Regional Studies, vol. 29, no. 8, pp. 761-772.
Smith, A. (1996): From convergence to fragmentation: uneven regional development, 
industrial restructuring, and the 'transition to capitalism' in Slovakia. Environment and 
Planning A, vol. 27, no. 1 pp. 135-156.
Smith, A. (1997): Breaking the old and constructing the new? Geographies of uneven 
development in Central and Eastern Europe, in: Lee, R. and Wills, J. (eds.): The 
Geographies o f  Economies, pp. 331-344. Arnold, London.
Smith, A. and FerenÔikovâ, S. (1998): Inward investment, regional transformations and 
uneven development in Eastern and Central Europe: Enterprise case-studies from 
Slovakia. European Urban and Regional Studies, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 155-173.
Smith, A. and Pickles, J. (1998): Introduction, in: Pickles and Smith (eds.): Theorising 
Transition, pp. 1-22. Routledge, London.
Smith, A. and Swain, A. (1998): Regulating and institutionalizing capitalism: the micro- 
foundations of transformation in Eastern and Central Europe, in: Pickles and Smith 
(eds.): Theorising Transition, pp. 25-53. Routledge, London.
Stark, D. (1992): Path dependence and privatization strategies in East Central Europe. 
East European Politics and Societies, vol. 6, no. 1 (winter 1992), pp. 17-54.
Stark, D. (1995): Not by design: the myth o f  designer capitalism in Eastern Europe, in: 
Hausner, J., Nielsen, K., Jessop, B. (eds.): Strategic Choice and Path-Dependency in 
Post-Socialism, pp. 67-83. Edward Elgar, Aldershot.
Stark, D. (1996): Recombinant property in Eastern European capitalism. American 
Journal o f  Sociology, vol. 101, no. 4 (January 1996), pp. 993-1027.
Stark, D. and L. Bruszt (1995): Restructuring networks: Network properties of assets 
and liabilities in the postsocialist transformations. Cornell working papers on transition 
from state socialism, no. 95.4. Cornell University, Einaudi Centre for International 
Studies.
Stark, D. and Bruszt, L., (1998): Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and 
Property in East Central Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Storper, M. (1995): The resurgence of regional economies, ten years later: the region as 
a nexus of untraded interdependencies. European Urban and Regional Studies, vol. 2, 
no. 3, pp. 191-221.
Storper, M. (1997): Regional economies as relational assets, in: Lee, R. and Wills, J. 
(eds.): The Geographies o f  Economies, pp. 248-258. Arnold, London.
Storper, M. and Salais, R. (1997): Worlds o f  Production: the action frameworks o f  the 
economy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Swaan, W. and Lissowska, M. (1996): Capabilities, Routines, and East European 
economic reform: Hungary and Poland before and after the 1989 revolutions. Journal o f  
Economic Issues, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 1031-1056.
Swain, A. (1994): Creating capitalism without capital: the impact of automotive direct 
foreign investment on the uneven development of capitalism in east and central Europe. 
Paper presented to the 5th British-Russian (Soviet) Geography Seminar, Birmingham, 
May 1994.
Swain, A. and Hardy, J. (1998): Globalization, institutions, foreign investment and the 
reintegration of East and Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union with the world 
economy. Regional Studies, vol. 32, no. 7, pp. 587-590.
Swedberg, R. (1990): Economics and Sociology. Redefining their boundaries: 
Conversations with economists and sociologists. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Swedberg, R. and Granovetter, M. (1992): Introduction, in: Swedberg, R. and 
Granovetter, M. (eds.) (1992): The Sociology o f  Economic Life, pp. 1-26. Westview 
Press, Boulder, CO.
Szelényi, I., Beckett, K and King, L. P. (1994): The Socialist Economic System, in: 
Smelser, N. J. and Swedberg, R. (eds.): The handbook o f  Economic Sociology, pp. 234- 
251. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Tesla Sezam (1998): company web site (in Czech only) http://www.motorola- 
sps.cz/sezam.htm
Tesla Sezam (undated): A company brochure.
Thompson, J. B. (1991): Editor’s introduction, in: Bourdieu, P.: Language and Symbolic 
Power, pp. 1-31. Polity Press, Cambridge.
Thompson, G., Frances, J., Levaôic, R., Mitchell, J. (eds. ) (1991): Markets, Hierarchies 
and Networks: The coordination o f  Social Life. Sage and The Open University, London.
TomeS, J. (1996): Vÿvoj regionâlmch rozdilû v nezamëstnanosti jako indikâtor 
transformaômch zmèn (Development of regional differences in unemployment as a 
transformation indicator), in: Hampl, M. (éd.): Geografickâ organizace spoleânosti a 
transformaâni procesy v Ceské republice (Geographical organization o f  society and 
transformation processes in the Czech Republic), pp. 255-301. Charles University, 
Faculty of Natural Sciences, Prague.
Uzzi, B. (1996): The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic 
Performance of Organizations: the Network Effect. American Sociological Review, vol. 
61, no. 4 (August), pp. 674-698.
Van Zon, H. (1998): The mismanaged integration of Zaporizhzhya with the world 
economy: implications for regional development in peripheral regions. Regional 
Studies, voi 32, no. 7, pp. 607-618.
White, H. (1990): Interview, in: Swedberg, R.: Economics and Sociology. Redefining 
their boundaries: conversations with economists and sociologists, pp. 78-95. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton.
Yeung, H. W. (1994): Critical reviews of geographical perspectives on business 
organizations and the organization of production: towards a network approach. Progress 
in Human Geography, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 460-490.
ï ê k  V. (1997) Krizovatky nasi privatizace (The Crossroads of Our Privatization). Listy, 
vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 13-22.
Zemplinerovâ, A. and Benâôek, V. (1996): Foreign investment - East and West: The 
experience o f the Czech Republic. CERGE-EI and Charles University, Prague, mimeo.
Zukin, S. and DiMaggio, P. (eds.) (1990): The Structures o f  Capital: The social 
organization o f  the economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
